Studies in the psychology of sex, volume VI. Sex in Relation to Society by Havelock Ellis. - HTML preview

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spontaneous growth, to modify them. This action is

diverse, according as

we are dealing with one or the other of the strongly

marked divisions of

theoretical morality: traditional and posterior

morality, retarding the

vital growth of moral practice, or ideal and anterior

morality,

stimulating the vital growth of moral practice.

Practical morality, or

morals proper, may be said to stand between these two

divisions of

theoretical morality. Practice is perpetually following after anterior

theoretical morality, in so far of course as ideal

morality really is

anterior and not, as so often happens, astray up a blind alley. Posterior

or traditional morality always follows after practice.

The result is that

while the actual morality, in practice at any time or

place, is always

closely related to theoretical morality, it can never

exactly correspond

to either of its forms. It always fails to catch up with ideal morality;

it is always outgrowing traditional morality.

It has been necessary at this point to formulate

definitely the three

chief forms in which the word "moral" is used, although under one shape or

another they cannot but be familiar to the reader. In

the discussion of

prostitution it has indeed been easily possible to

follow the usual custom

of allowing the special sense in which the word was used to be determined

by the context. But now, when we are, for the moment,

directly concerned

with the specific question of the evolution of sexual

morality, it is

necessary to be more precise in formulating the terms we use. In this

chapter, except when it is otherwise stated, we are

concerned primarily

with morals proper, with actual conduct as it develops among the masses of

a community, and only secondarily with anterior morality or with posterior

morality.

Sexual morality, like all other kinds of morality, is

necessarily

constituted by inherited traditions modified by new

adaptations to the

changing social environment. If the influence of

tradition becomes unduly

pronounced the moral life tends to decay and lose its

vital adaptability.

If adaptability becomes too facile the moral life tends to become unstable

and to lose authority. It is only by a reasonable

synthesis of structure

and function--of what is called the traditional with

what is called the

ideal--that the moral life can retain its authority

without losing its

reality. Many, even among those who call themselves

moralists, have found

this hard to understand. In a vain desire for an

impossible logicality

they have over-emphasized either the ideal influence on practical morals

or, still more frequently, the traditional influence,

which has appealed

to them because of the impressive authority its _dicta_

seem to convey.

The results in the sphere we are here concerned with

have often been

unfortunate, for no social impulse is so rebellious to decayed traditions,

so volcanically eruptive, as that of sex.

We are accustomed to identify our present marriage

system with "morality"

in the abstract, and for many people, perhaps for most, it is difficult to

realize that the slow and insensible movement which is always affecting

social life at the present time, as at every other time, is profoundly

affecting our sexual morality. A transference of values is constantly

taking place; what was once the very standard of

morality becomes immoral,

what was once without question immoral becomes a new

standard. Such a

process is almost as bewildering as for the European

world two thousand

years ago was the great struggle between the Roman city and the Christian

Church, when it became necessary to realize that what

Marcus Aurelius, the

great pattern of morality, had sought to crush as

without question

immoral,[265] was becoming regarded as the supreme

standard of morality.

The classic world considered love and pity and self-

sacrifice as little

better than weakness and sometimes worse; the Christian world not only

regarded them as moralities but incarnated them in a

god. Our sexual

morality has likewise disregarded natural human

emotions, and is incapable

of understanding those who declare that to retain unduly traditional laws

that are opposed to the vital needs of human societies is not a morality

but an immorality.

The reason why the gradual evolution of moral ideals,

which is always

taking place, tends in the sexual sphere, at all events among ourselves,

to reach a stage in which there seems to be an

opposition between

different standards lies in the fact that as yet we

really have no

specific sexual morality at all.[266] That may seem

surprising at first to

one who reflects on the immense weight which is usually attached to

"sexual morality." And it is undoubtedly true that we have a morality

which we apply to the sphere of sex. But that morality is one which

belongs mainly to the sphere of property and was very

largely developed on

a property basis. All the historians of morals in

general, and of marriage

in particular, have set forth this fact, and illustrated it with a wealth

of historical material. We have as yet no generally

recognized sexual

morality which has been based on the specific sexual

facts of life. That

becomes clear at once when we realize the central fact that the sexual

relationship is based on love, at the very least on

sexual desire, and

that that basis is so deep as to be even physiological, for in the absence

of such sexual desire it is physiologically impossible for a man to effect

intercourse with a woman. Any specific sexual morality must be based on

that fact. But our so-called "sexual morality," so far from being based on

that fact, attempts to ignore it altogether. It makes

contracts, it

arranges sexual relationships beforehand, it offers to guarantee

permanency of sexual inclinations. It introduces, that is, considerations

of a kind that is perfectly sound in the economic sphere to which such

considerations rightly belong, but ridiculously

incongruous in the sphere

of sex to which they have solemnly been applied. The

economic

relationships of life, in the large sense, are, as we

shall see, extremely

important in the evolution of any sound sexual morality, but they belong

to the conditions of its development and do not

constitute its basis.[267]

The fact that, from the legal point of view,

marriage is

primarily an arrangement for securing the rights of

property and

inheritance is well illustrated by the English

divorce law

to-day. According to this law, if a woman has sexual

intercourse

with any man beside her husband, he is entitled to

divorce her;

if, however, the husband has intercourse with

another woman

beside his wife, she is not entitled to a divorce;

that is only

accorded if, in addition, he has also been cruel to

her, or

deserted her, and from any standpoint of ideal

morality such a

law is obviously unjust, and it has now been

discarded in nearly

all civilized lands except England.

But from the standpoint of property and inheritance

it is quite

intelligible, and on that ground it is still

supported by the

majority of Englishmen. If the wife has intercourse

with other

men there is a risk that the husband's property will

be inherited

by a child who is not his own. But the sexual

intercourse of the

husband with other women is followed by no such

risk. The

infidelity of the wife is a serious offence against

property; the

infidelity of the husband is no offence against

property, and

cannot possibly, therefore, be regarded as a ground

for divorce

from our legal point of view. The fact that his

adultery

complicated by cruelty is such a ground, is simply a

concession

to modern feeling. Yet, as Helena Stöcker truly

points out

("Verschiedenheit im Liebesleben des Weibes und des Mannes,"

_Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft_, Dec., 1908), a

married man

who has an unacknowledged child with a woman outside

of marriage,

has committed an act as seriously anti-social as a

married woman

who has a child without acknowledging that the

father is not her

husband. In the first case, the husband, and in the

second case,

the wife, have placed an undue amount of

responsibility on

another person. (The same point is brought forward

by the author

of _The Question of English Divorce_, p. 56.)

I insist here on the economic element in our sexual

morality,

because that is the element which has given it a

kind of

stability and become established in law. But if we

take a wider

view of our sexual morality, we cannot ignore the

ancient element

of asceticism, which has given religious passion and

sanction to

it. Our sexual morality is thus, in reality, a

bastard born of

the union of property-morality with primitive

ascetic morality,

neither in true relationship to the vital facts of

the sexual

life. It is, indeed, the property element which,

with a few

inconsistencies, has become finally the main concern

of our law,

but the ascetic element (with, in the past, a

wavering

relationship to law) has had an important part in

moulding

popular sentiment and in creating an attitude of

reprobation

towards sexual intercourse _per se_, although such

intercourse is

regarded as an essential part of the property-based

and

religiously sanctified institution of legal

marriage.

The glorification of virginity led by imperceptible

stages to the

formulation of "fornication" as a deadly sin, and finally as an

actual secular "crime." It is sometimes stated that it was not

until the Council of Trent that the Church formally

anathematized

those who held that the state of marriage was higher

than that of

virginity, but the opinion had been more or less

formally held

from almost the earliest ages of Christianity, and

is clear in

the epistles of Paul. All the theologians agree that

fornication

is a mortal sin. Caramuel, indeed, the distinguished

Spanish

theologian, who made unusual concessions to the

demands of reason

and nature, held that fornication is only evil

because it is

forbidden, but Innocent XI formally condemned that

proposition.

Fornication as a mortal sin became gradually

secularized into

fornication as a crime. Fornication was a crime in

France even as

late as the eighteenth century, as Tarde found in

his historical

investigations of criminal procedure in Périgord;

adultery was

also a crime and severely punished quite

independently of any

complaint from either of the parties (Tarde,

"Archéologie

Criminelle en Périgord," _Archives de

l'Anthropologie

Criminelle_, Nov. 15, 1898).

The Puritans of the Commonwealth days in England

(like the

Puritans of Geneva) followed the Catholic example

and adopted

ecclesiastical offences against chastity into the

secular law. By

an Act passed in 1653 fornication became punishable

by three

months' imprisonment inflicted on both parties. By

the same Act

the adultery of a wife (nothing is said of a

husband) was made

felony, both for her and her partner in guilt, and

therefore

punishable by death (Scobell, _Acts and Ordinances_,

p. 121).

The action of a pseudo-morality, such as our sexual

morality has been, is

double-edged. On the one side it induces a secret and

shamefaced laxity,

on the other it upholds a rigid and uninspiring

theoretical code which so

few can consistently follow that theoretical morality is thereby degraded

into a more or less empty form. "The human race would gain much," said the

wise Sénancour, "if virtue were made less laborious. The merit would not

be so great, but what is the use of an elevation which can rarely be

sustained?"[268] At present, as a more recent moralist, Ellen Key, puts

it, we only have an immorality which favors vice and

makes virtue

irrealizable, and, as she exclaims with pardonable

extravagance, to preach

a sounder morality to the young, without at the same

time condemning the

society which encourages the prevailing immorality, is

"worse than folly,

it is crime."

It is on the lines along which Sénancour a century ago and Ellen Key

to-day are great pioneers that the new forms of anterior or ideal

theoretical morality are now moving, in advance,

according to the general

tendency in morals, of traditional morality and even of practice.

There is one great modern movement of a definite kind

which will serve to

show how clearly sexual morality is to-day moving

towards a new

standpoint. This is the changing attitude of the bulk of the community

towards both State marriage and religious marriage, and the growing

tendency to disallow State interference with sexual

relationships, apart

from the production of children.

There has no doubt always been a tendency among the

masses of the

population in Europe to dispense with the official

sanction of sexual

relationships until such relationships have been well

established and the

hope of offspring has become justifiable. This tendency has been

crystallized into recognized customs among numberless

rural communities

little touched either by the disturbing influences of

the outside world or

the controlling influences of theological Christian

conceptions. But at

the present day this tendency is not confined to the

more primitive and

isolated communities of Europe among whom, on the

contrary, it has tended

to die out. It is an unquestionable fact, says Professor Bruno Meyer, that

far more than the half of sexual intercourse now takes place outside legal

marriage.[269] It is among the intelligent classes and in prosperous and

progressive communities that this movement is chiefly

marked. We see

throughout the world the practical common sense of the people shaping

itself in the direction which has been pioneered by the ideal moralists

who invariably precede the new growth of practical

morality.

The voluntary childless marriages of to-day have served to show the

possibility of such unions outside legal marriage, and such free unions

are becoming, as Mrs. Parsons points out, "a progressive substitute for

marriage."[270] The gradual but steady rise in the age for entering on

legal marriage also points in the same direction, though it indicates not

merely an increase of free unions but an increase of all forms of normal

and abnormal sexuality outside marriage. Thus in England and Wales, in

1906, only 43 per 1,000 husbands and 146 per 1,000 wives were under age,

while the average age for husbands was 28.6 years and

for wives 26.4

years. For men the age has gone up some eight months

during the past forty

years, for women more than this. In the large cities,

like London, where

the possibilities of extra-matrimonial relationships are greater, the age

for legal marriage is higher than in the country.

If we are to regard the age of legal marriage as, on

the whole,

the age at which the population enters into sexual

unions, it is

undoubtedly too late. Beyer, a leading German

neurologist, finds

that there are evils alike in early and in late

marriage, and

comes to the conclusion that in temperate zones the

best age for

women to marry is the twenty-first year, and for men

the

twenty-fifth year.

Yet, under bad economic conditions and with a rigid

marriage law,

early marriages are in every respect disastrous.

They are among

the poor a sign of destitution. The very poorest

marry first, and

they do so through the feeling that their condition

cannot be

worse. (Dr. Michael Ryan brought together much

interesting

evidence concerning the causes of early marriage in

Ireland in

his _Philosophy of Marriage_, 1837, pp. 58-72).

Among the poor,

therefore, early marriage is always a misfortune.

"Many good

people," says Mr. Thomas Holmes, Secretary of the Howard

Association and missionary at police courts (in an

interview,

_Daily Chronicle_, Sept. 8, 1906), "advise boys and girls to get

married in order to prevent what they call a

'disgrace.' This I

consider to be absolutely wicked, and it leads to

far greater

evils than it can possibly avert."

Early marriages are one of the commonest causes both

of

prostitution and divorce. They lead to prostitution

in

innumerable cases, even when no outward separation

takes place.

The fact that they lead to divorce is shown by the

significant

circumstance that in England, although only 146 per

1,000 women

are under twenty-one at marriage, of the wives

concerned in

divorce cases, 280 per 1,000 were under twenty-one

at marriage,

and this discrepancy is even greater than it

appears, for in the

well-to-do class, which can alone afford the luxury

of divorce,

the normal age at marriage is much higher than for

the population

generally. Inexperience, as was long ago pointed out

by Milton

(who had learnt this lesson to his cost), leads to

shipwreck in

marriage. "They who have lived most loosely," he wrote, "prove

most successful in their matches, because their wild

affections,

unsettling at will, have been so many divorces to

teach them

experience."

Miss Clapperton, referring to the educated classes,

advocates

very early marriage, even during student life, which

might then

be to some extent carried on side by side

(_Scientific

Meliorism_, Ch. XVII). Ellen Key, also, advocates

early marriage.

But she wisely adds that it involves the necessity

for easy

divorce. That, indeed, is the only condition which

can render

early marriage generally desirable. Young people--

unless they

possess very simple and inert natures--can neither

foretell the

course of their own development and their own

strongest needs,

nor estimate accurately the nature and quality of

another

personality. A marriage formed at an early age very

speedily

ceases to be a marriage in anything but name.

Sometimes a young

girl applies for a separation from her husband even

on the very

day after marriage.

The more or less permanent free unions formed among us in Europe are

usually to be regarded merely as trial-marriages. That is to say they are

a precaution rendered desirable both by uncertainty as to either the

harmony or the fruitfulness of union until actual

experiment has been

made, and by the practical impossibility of otherwise

rectifying any

mistake in consequence of the antiquated rigidity of

most European divorce

laws. Such trial marriages are therefore demanded by

prudence and caution,

and as foresight increases with the development of

civilization, and

constantly grows among us, we may expect that there will be a parallel

development in the frequency of trial marriage and in

the social attitude

towards such unions. The only alternative--that a

radical reform in

European marriage laws should render the divorce of a

legal marriage as

economical and as convenient as the divorce of a free

marriage--cannot yet

be expected, for law always lags behind public opinion and public

practice.

If, however, we take a wider historical view, we find

that we are in

presence of a phenomenon which, though favored by modern conditions, is

very ancient and widespread, dating, so far as Europe is concerned, from

the time when the Church first sought to impose

ecclesiastical marriage,

so that it is practically a continuation of the ancient European custom of

private marriage.

Trial-marriages pass by imperceptible gradations

into the group

of courtship customs which, while allowing the young

couple to

spend the night together, in a position of more or

less intimacy,

exclude, as a rule, actual sexual intercourse.

Night-courtship

flourishes in stable and well-knit European

communities not

liable to disorganization by contact with strangers.

It seems to

be specially common in Teutonic and Celtic lands,

and is known by

various names, as _Probenächte, fensterln, Kiltgang,

hand-fasting, bundling, sitting-up, courting on the

bed, etc_. It

is well known in Wales; it is found in various

E