CONSIDERATIONS FOR PLANNING
6-43. Coordinated interagency planning is required to ensure balanced development of the entire security sector. Imbalanced development can actually undermine the long-term success of SSR efforts. Integrated planning helps prioritize and sequence the activities of each contributing agency into a comprehensive SSR
strategy. SSR planning must account for several interrelated factors that influence reform: Cultural awareness.
Leadership capacity building.
Public trust and confidence.
Host-nation dependency.
Perseverance.
End state.
Interactions among the security sector and these factors complicate reform. Additionally, actions taken to reform one aspect of the security sector invariably affect reform activities in another. Effective assessment of these factors will drive the process and help define success.
Cultural Awareness
6-44. Regardless of the need to develop a host nation’s security forces quickly, SSR requires considerable tolerance, cultural awareness, and an environment of mutual respect. In particular, actors working closely with host-nation forces must respect the security culture of the host nation. This culture is shaped by history, language, religion, and customs and must be understood. Cultural awareness and sensitivity are necessary to dispel the natural tensions that arise when external actors dictate the terms and conditions of SSR for the host nation. Responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability to local culture help limit resentment and resistance to reform while generating local solutions to local problems. Local help fosters acceptance and strengthens the confidence of the citizens in reform.
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Leadership Capacity Building
6-45. Challenges associated with developing capable, legitimate, and accountable security forces require capable leadership in the host-nation security sector at all levels. To establish the conditions for long-term success, SSR may help the host nation identify and begin training and advising security force leaders as early as possible. Such efforts must avoid undermining host-nation legitimacy while recognizing that assistance, advice, and education may be needed.
6-46. Programs focused on developing senior leaders, such as those conducted by the DOD Regional Centers for Security Studies, may prove helpful. Often the host nation can augment programs for officer training and staff college courses of participating forces and may even develop similar institutions. This participation ensures that future leaders gain the knowledge and skills to manage security forces effectively while meeting the broader responsibilities normally associated with leaders in the security sector.
Public Trust and Confidence
6-47. In rebuilding the institutions of a failed state, commanders must engender trust and confidence between the local populace and the security forces. As SSR proceeds, these security forces carry a progressively greater burden in ensuring public safety. Frequently, they do so in an environment characterized by crime and violence. This proves true in areas recovering from violent, predatory forces.
Recovery requires a community-based response that uses the unique capabilities of the security forces and police. Operating in accordance with the laws of the host nation, the success of these forces will help to gain the trust and confidence of the local populace. Furthermore, increased public confidence engenders greater desire among the people to support the efforts of the security forces.
6-48. External participants in SSR must focus on enhancing the functionality of host-nation security forces while sustaining and strengthening the perception of legitimacy for civilians. Public confidence is further strengthened as host-nation forces support activities that foster civil participation. These activities, such as providing security for elections, associate the security forces with positive processes; this improves the credibility of host-nation security forces while providing visible signs of accountability and responsibility.
Host-Nation Dependency
6-49. During reform, the risk of building a culture of dependency is mitigated by adopting a training process. This process sequentially provides training and equipment to security forces, a dedicated advising capability, and an advisory presence. After initial training efforts, this reform helps host-nation security forces progress toward the transition of security responsibility. A robust transition plan supports the gradual and coherent easing of host-nation dependency, typically in the form of increased responsibility and accountability.
6-50. Depending on the security environment, external actors in SSR may need to protect new host-nation security forces from many direct and immediate threats during their development. While this requirement usually applies only during initial training, security forces remain at risk throughout their development during SSR; these threats may contribute to problems with discipline, dependability, and desertion. In extreme circumstances, protecting host-nation security forces may necessitate training outside the physical boundaries of the state.
Perseverance
6-51. SSR is a complex activity, and participants must demonstrate persistence and resilience in managing the dynamic interactions among the various factors affecting the reform program. Within the SSR
processes, some failures are likely. Early identification of potential points of failure, such as corruption within the police force, allows for mitigating action.
End State
6-52. In stability operations, the external assistance force cannot impose success on the host nation. The host-nation government should emerge as the only legitimate authority. Within SSR, security forces are 6 October 2008
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developed to enhance the legitimacy of the host-nation government. The resulting security forces must be—
Competent from the ministerial level to the individual soldier and police officer, across all related fields of interest and functional specialties.
Capable in size and effective enough to accomplish missions, remain sustainable over time, and maintain resources within state capabilities.
Committed to the security and survival of the state, the preservation of the liberties and human rights of the citizens, and the peaceful transition of authority.
Confident in the ability to secure the country; earning the confidence of the citizenry, the government, and the international community.
TRANSITION OF AUTHORITY
6-53. Transferring security responsibility from intervening to host-nation forces is done according to the tactical, operational, and strategic conditions identified during SSR planning. As forces establish suitable conditions, responsibility for security gradually transitions to the local, provincial, and national government. During transition, the presence of advisors is reduced, although some advisors may be retained to ensure the long-term sustainability of SSR. Transition planning must begin early and focus on timeline adherence.
6-54. During the transition of authority, a formal network of committees or consulting agencies validates the readiness and accountability of host-nation security forces. Progress toward transition is gauged through a process that confirms the performance and capabilities of host-nation security forces. Typically, forces gauge capabilities through test exercises similar to those used to validate the readiness of forces for contingency operations. These procedures prevent a premature transition of authority, which can lead to a loss of confidence and cause the populace to seek alternative means of security.
6-55. When the host nation emerges from an extended period of violent conflict characterized by widespread human rights violations, a rigorous vetting process should reestablish the legitimacy of reconstituted or rebuilt security forces. Such processes must be demonstrably neutral and free from political manipulation and may require external control or administration. When public records have been destroyed or lost, effective vetting may require detailed background investigations by trained interviewers to identify past human rights violators and to screen out unsuitable recruits from reconstituting security forces.
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
6-56. Through unity of effort, execution of SSR unites all elements of the security sector. The activities of military forces may be focused on reforming the host-nation military forces, but those actions are only part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reform the entire security sector. Military forces may directly support related reform efforts or indirectly support the efforts as related, integrated activities.
6-57. Once the security environment is considered stable, other participating agencies, organizations, and institutions can safely begin operations in the operational area. Military forces gradually transfer appropriate responsibilities to other participants in the stability effort, one military force to another military or civilian group. These transitions allow the military force to focus their efforts on other stability tasks, many of which fall within the bounds of the broader effort to reform the security sector of the host nation.
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL
6-58. Establishing civilian oversight and control of the defense sector is critical to the success of any SSR
program. Oversight and control mechanisms and processes ensure civilian control of the military, a fundamental tenet of effective governance. These processes and mechanisms also ensure that the various components of the defense sector are accountable to elected and appointed civilian leadership, both in the executive and legislative branches. That accountability is essential to establishing a sound foundation for defense budget planning and program implementation.
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6-59. The primary agent of civilian oversight and control within the defense sector is the ministry of defense. The ministry of defense operates within some form of interagency or cabinet framework that establishes political links and accountability between the ministry and the executive branch. Other agencies involved in the defense sector may share oversight and control responsibilities, such as the cabinet-level leadership of intelligence agencies, executive protection forces, and border forces. In transitioning or post-conflict states, these institutions are frequently weak, dysfunctional, or altogether absent. SSR programs encompass restructuring, rebuilding, and, in some cases, creating entirely new institutions to provide oversight and control mechanisms for the defense sector.
6-60. The legislative branch plays an important role in oversight and control. The legislature typically determines the funding level of government activities while providing the statutory framework for planning and implementation. Constitutional frameworks may vest in the legislature a share in the appointment of senior government officials, or in the structuring, commissioning, and promoting of military personnel. In this context, building an effective partnership between the executive and legislative branches becomes an important enabler of effective SSR.
6-61. Most transitioning and post-conflict states clearly define and delineate the roles and responsibilities of military forces and law enforcement agencies as they provide internal security for the state. As the security apparatus of a state begins to fracture, the necessary distinctions between military and law enforcement roles and missions erode or disappear entirely. This situation frequently leads to inappropriate military involvement in political affairs. As a result, military forces may subsume justice and law enforcement functions although they lack the training or equipment. Restoring the distinction between military and law enforcement functions, as well as providing robust mechanisms to sustain that distinction, is fundamental to SSR.
6-62. The primary agent of civilian oversight and control over law enforcement agencies will likely be a separate ministry, such as the ministry of interior or of justice. As host-nation capacity for law enforcement increases, inherent power struggles may develop as police leaders strive for primacy in the management of social order. For this reason, it becomes imperative to facilitate forcing functions and forums that improve communications and coordination between disparate ministries that have responsibility for maintaining civil security. Often, the threshold delineating military and police primacy issues depends on the quantifiable level of violent activities in an area. This threshold serves as a quantifiable measure of effectiveness for military or civilian security sector efforts.
SECURITY FORCES STRUCTURE
6-63. An integrated approach is essential to building partner capacity in the security sector. While it is important to develop all essential capabilities, structures must be kept simple. In determining the optimal security forces structure, SSR accounts for the following:
Political oversight and control in the form of capable ministries or Departments of Defense, Justice, and Interior. This aspect of SSR links the political direction of the state to the implementation of national interests and policies.
National force headquarters that provides overall command and translates national interests and policies to the operational level for military, police, and other security forces. For the military element, this may be a joint structure.
Appropriate legislation defining the role of the different security sector elements and forces and delineating oversight mechanisms in both the legislative and executive branches.
Operational headquarters for both the military and law enforcement sectors. These may be
regionally based, capability based, or a combination of the two.
Staff disciplines at all levels, from strategic to tactical, for both military and law enforcement sectors.
The ethnic and cultural factors that influence the security sector. SSR approaches must be able to accommodate significant cultural differences across societies and states.
6-64. The size, structure, and capabilities of tactical organizations, whether in the law enforcement or the military sector, depend on various considerations. Tactical forces must meet all the operational functions 6 October 2008
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identified when assessing the security sector. This assessment informs SSR; an interagency team completes the assessment, drawing on all of the functional specialties required for a successful program. The considerations and factors guiding the assessment include the following:
Required capabilities and roles. This includes consideration of the requirement for different types of forces. These requirements stem from a thorough threat analysis that helps to identify functional capabilities and requirements.
Historical lineage and traditions (their positive and negative influences) of previous host-nation security forces.
A realistic consideration of available resources, including near- and long-term manpower.
Legal and political requirements for peace settlements, mandates, host-nation tools of
governance, bilateral agreements, and similar political documents, frameworks, or processes that shape the overall stability operation.
Equipment and Resources
6-65. An integrated and synchronized training plan provides guidelines for identifying and balancing resource requirements; accounts for resource planning and prioritization; and identifies budget, funding control, execution, and reporting requirements. It also addresses the funding, procurement, allocation, and distribution of resources necessary to reform host-nation security forces. This is a broad task with the military advising and assisting the host nation and other actors in the stability operation. Training plans address not only how to use the equipment and resources, but also how to maintain them. Likewise, equipment procurement includes sustainment plans that provide life cycle management for materiel systems.
Infrastructure and Essential Services
6-66. The initial SSR assessment identifies requirements to support the entire program, including the reform of host-nation security forces. These requirements are incorporated into the broad plan for SSR, and resources are allocated against them. Typically, these requirements consist of the basic infrastructure and services necessary to support training and operational requirements. While commanders try to use existing infrastructure, they may need to acquire resources to improve or expand that infrastructure to support the reform effort.
Geographical Force Dispositions
6-67. Several factors influence the geographical distribution of restructured security forces. These factors include regional requirements, force role and capabilities, geography and climate, and existing infrastructure. Other considerations include differing cultural regions, local and regional associations, and historical lines of authority.
Accession and Training Policies
6-68. SSR planning includes policies for accession and training host-nation security sector personnel.
These policies are developed with, and as a complement to, the broad program for DDR. The accession effort includes a thorough, transparent vetting of all prospective recruits by an external agency that has credibility with all participants in SSR; vetting is conducted in consultation with civil authorities.
REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT
6-69. The initial SSR assessment identifies the nature and type of forces to be developed and their respective capabilities. While these capabilities reflect host-nation aspirations, they also represent a detailed capability requirements analysis. This ensures a qualitative, as well as quantitative, foundation for the development program that accounts for future contributions by the host nation. All efforts to build capable forces are balanced with support to the institutional systems, processes, and managers that support them.
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Military Forces
6-70. Military forces are developed primarily to counter external threats. The design of these forces develops from the analysis of those threats and the specific capabilities required to counter them. Other key military missions include providing humanitarian assistance, and in special cases, countering certain types of internal military threats. External organizations executing SSR and the individuals assigned to them are selected for their specific abilities to train and advise the developing force. For example, military police should help develop military police forces. This provides for appropriate development of expertise while facilitating the advising process.
Justice and Law Enforcement Forces
6-71. An effective and accountable justice system and supporting law enforcement (especially police) forces are central to a legitimate security framework. Although the military may be involved initially in developing the justice and law enforcement forces, this task should be assumed by other agencies as soon as possible. Qualified, professional justice sector and police trainers support an improved advising process and ensure sustainable development with appropriate civilian oversight. Their expertise ensures an appropriate delineation of roles and responsibilities between military forces and law enforcement sectors.
In policing, development of organizational substructure—supervision, process, policy, internal governance, planning, and budgeting—are vital to the long-term sustainability of reform efforts.
Other Security Forces
6-72. Requirements may arise for the development of other forces within the security sector. These requirements may include specialized security forces; presidential guards; a coast guard, border control, and customs services; or intelligence services. The host nation provides the specific requirements on which to develop these forces. Until such forces are developed and trained, other security forces assume responsibilities outside of their intended domain. In such cases, due caution ensures forces conduct operations in compliance with relevant host-nation constitutional and statutory provisions and consistent with international law and humanitarian guidelines. Such caution extends to how civilians perceive operations and the legitimacy of the forces supporting the operation; continuous assessment ensures that commanders remain aware of how their operations affect the local populace and the broader SSR program.
6-73. In general, the capabilities of the security forces reflect the roles for which they were designed and trained. There may be overlap, particularly in times of emergency or until all planned forces are developed and trained. Cooperation between military and police is emphasized from the outset, permitting both to maintain their appropriate and distinct constitutional roles in the security sector. SSR educates host-nation forces, civilian oversight agencies, and political leadership on the appropriate roles for each part of the security forces. Military forces should be restricted to their role as a force of last resort in the face of military threats. Their use may require several approaches within the constitutional rule of law when military support to civil authority is required.
6-74. Ultimately, force development clearly defines and institutionalizes the separation of roles and responsibilities between military forces and law enforcement agencies. Usually, their organization, training, and equipment reflect this distinction; their design clearly limits the amount and degree of force that law enforcement agencies can generate. For example, civilian police entities may adopt military-style command structures and systems but not their mobile organizational structure. Another separation exists in that police forces provide services to a particular local area, neighborhood, or community. Since they lack organization for a large-scale maneuver, they do not generally form like military forces.
INITIAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION
6-75. In areas of the world torn by conflict, disaster, poverty, or internal strife, host-nation security forces often possess only rudimentary proficiency and development. Initial training for security forces must focus primarily on developing basic skills appropriate to their roles. Host-nation security forces should not train for specialty skills until personnel exhibit sufficient competence and confidence with these basic core 6 October 2008
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skills. Advanced technology or materiel, while representative of increased status among developing forces, often extends beyond the comprehension of local forces, creating an unnecessary training burden.
6-76. To foster development and ease transition, training exercise programs are progressive. They test all levels of command, gradually bringing together all the individuals and institutions representing the new security sector, from team-level organizations through senior ministerial personnel. Host-nation security forces also require a complementary education program that supplements training, ensures understanding of roles and responsibilities, and reinforces relationships across the security sector with the local populace.
Education and training must encourage civilian oversight of the security forces and a culture of service to the host nation and its population.
DEVELOPING SECURITY FORCES
6-77. Security force assistance is the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. It is integral to successful stability operations and extends to all security forces: military, police, and border forces, and other paramilitary organizations. This applies to all levels of government within the host nation as well as other local and regional forces. Forces are developed to operate across the spectrum of conflict—combating internal threats such as insurgency, subversion, and lawlessness; defending against external threats; or serving as coalition partners in other areas. It is critical to develop the institutional infrastructure to sustain security force assistance gains; host-nation security forces must have the capability to perform required functions across the stability sectors. They must exist in sufficient numbers to have the capacity to perform these functions wherever and whenever required. Finally, they must have the sustainability to perform functions well into the future, long after external forces are no longer engaged. Successful security force assistance involves thorough and continuous assessment and includes the organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising of the forces involved.
6-78. Some security force assistance operations require organizing new institutions and units from the ministerial level to the smallest maneuver unit. Building infrastructure-related capability and capacity—
such as personnel, logistics, and intelligence—is necessary for sustaining the new host-nation capacity.
Developing host-nation tactical capabilities without the sustainment structure is inadequate. Host-nation organizations reflect their own unique requirements, interests, and capabilities; they should not simply mirror existing external institutions.
6-79. Training is conducted in institutions—such as training centers and academies—in units, and by individual personnel. It includes a broad range of subject matter including those issues that make security forces responsive to a civilian oversight and control.
6-80. Equipping is accomplished through several mechanisms including traditional security assistance, foreign military support, and donations. Equipment must be appropriate for host-nation sustainment—
appropriate to the physical environment of the region and within reasonable appropriations for operations and maintenance—and property accountability procedures. Equipping police forces can be a dangerous and complex process, occurring at numerous, geographically disparate locations across an operational area.
6-81. In many cases, particularly after major combat operations, it may be necessary to rebuild—or build—infrastructure to support security forces. This typically includes facilities and materiel but may also include physical plants, information systems, communications infrastructure, transportation, personnel management processes, and other necessary infrastructure. Rebuilding police facilities often differs from rebuilding military compounds. Police stations must be approachable and accessible to the community they support to be legitimate and effective.
6-82. Advising host-nation units and institutions is key to the ultimate success of security force assistance.
This benefits both the state and the supporting external organizations. To be effective, advising requires specially selected and trained personnel.
6-83. Military forces conduct security force assistance according to certain imperatives. Like the principles of war, these imperatives, if followed, give the operation the best chance for success:
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Understand the operational environment. An in-depth understanding of t