The Al-Qaeda War Against France by iakovos alhadef - HTML preview

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“Governmental positions on the Iraq War prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governmental_positions_on_the_Iraq_War_prior_to_the_2003_invasion_of_Iraq

 

 France and Iran Agree 15 Billion Euros worth of Business Deals”, January 2016

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France and Iran have signed 15 billion euros worth of business deals as President Rouhani continues his European post-sanctions shopping trip.

The agreements cover aviation, carmaking, energy, shipping, infrastructure, railways, health and agriculture though most have not yet been finalised and French banks remain wary of doing business with Iran. There is also an agreement between French export-credit group Coface and the Iranian central bank.

Speaking at a business forum hosted by France’s main industry body Medef, Carlos Tavares, the chief executive of PSA Peugeot Citroen, detailed the planned modernisation of a Peugeot car plant in Tehran: “We are very positive and very happy to sign this agreement. We expect that from late 2017, we will be able to introduce three brand new products with new technology, with updated technology to support our Iranian customers and we will make sure that we invest the appropriate capacity up to 200,000 cars a year in our plan with our partner Iran Khodro.”

Iran says it wants to buy over 100 Airbus planes to update its ageing fleet, including a dozen A380 superjumbos. Exactly what stage the Airbus deal was at remained unclear on Thursday, however, amid scepticism over how far and how fast western firms can get into Iran.

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Total has reportedly signed a memorandum of understanding to purchase up to 200,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil per day as the country moves to ramp up its exports to pre-sanctions levels.

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French national railway operator SNCF is to provide expertise for the building of high speed rail lines and stations.

http://www.euronews.com/2016/01/28/france-and-iran-agree-15-billion-euros-worth-of-business-deals/

 

“French Intervention in Mali: Causes and Consequences”, February 2013

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Ansar Dine, which heads these groups in negotiations, withdrew an offer it had presented in Algeria that stipulated its cessation of hostilities against Mali. It also requested the African mediator, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Fasso, to postpone talks that had been scheduled for 14 January to discuss the road map proposed by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) based on the notion of granting autonomy to the region and allowing the application of shari’ah (Islamic law).

Ansar Dine – supported by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Jamaat at-Tawhid wal-Jihad fi Gharb Afriqiya (The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa – MOJWA), and al-Mulathamin (The Masked Ones, which split from al-Qaeda under the leadership of Mokhtar Belmokhtar) froze negotiations by sending its troops from Timbuktu towards the centre of Mali to attack the town of Mopti in an attempt to convince the French and Malians that the Islamist militants had resolved to move towards Bamako, thus forcing the French to make a hasty decision to enter war.

http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/positionpapers/2013/01/2013120113020737609.html

 

 “Iran and France agree to cooperate to fight terrorism and resolve world crises”, January 2016

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Rouhani and his French counterpart, François Hollande, agreed to cooperate on the fight against terrorism and to work together to resolve conflicts and crises the world over.

The trip came a matter of weeks after a landmark accord was reached between Tehran and six world powers to curb Iran’s nuclear activity.

Hollande stressed the need to rigourously apply the nuclear accord. Rouhani agreed, but said all sides must meet their commitments.

Syria was among the crises discussed. Rouhani stressed that defeating terrorism is more important than who is running the country.

http://www.euronews.com/2016/01/28/iran-and-france-agree-to-cooperate-to-fight-terrorism-and-resolve-world-crises/

 

 “Italian companies sign deals worth €16-17 billion with Iran”, January 2016

http://www.italy24.ilsole24ore.com/art/markets/2016-01-25/iran-saipem-130739.php?uuid=ACNrQjGC&icmpid=boxhp

 

 The Sudanese link: from Seleka in Central Africa Republic to Boko Haram in Nigeria”, May 2014

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What is the unseen hand behind the rise of radical Islamic movements from Northern Nigeria to the Central African Republic? It is the government of Sudan. That is the allegation of Yasir Arman, secretary general and spokeman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, North (SPLM North), which is fighting the Sudanese government in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile.

Speaking in London, Mr Arman pointed to the African Islamic University in Khartoum as the key institution that has been training radical Islamists. “They have been radicalising people for years,” said Mr Arman. The University, established in 1977, was given University status by President Omar Al-Bashir in 1992. The word “Islamic” was dropped from its title, but not from its objectives.  Mr Arman says that President Al-Bashir has used the University to mobilise students from across the continent.

Mr Arman suggest that Sudan’s aims are supported by a wider radical alliance, supported by Qataris, Yemenis and the Iranians. “The Egyptians, Saudis and the Emirates are very worried,” he says.

This circle of Islamists – says Mr Arman – links a wide range of rebels across central and northern Africa. These include Libyan rebels now attempting to seize control of the country and movements in the Central African Republic (CAR).  He point to the role of Michel Am-Nondokro Djotodia, the former Seleka rebel who seized power in the CAR. Djotodia, who was president of the CAR from 24 March 2013 – 10 January 2014, certainly has Sudanese links. He served as Consul in Nyala, in Darfur.

Boko Haram

Mr Arman says that Boko Haram is part of this circle.  He points to the large number of Nigerians – most of them Fulani – who live in Sudan. “There are as many millions of Nigerians in Sudan – mostly Fulani – who came on the way to the Haj,” says Mr Arman. He believes it is only a matter of time before Iranian weapons find their way into the hands of Boko Haram.

https://africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/michel-djotodia-and-sudan/

 

 Turkey Reinforces 'Hands Off' Policy on Mali”, January 2013

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The Turkish foreign ministry has criticized the ongoing French operation in Mali. The public criticism comes as Turkey is increasingly seeing West Africa as a region of interest economically and diplomatically.
Ankara has been increasing voicing concerns regarding the intervention by French forces against an Islamic insurgency in Mali.

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The Turkish foreign ministry points out the United Nations Security Council resolution on Mali sanctioned only an African led intervention. Ankara's ambivalence over France's military intervention is part of a growing rivalry between Paris and Ankara over West Africa, according to Semih Idiz, a diplomatic columnist for the Turkish daily Taraf.
"I think this reflects some of the competition between Turkey and France. Prime Minister Erdogan just a few days before the Mali story broke out was in Niger, blasting at the former colonial power and trying to say that Turkey will not be like that," said Idiz. "There is a scramble for Africa and Turkey is very much part of this. It has opened quite a large number of embassies across Africa. So its clear that Turkey does see itself as a potent power."

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Analysts say Ankara's ambivalence over France's intervention is likely to raise eyebrows among its western allies, all of who are strongly supporting it. But in Turkey's pro government media the question is increasingly being posed why those allies can back an intervention in Mali against an Islamic insurgency, but fail to do so in Syria.

http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-reinforces-hands-off-policy-in-mali/1591055.html

 

Mali conflict: UN backs France's military intervention”, January 2013

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21021132

 

 Mali: A Diplomatic Opportunity for Israel”, February 2013

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However, with the electoral victory of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia, and with the nearly takeover of Mali by al-Qaeda, more and more African countries are becoming fearful of Iran and of its Islamist allies. Ethiopia, forced to confront Islamist militias backed by nearby rebels in Somalia, has become one of Israel’s closest allies in Africa, as well as a major buyer of Israeli defense equipment. Kenya, which also faces Islamist terrorism from neighboring Somalia, is interested in strengthening its military ties with Israel. Even Nigeria reportedly spent about $500 million on Israeli military equipment in the past few years.

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Mali’s anger at Arab countries, especially Egypt, is part of a wider African fear of Islamic influence and of Iranian meddling on the continent. Even though France’s military intervention in Mali is only meant to serve French interests, it opens a window of opportunity which Israel should seize to improve its relations with Africa and with France itself. French military strikes against Mali’s Islamists are in stark contrast with France’s backing of the Muslim rebels in Côte d’Ivoire during that country’s civil war in 2002-2011. There, President Laurent Gbagbo, a Christian, started challenging France’s strong economic grip over his country. His defiant policy created a community of interests between France and Côte d’Ivoire’s Muslim rebels led by Alassane Ouattara. Hence did France support the Muslim rebels from Côte d’Ivoire’s northern region against Gbagbo and the Christian south. The embattled Ivorian president, a close friend of Israel, sought and obtained Israel’s logistical help. France and Israel ended up confronting each other by proxy in Côte d’Ivoire. In April 2011, then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy ordered a French military commando to oust Gbagbo from his bunker, allowing Ouattara to take the presidency.

While France and Israel collided in Côte d’Ivoire, the policy of President François Hollande in Mali creates a new community of interests, since France is now fighting forces that are hostile to Israel. Thus, the Malian crisis constitutes an opportunity for Israel to improve its relations with France and with former French colonies in Africa. This opportunity should be seized by Israel’s next foreign minister.

http://navon.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/BESAFeb2013.pdf

 

 “An unholy alliance”, June 2012

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Machinegun bursts on May 26th sent residents scurrying for cover. But the shooting turned out to be celebratory. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, a secular group known by its French initials, MNLA, had cut a deal with Islamic fundamentalists from a locally dominant lot called Ansar Eddine. The pair agreed to join forces and set up a transitional government. Peace would follow.

Yet residents still have reason to be scared. Ansar Eddine has become almost indistinguishable from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This is the closest to government that al-Qaeda, under any guise, has ever come. Though the nomadic Tuareg and other ethnic groups of northern Mali number only 1.3m people, the area they now control is as big as France.

The new alliance seems to be founded on two pillars. Ansar Eddine, which had previously argued only for autonomy, has evidently dropped its objections to full independence. And the MNLA has agreed to an Islamic state. Many MNLA supporters are aghast at what they see as a betrayal of a core principle of the decades-old Tuareg rebellion: a secular state offering freedom of religion and lifestyle.

The deal may yet fall apart. Tuareg officials say they want a model “similar to Mauritania or even Egypt”, where state and religion have rarely mixed. Ansar Eddine insists on a strict interpretation of sharia law, with amputations and beheadings for serious crimes. The two sides also argue over the government's make-up. Such is the mistrust that the MNLA leaders refused to let Ansar Eddine's leader, a notoriously tricky strongman called Iyad ag Ghali, sign an earlier accord.

In the end a tribal chief close to him had to put his name to it. The MNLA chose to deal with Ansar Eddine because the fundamentalists have money and guns, whereas the MNLA can barely afford to pay salaries. Flush with cash from al-Qaeda, Mr ag Ghali has started to attract deserters from the impecunious Tuareg.

The government in Bamako, Mali's capital, is in disarray after a coup by disaffected soldiers in March and is struggling to control even the southern half of the country, having abandoned the north to the assorted rebels. Meanwhile the MNLA naively thought that, as long as it distanced itself from AQIM, the West would support it. Instead it has been outmanoeuvred by Ansar Eddine. The West, with France to the fore, is hardly likely to tolerate the existence of an al-Qaeda-run state in a large swathe of west Africa.

http://www.economist.com/node/21556307

 

 Sudan orders Iranian diplomats to leave”, September 2014

Sudan has ordered Iran to close its cultural centres and given their managers 72 hours to leave the country, officials have said, as a diplomatic row threatens normally close relations.

"Sudanese authorities summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Khartoum and informed him of the decision to close the three cultural centres and to give the diplomats who ran them 72 hours to leave the country," the AFP news agency quoting an unnamed official said on Tuesday.

Sudanese media speculated that the expulsions were linked to government concerns that Iranian officials were promoting their Shia brand of Islam in the largely Sunni country, according to the Reuters news agency.

The Iranian cultural centre and its branches had exceeded their mandates and "become a threat to intellectual and social security," said a foreign ministry statement.

Regional rivalries

Khartoum has maintained generally close relations with Tehran, whose ships have made a number of port calls in Port Sudan this year.

Iran is also reportedly a significant arms supplier to Sudan and the two governments are both backers of Hamas, although Sudan has denied Israeli accusations that it has acted as a conduit for Iranian arms deliveries to the Palestinian group.

Sudan turned down an Iranian offer to set up air defences on its Red Sea coast after a 2012 air strike Khartoum blamed on Israel, fearing it would upset Tehran's regional rival, the Sunni superpower Saudi Arabia, Sudan's foreign minister said in May.

A Sudanese analyst told AFP that the move by Khartoum might be in response to pressure from Riyadh, which put enormous strain on the Sudanese economy earlier this year by denying it access to the Saudi banking system.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/09/sudan-orders-iranian-diplomats-leave-201492141938226714.html

 

 “Leader of Al-Qaeda in Sudan killed in Mali”, February 2013

The leader of Sudan’s Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Niles group, Abu Hazim, was killed in an airstrike carried out recently by French warplanes on the positions of jihadists in northern Mali.

Hazim, whose real name is Eman Mahmoud, was born in the northern Sudan town of Dongola in 1964. He was married to two women, one of whom is from India.

The SITE Intelligence Group, a website that specialises in tracking the online activity of terrorist organisations, was the first to reveal the news, saying it obtained a statement announcing his death on Al- Qaeda-linked internet forums.

The Long War Journal, another website dealing with terror groups, cited a US intelligence official saying that Hazim had moved to Mali to fight alongside Al-Qaeda jihadists at the beginning of the French-led operation launched last January to stop their advance towards the Malian capital.

The Sudanese jihadist took part in operations in the Philippines and Chechnya, as well as joining the fight against the Soviet army in Afghanistan. He also trained militants who participated in the “jihad” in Iraq and Somalia, said the statement announcing his death.

Khartoum-based newspaper Al-Sahafa said it obtained confirmation of his death from “informed sources”. The daily further added that the latter denied the existence of Al-Qaeda in Sudan, saying only there are small circles of radical youth in the country.

The Sudanese source told Al-Sahafa they conducted a dialogue with these youth after their return from Somalia and most of them renounced violence and extremist ideology.

Last January, the Sudanese Al-Qaeda group announced the formation of its student wing in the University of Khartoum, in a sign of growing extremist influence in the country.

The Agence France-Presse correspondent in the M