What emerges from our analysis of the Dalai Lama so far is a portrait of someone who has the external appearance of a spiritual personality, a holy being, but in truth is ordinary, self-centred and ruthless. As the following chapter reveals, behind the mask of Avalokiteshvara hides an ordinary person, engaged in the same kinds of unsavoury actions and with the same kind of motivation that we associate with corrupt politicians.
The Recognition of the Fourteenth alai Lama
As explained in Chapter 2, fundamental questions are now being asked publicly about the veracity of many aspects of the selection process by which the current Dalai Lama was identified, and therefore about the true identity of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama himself.
The illusion of Government
Gradually over the years since the Dalai Lama left his homeland, 145,000 Tibetans have moved from Tibet and made settlements in India, Nepal and Bhutan or settled further afield in exile communities throughout the world.268
The Dalai Lama himself, together with many of his closest followers, eventually settled in the old British hill station of McLeod Ganj, near the small Indian town of Dharamsala in northern India. The Tibetan town that has grown up around him there is now the principal Tibetan refugee community.
At enormous expense an administration was established in Dharamsala to maintain effective control over the widely-spread refugee population.269This administration has become known as ‘The Government of Tibet in Exile’ though it has no legal status either within or outside India and is not officially recognised by any country, least of all by India.270
An official statement, published by the Department of Information of the Tibetan government in exile, reads:
‘In exile, the Tibetan Government has been reorganized according to modern democratic principles. It administers all matters pertaining to Tibetans in exile, including the restoration, preservation and development of Tibetan culture and education, and leads the struggle for the restoration of Tibet’s freedom.’271
There is a Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE) (for merly called the ‘Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies’, and before that the ‘Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies), which consists of fortysix representatives. However, of these representatives only thirty are directly elected by the Tibetan people. The five major religious traditions (Gelug, Kagyu, Sakya, Nyingma and Bön) elect two representatives each, and the remaining six are direct appointees of the Dalai Lama. This in itself represents a breach of democratic principles, since only two-thirds of the delegates are directly elected by the people. The TPiE nominally appoints the members of the Cabinet (‘Kashag’ in Tibetan), but in practice these are often directly appointed by the Dalai Lama. And for a time in the early 1980s the Dalai Lama even took it upon himself to appoint unilaterally all delegates of the TPiE. 272
Tsering Wangyal writing in the Tibetan Reviewin 1979 pointed out that ‘every important office-bearer in Dharamsala has to be approved by the Dalai Lama before formally taking his office.’273In the same article he continued:
‘Despite the introduction in 1963 of some of its external paraphernalia, Tibetan democracy is yet to come of age. The Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies (The National Assembly), the most consciously democratic institution in the exiled Tibetan community, has at its last public appearance failed to alter its image of being an impotent body – subservient for all practical purposes to the dictates of the government (the Dalai Lama). … The experience so far has shown that the old-world values and ideas continue to dominate the positions of power in the Tibetan community …’
In the last fifty years, the Tibetan exile government functioning in Dharamsala has never faced an opposition party, nor even an individual who could be called an opposition member. It has never taken a decision contrary to the Dalai Lama’s position, and such an event is even considered to be inconceivable. With all authority (executive, legislative, judicial and religious) invested solely in the person of the Dalai Lama, this government has ceased to uphold any pretence of constitutional democracy.
The Tibetan government is the Dalai Lama, and the Dalai Lama is the Tibetan government. Behind the trappings of government with its illusion of democracy, the Dalai Lama’s position, with its central tenet, ‘L’etat, c’est moi’ (‘I am the State’), extends its domain of authority over all aspects of policy and decisionmaking. There is no decision of government that is not the Dalai Lama’s decision.
Because the Dalai Lama is commonly held to be an infallible being, the embodiment of a Buddha, it is not only inconceivable but would also be heretical to formulate a policy or make a decision contrary to his wishes. Furthermore, because it would again be an act of heresy to criticise the policy or decision of a supposedly enlightened being, all criticism and blame for the Dalai Lama’s mistakes are directed at the Tibetan government, which has no means of redress.
In this way, the so-called Tibetan government is blamed for all of the Dalai Lama’s mistakes, and the untarnished image of the Dalai Lama is maintained. This very convenient system has enabled the Dalai Lama, through the illusion of government, to destroy the reputation and activities of others, to intimidate and persecute them, and to instigate violence against them, all while maintaining a faultless public image, and knowing full well that all subsequent blame will be carried by his ‘government’.
In September 1995, an unprecedented ‘open letter’ from the Tibetan people to the Dalai Lama was given anonymously to an English woman travelling in Nepal. Called the Mongoose-Canine Letter (see Appendix 2), it revealed to Westerners for the first time another side of the Dalai Lama, one which was already an open secret within the Tibetan community. For the first time ever, the Dalai Lama and his government were publicly accused of such things as illegal international trading in arms; persecution and assassination; and of creating schism and disharmony within the Tibetan spiritual traditions and community.
The Dalailama’s Brother, Gyalo Dondrub
According to Tibetan sources, an older brother of the Dalai Lama called Gyalo Dondrub has taken advantage of the exile situation to gain increasing personal influence.
‘In Tibet, the family of the Dalai Lama was respected, but had no political power. Gyalo Dondrub, however, has used the changed situation in exile to gain a powerful influence over Tibetan politics.’274
Various established Tibetan ‘noble families’ such as Phala, Surkhang and Yuthog actively used their influence to achieve great benefits for the Tibetan exile community.
‘In old Tibet, political matters were in the hands of the nobility. After the successful escape from Tibet, it was these families in particular who established settlements, schools and political representation in foreign countries.
‘They however stood in the way of Gyalo’s ambition. In the mid-1960s he succeeded in setting public opinion against Surkhang and Yuthog, who were thus forced to leave India and move to Taiwan. Phala was assigned as representative in Switzerland and thereby lost his direct influence in India.’275
To this day Gyalo Dondrub remains one of the most powerful figures in the Tibetan government and community.
‘He [Gyalo] is continuously occupied with ‘‘secret’’ business behind the scenes, and although he maintains contact with the CIA, he is the only direct contact the Dalai Lama has with the communist leadership in Beijing. He is regarded as the ‘‘secret boss’’, and his role, as well as his goals are unclear.’276
Kensaku Okawa comments on a speech given in Taiwan on 29 October 1967 by a former minister of the Tibetan exile government, Yuthok Tashi Dhundup:
‘Yuthok criticized many of Gyalo’s activities, for example, (1) Gyalo dominates DL [Dalai Lama] and controls TGE [Tibetan government in exile] through his brother; (2) Gyalo embezzles TGE’s budget and invests it into his own business; (3) Gyalo embezzles the donations intended for the Tibetan guerrilla force; (4) Gyalo controls TGE by tactics involving bribery and boycott against its officials. This talk reveals not only Gyalo’s growing influence in TGE, but also the discord between him and officials such as Yuthok.’277
A picture begins to emerge of a government dominated and controlled by the Dalai Lama and his family.
‘In Tibet, a family member of a Dalai Lama was legally barred from holding office, something that changed in exile, where Gyalo Thondup [or Dondrub] and others later became ministers. Much controversy surrounds Gyalo Thondup whom Tibetans believe to be the main architect of the Dalai Lama’s plan to integrate Tibet into China under increased cultural autonomy.
‘Recently, another brother of the Dalai Lama has claimed that today only three families, including his, run the exile government … “the Tibetan exile government is run by three families, one of which is mine’’ [that is, the Dalai Lama’s family, or Yapshi Taklha family] … the old Gelugpa elite in the exile government had largely been replaced in the 1960s. The family of the Dalai Lama, [admits] to running the government from behind the scenes for decades …’278
And as Michael Backman reports in his articleBehind the Dalai Lama’s holy cloak:
‘Like many Asian politicians, the Dalai Lama has been remarkably nepotistic, appointing members of his family to many positions of prominence. In recent years, three of the six members of the Kashag, or cabinet, the highest executive branch of the Tibetan government-in-exile, have been close relatives of the Dalai Lama.
‘An older brother served as chairman of the Kashag and as the minister of security. He also headed the CIA-backed Tibetan contra movement in the 1960s.
‘A sister-in-law served as head of the government-in-exile’s planning council and its Department of Health.
‘A younger sister served as health and education minister and her husband served as head of the government-in-exile’s Department of Information and International Relations.
‘Their daughter was made a member of the Tibetan parliament in exile. A younger brother has served as a senior member of the private office of the Dalai Lama and his wife has served as education minister.
‘The second wife of a brother-in-law serves as the representative of the Tibetan government-in-exile for northern Europe and head of international relations for the government-in-exile. All these positions give the Dalai Lama’s family access to millions of dollars collected on behalf of the government-in-exile.’279
It is not only Gyalo Dondrub’s position on Tibetan independence that has attracted the most censure from Tibetans, but also the way in which he has manipulated his position as the Dalai Lama’s older brother and thus the secular head of the Yapshi Taklha family, the Dalai Lama’s family, which has been automatically co-opted into the Tibetan aristocratic system.
As it is clear that the source of Gyalo Dondrub’s power lies in his closeness to the Dalai Lama, and that the Dalai Lama has done nothing to restrain his brother, it is the Dalai Lama who must take responsibility for his brother’s bullying and destructive actions.
The Dudjom Rinpoche Affair
Dudjom Rinpoche was one of the important modern masters of the Nyingma tradition, and a great spiritual teacher. Shortly after his arrival from Tibet, in the early 1960s, he gave extensive teachings in Kalimpong and Darjeeling. These were very popular and he became famous throughout the Tibetan community. But suddenly Dudjom Rinpoche was arrested and jailed in Siliguri, falsely accused by the Dalai Lama’s exile government of being a Chinese spy. As Kundeling Rinpoche notes:
‘This is the favourite accusation of the Tibetan government in exile made against anyone who they perceive as posing a threat to the absolute authority of the Dalai Lama.
‘Dudjom Rinpoche became very popular; he became very famous and that posed a threat to their absolute authority. That is basically what an autocratic system is all about. Except for the leader, nobody can be smarter or more famous or more good looking or more prosperous than that particular person. You can’t outshine your ruler. If you do, you have to be cut down to size.’280
It may also be that Dudjom Rinpoche was not interested in the Dalai Lama’s desire for a union of all Tibetan traditions. In replying to the question ‘If some people have been practising according to one lineage, is it necessary for them to change lineages in order to create unity in the community?’ Dudjom Rinpoche replied:
‘Certainly not. Whatever practice a person is well-grounded in is what he should continue. Part of our purpose is to preserve all lineages as methods for attaining enlightenment. … as practitioners we should sustain our own tradition while respecting and rejoicing in the virtue of other traditions.’281
The Assassination of Gungtang Tsultrim
Gungtang Tsultrim was the leader of an organisation known as the ‘Thirteen Settlements’ or ‘Thirteen Groups of Tibetans’. This organisation consisted of thirteen (later fourteen) Tibetan exile groups and settlements that wished to establish themselves under Indian law, independent of the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama’s exile government. Although this organization had its origins in a grassroots movement in Tibet, the principal impetus for its formation in India occurred shortly after the Dalai Lama’s arrival in Dharamsala.
When the Dalai Lama first arrived in Dharamsala, he held a series of meetings with other senior leaders from all the traditions. The purpose of these meetings was for the Dalai Lama to introduce a proposal for the integration of all four schools of Tibetan Buddhism into one. At the time the Gelugpa did not reject the Dalai Lama’s ideas directly because of their close relationship with the institution of the Dalai Lama; they remained neutral. But the proposal was rejected by the Sakya, Nyingma and Kagyu lamas. Practitioners of these other traditions were extremely worried about this proposal, fearing that their traditions would soon be destroyed. In response to the proposal, and against the Dalai Lama’s wishes, they organised thirteen groups which then associated to form the ‘Thirteen Settlements’.
Over the years many conflicts developed between the Dalai Lama and these thirteen settlements, until in 1976 their secular leader Gungtang Tsultrim was murdered. Without the strong leadership of Gungtang Tsultrim, and with no other leader of his capacity to replace him, the coalition disintegrated. This had been the motive for the assassination.
A website dealing mainly with controversies regarding the Karmapa adds:
‘In 1964, the government-in-exile of the Dalai Lama wanted to introduce social, economic and religious reforms to the recently evicted Tibetans. Gyalo Thondrub, the Dalai Lama’s audacious brother, decided that the best answer to Mao’s invasion and destruction of their country was to adapt Tibet and Tibetan policy in exile to the new Communist realities. He boldly proposed to abolish the old Buddhist schools, to do awaywiththerich,religiousshow,andthusbringthehighlamas to the ground. “No more thrones, rituals, or gold brocades,” he was rumoured to have uttered. The spiritual hierarchies of the Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya and the corollary sub-orders fell victim to slander and reproach. His words struck fear into the lamas’ hearts. As more details of the elaborate plan began to emerge, it became clear that a coup against three of the schools was being hatched. The new religious body that would replace the traditional lineages was to be controlled by the Gelugpa hierarchy. The worried lamas rushed to Karmapa for help.
‘When in 1976, Gungthang Tsultrim, the political head of the alliance, was murdered, the assassin confessed to operate on orders from the Tibetan cabinet. Hired for the job, he was paid rupees three hundred thousand by the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala. The Tibetan government-in-exile had also offered him more money for eliminating the 16th Karmapa, he confessed.’282
The Karmapa Affair
The Sixteenth Karmapa, the head of the Karma Kagyu Tradition, was one of the most famous and highly-revered spiritual masters within the Tibetan community in India, and gradually his reputation also spread throughout the West. He was regarded as one of the greatest spiritual masters of the twentieth century. He had a strong following throughout the Himalayan region including India, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, and a growing discipleship in the West. The Thirteen Settlements had wished to make the Karmapa their spiritual head. The Dalai Lama’s government therefore tried directly and indirectly to eclipse the popularity and fame of the Karmapa. It is well known that the Dalai Lama and the Karmapa were in open conflict in the last years of the Karmapa’s life.
In an interview the Dalai Lama has talked of his relationship with the Sixteenth Karmapa:
‘ “On a personal level, still old friends; no problem. But as to the Tibetan community and the politics, a little bit of doubt, a little distance …” The Karmapa, he went on, had refused to contribute to the booklet for independence. “And later, I heard that in talking to some of his centres in Europe and America he said the Tibetan freedom struggle is politics, and that as spiritual practitioners they should not be involved.”
‘ “… So Karmapa Rinpoche, I think perhaps he misled people a little bit, and that made me a little sad …” ’283
The Karmapa was here actually exposing the truth about the Dalai Lama’s use of ‘Lama Policy’, so in light of the Dalai Lama’s views on the union of religion and politics, and his identification of the Tibetan state under his control with the continued development of Buddhism, it is unlikely that the Dalai Lama’s reaction was merely one of sadness.
After the Sixteenth Karmapa passed away, the Dalai Lama took the unprecedented step of using his own power to force the selection of the Karmapa’s reincarnation. This was entirely unwarranted because historically the selection has always been an internal matter solely under the jurisdiction of the Kagyu spiritual tradition itself. There were two candidates: one born in Chineseoccupied Tibet, the candidate officially recognised by the Chinese authorities; and the other born in India and recognised by the great Kagyu spiritual master Shamar Rinpoche. Shamar Rinpoche’s lineage has been closely connected with the Karmapa lineage since the 13th century, and he has been considered second only to the Karmapa himself within the Kagyu tradition. The Dalai Lama sided with the Chinese and ‘officially’ recognised their candidate, a decision that caused chaos within the Kagyu tradition, producing a deep schism between those who follow the Dalai Lama and those who follow Shamar Rinpoche. This schism has divided this spiritual tradition against itself, and at times has led to violence.
As an article in the IndianSundaymagazine commented:
‘The Dalai Lamas have never held any right over the confirmation, let alone recognition, of a Karmapa at any time throughout history. In fact, the Karmapa line precedes that of the Dalai Lamas by over three hundred years and their lineages are and always have been entirely separate.
‘The Dalai Lama does not have historic or religious authority to approve Karmapa reincarnations, or head lamas for any school of Tibetan Buddhism besides his own Gelugpa lineage. This point may be confusing to non-Tibetans because, as head of the Tibetan government-in-exile, the Dalai Lama has a claim on the political loyalty of many Tibetans. Yet, his political role does not give the Dalai Lama spiritual authority to validate the head lamas of Buddhist schools outside his own. The four Buddhist schools of Tibet have always had separate administrations and have chosen their own head lamas, much as Protestants and Catholics choose their own leaders. So, just as the Pope has no role in choosing the Protestant Archbishop of Canterbury, so the Dalai Lama is not authorized to recognize the Karmapa, who is the leader of the Karma Kagyu school. Only the administration of the late 16th Karmapa is authorized to validate its own chief lama’s reincarnation.’284
In a letter to the Dalai Lama in February 1997, Shamar Rinpoche stated clearly that the Dalai Lama has no authority in confirming a Karmapa reincarnation and no business throwing his ‘weight’ at the Kagyu lineage:
‘This amounts to a medieval dictatorial command and I understand that this is the approach that you desire. But it is completely unacceptable to me ... Therefore, my final request to the Private Office of the Dalai Lama is that [it] does not involve His Holiness’s name in this problematic issue ... with respect to our lineage it is up to us, who are part of that lineage, to achieve its aims ... you ought to be cautious in your undertakings!’285
As a consequence of his outspoken criticism of the Dalai Lama on this issue, the Tibetan government has done everything possible to turn this lama into a pariah within Tibetan society.
As the Mongoose-Canine Letteraddressed to the Dalai Lama says:
‘… when in the 1960’s you tried to get rid of the influence of one great Lama’s power, such as Dujom Rinpoche and Karmapa, the side-effect was felt by many Tibetan Lamas, and you caused them to unite in opposition. You could not leave it lightly and you had to do something that caused a split within Tibetan society ... Your ministers will have told you that a Karmapa established in the Himalayas will affect the name and power of the Dalai Lama as before since he is very popular in the Himalayas. If the Tibetan exile government of Dalai Lama is really for the independence of Tibet, for the democracy of Tibet, ... how can a private organisation like that of the Karmapa, affect your government?
‘... When your Holiness Dalai Lama gave support for this (backed the Chinese candidate) how badly will this harm Tibet’s future? You think that if within your life you cannot be the leader of the Tibetans in Tibet, at least you must keep your position as leader of Tibet in India by using Dharma and politics. For that you calculate that it does not matter what happens for the future of Tibet after your life, as long as you can keep your power now. It is really sad.’ (see Appendix 2)
In an interview in 1994, Jigme Rinpoche, a leading Kagyu lama, made the following comments on the Karmapa situation:
‘... in my opinion a mistake was made right at the beginning, there were miscalculations, control was lost and it was necessary to go that way … The mistakes were not just made now but centuries ago, and led to the loss of the country. Many people in the West think that everybody in Tibet was wise, and they wonder why Tibetans lost Tibet. But when one looks objectively one finds that mistakes like those led to the loss of Tibet and will lead to the loss of the freedom of Tibet in the future. ...
‘If this continues, Tibet has only [a] few years left … The 16th Karmapa said something like that to Gendun Rinpoche. He said, “You should go to Europe and establish the Dharma.” Gendun Rinpoche asked Karmapa what will happen in Tibet and Asia, and Karmapa said, “Only the outer form of Dharma will continue to exist there, and it will be very difficult in the future to maintain its essence.” ’286
When other Tibetans achieve fame or influence the Dalai Lama destroys their reputations, their security and even sometimes their lives, acting with political motivations of jealousy and clinging to power. This is what he did to the Panchen Lama, to Dudjom Rinpoche, to Gungtang Tsultrim, even to his own Spiritual Guide Trijang Rinpoche, and his Spiritual Guide Je Phabongkha Rinpoche. This is what he did to the Karmapa and what he is trying to do to the few holy spiritual masters who are left within the Gelugpa Tradition today.
The Politics of the Kalachakra Initiations
On this subject the Mongoose-Canine Lettersays:
‘Normally the Kalachakra initiation is not given in public. Then you [Dalai Lama] started to use it continuously in a big way for your politics … Nowadays you have given the Kalachakra initiation so many times you have made the Tibetan people into donkeys. You can force them to go here and there as you like.’ (see Appendix 2)
When people receive a Tantric Buddhist initiation or empowerment they are encouraged to establish a close connection with the person giving the initiation. It has been said that the main reason for the Dalai Lama giving so many Kalachakra initiations in the West is to create many western disciples as a powerful basis of support for his political actions – such as the ban on the practice of Dorje Shugden.
According to some sources, in the past Kalachakra initiations were mainly given by those holding the Panchen Lama’s position, and that this is because of a special connection, the Panchen Lama being a manifestation of Shambhala’s god-king. Gradually the Fourteenth Dalai Lama has taken over this position, until finally now no other lama has the opportunity to give the Kalachakra initiation in public. For the Dalai Lama, giving the Kalachakra empowerment is the best method to make money, to control people through spiritual devotion, and to spread his reputation. In this way he can use people’s religious faith to fulfil his political aims. It is shameful that Buddha’s precious teachings of Highest Yoga Tantra are being used for such worldly achievements.
Defamation of Je Phabongkhapa
Je Phabongkhapa, or Phabongkha Rinpoche, (1878-1941) ‘was one of the great lamas of the twentieth century. He attained his geshe degree at Sera Monastic University, Lhasa, and became a highly influential teacher in Tibet. He was the root Guru of both tutors of the present Dalai Lama, and the teacher of many of the other Gelug lamas who have been bringing the Dharma to the West since they fled Tibet in 1959.’287
But the Fourteenth Dalai Lama now defames this great Teacher. As recently as 27 March 2006 the Dalai Lama implied that Je Phabongkhapa developed a sectarian bias due to his association with Dorje Shugden:
‘In the case of Kyabje Pabongkha Rinpoche, he was, in the earlier part of his life, a practitioner of ecumenical faith. Gradually, he developed a relationship with Dholgyal. Need I say more?’288
ButtheDalaiLamagivesnoevidenceforsayingthatJePhabongkhapa was sectarian later in his life.
On another occasion the Dalai Lama said that although ‘Kyabje Phabongkha Rinpoche was really an incredibly great master. ... virtually the supreme holder of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim) and Mind Training (Lo jong) traditions’ and ‘was a highly realized being’, that nevertheless ‘with regard to Dholgyal [Dorje Shugden] he seems to have made mistakes.’289
The following account illustrates the low esteem in which Je Phabongkhapa is held within certain sections of the Gelugpa Tradition as a result of the Dalai Lama’s defamation. In August 2009 there was a Rigchung degree ceremony (for those who have successfully completed their study of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra) held at Sera-Mey Monastery in South India. During the ceremony for a monk from the Gungru Khamtsen section of the monastery, the disciplinarian of the monastery Geshe Ngawang Yonten publicly read out the ‘refuge letter’ (in which a patron writes the names of his family and spiritual masters for blessing by the assembled monks). The refuge letter included the names of Kyabje Phabongkha Rinpoche and Drana Rinpoche (another prominent Dorje Shugden practitioner).
After the ceremony the disciplinarian received phone calls from monks complaining about his reading out the names of these two Lamas. The next day in the assembly hall, the disciplinarian apologised: ‘I didn’t get any prior notice before reading the letter. The person who wrote the names has accumulated negativity, as I did for reading it [the letter]. Therefore we should purify our sin by offering katag [traditional Tibetan offering scarf] to the Protector Thawo. These Lamas did not sign and pledge that they will never worship Shugden, and we will never share material and religious ties with Shugden followers.’
During the Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s time, Je Phabongkhapa was the most famous and influential Lama who engaged practically in spreading the doctrine of Je Tsongkhapa throughout Tibet. He was greatly influential in reviving the Gelug Tradition at this time, emphasising the practical application of Buddha’s teachings instead of just scholastic knowledge, and he was the lama most involved in promoting the practice of Dorje Shugden. Because of this, detractors of this practice such as the present Dalai Lama have tried either to maintain that Je Phabongkhapa rejected the practice of Dorje Shugden towards the end of his life, or to smear him with the accusation of being sectarian and of promoting Dorje Shugden practice as a way of damaging other Buddhist traditions.
There may be another reason for the present Dalai Lama’s defamation of Je Phabongkhapa. As Goldstein says ‘Phabongka was famous for his view that lamas should not become involved in politics ...’290, which is not an attitude the Dalai Lama can accept, especially from such an important figure within the Gelug Tradition.
With regard to the many ru