SOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue MENO: Yes.
will be taught?
SOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are prof-MENO: Certainly.
itable; for all good things are profitable?
SOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end MENO: Yes.
of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it SOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable?
will be taught; and if not, not?
MENO: That is the only inference.
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then now let us see what are the SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue things which severally profit us. Health and is knowledge or of another species?
strength, and beauty and wealth—these, and the MENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which like of these, we call profitable?
comes next in order.
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?—
SOCRATES: And yet these things may also someThis is a hypothesis which is not set aside.
times do us harm: would you not think so?
MENO: Certainly.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be which makes them profitable or the reverse? Are that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, they not profitable when they are rightly used, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is and hurtful when they are not rightly used?
knowledge?
MENO: Certainly.
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the SOCRATES: And virtue makes us good?
soul: they are temperance, justice, courage, quick-55
Meno
ness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and MENO: That appears to be true.
the like?
SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, MENO: Surely.
and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wis-SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowl-dom or prudence, since none of the things of the edge, but of another sort, are sometimes profit-soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, able and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, cour-but they are all made profitable or hurtful by age wanting prudence, which is only a sort of the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore confidence? When a man has no sense he is if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is wisdom or prudence?
profited?
MENO: I quite agree.
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth SOCRATES: And the same may be said of tem-and the like, of which we were just now saying perance and quickness of apprehension; what-that they are sometimes good and sometimes ever things are learned or done with sense are evil, do not they also become profitable or hurt-profitable, but when done without sense they are ful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them hurtful?
rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul MENO: Very true.
herself are benefited when under the guidance SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul at-of wisdom and harmed by folly?
tempts or endures, when under the guidance of MENO: True.
wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is un-SOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, der the guidance of folly, in the opposite?
and the foolish soul wrongly.