sources.
STANDARDIZED POSTURES IN COMPANY TACTICAL STANDING OPERATING
PROCEDURES
2-2. Within squads, platoons, and companies, equipment may be increased or
decreased, as needed. Some examples are as follows:
z
Choose the M9 pistol for extraction and apprehension teams. The use
of a long weapon (for example, an M16 with an M203, an M4 with an
M203, or a 12-gauge shotgun) with NL munitions capability is also
recommended, especially for overwatch personnel.
z
Add nonstandard weapons such as shotguns for greater NL
capabilities.
NOTE: The shotgun is used to protect the M203 gunner as he reloads.
z
Add NL munitions to existing organic weapons systems, such as the
M203.
z
Arm soldiers in the front line of the formation with their standard
weapon. If the weapon is a long weapon, it should be carried across the
back from left to right or vice versa, with the butt up and muzzle
down. Ensure that the weapon is cleared and that the magazine is in
the appropriate ammunition pouch.
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z
Balance the mix of weapons and munitions according to the mission,
enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian considerations
(METT-TC).
z
Establish command relations and determine who has or gives the
authority to fire NL munitions.
z
Maximize the distance and barriers between the crowd and control
formations. Use NL munitions to create a standoff distance.
z
Maintain a lethal overwatch of the control force at all times.
z
Maintain a reserve force at all times to reinforce the control force, as
needed.
z
Create NLW range cards for static positions.
z
Consider environmental conditions and their effect on the
performance of NL munitions. Proper storage, periodic inspections,
and the rotation of NL munitions are critical to maintaining the
effectiveness and viability of NL munitions.
WEAPON AND AMMUNITION CONFIGURATIONS
2-3. Individuals designated as NL shooters must have the means to transition
to lethal rounds, if required. Lethal rounds are carried separately from NL
rounds so that the shooter will not confuse them in the heat of confrontation.
However, in the heat of confrontation where a lethal option is necessary, NL
rounds can be used lethally by adjusting the point of aim to a vulnerable part of the body and closing in on the distance to the target.
2-4. Squad leaders should designate NL shooters within their squad. Ideally,
the squad should not change its organization to accommodate NLW.
2-5. Commanders should not dispatch NL patrols. They should plan a combat
or security patrol with NL capabilities. Soldiers are never sent in harm’s way without lethal protection. NLW are only considered additional tools for the
mission and not a mission in itself. There is no such thing as a NL mission.
2-6. Soldiers manning a static position should have NL capabilities depending on METT-TC. Shotguns and the M203 work well at static positions.
2-7. Recovery, apprehension, and/or extraction teams should be established
before deployment. Team members should be equipped with personal
protective equipment (PPE), an M9, NL munitions and weapons, and Flex-
Cufs®. They should have some training in open-hand control, pain
compliance, and handcuffs and/or Flex-Cufs.
2-8. Crowd control formations (see Chapter 6) should be well trained and well rehearsed. Rapid, coordinated movements of a well-trained and well-rehearsed control force can often be a strong enough deterrent. A lethal
overwatch marksman always covers the control force.
2-9. During a NL engagement, the use of designated marksmen (DM)
provides confidence and safety to those facing a riot. The DM in an overwatch
position scans the crowd to identify threats and designate personnel for
recovery and lethal rounds firing (if a lethal threat is presented). They are
ideally suited for flank security and countersniper operations.
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Control Force Operations
NONLEHTAL PLANNING
2-10. The fundamental principles of mission planning are not changed by the
incorporation of NLW into a plan. NLW are intended to be operational-
enhancement tools. The first concern of a commander is the successful
completion of the mission. NL munitions provide a commander with a wider
range of response options, but these munitions are not a replacement for
lethal capabilities. Commanders must always be capable of answering a lethal
attack with a lethal response.
2-11. When a commander commits his soldiers and equipment to a crowd
control situation, he commits his forces with the additional tools of NL
capabilities. This is an addition to the force continuum that the force
commander now has available to him. Commanders that properly employ NL
munitions and weapons have a tactical advantage over those who rely
completely on lethal means.
2-12. When developing a tactical standing operating procedure (TSOP) (see
Chapter 6), units should consider the following: z
Crowd control formations.
z
Extraction teams.
z
Apprehension teams.
z
Lethal overwatch marksmen and/or observer teams.
z
Reserve and/or security forces.
MILITARY WORKING DOG TEAMS
2-13. Military working dog (MWD) teams may be employed with a control
force formation as a method of increasing crowd apprehension about
approaching or engaging the formation. The teams should be in the rear of the
formation in plain sight of the crowd, but in front of the command element and the M33A1 squad RCA disperser. The MWD teams work back and forth
behind the formation as an intimidation measure. The presence of the MWD
may produce a profound psychological effect on the crowd. These teams may
also be used to help control individuals who have been captured by the
recovery and apprehension teams.
CAUTION
Do not unleash an MWD on a crowd.
COMBAT CAMERAMEN
2-14. Video and still cameramen should make a photographic record of the
individuals in the crowd who are leaders and instigators. Events must be
documented to hold personnel, factions, gangs, or groups accountable for acts
that violate law, destroy property, or cause physical harm. Electronically
recording events aids in the prosecution of such cases and eliminates the
sense of anonymity that people in large crowds often feel.
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS
2-15. Information superiority helps forces to anticipate problems and
requirements. It allows commanders to control situations earlier and with less force, creating the conditions necessary to achieve the optimal end state.
Public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil military operations are activities that will allow the commander to control situations earlier and with less force.
2-16. Information is available from a multitude of sources. A diversity of
sources is the best approach because it prevents biased perspectives. Primary
sources are as follows:
z
Open sources.
Libraries.
Newspapers and news periodicals.
Radio and television.
Internet.
z
Law enforcement sources.
Local law enforcement agencies.
National law enforcement agencies.
z
Military sources.
Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence community (most
restrictive source).
Local military intelligence (MI) field offices.
2-17. Police intelligence operations (PIO) is one of the five military police functions. This function is a process of actively and passively collecting
information that is of a police, criminal, or combat nature. As military police perform the other four functions of maneuver and mobility support (MS), area
security (AS), law and order (L&O), and internment and resettlement (I/R), they are gathering information that supports, enhances, and contributes to
the commander’s protection program, situational awareness, and battlefield
visualization by portraying relevant threat information that may affect
operational and tactical environments.
2-18. IPB is a continuous process for analyzing the threat and the
environment of a specific geographic area. During the IPB process, the
Intelligence Officer (US Army) (S2) or Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
(Intelligence) (G2) uses all available databases, intelligence sources and
products, and related MI discipline to analyze the threat and the
environment. The PIO function supports this process by providing the S2 with
collected police, criminal, and combat information that can directly and
significantly contribute to the success of the MI effort. In addition to combat information, the PIO function provides additional information on possible
criminal threats and COAs. This is intended to support the S2 IPB process
and can be used by the commander to upgrade force protection. (See
FM 19-10. )
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THREAT ANALYSIS
2-19. Crowd control requires its own thought process. Emphasis should be on
prevention rather than confrontation. In combat, military forces are taught to fight and eliminate threats. In crowd control, military forces must deal with
noncombatants that have internationally recognized rights. These rights must
be respected while maintaining public order. This is an issue that law
enforcement agencies (LEAs) have been struggling with for years.
2-20. Dealing with crowd control incidents is a matter of using some basic
guidelines. It also includes asking the right questions in a logical manner so that key issues are not omitted. The commander must use these guidelines in
context with METT-TC and the location of the incident (CONUS or
OCONUS).
PREINCIDENT PLANNING
2-21. This phase of planning begins before the incident and is initiated at the operational level with guidance from the strategic level. The planning
includes guidance on crowd control and addresses responsibilities, training,
organization, operating procedures, use of force (CONUS), and/or rules of
engagement (OCONUS). The most difficult and productive decisions are those
made in the preincident planning process.
Avoid Confrontation
2-22. Crowd situations are highly unpredictable, but one thing seems
certain—confrontation will likely cause crowd resistance. When pushed,
people tend to resist opposition to the realization of their purposes.
Focus on Prevention
2-23. Planning should key in on the prevention of unfavorable outcomes.
Experience has shown some LEAs attempting to help crowds accomplish their
goals within the law that have been beneficial and even led to conceding some
violations for the purpose of avoiding confrontation. However, LEAs maintain
a law enforcement presence, which signifies social restraint. LEAs also decide when and where they will not compromise and the amount of force to use.
Define Goals
2-24. When defining a goal, deciding what must be accomplished is the first
step. Defining the goal is fundamental. However, actually working toward and
accomplishing the goal is easier said than done, as the process can drive the
situation. Commanders and leaders must be aware of this. The military force
must focus on what they are trying to accomplish.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE
2-25. Seek to know as much as possible about social protest groups (within
the limits of the law, see Appendix B) before an incident. This will provide
insight into the organization and its functions and provide a warning as to
what to expect. When you know as much about these organizations as
possible, then it is possible to anticipate their next move. See Ap pendix C.
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2-26. Continually assess what is to be accomplished against what others are
trying to accomplish. Some groups may not have goals that conflict with those
of US forces, but their actions may. Other groups may have goals and
activities that do conflict. In either case, the assessment of group goals
compared to the goals of US forces helps to understand and avoid potential
conflicts.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS PREPARATION
2-27. Counterdemonstration workgroups are a mixture of traditional and
nontraditional staff proponents brought together to coordinate the resources
to be employed by task force (TF) units before a potential civil disturbance.
Meetings of the counterdemonstration workgroup are held on a regular basis
(generally weekly) and are chaired by the Assistant Chief of Staff G3
(Operations and Plans) (G3). The following staff proponents may be involved,
and others may be involved as needed:
z
Public affairs office (PAO).
z
Joint military commission (JMC), if organized.
z
Provost marshal office (PMO).
z
PSYOP.
z
G2, Assistant Chief of Staff G5 (Civil Affairs) (G5), Assistant Chief of
Staff G6 (Signal) (G6).
z
Civil affairs (CA).
z
Army airspace command and control (A2C2).
z
Chaplain.
z
Engineer.
z
Surgeon.
z
Fire support element (FSE).
RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOPMENT
2-28. Working relationships between commanders and protest group leaders
are increasingly seen as the best means for preventing bad outcomes in crowd
situations. This is called the negotiated management model of crowd control.
LEAs in large metropolitan cities in the US and Europe practice it.
2-29. Open dialog helps develop working relationships between commanders
and protest group leaders, providing an opportunity to communicate clearly.
Talking allows group leaders to tell authorities and tactical commanders what
they want to accomplish. It also allows authorities and commanders to tell
group leaders what they are prepared to do and how they might respond to
certain crowd behaviors. Such communications can do much to resolve issues
and prevent violence.
2-30. Commanders may not be able to talk to all leaders before a crowd
assembles. Some groups do not have recognized leaders and are ad hoc
organizations. Other groups may have several leaders, but only some of those
leaders will negotiate. In such cases, meetings with some leaders may tell you who the other leaders are and provide critical information. Negotiations may
also encourage more moderate leaders to do things that will support the
commander.
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2-31. Initiate communication with group leaders to work out issues before an
event. Commanders should make a concentrated effort to maintain a working
relationship with the leaders of protest groups.
2-32. Communication also means persuasion. Commanders should make a
concerted effort to win over demonstration leaders. Commanders may tell
group leaders that they want to help them complete their mission in a safe
manner. They should encourage demonstrators to protest in an acceptable
way and, if possible, offer favors to get them to do just that.
NOTE: Commanders must only offer what they are willing and able to
deliver.
2-33. Several rules apply in negotiations, and credibility is key. Only
communicate necessary information and those actions that authorities and
commanders intend to do. Negotiations are made from a position of strength,
and by negotiating an agreement may be reached. However, contingencies
should be developed in the event that the agreement is violated.
2-34. Working relationships between commanders and protest group leaders
often result in protest groups policing themselves. This is one of the basic
premises of negotiated management. Protesters are more likely to listen to
their own leaders, as opposed to listening to US forces. Protest organizers are likely to buy into a cooperative effort and agree to ground rules set during
preprotest negotiations. Many protest leaders seek to stay on the right side of the law.
ACCEPTABILITY
2-35. Deployed US forces will find themselves engaged in crowd control
operations under difficult circumstances. The host nation (HN) may have
groups that do not accept the presence of US forces, which will make imposing
order and the protection of citizens difficult at best. US forces will be under intense media and political scrutiny (an environment much like what LEAs
operate in on a day-to-day basis).
2-36. Winning in this environment is not like winning in combat. US forces
may appear to be invincible and formidable, but they risk being portrayed as
oppressors. Thus, US forces can lose by appearing to win. Groups that
perceive themselves as oppressed will readily seek victimhood in an effort to
gain the support of public opinion. Winning in this environment is about
seizing and holding the moral high ground. US forces must maintain the
authority and legitimacy of what they are doing.
2-37. Projecting a favorable image will require outreach to local leaders and citizens. It will also require developing a relationship with the media. For
example, the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department often invites the media to
accompany their tactical commander during crowd control situations. This
shows that they have nothing to hide. It also provides an opportunity for
individuals to see the commander’s side of an event.
2-38. In this environment, commanders must consider how actions will play
among several audiences—local, allied, US, and international. The media
effect is inescapable. In some cases, it will be difficult to accommodate all of 18 April 2005
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Control Force Operations
these audiences. However, the most important audience will be the US public,
which is key to the continued support of US forces.
CROWD ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS
2-39. Assessing crowds requires its own set of questions. These questions
should be answered before a crowd assembles or as quickly as possible if a
gathering occurs without notification. In some cases, all the questions may not be answered. These questions represent a logical way to think about crowds.
The questions are as follows:
z
Who are they? What is the overarching identity of the crowd?
Are they strikers, ethnic factions, or social protesters? Do they
identify themselves as strikers, ethnic groups, religious
factions, or protesters against some perceived social injustice?
Understanding who they are will indicate what they may do. It may be
possible to determine identities and goals from advance assembling
instructions, leaflets distributed to bystanders, placards and banners,
and chants and songs.
z
What are their goals? What the group wants to accomplish by
assembling could determine the extent to which they can be
accommodated once they have assembled. They may only seek
recognition for their cause (being seen and heard). If so, this goal is
usually easy to accommodate. However, some groups may have more
demanding goals, for example the demonstrators in Seattle who
sought to stop the WTO. Goals that cannot be accommodated make
confrontation very likely.
z
What is the composition of the crowd and are there any known
factions? Seattle demonstrations against the WTO were comprised of
groups that were protesting environmental issues, wages, and child
labor laws. Differing goals and the resulting friction were evident
between such organizations as the Ruckus Society and the American
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).
Factions within a crowd represent threats and opportunities.
z
What are they capable of doing? Protest groups often claim that
they will assemble large numbers of people to produce some disruptive
action. However, there is often a difference between the claim and
reality. An organization may claim that it can mass a 100,000 people,
but in reality can only get 40,000. Organizers exaggerate for the
following reasons: they want to boost the morale of their own people
and they want the media to report that they have strength in
numbers. Studying the past activities of a group may provide
indications of what they are capable of doing in the future.
z
What are their traditional behaviors or cultural repertoires?
What people do during protests is not universal. It varies with the
group and the culture. Social protest organizations and striking
unions will carry placards and banners. Other groups will protest in a
more quiet way, like the 5,000 women in Sarajevo whose standard
Sunday behavior was to sit and block traffic. They were protesting the
loss of male relatives in the Bosnian war. Understanding the goals of
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Control Force Operations
the protesters can be helpful in deciding how to respond to their
behaviors.
z
When and where will they assemble? Every protest organizer has
a time and place for assembling and perhaps a destination for the
crowd to move toward. If the organizer attempts to mobilize large
numbers of participants, the time and place for assembling and
dispersing must be made known in the instructions. This information
may be stated in the mobilization instructions or disseminated by an
informal network, such as word of mouth. Such impromptu networks
in densely populated areas can enable rapid assembling.
z
Where will they go? Many crowds have destinations. Organizations
may march a specified distance to ensure that their cause gets
sufficient attention. Commanders need to know the route to minimize
disruptions to the rest of the community. In Los Angeles, LEAs
attempt to reroute traffic and prevent congestion caused by protest
marches