What the two principles are of all things posterior to the one; how Socrates the Philebus calls them bound and infinity; and of what things they are the causes to beings.3
3 The seventh and eighth chapters form the third in my translation.
CHAPTER IX.
What the third thing is which is produced from the two principles. Why Socrates in the Philebus calls it that which is mixed. That it is nothing else than that which is primarily being.
And how this proceeds from the two principles, and from the one.
CHAPTER X.
How from images also, it may be inferred, that the first thing which subsists from bound and infinity is being. How this may be demonstrated. And how bound and infinity are twofold; one order of these subsisting in being, but the other existing prior to being.5
5 And the ninth and tenth are the fourth and fifth chapters in my translation.
CHAPTER XI.
What the triad is, which Socrates in the Philebus says is inherent in every thing that is mixed.6
6 This, is the sixth chapter in my translation.
CHAPTER XII.
Concerning the first intelligible triad in common; and how the second triad proceeds analogous to this.7
7 It appears from this account of the contents of the twelfth chapter, that a considerable part of it is wanting in the original; because nothing is said in it about the manner in which the second triad proceeds analogous to
the first.
CHAPTER XIII.
What the second intelligible triad is. A more accurate account of it, as subsisting from that which predominates, from that which is participated, and from that which characterizes the mixture.
CHAPTER XIV.
What the third intelligible triad is; what that is which predominates, and is participated in this. And at the end, a discourse in common concerning the distinction of the three triads.
CHAPTER XV.
How the intelligible triads are delivered in the Timaeus. And many admonitions concerning animal itself, [evincing] that it has the third order in intelligibles.
CHAPTER XVI.
Many demonstrations that eternity subsists according to the middle order of intelligibles.
CHAPTER XVII.
That the one in which eternity abides is the summit of intelligibles.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Concerning all the intelligible orders in common, according to the doctrine of Timaeus. And a more accurate account of the peculiarities in the intelligible triads.
CHAPTER XIX.
Concerning intelligible forms, and the doctrine unfolding the peculiarity of them. How likewise they are four, and from what causes they subsist.
CHAPTER XX.
That also from what is said in the Sophista, it is possible to discover the three intelligible orders; viz. in that part of the Sophista, in which it is shown what the one being, what whole, and what all are.
CHAPTER XXI.
A summary account of what has been said concerning the intelligible triads. And admonitions from Plato that it is possible to divide them into father, power, and intellect.
CHAPTER XXII.
How in the Phaedrus it is said that every thing divine is beautiful, wise, and good. What triple elements of each of these Plato delivers. And how from these it is possible to accede to the union and separation of the intelligible triads.
CHAPTER XXIII.
How Parmenides delivers the multitude of Gods in the second hypothesis. And how we should discourse about each order of them, employing for this purpose the conclusions of that hypothesis.
CHAPTER XXIV.
What the first intelligible triad is according to Parmenides. Whence he begins, and how far he proceeds, teaching concerning it.
CHAPTER XXV.
What the second intelligible triad is. How it is delivered by Parmenides in continuity with the triad prior to it. And how far he produces the discourse concerning it.
CHAPTER XXVI.
What the third intelligible triad is. And how Parmenides unfolds it through the third conclusion.
CHAPTER XXVII.
Concerning the three conclusions in common, through which the three orders of intelligibles, are characterized. And how through these it is possible to dissolve the most difficult of theological doubts.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
A celebration of the intelligible Gods, unfolding at the same time the union of intelligibles themselves with the good, and their exempt hyparxis.
An explanation of certain terms which are unusual, or have a meaning different from their common acceptation, and which there was a necessity of introducing in the translation of this work.
(Transscription of ancient Greek mostly according to classical scheme) COMPOSITE, synthetos. I have used the word composite instead of compounded, because the latter rather denotes the mingling than the contiguous union of one thing with another, which the former, through its derivation from the Latin word compositus, solely denotes.
DEMIURGUS OF WHOLES, demiurgos tōn olōn. The artificer of the universe is thus denominated, because he produces the universe so far as it is a whole, and likewise all the wholes it contains, by his own immediate energy; other subordinate powers cooperating with him in the production of parts. Hence he produces the universe totally and at once.
DESIRE , epithymia. Is an irrational appetite solely directed to external objects, and to the gratification arising from the possession of them.
DIANOIA, dianoia, from whence dianoetic, the discursive energy of reason; or according to its most accurate signification, it is that power of the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect, or the power which sees truth intuitively.
DOXASTIC, formed from doxa, opinion, is the last of the gnostic powers of the rational soul; and knows that a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it, or why it is. The knowledge of the dioti, or why a thing is, being the province of dianoia.
GUEST , xenos. This word, in its more ample signification in the Greek, denotes a stranger, but properly implies one who receives another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the dialogues of Plato therefore, (and consequently in this work of Proclus when he cites the dialogues in which this word occurs) wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a xenos, I have translated this word guest, as being more conformable to the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so many guests. Hence in the Timaeus, the persons of that dialogue are expressly spoken of as guests from having been feasted with discourse.
HYPARXIS, hyparxis. The first principle, or foundation as it were, of the essence of a thing.
Hence, also, it is the summit of essence.
IMPARTICIPABLE, amethektos. One thing is said to be imparticipable with respect to another, to which it is superior, when it is not consubsistent with it.
INTELLECTUAL PROJECTION. The immediate energy of intellect is thus denominated, because it is an intuitive perception, or an immediate darting forth, as it were, to its proper object, the intelligible.
MONAD, monas, in divine natures is that which contains distinct, but at the same time profoundlyunited multitude, and which produces a multitude exquisitely allied to itself. But in the sensible universe, the first monad is the world itself, which comprehends in itself all the multitude of which it is the cause (in conjunction with the cause of all). The second monad is the inerratic sphere. In the third place, the spheres of the planets succeed, each of which is also a monad, comprehending an appropriate multitude. And in the fourth and last place are the spheres of the elements, which are in a similar manner monads. All these monads likewise are denominated olothetes, wholenesses, and have a perpetual subsistence.
PERMANENCY, stasis. The proper word for rest, in Greek, is eremia. And Simplicius justly observes, that not every stasis is eremia, but that only which is after motion. This word is employed by Plato in the Sophista, to express one of the five genera of being, viz. essence, permanency, (stasis), motion, sameness, and difference; in which place it evidently does not signify rest.
PHANTASY, or Imagination, phantasia, is, morphōtike noesis, i. e. a figured intelligence, because all the perceptions of this power are inward, and not external, like those of sense, and are accompanied with figure.
PSYCHICAL, psychikos, i. e. pertaining to soul, in the same manner as physikos, physical, is something pertaining to nature.
REASON, logos. This word in Platonic writers signifies either that inward discursive energy called reasoning; or a certain productive and seminal principle; or that which is indicative and definitive of a thing. Hence logoi or reasons in the soul, are, gnostically producing principles.
UNICAL, eniaios, that which is characterized by unity.
UNIFORM enoeides. This word when it occurs in Proclus, and other Platonic writers, signifies that which has the form of the one, and not as in Johnson, that which keeps its tenour, or is similar to itself.
Note, Martin Euser, 2009. The following should also be kept in mind: Animal is generally descriptive of an ensouled being; from planets to the simplest organism that can move itself.
Daemon or daimon does not mean a "demon", but a kind of (half) god.
Hence, the word daimoniacal pertains to such a halfgod.
Occult means hidden to the (outer) senses.
Intellectual means true understanding, deep insight and direct experience of the essence of things. Not to be confused with the brainmind which plays a minor role in Platonic philosophy.
BOOK III.