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connecting and binding; and among others, as endued with a perfective and forming power.
Here again, it subsists intellectually and paternally; but there in a manner, entirely motive, vivific, and effective. Here, as governing and assimilating; there in a liberated and undefiled manner; and elsewhere according to a multiplied and dividing mode. Love, therefore, supernally descends from intelligibles to mundane natures, calling all things upwards to divine beauty. Truth also proceeds through all things, illuminating all things with knowledge.
And lastly, Faith proceeds through the universe, establishing all things unically in good.
Hence the Chaldaean oracles assert that all things are governed by, and abide in, these. And on this account they order Theurgists to conjoin themselves to divinity through this triad.
Intelligibles themselves, indeed, do not require the amatory medium, on account of their ineffable union. But where there is a union and separation of beings, there also Love abides.
For it is the binder and conciliator of natures posterior and prior to itself; but the converter of subsequent into prior, and the elevating and perfecting cause of imperfect natures.
The Chaldaean oracles, therefore, speak of Love as binding, and residing in all things: and hence, if it connects all things, it also copulates us with the governments of daemons. But Diotima in the Banquet, calls Love a great daemon, because it everywhere fills up the medium between desiring and desirable natures. And indeed that which is the object of Love vindicates to itself the first order; but that which loves is in the third order from the beloved object. Lastly, Love usurps a middle situation between each, congregating and collecting together that which desires and that which is desired, and filling subordinate from better natures. But among the intelligible and occult Gods, it unites intelligible intellect to the first and secret beauty by a certain life better than intelligence. Hence, the theologist of the Greeks
[Orpheus], calls this Love, blind; for he says,
In his breast feeding, eyeless, rapid Love;
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But in natural posterior to intelligibles, it imparts by illumination an indissoluble bond to all things perfected by itself; for a bond is a certain union, but accompanied with much separation. On this account the Chaldaean oracles are accustomed to call the fire of this Love a copulator.
For proceeding from intelligible intellect, it binds all following natures to each other, and to itself. Hence, it conjoins all the Gods with intelligible beauty, and daemons with Gods; but it conjoins us both with Gods and daemons. In the Gods indeed it has a primary subsistence; in daemons a secondary one; and in partial souls a subsistence through a certain third procession from principles. Again, in the Gods it subsists above essence; for every genus of Gods is superessential. But in daemons it subsists according to essence; and in souls according to illumination.
And this triple order appears similar to the triple power of intellect. For one intellect subsists as imparticipable, being exempt from all partial genera; but another as participated, of which also the souls of the Gods participate as of a better nature; and another is from this ingenerated in souls, and which is indeed their perfection. And these three distinctions of intellect Timaeus himself indicates. Hence, that Love which subsists in the Gods must be considered as analogous to imparticipable intellect; for this it exempt from all the beings which receive and are illuminated by its nature. But daemoniacal Love is analogous to participated intellect; for this is essential and is perfected from itself, in the same manner as participated intellect is proximately resident in souls.
And the third Love is analogous to intellect which subsists as a habit, and which inserts an illumination in souls. Nor is it unjustly that we consider Love as coordinate with this intellectual difference; for in intelligible intellect it possesses its first and occult subsistence.
And if it thence leaps forth, it is also established there according to cause.
It likewise appears to me that Plato finding that intelligible intellect was called by Orpheus both Love and a great daemon, was himself pleased to celebrate Love in a similar manner.
Very properly, therefore, does Diotima call it a great daemon. And Socrates conjoins the discourse about Love with that concerning daemons. For as every thing daemoniacal is suspended from the amatory medium, so likewise the discourse concerning a daemoniacal
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nature is conjoined with that concerning Love, and is allied to it. For Love is a medium between the object of Love and the lover; and a daemon is a medium between man and divinity.
CHAPTER XLII.
THE nature of daemons, therefore, remains in the next place to be more fully disclosed; for the reader has been already presented with some very important information concerning them, in the discussion of the sublunary Gods.
As there is no vacuum then in corporeal, so neither in incorporeal natures. Hence, between divine essences which are the first of things, and partial essences such as ours, which are nothing more than the dregs of the rational nature, there must necessarily be a middle rank of beings, in order that divinity may be connected with man, and that the progression of things may form an entire whole, suspended like the golden chain of Homer from the summit of Olympus. This middle rank of beings,
considered according to a twofold division, consists of daemons and heroes, the latter of which is proximate to partial souls such as ours, and the former to divine natures, just as air and water subsist between fire and earth. Hence, whatever is ineffable and occult in the Gods, daemons and heroes express and unfold. They likewise conciliate all things, and are the sources of the harmonic consent and sympathy of all things with each other. They transmit divine gifts to us, and equally carry back ours to the divinities. But the characteristics of divine natures are unity, permanency in themselves, a subsistence as an immoveable cause of motion, transcendent providence, and which possesses nothing in common with the subjects of their providential energies.
And these characteristics are preserved in them according to essence, power and energy.
On the other hand, the characteristics of partial souls are, a declination to multitude and motion, a conjunction with the Gods, an aptitude to
receive something from other natures, and to mingle together all things in itself, and through itself. And these characteristics they also possess according to essence, power and energy. Such then being the peculiarities of the two extremes, we shall find that those of daemons are to con
tain in themselves the gifts of divine natures, in a more inferior manner indeed than the Gods, but yet so as to comprehend the conditions of subordinate natures, under the idea of a divine essence. In other words, the prerogatives of deity characterize and absorb as it were by their powerful light, whatever daemons possess peculiar to inferior beings.
Hence, they are multiplied indeed but unitedly; mingled, but yet so that the unmingled predominates; and are moved, but with stability. On the contrary, heroes possess unity, identity, permanency, and every excellence, under the condition of multitude, motion, and mixture; viz. the prerogatives of subordinate predominate in these over the characteristics of superior natures, yet so as never to induce a cessation of energy about, or oblivion of, divinity. In short, daemons and heroes are composed of the properties of the two extremes—Gods and partial souls; but in daemons there is more of the divine, and in heroes more of the human nature.
Having premised thus much, I shall next present the reader with all the information I have been able to collect from the most genuine Platonists, and especially from Proclus, on the nature of this middle order of beings.
In the first place, therefore, what follows on this subject is derived from the MS. Commentary of Proclus On the First Alcibiades, in which extract also the nature of the daemon of Socrates is unfolded, about which modern wit has been so much puzzled, and so egregiously mistaken.
Let us now speak first, concerning daemons in general; secondly, concerning those that are allotted us in common; and thirdly, concerning the daemon of Socrates. For it is always requisite that demonstrations should begin from things more universal, and proceed from these as far as to individuals. For this mode of proceeding is natural, and is more adapted to science. Daemons, therefore, deriving their first subsistence
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from the yivific Goddess [Juno], and flowing from thence as from a certain fountain, are allotted an essence characterized by soul. This essence in those of a superior order is more intellectual, and more perfect according to hyparxis; in those of a middle order it is more rational; and in those which rank in the third degree, and which subsist at the extremity of the daemoniacal order, it is various, more irrational, and more material. Possessing, therefore, an essence of this kind, they are distributed in conjunction with the Gods, as being allotted a power ministrant to deity. Hence, they are in one way subservient to the liberated Gods, who are the leaders of wholes prior to the world; and in
another to the mundane Gods, who proximately preside over the parts of the universe. For there is one division of daemons according to the twelve supercelestial Gods, and another according to all the peculiarities of the mundane Gods. For every mundane God is the leader of a certain daemoniacal order, to which he proximately imparts his power; viz. if he is a demiurgic God, he imparts a demiurgic power; if immutable, an undefiled power; if telesiurgic, a perfective power. And about each of the divinities, there is an innumerable multitude of daemons, and which are dignified with the same appellations as their leading Gods.
Hence, they rejoice when they are called by the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hermes, &c. as expressing the peculiarity of their proper deities. And from these, mortal natures also participate of divine influxions. And thus animals and plants are fabricated, bearing the images of different Gods; daemons proximately imparting to these the representations of their leaders. But the Gods in an exempt manner supernally preside over daemons; and through this last natures sympathize with such as are first. For the representations of first are seen in last natures; and the causes of things that are last are comprehended in primary beings.
The middle genera, too, of daemons give completion to wholes, the communion of which they bind and connect; participating indeed of the Gods, but participated by mortal natures. He, therefore, will not err who
asserts that the mundane artificer established the centres of the order of the universe in daemons; since Diotima also assigns them this order, viz.
that of binding together divine and mortal natures, of deducing supernal
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streams, elevating all secondary natures to the Gods, and giving completion to wholes through the connexion of a medium.
Hence, we must not assent to their doctrine, who say that daemons are the souls of men that have changed the present life. For it is not proper to consider a daemoniacal nature according to habitude, as the same with a nature essentially daemoniacal; nor to assert that the perpetual medium of all mundane natures consists from a life conversant with multiform mutations. For a daemoniacal guard subsists always the same, connecting the mundane wholes. But soul does not always thus retain its own order, as Socrates says in the Republic; since at different times it chooses different lives. Nor do we praise those who make certain of the Gods to be daemons, such as the erratic Gods, [i.e. the planets] according to Amelius. But we are persuaded by Plato, who calls the Gods the rulers of the universe, but subjects to them the herds of daemons. And we shall everywhere preserve the doctrine of Diotima, who assigns the middle order, between all divine and mortal natures, to a daemoniacal essence.
Let this then be the conception respecting the whole of the demoniacal order in common.
CHAPTER XLIII.
IN the next place, let us speak concerning the daemons, who are allotted the superintendence of mankind. For of these daemons, which, as we have said, rank in the middle order, the first and highest are divine daemons, and who often appear as Gods, through their transcendent similitude to the divinities. For, in short, that which is first in every order preserves the form of the nature prior to itself. Thus, the first intellect is a God, and the most ancient of souls is intellectual. Hence, the highest genus of daemons, as being proximate to the Gods, is uniform and divine.
The next to these in order are those daemons who participate of an
[261] intellectual peculiarity, and preside over the ascent and descent of souls, and who unfold into light and deliver to all things the productions of the Gods.
The third are those who distribute the productions of divine souls to secondary natures, and complete the bond of those that receive effluxions from thence.
The fourth are those that transmit the efficacious powers of whole natures to things generated and corrupted, and who inspire partial natures with life, order, reasons, and the allvarious perfect operations which things mortal are able to effect.
The fifth are corporeal, and bind together the extremes in bodies. For, how can perpetual accord with corruptible bodies, and efficients with effects, except through this medium ? For it is this ultimate nature which has dominion over corporeal goods, and provides for all natural prerogatives. The sixth in order are those that revolve about matter, connect the powers which descend from celestial to sublunary matter, perpetually guard this matter, and defend the shadowy representation of forms which it contains.
Daemons, therefore, as Diotima also says, being many and allvarious, the highest of them conjoin souls proceeding from their father to their leading Gods. For every God, as we have said, is the leader in the first place of daemons, and in the next of partial souls. For the demiurgus disseminated these, as Timaeus says, into the sun and moon, and the other instruments of time. These divine daemons, therefore, are those which are essentially allotted to souls, and conjoin them to their proper leaders. And every soul, though it revolves together with its leading deity, requires a daemon of this kind. But daemons of the second rank preside over the ascensions and descensions of souls; and from these the souls of the multitude derive their elections. For the most perfect souls, who are conversant with generation in an undefiled manner, as they choose a life conformable to their presiding God, so they live according to a divine daemon, who conjoined them to their proper deity when they dwelt on high. Hence, the Egyptian priest admired Plotinus, as being governed by a divine daemon. To souls, therefore, who live as those that will shortly return to the intelligible world whence they came, the supernal is the same with the daemon which attends them here. But to imperfect
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If these things then are rightly asserted, we must not assent to those who make our rational soul a daemon. For a daemon is different from man, as Diotima says, who places daemons between Gods and men, and as Socrates also evinces, when he divides a daemoniacal oppositely to the human nature. "
For" says he," not a human but a daemoniacal obstacle detains me." But man is a soul using the body as an instrument. A daemon, therefore, is not the same with the rational soul.
This also is evident from Plato in the Timaeus, where he says that intellect has in us the relation of a daemon. But this is only true as far as
pertains to analogy. For a daemon according to essence is different from a daemon according to analogy. For in many instances, that which proximately presides, subsisting in the order of a daemon with respect to that which is inferior, is called a daemon. Thus Jupiter in Orpheus calls his father Saturn an illustrious daemon; and Plato in the Timaeus calls those Gods who proximately preside over, and orderly distribute the realms of generation, daemons. " For,"
says he, " to speak concerning other daemons, and to know their generation, exceeds the ability of human nature." But a daemon according to analogy is that which proximately presides over any thing, though it should be a God, or though it should be some one of the natures posterior to the Gods.
And the soul that through similitude to the daemoniacal genus produces energies more wonderful than those which belong to human nature, and which suspends the whole of its life from daemons, is a daemon kata schesin, according to habitude, i. e. proximity or alliance.
Thus, as it appears to me, Socrates in the Republic calls
those daemons, who have lived well, and who in consequence of this are transferred to a better condition of being, and to more holy places. But an essential daemon is neither called a daemon through habitude to secondary natures, nor through an assimilation to something different from itself; but is allotted this peculiarity from himself, and is defined by a certain hyparxis, by appropriate powers, and by different modes of energies. In short, the rational soul is called in the Timaeus the daemon
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of the animal; but we investigate the daemon of man, and not of the animal; that which governs the rational soul itself, and not its instrument; and that which leads the soul to its judges, after the dissolution of the animal, as Socrates says in the Phaedo. For when the animal is no more, the daemon which the soul was allotted while connected with the body, conducts it to its judge. For, if the soul possesses that daemon while living in the body, which is said to lead it to judgement after death, this daemon must be the daemon of the man, and not of the animal alone.
To which we may add, that beginning from on high, it governs the whole of our composition.
Nor again, dismissing the rational soul, must it be said that a daemon is that which energizes in the soul: as for instance, that in those who live according to reason, reason is the daemon; in those that live according to anger, the irascible part; and in those that live according to desire, the epithymetic or desiring part. Nor must it be said that the nature which proximately presides over that which energizes in our life, is a daemon: as for instance, that reason is the daemon of the irascible, and anger of those that live according to desire. For, in the first place, to assert that
daemons are parts of our soul, is to admire human life in an improper degree, and oppose the division of Socrates in the Republic, who after Gods and daemons places the heroic and human race, and blames the poets for introducing in their poems heroes in no respect better than men, but subject to similar passions. By this accusation, therefore, it is plain that Socrates was very far from thinking that daemons, who are of a sublimer order than heroes, are to be ranked among the parts and powers of the soul. For from this doctrine it will follow that things essentially more excellent give completion to such as are subordinate.
And in the second place, from this hypothesis, mutations of lives would also introduce multiform mutations of daemons. For the avaricious character is frequently changed into an ambitious life, this again into a life which is formed by right opinion, and this last into a scientific life.
The daemon, therefore, will vary according to these changes; for the energizing part will be different at different times. If, therefore, either this energizing part itself is a daemon, or that part which has an arrange[264]
ment prior to it, daemons will be changed together with the mutation of human life, and the same person will have many daemons in one life; which is of all things the most impossible. For the soul never changes in one life the government of its daemon; but it is the same daemon which presides over us till we are brought before the judges of our conduct, as also Socrates asserts in the Phaedo.
Again, those who consider a partial intellect, or that intellect which subsists at the extremity of the intellectual order, as the same with the daemon which is assigned to man, appear to me to confound the intellectual peculiarity with the daemoniacal essence. For all daemons subsist in the extent of souls, and rank as the next in order to divine souls.
But the intellectual order is different from that of soul, and is neither, allotted the same essence, nor power, nor energy.
Further still, this also may be said, that souls enjoy intellect then only when they convert themselves to it, receive its light, and conjoin their own with intellectual energy; but they experience the presiding care of a daemoniacal nature through the whole of life, and in every thing which proceeds from fate and providence. For it is the daemon that governs the whole of our life, and that fulfils the elections which we made prior to generation, together with the gifts of fate, and of those Gods that preside over fate. It is likewise the daemon that supplies and measures the illuminations from providence. And as souls indeed, we are suspended from intellect, but as souls using the body we require the aid of a daemon.
Hence, Plato in the Phaedrus calls intellect the governor of the soul; but he everywhere calls a daemon the inspector and guardian of mankind.
And no one who considers the affair rightly, will find any other one and proximate providence of every thing pertaining to us, besides that of a daemon. For intellect, as we have said, is participated by the rational soul, but not by the body; and nature is participated by the body, but not by the dianoetic part. And further still, the rational soul rules over anger and desire, but it has no dominion over fortuitous events. But the daemon alone moves, governs, and orderly disposes all our affairs. For he gives perfection to reason, measures the passions, inspires nature, connects the body, supplies things fortuitous, accomplishes the decrees of fate, and imparts the gifts of providence. In short, he is the king of every thing in and about us, and is the pilot of the whole of our life.
And thus much concerning our allotted daemons.
CHAPTER XLIV.
IN the next place, with respect to the daemon of Socrates, these three things are to be particularly considered. First, that he not only ranks as a daemon, but also as a God. For in the First Alcibiades Socrates clearly says, " I have long been of opinion that the God did not as yet direct me to hold any conversation with you" He calls the same power therefore a daemon and a God. And in the Apology he more clearly evinces that this daemon is allotted a divine transcendency, considered as ranking in a daemoniacal order. And this is what we before said, that the daemons of divine souls, and who make choice of an intellectual and elevating life, are divine, transcending the whole of a daemoniacal genus, and being the first participants of the Gods. For, as is a daemon among Gods, such also is a God among daemons. Among the divinities however the hyparxis is divine; but in daemons on the contrary, the peculiarity of their essence is daemoniacal, but the analogy which they bear to divinity evinces their essence to be godlike. For on account of their transcendency with respect to other daemons they frequently appear as Gods.
With great propriety therefore, does Socrates call his daemon a God ; for he belonged to the first and highest daemons. Hence Socrates was most perfect, being governed by such a presiding power, and conducting himself by the will of such a leader and guardian of his life. This then was one of the illustrious prerogatives of the daemon of Socrates. The second was this: that Socrates perceived a certain voice proceeding from his daemon. For this is asserted by him in the Theaetetus and in the
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Phaedrus. This voice also is the signal from the daemon, which he speaks of in the Theages. And again in the Phaedrus, when he was about to pass over the river, he experienced the accustomed signal from the daemon. What then, does Socrates indicate by these assertions, and what was the voice through which he says the daemon signified to him his will ?
In the first place, we must say that Socrates, through his dianoetic power, and his science of things, enjoyed the inspiration of his daemon, who continually recalled him to divine love. In the second place, in the affairs of life, Socrates supernally directed his providential attention to more imperfect souls. And according to the energy of his daemon, he received the light proceeding from thence, neither in his dianoetic part alone, nor in his doxastic powers, but also in his spirit, the illumination of the daemon suddenly diffusing itself through the whole of his life, and now moving sense itself. For it is evident that reason, imagination, and sense, enjoy the same energy differently; and that each of our inward parts is passive to, and is moved by the daemon in a peculiar manner. The voice therefore, did not act upon Socrates externally with passivity; but the daemoniacal inspiration, proceeding inwardly through his whole soul, and diffusing itself as far as to the organs of sense, became at last a voice, which was rather recognized by consciousness than by sense. For such are the illuminations of good daemons and the Gods.
In the third place, let us consider the peculiarity of the daemon of Socrates; for it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. This also must be again referred to the Socratic life. For it is not a property common to our allotted daemons, but was the characteristic of the guardian of Socrates. We must say therefore, that the beneficent and philanthropic disposition of Socrates, and his great promptitude with respect to the communication of good, did not require the exhortation of the daemon. For he was impelled from himself, and was ready at all times to impart to all men the most excellent life. But since many of those that came to him were unadapted to the pursuit of virtue and the science of wholes, his governing good daemon restrained him from a providential care of such as these. Just as a good charioteer alone
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restrains the impetus of a horse naturally well adapted for the race, but does not stimulate him, in consequence of his being excited to motion from himself, and not requiring the spur, but the bridle. And hence Socrates, from his great readiness to benefit those with whom he conversed, rather required a recalling than an exciting daemon.
For the inaptitude of auditors, which is for the most part concealed from human sagacity, requires a daemoniacal discrimination; and the knowledge of favourable opportunities can by this alone be accurately announced to us. Socrates therefore being naturally impelled to good, alone required to be recalled in his unseasonable impulses.
But farther still, it may be said, that of daemons, some are allotted a purifying and undefiled power; others a perfective; and others a demiurgic power. And in short, they are divided according to the characteristic peculiarities of the Gods, and the powers under which they are arranged. Each likewise, according to his hyparxis, incites the object of his providential care to a blessed life; some of them moving us to an attention to inferior concerns; and others restraining us from action, and an energy verging to externals. It appears therefore, that the daemon of Socrates being allotted this peculiarity, viz. cathartic, and the source of an undefiled life, and being arranged under this power of Apollo, and uniformly presiding over the whole of purification, separated also Socrates from too much commerce with the vulgar, and a life extending itself into multitude.
But it led him into the depths of his soul, and an energy
undefiled by subordinate natures. And hence it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. For, what else is to recall, than to withdraw him from the multitude to inward energy? And of what is this the peculiarity except of purification? Indeed, it appears to me, that as Orpheus places the Apolloniacal monad over king Bacchus, which recalls him from a progression into Titanic multitude, and a desertion of his royal throne, in like manner the daemon of Socrates conducted him to an intellectual place of survey, and restrained his association with the
multitude. For the daemon is analogous to Apollo, being his attendant, but the intellect of Socrates to Bacchus; for our intellect is the progeny of the power of this divinity.
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CHAPTER XLV.
FROM the MS. Scholia also of Proclus on the Cratylus, we derive the following important information concerning this order of beings who connect the divine and human nature together. Of the genera posterior to the Gods, and which are indeed their perpetual attendants, but produce, in conjunction with them mundane fabrications from on high, as far as to the last of things,—of these genera, some unfold generation into light; others are transporters of union ; others of power; and others call forth the knowledge of the Gods, and an intellectual essence. But of these, some are called angelic, by those that are skilful in divine concerns, in consequence of being established according to the hyparxis itself of the Gods, and making that which is uniform in their nature commensurate with things of a secondary rank. Hence, the angelic tribe is boniform, as unfolding into light the occult goodness of the Gods.
Others among these are called by theologists daemoniacal, as binding the middle of all things, and as distributing divine power, and producing it as far as to the last of things. For daisai is to merisai. But this genus possesses abundance of power, and is multifarious, as giving subsistence to those last daemons who are material, who draw down s