MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to MENO: Yes.
be very like the truth.
SOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good SOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only and useful to states, not only because they have conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from knowledge, but because they have right opinion, true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me.
and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is There are not many things which I profess to given to man by nature or acquired by him—(do know, but this is most certainly one of them.
you imagine either of them to be given by na-MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in ture?
saying so.
MENO: Not I.)
SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, true opinion leading the way perfects action quite neither are the good by nature good?
as well as knowledge?
MENO: Certainly not.
MENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then right.
came the question whether virtue is acquired by SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit infe-teaching?
rior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is MENO: Yes.
the man who has right opinion inferior to him SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), who has knowledge?
then, as we thought, it was taught?
MENO: True.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom?
acknowledged by us to be useful?
MENO: Certainly.