From what has been said, therefore, it is evident to everyone, that the Gods being the causes of all motion, some of them are essential and vivific, according to a selfmotive, selfvital, and selfenergetic power. But others of them are intellectual, and excite by their very being all secondary natures to the perfection of life, according to the fountain and principle of all second and third progressions of motion. And others are unical, or characterized by unity, deifying by participation all the whole genera of themselves, according to a primary, allperfect, and unknown power of energy, and who are the leaders of one kind of motion, but are not the principle of another. But again others supply to secondary natures motion according to place or quality, but are essentially the causes of motion to themselves. For everything which is the cause of essence to other things is much prior to this the cause to itself of its own proper energies and perfection. Farther still, that which is selfmotive is again the principle of motion, and being and life are imparted by soul to everything in the world, and not local motion only and the other kinds of motion, but the progression into being is from soul, and by a much greater priority from an intellectual essence, which binds to itself the life of selfmotive natures and precedes according to cause all temporal energy.
And in a still greater degree do motion, being, and life proceed from a unical hyparxis, which connectedly contains intellect and soul, is the source of total good, and proceeds as far as to the last of things.
For of life indeed, not all the parts of the world are capable of participating, nor of intellect and a gnostic power;
but of the one all things participate, as far as to matter itself, both wholes and parts, things which subsist according to nature, and the contraries to these; and there is not anything which is deprived of a cause of this kind, nor can anything ever participate of being, if it is deprived of the one.
If, therefore, the Gods produce all things, and contain all things, in the unknown comprehension of themselves, how is it possible there should not be a providence of all things in these comprehensions, pervading supernally as far as to the most partial natures? For it is everywhere fit that offspring should enjoy the providential care of their causes. But all altermotive are the progeny of selfmotive natures. And things which subsist in time, either in the whole of time, or in a part of it, are the effects of eternal natures; because that which always is, is the cause of that which sometimes exists. And divine and unical genera, as they give subsistence to all multiplied natures, precede them in existence. In short, there is no essence, or multitude of powers, which is not allowed its generation from the one. It is necessary, therefore, that all these should be partakers of the providence of preceding causes, being vivified indeed from the psychical gods, and circulating according to temporal periods;
and participating of sameness and at the same time a stable condition of forms from the intellectual gods; but receiving into themselves the presence of union, of measure, and of the distribution of the good from the first Gods.
It is necessary, therefore, either that the Gods should know that a providential care of their own offspring is natural to them, and should not only give subsistence to secondary beings, and supply them with life, essence and union, but also previously comprehend it themselves the primary cause of the goods they contain, or, which it is not lawful to assert, that being Gods, they are ignorant of what is proper and fit.
For what ignorance can there be of beautiful things, with those who are the causes of beauty, or of things good, with those who are allotted an hyparxis defined by the nature of the good?
But if they are ignorant, neither do souls govern the universe according to intellect, nor are intellects carried in souls as in a vehicle, nor prior to these do the unities of the Gods contractedly comprehend in themselves all knowledge, which we have acknowledged they do through the former demonstrations.
If, therefore, they are not deprived of knowledge, being the fathers, leaders and governors of everything in the world, and to them as being such a providential cure of the things governed by, and following them, and generated by them, pertains, whether shall we say that they knowing the law which is according to nature, accomplish this law, or that through imbecility they are deprived of a providential attention to their possessions or progeny, for it is of no consequence as to the present discussion which of these two appellations you are willing to adopt?
For if through want of power they neglect the superintendence of wholes, what is the cause of this want of power? For they do not move things externally, nor are other things indeed the causes of essence, but they assume the government of the things they have produced, but they rule over all things as if from the stern of a ship, themselves supplying being, themselves containing the measures of life, and themselves distributing to things their respective energies.
Whether also, are they unable to provide at once for all things, or they do not leave each of the parts destitute of their providential care? And if they are not curators of everything in the world, whether do they providentially superintend greater things, but neglect such as are less?
Or do they pay attention to the less, but neglect to take care of the greater?
For if we deprive them of a providential attention to all things similarly, through the want of power, how, while we attribute to them a greater thing, viz. the production of all things, can we refuse to grant that which is naturally consequent to this, a providential attention to their productions?
For it is the province of the power which produces a greater thing, to dispose in a becoming manner that which is less.
But if they are curators of less things, and neglect such as are greater, how can this mode of providence be right? For that which is more allied, and more similar to anything, is more appropriately and fitly disposed by nature to the participation of the good which that thing confers on it.
If, however, the Gods think that the first of mundane natures deserve their providential care, and that perfection of which they are the sources, but are unable to extend their regard to the last of things, what is it that can restrain the presence of the Gods from pervading to all things? What is it which can impede their unenvying and exuberant energy?
How can those who are capable of effecting greater things, be unable to govern such as are less? Or how can those who produce the essence even of the smallest things, not be the lords of the perfection of them, through a privation of power? For all these things are hostile to our natural conceptions. It remains therefore that the Gods must know what is fit and appropriate, and they must possess a power adapted to the perfection of their own nature, and to the government of the whole of things.
But if they know that which is according to nature, and this to those who are the generating causes of all things is to take care of all things, and an exuberance of power, if this be the case, they are not deprived of a providential attention of this kind. Whether, also, together with what has been said, is there a will of providence in them?
Or is this alone wanting both to their knowledge and power? And on this account are things deprived of their providential care?
For if indeed knowing what is fit for themselves, and being able to accomplish what they know, they are unwilling to provide for their own offspring, they will be indigent of goodness, their unenvying exuberance will perish, and we shall do nothing else than abolish the hyparxis according to which they are essentialized.
For the very being of the Gods is defined by the good, and in this they have their subsistence.
But to provide for things of a subject nature, is to confer on them a certain good. How, therefore, can we deprive the Gods of providence, without at the same time depriving them of goodness?
And how if we subvert their goodness is it possible, that we should not also ignorantly subvert their hyparxis which we established by the former demonstrations? Hence it is necessary to admit as a thing consequent to the very being of the Gods that they are good according to every virtue. And again, it is consequent to this that they do not withdraw themselves from a providential attention to secondary natures, either through indolence, or imbecility, or ignorance.
But to this I think it is also consequent that there is with them the most excellent knowledge, unpolluted power, and unenvying and exuberant will. From which it appears that they provide for the whole of things, and omit nothing which is requisite to the supply of good.
Let, however, no one think that the Gods extend such a providence about secondary things, as is either of a busy or laborious nature, or that this is the case with their exempt transcendency, which is established remote from mortal difficulty.
For their blessedness is not willing to be defiled with the difficulty of administration, since even the life of good men is accompanied with facility, and is void of molestation and pain.
But all labors and molestation arise from the impediments of matter.
If, however, it be requisite to define the mode of the providence of the Gods, it must be admitted that it is spontaneous, unpolluted, immaterial, and ineffable. For the Gods do not govern all things either by investigating what is fit, or exploring the good of everything by ambiguous reasonings or by looking externally, and following their effects as men do in the providence which they exert on their own affairs;
but preassuming in themselves the measures of the whole of things, and producing the essence of everything from themselves, and also looking to themselves, they lead and perfect all things in a silent path, by their very being, and fill them with good.
Neither, likewise, do they produce in a manner similar to nature, energizing only by their very being, unaccompanied with deliberate choice, nor energizing in a manner similar to partial souls in conjunction with will, are they deprived of production according to essence; but they contract both these into one union, and they will indeed such things as they are able to effect by their very being, but by their very essence being capable of and producing all things, they contain the cause of production in their unenvying and exuberant will.
By what busy energy, therefore, with what difficulty, or with the punishment of what Ixion, is the providence either of whole souls, or of intellectual essences, or of the Gods themselves accomplished, unless it should be said, that to impart good in any respect is laborious to the Gods?
But that which is according to nature is not laborious to anything. For neither is it laborious to fire to impart heat, nor to snow to refrigerate, nor in short to bodies to energize according to their own proper powers. And prior to bodies, neither is it laborious to natures to nourish, or generate, or increase.
For these are the works of natures. Nor again, prior to these, is it laborious to souls. For these indeed produce many energies from deliberate choice, many from their very being, and are the causes of many motions by alone being present.
So that if indeed the communication of good is according to nature to the Gods, providence also is according to nature. And these things we must say are accomplished by the Gods with facility, and by their very being alone. But if these things are not according to nature, neither will the Gods be naturally good. For the good is the supplier of good; just as life is the source of another life, and intellect is the source of intellectual illumination.
And everything which has a primary subsistence in each nature is generative of that which has a secondary subsistence.
That however, which is especially the illustrious prerogative of the Platonic theology, I should say is this, that according to it, neither is the exempt essence of the Gods converted to secondary natures, through a providential care for things subordinate, nor is their providential presence with all things diminished through their transcending the whole of things with undefiled purity, but at the same time it assigns to them a separate subsistence, and the being unmingled with every subordinate nature, and also the being extended to all things, and the taking care of and adorning their own progeny.
For the manner in which they pervade through all things is not corporeal, as that of light is through the air, nor is it divisible about bodies, in the same manner as in nature, nor converted to subordinate natures, in the same manner as that of a partial soul, but it is separate from body, and without conversion to it, is immaterial, unmingled, unrestrained, uniform, primary and exempt.
In short, such a mode of the providence of the Gods as this, must at present be conceived. For it is evident that it will be appropriate according to each order of the Gods. For soul indeed, is said to provide for secondary natures in one way, and intellect in another. But the providence of divinity that is prior to intellect is exerted according to a transcendency both of intellect and soul. And of the Gods themselves, the providence of the sublunary is different from that of the celestial divinities. Of the Gods also who are beyond the world, there are many orders, and the mode of providence is different according to each.