Step 5
Facilities Negotiations
Fostering commitment to the peace process is vital, but no less so than trying to ensure that the negotiations at the heart of that process are productive. Indeed, if they prove unproductive, the PAG’s commitment to the process is very likely to evaporate.
Of course, mediators in all kinds of conflicts try to push negotiations forward, and many of the techniques they use to do so are the same whether or not a conflict involves terrorism. However, because of the extreme distrust and cultural chasm that separate governments and PAGs, some things that are all in a day’s work for a mediator may take on unusual sensitivity or significance.
This chapter highlights those tactics that are particularly pertinent to negotiations involving terrorists and outlines specific strategies that might help to secure an agreement despite the breadth and depth of the divide between the parties. It does so for the most part from the perspective of a mediator, rather than a government negotiator. To be sure, much of this chapter is relevant to the work of a government negotiator, but governments themselves are part of the challenge confronting a mediator who is trying to facilitate a negotiated settlement.
Navigate Sensitivity of Third-Party Mediator Involvement in Talks
A PAG may resent a third party intruding itself into the group’s conflict with the government, especial y if the would-be mediator represents a state or organization that is sympathetic to the government. A government may also be sensitive to third-party involvement, seeing it as unwanted interference in its internal affairs or even as an infringement of its sovereignty. The Spanish government was irked by the issuing of the Brussels Declaration in March 2010, a document signed by an array of major international figures (such as Nelson Mandela and Mary Robinson) that cal ed on ETA to adopt a permanent cease-fire and on Madrid to make an “appropriate response” and negotiate “a just, permanent and democratic resolution of the Basque conflict.” The Spanish government, whose security forces had dealt ETA numerous blows in recent years, declared, “This is not a time for statements, but a time for ETA to give up and disband itself.” 33
A mediator looking for entry may therefore want to avoid describing himself or herself as an “envoy” initiating a “negotiation” or “peace mission;” vague or elliptical terminology may be more acceptable, especial y if the mediation initiative can be disguised—verbal y at least—as a far less intrusive activity. To avoid offending the British government and to launch his involvement with the Northern Ireland peace process, George Mitchell was given the title “special advisor to the president and the secretary of state on economic initiatives in Ireland” and asked to organize a conference in Washington on trade and investment between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
While governments usual y want to treat terrorism as a matter for its domestic law enforcement system, some PAGs want to internationalize their conflict, bringing in foreign governments or IGOs that are either sympathetic to their goals or at least prepared to press the PAG’s government adversary to make concessions for the sake of ending the conflict. The PLO has almost invariably welcomed U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, not because Washington necessarily supports Palestinian interests but because Washington is seen as having both the ability to influence Israeli decision making and a strong interest in bringing stability to the Middle East.
Mediators, always looking for leverage over the parties, may share a PAG’s desire to internationalize the peace process and for much the same reason. However, confronted by a government’s reluctance to internationalize, a mediator will need to tread careful y not only in the terminology he or she uses but also in the external actors he or she seeks to introduce into the peace process. Ideal y, those actors should be seen by the government and the PAG as supportive allies or at least as evenhanded supporters of the peace process. Consider recruiting several foreign actors so as to reassure each party that as least some of the foreign players have its interests at heart. And where possible enlist the participation of foreign governments that one or both parties are reluctant to offend.
Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Spain, and Germany have all played host on various occasions to peace talks between the Colombian government and Marxist rebel group the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). At talks between the ELN and government in Cuba in 2005, Spain, Norway, and Switzerland participated as observers.
American involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process was welcomed by the IRA, which had always enjoyed strong political and financial support from sections of the American public. The British government was wary at first of U.S. involvement, but Downing Street did not want to offend or embarrass the Clinton White House. Furthermore, the body set up to oversee the decommissioning of arms and explosives by Republican and Nationalist fighters included a Canadian chosen by the British and a Finn picked by the Irish.
Build Trust and Demonstrate Neutrality
Neither party trusts the other but both must trust the mediator for the mediation to work. Such trust, however, will not exist at the outset of a mediation initiative and has to be earned.
A terrorist movement will natural y be suspicious of any formal mediation effort offered by an international community that has largely condemned the movement. Begin to al ay this suspicion by showing a willingness to listen to the PAG’s grievances and by indicating under- standing of, and even sympathy for, the terrorist group’s goals, while making it clear that the group’s tactics are entirely unacceptable.
A government will be wary of a mediator who regularly talks with a group it considers anathema and who seeks to persuade the government to make concessions to that group. Strive to persuade the government that the mediator’s allegiance is to the peace process, not the terrorists, and that a negotiated settlement is in everyone’s interests.
The mediator must not only be independent from both sides but also be seen to be independent. Insist on neutral language, which may mean embracing arcane terms or neologisms (“decommissioning” instead of “disarming” in the case of Northern Ireland) that ruffle no feathers. Be conscious of symbolism at all times. Do not choose a venue for negotiations that embodies the power of one side or evokes painful memories for the other. Time announcements of key developments and deadlines for reaching agreement to coincide with celebrations that bring the two sides together (a religious holiday, perhaps) rather than with commemorations that push them further apart (such as the anniversary of a military victory or defeat).
Provide Cover for the Parties
Once trust has been established, the mediator can become a cover for concessions, with the parties making compromises for the sake of good relations with the mediator, something they could not have made directly with each other. However, in the end the person negotiating for the terrorist group must be able to take responsibility for the agreement, which cannot be seen as having been forced on him by the mediator.
Mediators can be invaluable to parties who have great difficulty convincing constituents of the value of engagement. A mediator may opt to publicly assume responsibility for misunderstandings, deadlocks, and delays—even if the mediator was, in fact, entirely blameless—rather than see the process col apse. A mediator may also rescue negotiations from the ire of constituents averse to any concessions by publicly announcing that an arrangement may indeed be a compromise for both sides, but highlight the need for a compromise in order for the peace process to move forward.
Encourage Compromises
Compromise, of course, is vital if any peace process is to advance, yet in a conflict between terrorists and governments the two sides will probably have spent years, if not decades, loudly proclaiming their implacable opposition to any concessions to the other side. In such a situation, the mediator must use every tool at his or her disposal to help the parties escape this self-imposed embargo on compromise and to prepare their constituents to accept that a partial success is preferable to continuing armed struggle.
Useful techniques may include the following:
Allow Parties to Save Face
Like achieving compromises, helping parties save face is a vital ingredient of enabling the parties to exit entrenched positions and break stalemates. Governments, no less than PAGs, are acutely conscious of the price of being seen by their constituents as caving in to pressure either from their adversary or from the mediator. If the parties are to contemplate making concessions, they need the reassurance that the mediator, if not their adversary, will help them appear to be making concessions from a position of strength or adherence to principle, not out of weakness or unprincipled expediency.
One way the mediator can do this is to secure agreement on general principles before tackling specific demands. The parties may have difficulties in persuading their supporters to accept those principles, but if and when they are accepted, subsequent compromises can be presented to supporters as consistent with those principles.
Another tactic is to let parties buy time if they need it. A government or political party that has previously refused to negotiate with a PGA may need to give its constituents time to reconcile themselves to the fact of upcoming talks. In such cases, accede to requests to delay the start or next round of negotiations so that the political temperature can cool down and the party can consult with its members and supporters and begin to build acceptance of the idea of negotiations. Be aware, however, that parties may 74 pretend to need time to build internal consensus when they are merely seeking a breathing space in which to rearm. To guard against the latter, ask other parties for their assessment of the sincerity of the party’s request for time, insist on regular updates from the party and look for evidence of progress toward consensus, and create deadlines for a return to the negotiating table.
Consider referring highly contentious, symbolical y loaded issues to referendums, so that the parties do not have to shoulder the responsibility of making a controversial decision and can instead offload that burden to their constituents. Hard-liners may still protest if the constituents opt for a compromise solution, but such a solution will be better able to withstand attacks from spoilers if it has widespread public support. This tactic is not without its dangers, notably the prospect that a majority of voters will oppose a proposed concession or peace agreement. That danger should not be exaggerated, however. If a majority, or even a substantial minority of a PAG’s constituency, opposes a deal, then that deal may well be fated to eventual col apse. So an earlier rejection (and a subsequent search for a more acceptable deal) may, in fact, be better for the peace process in the long term.
Allow parties to reject an agreement rhetorical y, thereby maintaining their uncompromising image within their own constituency, as long as they implement it in practice. Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, was asked by George Mitchell to affirm his party’s commitment to the Mitchell Principles (the ground rules for participation in talks on Northern Ireland’s future). “Paisley responded with a speech in which he cal ed the entire process a ‘complete charade’ and criticized the Irish government. He then accepted the principles unreservedly. I thanked him and said that I regarded his additional comments as personal remarks that did not affect his party’s acceptance of the principles.”35
Structure the Process to Provide Necessary Flexibility and Constraints
The very structure of the peace process and the basic negotiating approach can also help the parties save face as well as allow the peace process to withstand external shocks and internal crises.
Draft Documents That Encourage, Not Foreclose, Discussion
The process of drafting documents to be used in the talks is not a purely technical affair but also an opportunity to stimulate constructive discussion of new ideas rather than provoke the rehearsal of old grievances. Even a seemingly obvious and straightforward step such as crafting a document that identifies the key issues for resolution may help the parties to see beyond their own agenda and acquire a more panoramic view of the interests at stake, which in turn may disclose where trade-offs can be made. Given that governments and publics often see nothing more of a PAG than its violence and hear nothing of its demands except for the loudest and more radical, this simple tactic can often surprise government negotiators and uncover potential y productive avenues for discussion and compromise.
Draft an agenda for discussion that gives the parties something to respond to, rather than presenting them with a blank slate and carte blanche to discuss anything and everything. Alternatively or additional y, consider using a two-draft process. The first draft presents in unvarnished form the parties’ maximalist demands and is virtual y guaranteed to provoke heated exchanges, denunciations, and accusations. But once the parties have let off steam, they can be given a much more moderate and more diplomatical y worded document, which will seem all the more even-tempered and even-handed in light of the first, and which will allow the parties to discuss issues of substance.
Manage Public Relations and Media
In dealing with the media and shaping public perceptions of the peace process, the mediator should employ many of the same techniques that are pertinent to mediating conflicts of all kinds. These are discussed in depth in another handbook in the Peacemaker’s Toolkit series, Ingrid Lehmann’s Managing Public Information in a Peace Process. For instance, the mediator should monitor the press careful y and continuously, anticipate crises, and maintain good contacts with both local and international media.
Some PR techniques, however, are particularly germane to mediation between governments and PAGs. Leaks, for example, are more likely because of the low level of trust between the parties, the high level of internal disunity on the PAG’s (and perhaps also the government’s) side, and the intense interest among the public on both sides in the progress of the talks and the equal y intense fear that the negotiators are trading unacceptable and unforgivable concessions.
That same degree of public interest also puts a premium on the need for the mediator to conduct a public information campaign throughout the mediation effort. Even before talks occur, and even when they have resumed in secret following an earlier breakdown, the mediator should seek to build popular support for the idea of a negotiated settlement by using the media, speeches, and other public appearances to underscore the costs of continued conflict, lay out the mutual advantages that a peaceful settlement can bring, explain the terms and structure of the negotiating process, counter misinformation, and encourage optimism while tempering unrealistic expectations.
A mediator should be seen by all parties as fundamental y evenhanded, but that does not mean that all a mediator’s public statements should treat both sides equal y or should pretend that both sides have always made equal concessions. It is important that a negotiation be seen as balanced as a whole; it is not necessary to strive for balance at every point within that negotiation. As well as issuing statements denouncing one side for violating the terms of an agreement, the mediator should be prepared to issue press releases that reveal that one side has gained a concession or other advantage in the talks. Such statements may actual y spur negotiations by enabling a party to show skeptical supporters that the negotiations are going wel . But, of course, the mediator must not give the impression that either side is getting too far ahead of the other. A succession of statements that portray the same side as winning all the negotiating rounds will demolish support for the talks among the other party’s constituency.
The media can be a chal enge for the mediator in terms of publishing leaks, ratcheting up tension, and inflaming opinion on one or both sides. But the media can also be a useful al y. For instance, a vigilant press can play a key role in monitoring the conduct of the government’s security forces during a peace process. In democratic societies, although governments usual y have the upper hand over terrorist groups in terms of the orchestration of domestic propaganda, independent television, radio, and press outlets can play major roles in shaping public opinion. In nondemocratic societies, where a government wil usual y be able to control coverage of the conflict and the peace process by domestic media, it usual y fal s to the international media to report violations of human rights by the security forces and to uncover or publicize failures by the government to honor the terms of agreements reached at the negotiating table.
For these reasons, the mediator should establish and maintain good relations with both the domestic and the international media. Toward this end, the mediator should make himself or herself accessible to journalists looking for interviews, ensure that his or her team regularly briefs the media on the progress of talks, and arrange photo-ops and other events that spotlight key figures, events, and developments in the peace process.
Use Deadlines Adroitly When Pressing for Agreement
There are no hard and fast rules about if, when, and how to use deadlines to pressure the parties to come to an agreement. Deadlines can certainly be helpful in developing among the parties a sense of purpose and urgency—in creating the image of a peace process as a train that is about to depart from the station whether or not all parties are aboard. In the absence of a deadline, the parties might continue talking indefinitely, conscious that ongoing talks are less risky (in terms of political standing and personal safety) than reaching an agreement that one’s own hardliners might violently reject or that exposes one’s side to domination by the other.
Unsurprisingly, a deadline is most likely to work when all sides have been consulted about it in advance and buy into it. In Northern Ireland, Mitchell had spent weeks discussing a deadline of Good Friday with all the participants and working to get their support. Before he presented the revised plan for their approval he knew it would be agreed to unanimously. The headlines in the newspapers said that he had imposed a deadline, but in reality he had not imposed anything; the parties had accepted the deadline because they were as eager as Mitchell to get an agreement.37
A deadline for agreeing to a political solution may be attractive to the terrorists if they have renounced violence, because otherwise the government will achieve its goal (ending terrorists acts) while the terrorists have not had any of their interests met. A deadline in this case forces the government side to engage on the issues.
For a mediator, the proposal of a deadline can indicate seriousness of intent, and for the parties the acceptance of a deadline can demonstrate a commitment to a solution.
But deadlines can be counterproductive. In the first place, they may be seen by a PAG—or, indeed, a beleaguered government—as an opportunity to buy time, to gain a breathing space in which to rearm and rebuild before the deadline arrives and, in the absence of agreement, the fighting restarts. Second, the imposition of a deadline may exacerbate a PAG’s sense of being constantly hounded and harried by the forces or representatives of the established order, and may thus make the PAG’s negotiators less, rather than more, prepared to compromise and reach agreement. Third, a deadline can deny the parties the time they need to build support on their own side for the terms of an agreement. Fourth, a deadline that the mediator sets but, when it is missed, does not enforce will create the impression that the mediator is indecisive, unreliable, and given to bluffing—characteristics that will make the mediator’s job only more difficult.
Make a Signed Deal Easier to Envisage or Accept
Signing a peace agreement is, in most cases, a step into the unknown for the parties. It is one thing to discuss the terms of an agreement but quite another to sign up to when one finds it hard to envisage how it might work in practice. The mediator thus needs to offer the parties reassurance. This can come in various forms. For instance, the mediator can point to the negotiating process itself as a model and explain that powersharing arrangements can work on a grand scale because they are already happening on a smaller scale in the negotiations themselves. Representatives from parties in other conflicts that have implemented similar agreements can be invited to describe their experiences, particularly any unanticipated challenges they encountered and the ways in which they dealt with those without having to renegotiate the agreement. The mediator can also solicit side letters from one of the parties or a third party (such as a powerful state) that promise a signatory support—be it moral or material—once the deal is done to ensure that the terms of the deal are implemented without unwelcome surprises.
In negotiations in which the parties have been able to hammer out the terms of a deal that addresses one component of their conflict (e.g., an exchange of prisoners or the declaration of a temporary cease-fire) but have not been able to bridge the chasm of mistrust or develop any confidence between them, they may be prepared to sign an agreement only if they do not have to sign with one another directly. In such a situation, the mediator can act as a signatory or can enlist a third party, so that each party signs an agreement with the mediator or third party but not with each other. Hamas and Israel negotiated a deal on prisoner exchanges in 2009 but were only prepared to sign up to it by signing separate agreements with Egypt, which had mediated the negotiations.
Decrease External Opposition to the Negotiations
External actors may be helpful to and supportive of the mediator, but they are just as likely to be obstructive. Seek to diminish the level of opposit