Signal Support to Theater Operations by Department of the Army - HTML preview

PLEASE NOTE: This is an HTML preview only and some elements such as links or page numbers may be incorrect.
Download the book in PDF, ePub, Kindle for a complete version.

SECTION III - CHANGES IN THEATER SIGNAL

ARMY NETWORK OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-33. On the battlefield, information  systems provide the vital link among tactical, operational,  and strategic operations. These are particularly attractive to adversaries because attacks by a foreign power are indistinguishable from hacking or criminal activities at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. The theater signal operational environment that drives theater signal doctrine and force structure includes all of the elements of the larger operational environment which affect all US forces, and the additional factors imposed by  the requirements, characteristics, and doctrine of the forces supported  by theater  signal. Highlights of the changes to the theater signal operational environment are shown in Figure 1-5.

Note. The DOD defines an operational environment as a "composite of all the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander."

img7.png

Figure 1-5. Changes in network requirements

1-34. Army networks meet these changes with the ever increasing use of modernized communications resources, emerging technologies, and compatible government off-the-shelf and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment as part of networks designed to interface with the GIG infrastructure.

1-35. Coalition, multinational, interagency, and commercial networks exist throughout the operational environment but must be fully integrated to "Fight the Network." The DOD's dependence on commercial networks and competing commercial priorities adds additional complexity to planning and execution. These commercial networks may include the communications infrastructure of hostile or occupied territories. The challenges associated with network security in this "mixed" network environment cannot be ignored.

1-36. Joint access to the GIG and its services are provided through STEPs, teleports, and other points of presence (POPs) located in all theaters and coordinated by the ASCC. Joint doctrine and policy must govern operations due to their global interdependence. For example, USCENTCOM reachback occurs through facilities located in the USPACOM, USEUCOM, and continental United States (CONUS). The Army, along with the other services and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), must work in concert to ensure that only the most modern capabilities and systems are fielded to these sites, while maintaining backwards compatibility for servicing those units that have not been fully modernized.

1-37. Theater networks are an extension of the GIG and stability operations and strategic functions for the GCC and ASCC. Theater networks operate continuously and extend horizontally and vertically to enable simultaneous operations while sustaining Army business lines and reachback to installations and power projection platforms. It is at the ASCC that critical theater resources, e.g., electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) management and satellite access, are allocated and synchronized with the GCC requirements. The theater network, through fixed and deployable formations, delivers Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) services and the Army capabilities that comprise the theater GIG. Additionally, the theater  network supports the combatant command's and host nation's unique requirements. In addition to coordinating daily theater operations and the theater signal battle, theater network assets may augment division and BCT operations.

1-38. Tactical users require extensive networks to enable battle command, intelligence, and sustainment operations. They must leverage internal, strategic, and national capabilities and the ASCC to orchestrate the theater network battle. Corps, division, and the BCT will deploy into theaters from multiple force projection platforms. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM lessons learned highlighted initial operational risk from shortfalls caused by lack of interoperability standards. Therefore, this complex environment demands full connectivity, complete synchronization, and consistent worldwide standards to allow immediate access to the fight. Corps, division and the BCT will dynamically maneuver forces and capabilities within the constructs of a joint capable network, and this capability will extend across all tactical echelons.

THEATER NETWORK MISSIONS

1-39. The effect on network elements in a theater of operations is profound, resulting in the theater signal mission expanding significantly. The former doctrine of "install, operate, maintain and protect" no longer captures the necessity to meet new network enabled requirements in the areas of data services, satellite communications (SATCOM) usage, network protection, non-traditional roles and support relationships, increased use of commercial systems, components, and contractor support.

1-40. Greater Demands for Data Services. Deployed tactical elements demand the same data services provided in home stations. This includes new applications and requirements for significantly increased bandwidth. Deployed forces must retain this "home station quality" interoperability with the sustaining base for all forms of C2, intelligence, and logistic support.

1-41. Increased Reliance on SATCOM. To support modularity designs and capabilities, mobility and battle command systems, tactical elements need to untether from  terrestrial transport systems. The capability to fight in a non-contiguos, asymmetrical battlefield within an enclave operational environment will become more the norm than the contiguous battlefield of the Cold War era. These enclaves are, more often than not, beyond li