It says the shipment came from Bandar Abbas, a port in southern Iran, and were hidden in containers labelled as building materials.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11743454
“Iran denies shipping arms to Islamist militants in Somalia”, February 2013
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"The allegations of arm transfers from Iran to Somalia are absurd fabrications and have no basis or validity," Iran's U.N. mission wrote to the U.N. Security Council in a letter obtained by Reuters. "Thus it is categorically rejected by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran."
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-arms-yemen-un-idUSBRE91D0B120130214
“Gambia cuts ties with Iran and orders diplomats to go”, November 2010
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The Gambia has said it is cutting all ties with Iran and ordered all Iranian government representatives to leave within 48 hours.
Officials from the small West African nation gave no reason for the move.
But last month Nigeria said it had intercepted an illegal arms shipment in Lagos from Iran, destined for The Gambia.
Senior Iranian official Alaeddin Borujerdi has said the move was taken under US pressure.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11819143
“Senegal severs ties with Iran”, February 2011
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Senegal has cut
diplomatic ties with Iran, accusing Tehran of supplying weapons to separatist
rebels in its southern Casamance region, the foreign ministry said.
"Senegal has decided to break off diplomatic relations with the Republic
of Iran," the foreign ministry said in a statement on Wednesday.
The statement linked the Iranian weapons with an attack on Sunday in Casamance,
the latest in a string of such attacks by rebels engaged in one of Africa's longest-running conflicts, which resulted in the
deaths of three Senegalese troops.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122392022223897.html
“Kenyan government links 2 terrorism suspects to Iran”, November 2015
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Kenyan security agencies announced Saturday the arrest of two terrorism suspects with alleged links to Iran, claiming that both men admitted plotting attacks on Western targets in the African nation.
Abubakar Sadiq Louw, 69, and Yassin Sambai Juma, 25, are accused of terrorism and espionage on behalf of Iranian state intelligence. The pair "admitted to conspiring to mount terror attacks," with the government asserting that the men's targets "included hotels in Nairobi frequently used by Western tourists, businessmen and diplomats."
Described as a senior figure in the Shiite Muslim community in the capital of Nairobi, Louw was working on behalf of the Quds Force, an elite unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guard that has carried out covert operations in other countries, the agencies said. Juma was allegedly one of the students Louw recruited.
There was no immediate comment from the Iranian government.
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In 2012, two Iranians were arrested and charged with preparation to commit a felony and possession of explosives without a license. A senior Kenyan government official familiar with the intelligence in that case said the men were in the advanced stages of planning a terrorist attack.
"We don't allow organizations or countries to commit terror in our country," the official said, adding that the suspects may have wanted to use Kenya as a transit point to strike in nearby countries.
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/28/africa/kenyan-terror-arrests/
“UN investigates Nigerian weapons shipment from Iran”, January 2011
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UN weapons experts are in Nigeria to inspect an Iranian arms shipment seized in the port of Lagos last October.
The weapons, including rocket launchers and grenades, were found in containers labelled as building materials.
Nigeria reported the seizure to the UN Security Council for an apparent breach of the sanctions against Iran.
Nigeria has charged an alleged member of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and three Nigerian citizens over the illegally imported weapons.
Iran is under UN sanctions because of its nuclear programme and is banned from supplying, selling or transferring arms.
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But the shipment was intercepted when an attempt was made to re-export it to The Gambia.
The Gambia's neighbour Senegal recalled its ambassador to Tehran over the incident, amid speculation the weapons may have been destined for separatist rebels in its Casamance region.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12216803
“Alberto Nisman: Argentina prosecutor's death closer to being solved”, February 2016
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A year after the mysterious death of star prosecutor Alberto Nisman shookArgentina to the core and made headlines around the world, the case may finally be moving closer to a solution.
A judicial attempt to rule out the suggestion that Nisman’s death was suicide and the appearance in court of a former spymaster who could provide clues in the case suggests that the stalled investigation may inching towards a conclusion.
Nisman was found shot dead in his home last year just hours before he was due to appear before Congress to explain his accusations that thenpresident Cristina Fernández de Kirchner had conspired to cover up Iran’s alleged involvement in a 1994 terrorist attack in Buenos Aires.
“Iran-Linked Terror Suspect’s Family Faults SSS”,
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The family urged the SSS to charge Abdullahi to court or release him. Abdullahi, a leader of Shi’a Islamic sect and two other terror suspects, Sulaiman Saka and Saheed Adewunmi, were paraded by the SSS penultimate Wednesday for allegedly working for Iranian terrorists planning to attack American and Israeli interests in Nigeria. Deputy Director, Public Relations, SSS, Marilyn Ogar, also alleged that Abdullahi confessed to interrogators that he received $4,000 upon completion of his training in Iran; 3,500 Euro in April 2012 at a meeting in Dubai. Ogar further said that Abdullahi received $20,000, out of which he allegedly used $10,000 in relocating to Lagos from Ilorin, furnishing a house and renting a shop for his business.
https://www.naij.com/26109.html
“Iran and Sudan Begin to Execute Moves to Dominate Central & Western Africa”, July 2013
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Meanwhile, hectic preparations were, by late June 2013, taking place in Khartoum for the escalation of the surge into western Africa. Both Iran and Sudan consider the Central African Republic (CAR) a crucial venue because the CAR permits movement westward around the chaos in Darfur and the French presence in N’Djamena. Moreover, Bangui provides quick access to the Gulf of Guinea, as well as to the sub-Sahelian east-west roadway which passes through the region’s main capitals — those which Khartoum has been recently courting — all the way to Dakar.
On June 17, 2013, Pres. Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and President Michel Djotodia of the Central African Republic oversaw in Khartoum a series of secret multi-national discussions which would now facilitate a dramatic break-out westward for Sudan, Iran, the CAR and their allies.
Djotodia is the first Muslim to lead the CAR, significant since only 15 percent of the population is Muslim and most of them practice tribally-influenced offshoots of Islam. Djotodia, in contrast, was a councilor in the CAR Embassy in Sudan but based in Darfur where he was converted to Islamism-jihadism by his Sudanese hosts. He is convinced in the Sudanese tenet that a strong jihadist kernel is indispensable to ensuring the loyalty and cohesion of any revolutionary movement irrespective of its openly declared ideology or policy.
Indeed, the key internal security and intelligence positions in Djotodia’s Seleka coalition are held by fellow jihadists and their own stalwart tribal-jihadist militias. Hence, Djotodia is convinced he is beholden to Bashir’s Sudan for his own ascent to power. Little wonder that the CAR’s Christian majority fear that Djotodia and his Muslim allies from the north intend to impose an Islamist regime on the nation.
“Africa: Iran’s final frontier?”, April 2013
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Iran’s Africa strategy involves courting African countries voting in important international bodies, prioritizing outreach to African countries that mine uranium, and cementing partnerships that could give Iran access to strategic naval bases.
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Iranian diplomats have long sought to cultivate ties with South Africa. The Islamic Republic’s opposition to Apartheid set the foundation for warm ties after the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1994. Iranian supply of oil to South Africa has heightened economic relations. For Tehran, however, trade is not the only factor in Iran’s desire to have good relations with South Africa. “South Africa is a key member of the Non-Aligned Movement, a bloc of developing countries that has resisted the efforts to force Tehran to halt uranium enrichment,” a commentary in the official Tehran Times explained.[7]
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Another factor behind Iran’s nuclear drive may be its developing nuclear program. The Iranian leadership has said it seeks up to 16 nuclear reactors for civilian energy purposes.[29] Should Iran build such a network, it will deplete its limited indigenous uranium supply within 10 years.[30] Regardless of Iran’s nuclear motivation, two things are clear: Iran has at present no intention of abandoning its nuclear drive, and it will also never have true energy security. Its quest to find alternative sources of uranium may also bring Iran back to Africa.
A number of African states mine uranium: Nambia and Niger are major uranium exporters. Malawi and Gabon operate uranium mines. South Africa produces some uranium as a byproduct of gold mining, and prospecting continues across the continent. Uranium deposits exist in Togo, Guinea, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.[31] Iran seeks to cultivate ties with many of these states.
https://www.aei.org/publication/africa-irans-final-frontier/
“Zimbabwe and Algeria sending troops to support Gaddafi in Libya war?”, June 2011
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While in February the media focused on the rebels and allegations from Gaddafi's former Chief of Protocol Nouri Al Misrahia that the leader was using mercenaries from Kenya, Chad, Niger and Mali against his own people after losing control of the Libyan army, other reports suggested that while the mercenaries might have represented a very small part of Gaddafi's forces, the governments of Algeria, Zimbabwe and even South Africa were actively helping the leader
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It would not be the first time that Mugabe sent Zimbabwean militia's without prior consultation as in 1997 the country's troops were sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to help Laurent Kabila against rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Zimbabwe is also tipped as the favourite exile destination if Gaddafi ever decides to leave the country as President Robert Mugabe is the Libyan leader's closest ally in Africa. Over the years Gaddafi was said to have showered his counterpart with donations and subsidised oil shipments and in late 2010, Mugabe's party Zanu PF received hundreds of tractors and much farming equipment from Libya to use in election campaigns..
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At the same time reports also surfaced about Algeria's involvement in the conflict and its support of the Gaddafi regime. While Algeria has always been very vocal about being concerned by western imperialism on the continent, the alleged alliance came as a surprise, especially as President Bouteflika's government has cooperated for years with the US and Nato on its North Africa and Sub-Saharan anti-terrorist policies.
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Algeria Watch also accused the Algerian government of having provided the air transport planes that have carried sub-Saharan African mercenaries from Niger, Chad and Darfur to Libya.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/zimbabwe-and-algeria-sending-troops-to-support-gaddafi-in-libya-war-159320
“The Algerian Connection”, September 2011
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Algeria is the only country in North Africa that has not recognized the Libyan rebels’ Transitional National Government. It also reportedly shipped arms and foodstuffs to the Gaddafi forces during the six-month conflict. Algeria was one of four countries that did not endorse the Arab League’s support of Resolution 1973 of the United Nations Security Council, which opened the way for the air operation against the Gaddafi regime, starting on March 19. The others were Sudan, Syria and Yemen. (Yet, perhaps in a recognition of the nosediving fortunes of Gaddafi, an Algerian representative, along with those of many other countries, was present at the conference on aid to the new Libyan Government held on September 1 in Paris)
Algeria and the Gaddafi regime have had a common enemy: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), made up largely of former members of the Algerian terrorist movement, the Islamic Armed Group (GIA). The Algerian Government suppressed this group, which rose up following the Government’s cancellation in 1992 of an election that would have led to the victory of the Islamist political party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The 10-year war that followed ended in a defeat of the GIA and at an appalling cost of lives on both sides. The GIA then became the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and later officially joined al Qaeda. AQIM has retreated to the Sahel area south of the Saharan desert, where it is now mainly engaged in kidnapping Europeans (mostly French) and demanding ransom. However, in the most spectacular attack in years, terrorists stormed the Military Academy at Cherchell, Algeria, on August 26 and killed 16 officers and two civilians. The AQIM communiqué claiming responsibility for the attack said it was justified by Algeria’s support to the Gaddafi regime.
But at the same time, and to illustrate the ambivalence of the situation, relations between Gaddafi and the Algerian regime have been difficult ever since the Libyan colonel came to power in 1969. That this country of miniscule population, led by a quixotic and unpredictable dictator, could pose as a rival to Algeria’s dominance of the Maghreb and the Sahel region, was a constant source of annoyance to the ruling group in Algiers. Gaddafi’s support of the Touaregs of the Sahel, some of whom were among his mercenaries in the recent civil war; his posing as the “King of Africa,” and his generosity to a number of Black African regimes; even his support of the Polisario Front against Algeria’s rival, Morocco, grated on the Algerian Government because these were actions taking place in what it considered its own backyard.
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In the background to this situation lies the fact that Algeria has a problem of legitimacy stemming from the fact that what began as a revolutionary movement against the French occupation — the National Liberation Front (FLN) — morphed over the years into a military dictatorship ruling over a state. The present president, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, is the last of the original leaders of the FLN. With an ageing and ill president, it seems necessary for Algeria to create a new legitimacy for itself. But Algeria’s present policy seems marked by a sort of paralysis, as various groups maneuver behind the scenes in view of the upcoming succession.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-charles-g-cogan/algeria-gaddafi_b_948026.html
“Iran’s Battle for Africa”, September 2013
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What kind of power does Iran have? Europe gets a great deal of its oil and gas from the Middle East and North Africa. Much of it comes through the Straits of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and through pipelines across Iraq. But pipelines from Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco also carry natural gas into Europe. Several European companies want to support a project to build a gas pipeline from Nigeria to Algeria so Europe can get more of its natural gas from Africa.
To disrupt this trade, Iran doesn’t need to take over the governments of the countries along the route. Pipelines are easy to break. Narrow straits of water can be strewn with mines, making it too expensive to insure ships to cross them. If Iran can gain enough power in these areas—a goal it is working toward—it can hold Europe to ransom.
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When we examine southern European countries on their own, we see an even more disturbing picture. In Spain, 54 percent of crude oil and 77 percent of gas imports are vulnerable to Iranian disruption. In Italy, it’s 48 percent of oil