IN the third place therefore, the genus of true science is said to be established about the supercelestial place. For these two things ascend to the contemplation of that essence, viz. intellect the governor of the soul (but this is a partial intellect established indeed above souls, and elevating them to their paternal port) and true science which is the perfection of the soul. This therefore energizes about that place, as transitively revolving in harmonic measure about being. But intellect contemplates it, as employing simple intellection. Farther still, the science which is in us is one thing, but that which is in the supercelestial place another.
And the former indeed is true, but the latter is truth
itself. What therefore is it, and whence does it subsist? It is indeed a deity which is the fountain of all intellectual knowledge, and the first efficient cause of undefiled and stable intelligence. But it shines forth in the first triad of intellectuals, because this is perfective of all other things, and likewise of divine souls. For these ascending to this uniform power of all knowledge, perfect their own knowledge. For each of the undefiled souls, says Socrates, revolving together with Jupiter and the heaven, surveys justice, temperance and science. Hence, these three fountains are there, being intelligible deities, and the fountains of the intellectual virtues, and not being, as some think they are, intellectual forms.
For Plato is accustomed to characterize these by the term itself, as for instance science itself and justice itself; and this Socrates says somewhere in the Phaedo. By here when he says justice herself, temperance herself, and science herself, he appears to unfold to us certain selfperfect and intelligible deities, which have a triadic subsistence. And pf these science indeed is the monad; but temperance has the second order; and justice the third. And science indeed is the supplier of undefiled, firm and immutable intelligence; but temperance imparts to all the Gods the cause of conversion to themselves;
and justice imparts to them the cause of the distribution of the whole of good according to desert.
And through science indeed, each of the Gods intellectually perceives the natures prior to himself, and is filled with intelligible intelligence; but through temperance he is converted to himself and enjoys a second union, and a good coordinate to the conversion to himself: and through justice he rules over the natures posterior to himself, in a silent path, as they say measures their desert, and supplies a distribution adapted to each.
These three fountains therefore contain all the energies of the Gods.
And science indeed proceeds analogous to the first triad of intelligibles. And as that triad imparts essence to all things, so this illuminates the Gods with knowledge. But temperance proceeds analogous to the second triad of intelligibles. For temperance imitates the connective and measuring power of that triad; since it measures the energies of the Gods, and converts each of them to itself. And justice proceeds analogous to the third triad of intelligibles. For it also separates secondary natures according to appropriate desert, in the same manner as that triad separates them intelligibly by the first paradigms.
CHAPTER XV.
AFTER these things therefore, we may survey another triad
preexisting in this place, which also Socrates celebrates, viz. the plain of truth, the meadow, and the nutriment of the Gods. The plain of truth therefore, is intellectually expanded to intelligible light, and is splendid with the illuminations that proceed from thence. For as the one emits by illumination intelligible light, so the intelligible imparts to secondary natures a participation productive of essence. But the meadow is the prolific power of life, and of allvarious reasons, is the comprehension of the first efficient causes of life, and is the cause of the variety, and generation of forms. For the meadows also which are here are pro
ductive of allvarious forms and reasons, and bear water which is the symbol of vivification. And the nourishing cause of the Gods, is a certain intelligible union, comprehending in itself the whole perfection of the Gods, and filling the Gods with acme and power, in order that they may bestow a providential attention to secondary natures, and may possess an immutable intellectual perception of such natures as are first.
Above however, the Gods participate of these uniformly; but in a divided manner in their progressions.
With respect to the nutriment likewise, one kind is called by Plato ambrosia, but the other nectar. "For the charioteer", says he, "stopping the horses at the manger, places before them ambrosia, and afterwards gives them nectar to drink." The charioteer therefore, being nourished with intelligibles, unically participates of the perfection which is imparted through illumination by the Gods. But the horses participate of this divisibly; first indeed of ambrosia, and afterwards of nectar. For it is necessary that from ambrosia, they should stably and undeviatingly abide in more excellent natures; but that through nectar they should immutably provide for secondary natures.
For they say that ambrosia is solid, but nectar liquid nutriment; which Plato also indicates when he says that the charioteer places before the horses ambrosia and afterwards gives them nectar to drink.
Hence the nutriment of nectar manifests the unrestrained and indissoluble nature of providence, and its proceeding to all things in an unpolluted manner.
But the nutriment of ambrosia manifests stability, and a firm settlement in more excellent natures. From both these however, it is evident that the Gods both abide and proceed to all things, and that neither their undeviating nature, and which is without conversion to subordinate beings, is unprolific, nor their prolific power and progression is unstable; but abiding they proceed, and being established in the divinities prior to themselves, they provide for secondary natures without being contaminated.
Nectar aud ambrosia therefore, are the perfections of the Gods, so far as they are Gods; but other things are the perfections of intellect, nature, and bodies. Hence Plato having assumed these in souls, calls the souls
[which are nourished with these,] Gods. For so far as they also participate of the Gods, so far they are filled with nectar and ambrosia.
These however in their progressions have a bipartite division; the one indeed, being the supplier to the Gods of stable and firm perfection; but the other, of undeviating providence, of liberated administration, and of an unenvying and abundant communication of good, according to the two principles of the whole of things, which preside over a distribution of this kind.
For it must be admitted that ambrosia is indeed analogous
to bound, but nectar to infinity. Hence the one is as it were humid, and not bounded from itself; but the other is as it were solid, and has a boundary from itself. Nectar therefore is prolific, and is perfective of the secondary presence of the Gods, and is the cause of power, of a vigour which provides for the whole of things, and of infinite and neverfailing supply. But ambrosia is stable perfection, is similar to bound, is the cause to the Gods of an establishment in themselves, and is the supplier of firm and undeviating intellection. Prior to both these however, is the one fountain of perfection, and seat to all the Gods, which Plato calls nutriment, and the banquet, and delicious food, as unically perfecting indeed the divided multitude of the Gods, but converting all things to itself through divine intelligence. For the banquet indeed manifests the divided distribution of divine nutriment; but delicious food the united conversion of the whole of things to it. For it is the intellectual perception of the Gods, so far as they are Gods.
But nutriment connectedly contains both these powers, being the plenitude of intelligible goods, and the uniform perfection of divine selfsufficiency.
CHAPTER XVI.
CONCERNING these things therefore, thus much may suffice as to the present theory. But it follows that we should discuss the division of the supercelestial place into three parts. For the intelligible summit of intellectuals is, as we have before observed, a triad. Immediately therefore, according to the first conception of this place, Plato unfolds its triadic nature, assuming indeed, three negatives, the uncoloured, the unfigured, and the untangible. Having likewise established three divinities in it, viz. science, temperance, and justice, our preceptor and leader [Syrianus] thinks fit to divide this triad into three monads, and also demonstrates this conformably to the Orphic theologies.
If, however, it be requisite to discover the definite peculiarities of these three Goddesses, from what has been already laid down, we must understand, that the plain of truth, the meadow, and the nourishing cause of the Gods are posited there. To nourish therefore is the province of intelligible perfection.
Hence the elevating impulse is given to the wing of the soul, and also intellectual perfection, according to the nourishment which flows from thence into the soul. But the peculiarity of the meadow, is to possess a power generative of reasons and forms; and of the causes of the production of animals. Hence also souls are fed about the meadow; and the pabulum is indeed nutriment, but in a divided manner.
The plain however of truth is the expansion and manifestation of intelligible light, the evolution of inward reasons, and perfection proceeding every where. This therefore* is the peculiarity of the third monad.
* i.e. perfection proceeding everywhere.
But fecundity is the peculiarity of the second; and intelligible plenitude of the first. For all the supercelestial place is indeed illuminated with the light of truth. Hence all the natures that are contained in it are called true. And Socrates says, "that whatever soul attending on divinity has beheld any thing of reality shall be free from damage, till another period takes place."
For every thing in that place is truly being and intelligible, and is full of divine union.
In the first monads however [i.e. in the plain of truth and the meadow,] this intelligible light subsists contractedly, and is occultly established as it were in the adyta; but in the third monad [viz. in the nourishing cause of the Gods]
it shines forth, and is coexpanded, and is codivided with the multitude of powers. We may therefore from these things survey the differences of the three monads, in a manner conformable to the Platonic hypotheses.
But if indeed science pertains to the first monad, temperance to the second, and justice to the third, from these things also the triad will be perfectly apparent. And does not science which is stable, and the uniform intelligence of wholes, and which at the same time is consubsistent with intelligibles, pertain to the power which is united to the intelligible father, and which does not proceed, nor separate its union from the deity of that father? but does not the genus of justice pertain to the power which is divided, which separates the intellectual genera, leads the intelligible multitude into order, and imparts by illumination distribution according to desert? And does not the genus of temperance pertain to the power which is the medium of both these, which is converted to itself, and possesses the common bond of this triad? For the harmonic, and a communication with the extremes according to reason, are the illustrious good of this middle power.
That we may not therefore be prolix, what has been said being sufficient to remind us of the meaning of Plato, those three deities are celebrated by us, which dividing the supercelestial place, are indeed all of them intelligible as in intellectuals, and are likewise summits, and collective of all things into one intelligible union. One of these however is so stably; another generatively; and another convertively, possessing a primary effective power in intellectuals. For one of them indeed, unites the monads of all the Gods and collects them about the intelligible; but another effects this about the progressions of the Gods; and another about their conversions. All of them however at the same time collect into one the whole of an hyparxis which always abides, proceeds, and returns. Hence also Plato elevates the Gods that are distributed in the world, to this one place, and converts them energizing about this as collective of the whole orders of the Gods to the participation of intelligibles.
These monads, therefore, educe intelligible forms, fill them with the participation of divine union, and again recall the natures that have proceeded, and conjoin them to intelligibles. Concerning this whole triad however, what has been said may suffice.
CHAPTER XVII.
IT remains therefore, that we should pass to the discussion of Adrastia, Socrates indicating that she possesses her kingdom in this place. For that which defines the measures of a blameless life to souls from the vision of these intelligible goods, is certainly there allotted its first evolution into light. For the elevating cause, being secondary to the objects of desire, may be able to raise both itself and other things to the supercelestial place, through conversion. But that which defines and measures the fruits of the vision of the intelligible to souls, since it has its hyparxis in the intelligible, imparts by illumination beatitude to them from thence.
It is established therefore, as I have said, in that place. But it rules over all the divine laws uniformly, from on high, as far as to the last of things. It likewise binds to the one sacred law of itself, all the sacred laws, viz. the intellectual, the supermundane, and the mundane.
Whether therefore, there are certain Saturnian laws, as Socrates in the Gorgias indicates there are, when he says, " The law therefore which was in the time of Saturn is now also among the Gods; or whether there are Jovian laws, as the Athenian guest asserts there are, when he says,
"But justice follows Jupiter, which is the avenger of those that desert the divine law;"
or whether there are fatal laws, as Timaeus teaches there
are, when he says, "That the demiurgus announced to souls the laws of fate;"—of all these the sacred law of Adrastia is connective according to one intelligible simplicity, and at the same time imparts existence to all of them, and the measures of power. And if it be requisite to relate my own opinion, the inevitable guardian power of this triad, and the immutable comprehension of order pervading every where, presubsist in this goddess. For these three deities not only unfold and collect all things, but they are also guardians according to the Oracle of the works of the father, and of one intelligible intellect.
This guardian power therefore, the sacred law of Adrastia indicates, which nothing is able to escape. For with respect to the laws of Fate, not only the Gods are superior to them, but also partial souls, when they live according to intellect, and give themselves up to the light of providence.
And the Saturnian Gods are essentially exempt from the Jovian laws, and the connective and perfective Gods from the Saturnian laws; but all things are obedient to the sacred law of Adrastia, and all the distributions of the Gods, and all measures and guardianships subsist on account of this.
By Orpheus also, she is said to guard the demiurgus of
the universe, and receiving brazen drumsticks, and a drum made from the skin of a goat, to produce so loud a sound as to convert all the Gods to herself. And Socrates imitating this fabulous sound which extends a certain proclamation to all things, in a similar manner produces the sacred law of Adrastia to all souls.
For he says, "This is the sacred law of Adrastia, that whatever soul has perceived any thing of truth, shall be free from harm till another period," all but expressing the Orphic sound through this proclamation, and uttering this as a certain hymn of Adrastia.
For in the first place indeed, he calls it thesmos, a sacred law, and not nomos, a law, as he does the Saturnian and Jovian laws. For thesmos is connected with deity, and pertains more to intelligibles [than to the intellectuals]; but nomos indicating intellectual distribution, is adapted to the intellectual fathers. And in the second place, he speaks of it in the singular and not in the plural number, as Timaeus does of the fatal laws.
Note (ed.): laws of fate are meant here.
In the third place therefore, he extends it to all the genera of souls, and evinces that it is the common measure of their happy and blessed life, and the true guard of those souls that are able to abide on high free from all passivity. For such is the meaning of the words, "And the soul that is able to do this always, shall always be free from harm." This sacred law therefore, comprehends all the undefiled life of divine souls, and the temporal blessedness of partial souls. And it guards the former indeed intelligibly, but measures the latter by the vision of intelligible goods. And thus much concerning Adrastia.
CHAPTER XVIII.
WITH respect to what remains therefore, we shall summarily say, that the supercelestial place is the first triad of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, possessing three peculiarities, the unfolding into light, the collective, and the defensive. It likewise comprehends all these intelligibly, and in an unknown manner, conjoining indeed intellectuals to intelligibles, but calling forth the prolific powers of intelligibles, receiving in itself the plenitude of forms from the intelligible paradigms, and producing its own meadow from the fontal summit which is there.
But from the one intellect it gives subsistence to the three virtues, perfects all itself by intelligible impressions, and in its ineffable bosoms receives the whole of intelligible light. At one and the same time also it abides in the occult nature of the intelligible Gods, and proceeds intelligibly from thence, shines forth to the view of intellectuals, and converts and draws upward by ineffable powers all the images of its proper union which it has disseminated in every thing. To this place likewise it is necessary that we should mystically approach, leaving in the earth all the generationproducing life, and the corporeal nature, with which on coming hither we were surrounded as with a wall, but exciting alone the summit of the soul to the participation of total truth, and the plenitude of intelligible nutriment.
CHAPTER XIX.
AFTER this intelligible and unknown triad however, which presides over all the intellectual (noerōn) genera, let us survey the triad which connectedly contains the bond of them, intelligibly and at the same time intellectually.
For it is necessary that prior to intellect and the intellectual Gods, the cause of connectedly containing should be in these Gods; and that this being established in the middle of the intelligible and intellectual order, should extend to all the divine multitudes, all the genera of beings, and all the divisions of the world. For what is it which primarily connects things? If, as some say, the nature of spirit and local motion, body itself which is connective of other things will require connexion.
For every body according to its own composition is dissipable and divisible; which also the Elean guest indicating to those who make corporeal principles, says that the essence which is so much celebrated by them, is broken and dissipated.
Body therefore, is not naturally adapted to be connective of other things, nor even if a power of this kind pertained to bodies, would spirit be able to afford us this power, because it is always defluous and dissipated, and diffusing itself beyond that which bounds it. But if we suppose that habits and connective forms which are divided about bodies illuminate their subjects with connexion, it is perfectly necessary that they should effect this by being present with them; but how will these habits and forms connect themselves?
For it is difficult to devise how this can be effected.
For these being distributed about material bulks, and divided together with their subjects, require a boundary and connexion.
But they are not naturally adapted to be bounded or connected from themselves; because they have not an essence selfbegotten and selfsubsistent. That however, which neither produces nor perfects itself, cannot connect itself. And moreover, every habit, and every material form is altermotive, and depends on another more ancient cause, and on this account is inseparable from subjects, not being able to verge to itself.
But if abandoning these, we should assert that souls which are incorporeal and selfbegotten, are the first efficient causes of connexion, where shall we place the partible and at the same time impartible nature of souls, that which is mixed from the partible and impartible, that which participates of the genera of being, and that which is divided into harmonic reasons?
For souls indeed, connect bodies and natures, because they participate of an impartible peculiarity; but they are in want of another connective nature which may impart the first principle of mixture to the genera, and of connexion to divided reasons. For the selfmotive nature of souls being transitive, and extended to time, requires that which may connect its one life, and may render it total and indivisible.
For the whole which is connective of parts, exists prior to parts; since the whole which consists of parts receives connexion introduced from something different from itself.
But if proceeding with the reasoning power beyond
souls, we survey intellect, whether the intellect which is participated, or if you are willing, that which is imparticipable and divine, and in short, if we survey at once the intellectual genus of the Gods, if this is primarily connective of beings, we shall find also in this allvarious multitude, divisions of genera, and as Socrates says, many and blessed visions, and discursive energies. For the separation of divine natures, and the variety of forms, present themselves to the view in intellectuals, and also fabulous sections and generative powers. How therefore, can that which connects be primarily here, where the divisive genus shines forth? And how is it possible that intellectual multitude should not refer to another more ancient cause the participation of its proper connexion? For intellectual multitude is that which is primarily connected (since it is that which is primarily divided, and that which requires connexion is divisible, but the indivisible itself is beyond the connective hyparxis), but it is not that which primarily connects. For every thing which is connected, is connected by another thing which primarily possesses the power of connexion.
It is evident therefore, from what has been said, that the connective order of beings is established prior to the intellectual Gods.
The intelligible indeed, and occult hyparxis, is the supplier of union to all things, as proximately subsisting after the one, and being indivisible and uniform. But connexion is the contraction of multitude into impartible communion; on which account it subsists as secondary to intelligibles.
For the medium which was there was intelligible, and the united primarilyefficient cause of connexion. The connective however, of intelligibles and intellectuals, imitates the unific power of intelligibles.
For there the three triadic monads were the unions of wholes; one of them indeed according to transcendency; another according to the middle centre; and another according to conversion.
But in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders, these three triads are the second after those unions, and are connascent with multitude.
Hence one of these triads is collective; another is connective of multitude; and another is of a perfective nature. For that which is collected, that which is connected, and that which is perfected, is multitude. Whether therefore it is intellectual, or supermundane, or mundane, or any other multitude, it is collected, connected, and petfected through these three triads. And when collected indeed, it is elevated to the union of intelligibles, and is firmly established in them. When it is connected, it abides impartible and undissipated in its progeny. And when it is perfected, it receives completion from its proper parts or powers.
Since however, it is necessary that beings abiding, proceeding and returning should enjoy this triple providence, there are indeed three preexistent collective monads, three connective, and three perfective , monads. And we do not say this, that on account of the good of secondary natures, first natures are thus divided, and preside over so many orders and powers; but they indeed are always the primary causes of good to things subordinate, while we from inferior natures recur to the causes of wholes. The intelligible therefore, and intellectual triads, perfect things triadically, and always connect and collect them into union. But the intelligible monads generate without separation and unically, their permanencies, progressions and conversions. With respect to other things however, we have partly spoken, and shall again partly speak concerning them.
CHAPTER XX.
LET US therefore speak at present concerning the connective triad.
This then, Socrates, in the Phsedrus, calls the celestial circulation.
Because indeed, it possesses the middle centre of imparticipable life, and is that which is piost vital itself of life, he calls it circulation, as comprehending circularly, and on all sides all other lives, and divine intellections.
For on account of this, souls also which are elevated to it, are perfected according to intellection, and are conjoined with intelligible spectacles.
The circulation of the heaven, however, is always established after the same manner. For it is an eternal, whole, one, and united intelligence. But the circulation of souls is effected through time, subsists in a more partial manner, and is not an atoncecollected comprehension of intelligibles.
Souls, therefore, are carried round in a circle, and are restored to their pristine state, the celestial circulation always remaining the same.
Because, however, it gives completion to the bond of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, and connects all the orders in their abiding, proceeding, and returning, Socrates calls it celestial. For Timaeus says, that this [sensible] heaven also, compresses on all sides the elements that are under it, and that on this account, no place is left for a vacuum.
As, therefore, the apparent heaven is connective of all things that are under it, and is the cause of continuity, coherence and sympathy, (for the intervention of a vacuum would interrupt the continuity of things, and the subversion of this continuity would destroy the sympathy of bodies) thus also that intellectual heaven, binds iall the multitudes of beings into an impartible communion, illuminating each with an appro
priate portion of connexion.
For intellect participates of the connective cause in one way, the nature of soul in another, and a corporeal state of being in another.
For through the highest participation of connexion,
intellect is impartible; but through second measures of participation, soul is partible and impartible, according to one mixture; and through an ultimate diminution, bodies possessing a partible hypostasis, at the same time remain connected, and do not in consequence of being dissipated perish, but enjoy their own division and imbecility. The whole of the connective triad therefore, is denominated heaven according to the hyparxes of itself; but the breadth of life which is spread under it is called circulation. For in things apparent to sense, the period of the heavens is motion, and is as it were the life of body.
CHAPTER XXI.
IF however it be requisite to discover the triadic nature of it from what has been laid down, we must employ the mode of analogy. Since therefore Plato himself calls the back of the heaven one thing, and its profundity another, it is evident that the celestial arch is the third thing; for the arch which is under this, he directly calls subcelestial. But as we say that the supercelestial place is established above the back of the heaven, so likewise we must grant that the subcelestial is different from the celestial arch. For the heaven is bounded, supernally indeed by the back, but beneath by the arch. And it is comprehended indeed by the supercelestial place, but it comprehends the subcelestial arch.
It is evident therefore from these things, that the heaven presents itself to our view as triadic, according to its back indeed, connectedly containing all things in one simplicity; but according to its arch bounding the whole triad; and according to its profundity, itself proceeding into itself, and constituting the middle breadth of connexion and coherence. The back however, of the whole celestial order, is an intelligible deity, being perhaps allotted from hence this appellation.
But it is intelligible as in the connective triad, externally compressing, and connectedly comprehending all the kingdom of the heaven.
It likewise imparts to all the Gods by illumination a uniform and simple comprehension of secondary natures, and is supernally filled with intelligible union.
Hence also, divine souls being led through all the celestial profundity, stand indeed on the back of the heaven, but the circulation carries them round as they stand; and thus they survey what is called the supercelestial place.
The station therefore, is the establishment of souls in the intelligible watch tower of the heaven, extending to souls sameness, undefiled power, and undeviating intellection. But the circumduction is the participation of a life full of vigour, and the most acute energy. And the common presence of both these, comprehends the prolific energy, the quie