Step 1:
Assess the Track II Environment
The first step in any conflict intervention is usually conflict assessment. Even if one is a local, living in and with the conflict on a daily basis, it is important to step back and metaphorically go “up onto the balcony” To get a broader perspective of the situation and a keener sense of the opportunities and challenges that the intervention is likely to encounter.
One needs to understand who all the parties are, what the issues are, what the conflict dynamics are, and what has been done (and by whom) to address the issues over time. Intractable conflicts generally have long and complicated histories, which compound the complexities of present realities. Multiple parties are usually contesting the conflict, and multiple track II actors (some from within the country, others from outside) are on the scene, all working on related but different parts of the problem. The first step in any track II effort, therefore, is to figure out as much as possible who is doing what, what the needs are, and what is not being done that might be useful. (Such an inquiry is generally referred to as a “needs assessment.”) Knowledge of these gaps can then become the basis for conceptualizing and planning track II activities that will have the greatest impact. (For more detailed guidance on how to conduct a conflict assessment, see another handbook in the Peacekeeper’s Toolkit series, Managing a Mediation Process, by Amy L. Scott and David R. Smock.)
Determine if Track II Efforts Are Feasible
Track II activities depend on the presence of a reasonably developed and active civil society for success. Societies that have a lively civil society are more likely to have a cadre of people who have the conviction and staminneeded to participate in a track II process—and to do so in good faith, hopeful that a more constructive way of approaching the conflict can be
found. If people are content with the status quo or profoundly pessimistic about the chances of changing the situation, they will not be interested in participating, and if they are cajoled into participating, they are likely to undermine the process more than help it. If little civil society activity exists, this is where peacebuilding efforts need to start. Dialogues, problem-solving workshops, and other bilateral or multilateral processes will have to wait until later.
Even where an active civil society does exist, track II efforts may still be infeasible because of severe restrictions on civil liberties. For instance, if participants in track II activities are required to travel, those activities will lead nowhere if participants cannot obtain passports or visas. Similarly, participants may have difficulty gaining access to protected or neutral zones or moving freely within rebel-controlled territories. Track I players must be willing to give track II activities “space.” This is meant figuratively, rather than literal y (though finding suitable space is an issue, too). In repressive environments, where certain forms of assembly, speech, and action may be prohibited or punished, the safety of participants must be considered very careful y. People who engage in peacemaking are often regarded as traitors by members of their own communities. For this reason, many track II processes try to stay very low key, even secret, to protect participants when they reenter their home environments.
Knowing the local history of track II activities can be useful in determining what new activities wil be both possible and likely to bear fruit. The more that the government and/or potential participants are familiar with track II processes, the more comfortable with them they are likely to be. However, if one or more track II processes have gone badly in the past (for example, increasing rather than diminishing hostility between groups, or taking a lot of time without making significant progress or bringing about any change), the local community and/or the parties to the conflict may distrust proposals for new track II activities. Such a wary environment is not an insurmountable hurdle, but a lot of effort will have to be devoted to explaining how a new activity will avoid the kinds of problems previously encountered.
A related problem occurs when too much track II activity has happened in the past or is currently under way. Often, many track II actors converge on a single high-profile problem location, and many of those actors try to recruit the same local people to participate in their programs. Such a surfeit of attention can have several negative consequences. In the first place, coordination of track II activities becomes extremely difficult. Second, people “burn out.” They have been involved in numerous track II activities, and have said the same things over and over again to the same people but nothing ever seems to change. A third problem is that some parties to the conflict or members of the local community will “forum shop,” looking for the process that they think will best lead to the achievement of their goals.
When such shopping expeditions lead important parties away from the official negotiating table, track I efforts may be undermined.
Evaluate the Need for Track II before Track I
Track II is often needed before track I because track I mediation will not work if
➤ the parties are not ready to negotiate or the conflict is not “ripe” for negotiation;
➤ negotiation is impossible because one or more of the parties—or issues—is viewed by the other(s) as illegitimate;
➤ one of the parties is too fragmented, ill-defined, low-powered, or inexperienced to allow for effective de-escalation or negotiation;
➤ the conflict is needs-based or values-based; or
➤ the general population is unsupportive of the peacemaking effort.
If any one or more of these situations is present, track II processes can nurture the conditions for subsequent track I efforts.
Creating Ripeness
Disputing parties are usual y not ready to negotiate if they think they can win outright. Not until all sides agree that they are in a damaging situation that they cannot, by their own efforts, improve (often called a “mutual y hurting stalemate”) will they be willing to engage in track I peacemaking. Even then, if any party sees no “way out”—if it lacks trust in the other(s) to negotiate honestly or to uphold any agreement that is made—it may continue the struggle. (The concepts of “mutual y hurting stalemate” and “way out” are discussed in another Peacemaker’s Toolkit handbook, Timing Mediation Initiatives by I. William Zartman.)
When a conflict is not ripe for negotiations, track II activities can be useful in stimulating ripeness. A party that is unwilling to come to the negotiating table may nonetheless be open to a third-party consultation to guide them in developing or expanding their thinking on interests and positions. Many track II actors work directly with parties in this way (the Consensus Building Institute and Independent Diplomat are two examples). An intimate understanding of the conflict landscape—including knowledge of the decision-making dynamics within the parties—is essential if these actors are to accurately identify entry points for track II efforts that can serve to nudge the situation toward ripeness.
Track II activities can also facilitate communication between parties, build trust and relationships, break down stereotypes, and develop new ways of seeing and solving vexing problems. Such efforts help the parties understand that there is a way out of the predicament they are in, and that mutual y satisfactory solutions might indeed be possible.
Decision makers within the parties can also be influenced indirectly. Mid-level leaders—for instance, prominent figures within religious and ethnic groups and within civil society and the wider community—often have access to the official representatives of the parties or are at least able to influence the climate of opinion within a party’s broad constituency. If even just a handful of mid-level leaders on each side of a conflict are sufficiently concerned about the status quo to consider alternative, nonviolent approaches to addressing the conflict, then track II activities may be able to gain a foothold and slowly grow in scope and influence, eventual y paving the way to track I efforts.
Track II actors should assess not only this potential, but also what might be needed for mid-level leaders to leverage this power. If the potential exists, knowing what hinders it from being realized is vital to designing an effective strategy of engagement. Are there capacity gaps that can be addressed? Is there a need for a neutral forum? Are like-minded, concerned leaders aware that others share their views? The answers to these and other questions can indicate which track II activities might ripen the situation.
Track II mediators can interface with the many other ancil ary service providers—development and human rights workers, civil society organizations, media organizations, relief workers, and the like—to help provide a coordinated response to humanitarian needs, which will in turn create a better atmosphere at the local level to support the track I peacemaking initiative.
Dealing with “Illegitimate” Parties
Track II processes can be particularly useful when the conflict involves at least one party that is seen by another as “illegitimate.” State negotiators 13 often refuse to talk to such parties—paramilitary or terrorist groups for instance—because of concern that engaging them legitimizes them and condones or encourages their violent actions. However, peace can seldom be achieved without negotiating with such parties, because they will continue their violent struggle until they have at least “been heard” or their needs have been met.
Track II activities can be helpful in ameliorating this kind of situation in two (or more) ways. First, track II actors can work quietly through back channels to ensure that the interests and demands of an illegitimate party are clearly understood and brought to the table. Second, they can work to convince the illegitimate parties that talking is more likely to get their interests met than is violence.
Direct contact with illegitimate parties may be legal y prohibited, however. More than a few countries maintain lists of proscribed actors, and some countries limit almost any kind of interaction with the organizations and individuals named on those lists.
In June 2010, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law that makes it il egal for any American to offer a terrorist entity “material support” of any kind, including training and advice. The court ruled that “urging a terrorist group to put down its arms in favor of using lawful, peaceful means to achieve political goals” is “providing material support” to terrorists, and is therefore il egal.3
When faced with such restrictions, track II actors can work with surrogates—people who share the same (or similar) aspirations as the illegitimate groups, but with whom talking is legal.
This was the approach used in the 1991 Madrid Conference on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hosted by Spain, and co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Palestinian representatives were in frequent communication with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), they were not overt members of the PLO, which Israel considered a “terrorist” organization and with which it refused to negotiate.
Where the presence of illegitimate actors is preventing peace talks, track II actors should assess what steps they can take to reconfigure the dynamics of the situation and pave the way for negotiations. Parties to a conflict are rarely monolithic entities. Are there elements within a party 14 that are committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and that can be engaged? Sometimes parties are committed to conflict because they do not have confidence that political processes will serve their interests. If that confidence can be strengthened by expanding the negotiating agenda to include previously neglected issues or by enhancing the capacity of a party to participate effectively in the political process, perhaps these parties will renounce violence. Illegitimate parties usual y have concerns that are regarded as decidedly legitimate by other groups within society. By focusing on the legitimate concerns, rather than the illegitimate methods, the needs of both sides might be better addressed.
Empowering Low-Power Groups
Track II processes can also help parties that are not unwilling to negotiate but are not ready to do so. Several reasons can explain a lack of readiness. A common cause is a party’s internal fragmentation and disorganization.
One of the problems in resolving the conflict in Darfur has been that there are so many different rebel groups moving in different directions, and making different demands. Even when the government of Sudan was ready to negotiate with the rebels, it was difficult to decide which groups to negotiate with. Indeed, one of the primary reasons for the failure of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement was that two of the primary rebel groups, the SLA faction of Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur (SLA/AW) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), refused to sign or abide by the agreement, while other rebel groups were wil ing to end their struggle. The same dynamic seems to be occurring with the 2010 accords.
Track II actors can try to remedy such a lack of cohesion by helping the various parties identify their interests, goals, and needs, and then help them to work together to develop a coherent negotiating strategy that they can employ at the official negotiation table.
Another common problem is a simple lack of negotiation experience on the “lower-power” side, which consequently finds itself unable to stand up to the more experienced, “higher-power” side. This is another area in which track II trainers can help low-power parties prepare for negotiations. Such assistance might seem one-sided but it is actual y advantageous for both groups, as negotiators on al sides need to understand the negotiation process if it is to succeed. Track II trainers, consultants, facilitators, and 15 even mediators can work with low-powered and inexperienced parties to help them assess the conflict; identify their interests; develop constructive, nonviolent ways of addressing those interests; build coalitions; and improve their negotiation skil s so that they can negotiate effectively, both in unofficial discussions and at the formal negotiating table.
Dealing with Needs and Values
When conflicts are at an impasse because of a clash of seemingly incompatible and nonnegotiable positions, track II processes can be particularly useful. Such deadlocks are particularly common in conflicts that center on needs- based and values-based issues such as security and identity. Track II activities such as dialogue and interactive problem solving can begin to reframe the conflict from a zero-sum, mutual-blame situation to a more nuanced understanding of mutual needs. Although it is usual y assumed that needs-based conflicts are zero-sum or win-lose in nature, they actual y are not. Usual y, everyone’s needs (for security, for example) are more easily met simultaneously (because the more secure one side feels, the less it will feel the need to attack the other side, so the more secure the other side wil feel). This can propel the conflict into a de-escalatory spiral.
The Georgia–South Ossetia Dialogue Project, undertaken by the Conflict Management Group in partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council, brought together members of the negotiating teams of both sides and other influential actors for a series of facilitated joint brainstorming meetings over five years. Participants were asked to talk about their own experiences, interests, needs, and fears and listen to and explore those of the other side. They brainstormed ideas related to the Georgian–South Ossetian negotiation process, particularly on issues they discovered to be of common concern such as cultural and economic ties, refugees, and development. The improved relationships and understanding as wel as the concrete ideas that were developed in these sessions significantly improved both the tone and the content of the official negotiations.4
To assess whether addressing values and needs may be a useful contribution to the conflict at the prenegotiation stage, it is important to know what the root causes of the conflict are and how issues are being framed. When positions are articulated in fixed, nonnegotiable, and emotional y charged terms, this is general y an indicator that values and needs are driving the conflict in destructive ways.
Building a Peace Constituency
Official negotiations cannot succeed if they are not supported by the wider society. Complex conflicts affect all people and are played out at all levels of society, from the elites down to the grassroots. If the lower levels—the grassroots and the mid-level leaders—are still heavily invested in the conflict, the leaders are unlikely to be interested in or willing to negotiate an agreement. And even if they do, it likely will not hold. Thus, track II activities that bring people together in all sorts of ways across conflict lines can contribute to building a “peace constituency”—people who see the value of peaceful relations with “the enemy” and who will push for and support negotiations before, during, and after they occur.
Further, track II processes give space and legitimacy to advocates of moderation. Voicing moderation in long-running, violent conflicts can be dangerous. It can be seen as treason or “supporting the enemy.” Frequently, moderates on al sides are silenced, ostracized, exiled, or even kil ed. For that reason, track II processes are often held in secret or with a very low public profile. Although participating in private cross-conflict dialogues is stil not without risk, it is safer to do so than being open in one’s wil ingness to talk with the other side, and it can quietly grow a set of moderates who can come to the fore when the time is ripe.
Although such efforts are not sufficient to instigate ripeness on their own, having the support of significant mid-level and grassroots leaders once track I negotiations do begin is very important. If track I negotiators are too far out in front of their publics, spoilers will find it easier to scuttle the negotiations and/or the implementation of a peace agreement.
Consider Stand-Alone Track II Roles
Sometimes conflicts are serious and many people are dying, yet track I players choose not to get involved. The issues at stake may seem too political y dangerous or not sufficiently important from a political point of view to risk the time, resources, and/or reputation of potential track I intervenors. Alternatively or additional y, outside states may be reluctant to intervene in a conflict that they judge to be an internal matter for the state concerned. These “forgotten conflicts” can blow up into major catastrophes, as evidenced in the cases of Rwanda in 1994 and Sri Lanka in the 1960s and 1970s.5 In such cases, track I players—and the victims of the conflict—often appreciate the involvement of track II actors, whose efforts can (if successful) prevent the further escalation of the conflict. Activities undertaken in such circumstances include a broad range of prenegotiation activities, from dialogues and interactive conflict resolution to training and joint projects.
For example, the Henry Martyn Institute: International Center for Research, Interfaith Relations and Reconciliation and Peace Core Team Manipur provided participatory conflict resolution workshops in India. Through these trainings, participants were empowered to become more effective dialogue and workshop facilitators, and they went on to help resolve conflicts and to build a stronger peace constituency in violence- torn northeast India.6 John Paul Lederach’s many elective training workshops held in the 1980s in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe also empowered local people to resolve their own problems, often without the help of track I intervention at al . Lederach’s elicitive approach to training helps participants understand and focus on their own understandings about conflict and traditional approaches to conflict resolution and transformation. Often in protracted, violent conflicts, these traditional approaches are forgotten or discredited, or the social structures in which these processes were embedded are destroyed and replaced with alternative authority structures. Lederach helps participants reinvigorate cultural y tested, traditional approaches to peacemaking, and helps them identify ways in which these processes can be utilized to mitigate or bring an end to long-running, violent conflicts that are not adequately addressed by track I processes.7
Sometimes, the boundary between track I and track II can become very blurred, with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), for example, taking on roles normal y played by foreign diplomats and negotiating peace agreements between the parties to a conflict.
The Community of Sant’Egidio in Mozambique is one of the best-known examples of unofficial actors providing track I mediation. Sant’Egidio, an Italian NGO, did not intend to play a track I role; in fact, its representatives started out doing track II activities—establishing relationships with both sides, exploring alternative approaches to the problem, creating communication channels between disputants, and the like. But they ended up actual y negotiating the peace agreement. “Because the mediators didn’t have their own agenda, they were simultaneously able to make the parties themselves ful y responsible for the peace process and to draw in the international community as significant, but nonintrusive actors to the process.” 8
Assess the Need for Track II during Track I
Many of the activities deemed valuable during the prenegotiation phase can also be useful while talks between the parties are taking place. Track II actors can continue to connect the perspectives of illegitimate parties to the peace process through back channels, seek to strengthen the cohesiveness and capacity of one or more of the parties, and work with a broad spectrum of stakeholders on skill and capacity building, problem solving, and dialogue. Track II interventions can be especial y valuable to track I negotiations when official talks grind to a halt over a highly contentious issue. The problematic issue can be referred to a parallel track II process, which can bring mid-level leaders, with strong interpersonal relationships developed over time, together to examine the problems and devise new solutions. Problem-solving workshops are particularly fruitful sources of creative new approaches. These proposed solutions can then be fed back into the track I process and, if deemed promising, refined until an acceptable approach is found.
In cases in which one party refuses to discuss issues that another party considers of critical importance, these issues can be handed to a confidential track II process. The parties are usual y less resistant to discussing “illegitimate” issues or topics they find particularly threatening in track II environments than they are in the track I process.
Assess the Need for Track II after Track I
Postagreement disputes are common, and the threat of a return to violence is ever present. Track II actors can play a constructive role especial y when sections of the population are unhappy with, il -informed about, and/or isolated from the peace process; and when ambiguities in the peace agreement are likely to lead to disputes during the implementation phase— disputes that the society lacks the capacity to resolve peaceful y.
Continuing to Grow a Peace Constituency
A conflict is far from over when the parties reach a peace accord. But signing a peace agreement does carry enormous symbolic value, signaling a shift in the relationship between the parties. Track II actors can work to ensure that this shift is not an isolated experience among the elite within the society. Building a large constituency for peace can isolate spoilers and inoculate the grassroots constituencies from the dangers of sporadic violence and other setbacks.
At various times since the Good Friday Agreement was signed in Northern Ireland, spoilers have attempted to reignite the Troubles by kil ing a number of policemen and planting several car bombs. Each time, the peace constituency has pushed back—officials and grassroots people on both sides of the conflict have condemned the kil ings and refused to respond with violence. “That era is over,” both sides have repeatedly responded, refusing to get caught up in a new cycle of violence. Had many people not bought into the peace agreement, the likelihood of a spoiler’s being able to infect the larger society with renewed fear and hatred—leading to spiraling violence— would be much higher.
Fleshing Out the Details of an Agreement
Stil , peace deals often fail and even for the ones that hold, the period fol owing the signing of an agreement is a fragile time. Peace agreements are general y flawed to a greater or lesser degree. Negotiators may have left features of agreement ambiguous precisely because pushing for more specificity would have resulted in parties walking away from the table. Parties are often left to sort out these ambiguities at much lower political and bureaucratic levels, and to do so without the support of negotiators and the structure of formal talks. This is when having a strong track II constituency can be particularly useful. Track II mediators and civil leaders can hammer out details of broad-brush strategies, and actual y make the agreement work on the ground. Without such support and attention to detail, the broad-brush agreements developed by the official track I negotiators may never get translated into practice.
Resolving Postagreement Disputes
Every peace deal wil have its discontents. Understanding who is unhappy with the outcome of the peace process, and why, is important to the design of track II processes at this stage of the peace process. Track II efforts can be aimed at developing effective nonviolent channels for seeking a redress of grievances. Assessments should anticipate where and how discontent will manifest itself so that such efforts can be strategical y designed and targeted.
Disagreements over implementation often play out at the level of the community. Track II activities can anticipate such problems and work to strengthen constructive channels for addressing the issues. For instance, building the capacities of select institutions and people who can deal with these issues in a constructive, cooperative, nonviolent way makes the likelihood of long-term success of the peacemaking process much higher.
Track II trainers can, for example, help inexperienced local leaders design effective dispute-handling and governmental systems. Newly forming democracies often need help in designing and implementing both governmental and civil society organizations that can provide needed services and deal effectively with the many disputes that are likely to arise.
Aal (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 419–432; and the International Institute for Sustained Dialogue, “Sustained Dialogue in Tajikistan,” http://www.sustaineddialogue.org/programs/tajikistan_dialogue.htm (accessed March 21, 2010).