Talking to Groups That Use Terror by Editors Nigel Quinney and A. Heather Coyne - HTML preview

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Facilities Negotiations

 

Fostering commitment to the peace process is vital, but no less so than  trying to ensure that the negotiations at the heart of that process are  productive. Indeed, if they prove unproductive, the PAG’s commitment to  the process is very likely to evaporate.

 

Of course, mediators in all kinds of conflicts try to push negotiations  forward, and many of the techniques they use to do so are the same  whether or not a conflict involves terrorism. However, because of the  extreme distrust and cultural chasm that separate governments and PAGs,  some things that are all in a day’s work for a mediator may take on  unusual sensitivity or significance.

 

This chapter highlights those tactics that are particularly pertinent to negotiations involving terrorists and outlines specific strategies that might help to secure an agreement despite the breadth and depth of the divide  between the parties. It does so for the most part from the perspective of a mediator, rather than a government negotiator. To be sure, much of  this chapter is relevant to the work of a government negotiator, but  governments themselves are part of the challenge confronting a mediator  who is trying to facilitate a negotiated settlement.

 

Navigate Sensitivity of Third-Party Mediator Involvement in Talks

 

A PAG may resent a third party intruding itself into the group’s conflict with the government, especial y if the would-be mediator represents a  state or organization that is sympathetic to the government. A government may also be sensitive to third-party involvement, seeing it as unwanted  interference in its internal affairs or even as an infringement of its  sovereignty. The Spanish government was irked by the issuing of the Brussels Declaration in March 2010, a document signed by an array of major   international figures (such as Nelson Mandela and Mary Robinson) that cal ed on ETA to adopt a permanent cease-fire and on Madrid to make an   “appropriate response” and negotiate “a just, permanent and democratic resolution of the Basque conflict.” The Spanish government, whose security forces had dealt ETA numerous blows in recent years, declared, “This is not a time for statements, but a time for ETA to give up and disband itself.” 33

 

A mediator looking for entry may therefore want to avoid describing  himself or herself as an “envoy” initiating a “negotiation” or “peace  mission;” vague or elliptical terminology may be more acceptable,  especial y if the mediation initiative can be disguised—verbal y at  least—as a far less intrusive activity. To avoid offending the British government and to launch his involvement with the Northern Ireland peace process, George Mitchell was given the title “special advisor to the president and the secretary of state on economic initiatives in Ireland” and asked to organize a conference in Washington on trade and investment between   Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

 

While governments usual y want to treat terrorism as a matter for its  domestic law enforcement system, some PAGs want to internationalize  their conflict, bringing in foreign governments or IGOs that are either  sympathetic to their goals or at least prepared to press the PAG’s  government adversary to make concessions for the sake of ending the  conflict. The PLO has almost invariably welcomed U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, not because Washington necessarily supports Palestinian interests but because Washington is seen as having both the ability to influence Israeli decision making and a strong interest in bringing stability to the Middle East.

 

Mediators, always looking for leverage over the parties, may share a  PAG’s desire to internationalize the peace process and for much the same reason. However, confronted by a government’s reluctance to internationalize, a mediator will need to tread careful y not only in the  terminology he or she uses but also in the external actors he or she seeks to introduce into the peace process. Ideal y, those actors should be seen by the government and the PAG as supportive allies or at least as evenhanded supporters of the peace process. Consider recruiting several foreign actors so as to reassure each party that as least some of the foreign players have its interests at heart. And where possible enlist the participation of foreign governments that one or both parties are reluctant to offend.

 

 Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Spain, and Germany have all played host on   various occasions to peace talks between the Colombian government and Marxist rebel group the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). At talks between the ELN and government in Cuba in 2005, Spain, Norway, and   Switzerland participated as observers.

 

 American involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process was   welcomed by the IRA, which had always enjoyed strong political and   financial support from sections of the American public. The British   government was wary at first of U.S. involvement, but Downing Street did not want to offend or embarrass the Clinton White House. Furthermore, the body set up to oversee the decommissioning of arms and explosives by Republican and Nationalist fighters included a Canadian chosen by the British and a Finn picked by the Irish.

 

Build Trust and Demonstrate Neutrality

 

Neither party trusts the other but both must trust the mediator for the  mediation to work. Such trust, however, will not exist at the outset of a mediation initiative and has to be earned.

 

A terrorist movement will natural y be suspicious of any formal  mediation effort offered by an international community that has largely  condemned the movement. Begin to al ay this suspicion by showing a  willingness to listen to the PAG’s grievances and by indicating under- standing of, and even sympathy for, the terrorist group’s goals, while  making it clear that the group’s tactics are entirely unacceptable.

 

A government will be wary of a mediator who regularly talks with a  group it considers anathema and who seeks to persuade the government  to make concessions to that group. Strive to persuade the government that the mediator’s allegiance is to the peace process, not the terrorists, and that a negotiated settlement is in everyone’s interests.

 

The mediator must not only be independent from both sides but also  be seen to be independent. Insist on neutral language, which may mean  embracing arcane terms or neologisms (“decommissioning” instead of  “disarming” in the case of Northern Ireland) that ruffle no feathers. Be conscious of symbolism at all times. Do not choose a venue for  negotiations that embodies the power of one side or evokes painful  memories for the other. Time announcements of key developments and  deadlines for reaching agreement to coincide with celebrations that bring the two sides together (a religious holiday, perhaps) rather than with  commemorations that push them further apart (such as the anniversary  of a military victory or defeat).

 

Provide Cover for the Parties

 

Once trust has been established, the mediator can become a cover for  concessions, with the parties making compromises for the sake of good  relations with the mediator, something they could not have made directly with each other. However, in the end the person negotiating for the  terrorist group must be able to take responsibility for the agreement,  which cannot be seen as having been forced on him by the mediator.

 

Mediators can be invaluable to parties who have great difficulty  convincing constituents of the value of engagement. A mediator may opt  to publicly assume responsibility for misunderstandings, deadlocks, and  delays—even if the mediator was, in fact, entirely blameless—rather than see the process col apse. A mediator may also rescue negotiations from the ire of constituents averse to any concessions by publicly announcing that an arrangement may indeed be a compromise for both sides, but highlight the need for a compromise in order for the peace process to move forward.

 

Encourage Compromises

 

Compromise, of course, is vital if any peace process is to advance,  yet in a conflict between terrorists and governments the two sides will  probably have spent years, if not decades, loudly proclaiming their  implacable opposition to any concessions to the other side. In such a  situation, the mediator must use every tool at his or her disposal to help the parties escape this self-imposed embargo on compromise and to  prepare their constituents to accept that a partial success is preferable to continuing armed struggle.

 

Useful techniques may include the following:

 

  • Distinguish between valid security needs and entrenched positions  when trying to create compromises. For instance, a PAG may genuinely  fear for its members’ safety if it disarms entirely in advance of the  implementation of a negotiated settlement, but a blanket refusal to get  rid of any weapons as negotiations proceed is likely to be motivated by  political rather than practical considerations. Similarly, a government  that insists that a PAG hand in all its weapons at an early stage in  the peace process is probably trying to score political points by  demonstrating its uncompromising stance to its own supporters or  by demanding something that the PAG cannot realistical y provide.  Political calculations matter, of course, but they are more negotiable  than solid security concerns.

 

  • Make sure that both sides get something they want, but also try to  ensure that those gains are mutual y dependent. In Northern Ireland, several institutions were established—among them, the North-South   Ministerial Council, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the British-  Irish Intergovernmental Conference—and it was agreed not only that   they would function simultaneously and cooperatively during a   transitional phase, but also that if one ceased to function so would the others.

 

  • Ensure that concessions are not only reciprocal but also, where  possible, parallel, thereby helping to resolve the question of which side makes concessions first. In negotiations in the late 1980s and early 1990s to end the insurgency in El Salvador, the government and the FMLN   agreed that negotiations on political issues would proceed in tandem with a process of gradual disarmament.

 

  • Structure concessions so that they are not isolated nor unilateral but phased and reciprocal. For instance, demilitarization of the security  forces should be matched by disarmament of the terrorist forces. Early  release of prisoners should be accompanied by steps to recognize the  suffering of victims and provide their families with compensation.  Unilateral concessions are likely to be pocketed by the other side. In Colombia, President Pastrana sought to persuade FARC of his sincere   desire to negotiate by handing control of much of the south of the   country to FARC, but FARC responded by acquiring new recruits and   weapons. Pastrana later tried a similar approach with the ELN in the north of the country, but this time he conditioned the withdrawal of security forces on the ELN’s participation in a national peace convention.

 

  • Propose that the parties solve a thorny issue not by trying to negotiate a solution among themselves but by agreeing to establish an independent  process that will then determine a solution.  In the El Salvador   negotiations, “the FMLN wanted the dismissal of a large number of army officers identified by name, but was persuaded to accept that an impartial panel should make recommendations that the president agreed, sight   unseen, to carry out within his powers as commander in chief. The FMLN   also agreed not to press for negotiation of economic reforms, agreeing that the economic policy should be left to a government elected in a free and fair process with ample, international y verified participation.”34

 

  • Soften the impact of demands placed on parties by framing them as  considerations rather than requirements, as informal suggestions rather  than formal recommendations.

 

Allow Parties to Save Face

 

Like achieving compromises, helping parties save face is a vital ingredient of enabling the parties to exit entrenched positions and break stalemates.  Governments, no less than PAGs, are acutely conscious of the price of  being seen by their constituents as caving in to pressure either from their adversary or from the mediator. If the parties are to contemplate making concessions, they need the reassurance that the mediator, if not their  adversary, will help them appear to be making concessions from a position of strength or adherence to principle, not out of weakness or unprincipled expediency.

 

One way the mediator can do this is to secure agreement on general  principles before tackling specific demands. The parties may have  difficulties in persuading their supporters to accept those principles, but if and when they are accepted, subsequent compromises can be presented  to supporters as consistent with those principles.

 

Another tactic is to let parties buy time if they need it. A government  or political party that has previously refused to negotiate with a PGA may need to give its constituents time to reconcile themselves to the fact of upcoming talks. In such cases, accede to requests to delay the start or next round of negotiations so that the political temperature can cool down and the party can consult with its members and supporters and begin to build acceptance of the idea of negotiations. Be aware, however, that parties may 74  pretend to need time to build internal consensus when they are merely  seeking a breathing space in which to rearm. To guard against the latter, ask other parties for their assessment of the sincerity of the party’s request for time, insist on regular updates from the party and look for evidence of progress toward consensus, and create deadlines for a return to the  negotiating table.

 

Consider referring highly contentious, symbolical y loaded issues to  referendums, so that the parties do not have to shoulder the responsibility of making a controversial decision and can instead offload that burden to their constituents. Hard-liners may still protest if the constituents opt for a compromise solution, but such a solution will be better able to withstand attacks from spoilers if it has widespread public support. This tactic is not without its dangers, notably the prospect that a majority of voters will oppose a proposed concession or peace agreement. That danger should  not be exaggerated, however. If a majority, or even a substantial minority of a PAG’s constituency, opposes a deal, then that deal may well be fated to eventual col apse. So an earlier rejection (and a subsequent search for a more acceptable deal) may, in fact, be better for the peace process in the long term.

 

Allow parties to reject an agreement rhetorical y, thereby maintaining  their uncompromising image within their own constituency, as long as  they implement it in practice.  Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, was asked by George Mitchell to affirm his party’s commitment to the Mitchell Principles (the ground rules for participation in talks on Northern Ireland’s future). “Paisley responded with a speech in which he cal ed the entire process a ‘complete charade’ and criticized the Irish government. He then accepted the principles unreservedly. I thanked him and said that I regarded his additional comments as personal remarks that did not affect his party’s acceptance of the principles.”35

 

Structure the Process to Provide Necessary Flexibility and Constraints

 

The very structure of the peace process and the basic negotiating approach can also help the parties save face as well as allow the peace process to withstand external shocks and internal crises.

 

  • Terrorist negotiations are best advanced by step-by-step agreements.  Successive agreements allow issues to be handled seriatim, permit  check-points to be established along the way, engage the parties in a  familiarization and moderation process, and build trust. Incremental  negotiations also avoid major crises posed by a large take-it-or-leave-it proposal, which may be too much to swallow all at once and therefore  may cause breakdowns.

 

  • Design a structure that can accommodate walkouts by various parties,  given the need for grandstanding or time to adjust to major shifts in  position. The mediator can arrange for the negotiations to continue but  change the format to ensure that decisions that require all parties are not taken during periods when they are not participating.

 

  • Use different structures to address differing priorities among the  participants. Mediators can choose between options such as parallel  commissions; different groupings of parties in different parts or strands of the talks; the use of separate, private meetings on the side and other options to pursue negotiations in the forum most conducive to success.  The use of a variety of structures helps a mediator address the  asymmetry between the parties, as well as recognition issues. Such  asymmetric structures may be helpful to avoid asking a government to  sit with a terrorist movement as equals.

 

  • Format meetings for success. Hold private meetings between some  participants before or alongside the full formal meeting so that different parties can develop a better understanding of each other’s positions and of the mediator’s goals. Remove recording equipment and prohibit note  taking in meetings at which the participants are to be encouraged to  speak candidly.

 

  • In multiparty talks, design a voting structure that can limit  opportunities for stalling and build or sustain momentum. In the   Northern Ireland peace process, Mitchell used a complex voting procedure cal ed sufficient consensus. This procedure required majority support within unionist and nationalist ranks for any agreement while denying any single party within either bloc power of veto. Sufficient consensus also enabled a party to vote against a specific part of the agreement while voting for the agreement as a whole. In addition, Mitchell gave each party  the right to raise any relevant issue of concern and receive a fair hearing, but not the right to have a vote on each issue.36

 

Draft Documents That Encourage, Not Foreclose, Discussion

 

The process of drafting documents to be used in the talks is not a purely technical affair but also an opportunity to stimulate constructive  discussion of new ideas rather than provoke the rehearsal of old  grievances. Even a seemingly obvious and straightforward step such as  crafting a document that identifies the key issues for resolution may help the parties to see beyond their own agenda and acquire a more panoramic  view of the interests at stake, which in turn may disclose where trade-offs can be made. Given that governments and publics often see nothing more  of a PAG than its violence and hear nothing of its demands except for the loudest and more radical, this simple tactic can often surprise government negotiators and uncover potential y productive avenues for discussion  and compromise.

 

Draft an agenda for discussion that gives the parties something to  respond to, rather than presenting them with a blank slate and carte  blanche to discuss anything and everything. Alternatively or additional y, consider using a two-draft process. The first draft presents in unvarnished form the parties’ maximalist demands and is virtual y guaranteed to  provoke heated exchanges, denunciations, and accusations. But once the  parties have let off steam, they can be given a much more moderate and  more diplomatical y worded document, which will seem all the more  even-tempered and even-handed in light of the first, and which will allow the parties to discuss issues of substance.

 

Manage Public Relations and Media

 

In dealing with the media and shaping public perceptions of the peace  process, the mediator should employ many of the same techniques that are pertinent to mediating conflicts of all kinds. These are discussed in depth in another handbook in the Peacemaker’s Toolkit series, Ingrid Lehmann’s Managing Public Information in a Peace Process. For instance, the mediator should monitor the press careful y and continuously, anticipate crises, and maintain good contacts with both local and international media.

 

Some PR techniques, however, are particularly germane to mediation  between governments and PAGs. Leaks, for example, are more likely  because of the low level of trust between the parties, the high level of internal disunity on the PAG’s (and perhaps also the government’s) side, and the intense interest among the public on both sides in the progress of the talks and the equal y intense fear that the negotiators are trading  unacceptable and unforgivable concessions.

 

That same degree of public interest also puts a premium on the need  for the mediator to conduct a public information campaign throughout  the mediation effort. Even before talks occur, and even when they have  resumed in secret following an earlier breakdown, the mediator should  seek to build popular support for the idea of a negotiated settlement by using the media, speeches, and other public appearances to underscore the costs of continued conflict, lay out the mutual advantages that a peaceful settlement can bring, explain the terms and structure of the negotiating process, counter misinformation, and encourage optimism while  tempering unrealistic expectations.

 

A mediator should be seen by all parties as fundamental y evenhanded,  but that does not mean that all a mediator’s public statements should treat both sides equal y or should pretend that both sides have always made  equal concessions. It is important that a negotiation be seen as balanced as a whole;  it is not necessary to strive for balance at every point within that negotiation. As well as issuing statements denouncing one side for  violating the terms of an agreement, the mediator should be prepared to  issue press releases that reveal that one side has gained a concession or other advantage in the talks. Such statements may actual y spur  negotiations by enabling a party to show skeptical supporters that the  negotiations are going wel . But, of course, the mediator must not give the impression that either side is getting too far ahead of the other. A  succession of statements that portray the same side as winning all the  negotiating rounds will demolish support for the talks among the other  party’s constituency.

 

The media can be a chal enge for the mediator in terms of publishing  leaks, ratcheting up tension, and inflaming opinion on one or both sides.  But the media can also be a useful al y. For instance, a vigilant press can play a key role in monitoring the conduct of the government’s security forces during a peace process. In democratic societies, although governments  usual y have the upper hand over terrorist groups in terms of the  orchestration of domestic propaganda, independent television, radio,  and press outlets can play major roles in shaping public opinion. In  nondemocratic societies, where a government wil usual y be able to control coverage of the conflict and the peace process by domestic media, it usual y fal s to the international media to report violations of human rights by the security forces and to uncover or publicize failures by the government to honor the terms of agreements reached at the negotiating table.

 

For these reasons, the mediator should establish and maintain good  relations with both the domestic and the international media. Toward this end, the mediator should make himself or herself accessible to journalists looking for interviews, ensure that his or her team regularly briefs the media on the progress of talks, and arrange photo-ops and other events  that spotlight key figures, events, and developments in the peace process.

 

Use Deadlines Adroitly When Pressing for Agreement

 

There are no hard and fast rules about if, when, and how to use deadlines to pressure the parties to come to an agreement. Deadlines can certainly be helpful in developing among the parties a sense of purpose and  urgency—in creating the image of a peace process as a train that is about to depart from the station whether or not all parties are aboard. In the absence of a deadline, the parties might continue talking indefinitely,  conscious that ongoing talks are less risky (in terms of political standing and personal safety) than reaching an agreement that one’s own hardliners might violently reject or that exposes one’s side to domination by the other.

 

Unsurprisingly, a deadline is most likely to work when all sides have  been consulted about it in advance and buy into it. In Northern Ireland, Mitchell had spent weeks discussing a deadline of Good Friday with all the participants and working to get their support. Before he presented the revised plan for their approval he knew it would be agreed to unanimously. The headlines in the newspapers said that he had imposed a deadline, but in reality he had not imposed anything; the parties had accepted the deadline because they were as eager as Mitchell to get an agreement.37

 

A deadline for agreeing to a political solution may be attractive to the terrorists if they have renounced violence, because otherwise the  government will achieve its goal (ending terrorists acts) while the  terrorists have not had any of their interests met. A deadline in this case forces the government side to engage on the issues.

 

For a mediator, the proposal of a deadline can indicate seriousness of  intent, and for the parties the acceptance of a deadline can demonstrate a commitment to a solution.

 

But deadlines can be counterproductive. In the first place, they may be  seen by a PAG—or, indeed, a beleaguered government—as an opportunity  to buy time, to gain a breathing space in which to rearm and rebuild  before the deadline arrives and, in the absence of agreement, the fighting restarts. Second, the imposition of a deadline may exacerbate a PAG’s  sense of being constantly hounded and harried by the forces or  representatives of the established order, and may thus make the PAG’s  negotiators less, rather than more, prepared to compromise and reach  agreement. Third, a deadline can deny the parties the time they need to  build support on their own side for the terms of an agreement. Fourth, a deadline that the mediator sets but, when it is missed, does not enforce will create the impression that the mediator is indecisive, unreliable, and given to bluffing—characteristics that will make the mediator’s job only more difficult.

 

Make a Signed Deal Easier to Envisage or Accept

 

Signing a peace agreement is, in most cases, a step into the unknown for the parties. It is one thing to discuss the terms of an agreement but quite another to sign up to when one finds it hard to envisage how it might  work in practice. The mediator thus needs to offer the parties reassurance.  This can come in various forms. For instance, the mediator can point to  the negotiating process itself as a model and explain that powersharing  arrangements can work on a grand scale because they are already  happening on a smaller scale in the negotiations themselves.  Representatives from parties in other conflicts that have implemented  similar agreements can be invited to describe their experiences,  particularly any unanticipated challenges they encountered and the  ways in which they dealt with those without having to renegotiate the  agreement. The mediator can also solicit side letters from one of the  parties or a third party (such as a powerful state) that promise a signatory support—be it moral or material—once the deal is done to ensure that the terms of the deal are implemented without unwelcome surprises.

 

In negotiations in which the parties have been able to hammer out the  terms of a deal that addresses one component of their conflict (e.g., an exchange of prisoners or the declaration of a temporary cease-fire) but  have not been able to bridge the chasm of mistrust or develop any  confidence between them, they may be prepared to sign an agreement  only if they do not have to sign with one another directly. In such a  situation, the mediator can act as a signatory or can enlist a third party, so that each party signs an agreement with the mediator or third party but  not with each other. Hamas and Israel negotiated a deal on prisoner   exchanges in 2009 but were only prepared to sign up to it by signing separate agreements with Egypt, which had mediated the negotiations.

 

Decrease External Opposition to the Negotiations

 

External actors may be helpful to and supportive of the mediator, but they are just as likely to be obstructive. Seek to diminish the level of opposit