(5) Conduct a combined-arms rehearsal at the level where the vehicles are task-organized. Try to replicate conditions for mission execution during rehearsals, such as day, limited visibility, civilians on the battlefield, host nation support, and ROE. Include the following:
• Graphic and fire control measures.
• Direct fire plans.
• Communications.
• Breach drills.
• Techniques for using vehicles as infantry shields.
(6) The following measures minimize casualties when moving outside or between buildings:
(a) Cover all possible threat locations with either observation or fire.
(b) For those areas not possible to cover with observation or fire, use smoke to set a screen to block enemy observation of friendly movement.
(c) Move MGS vehicles forward to support infantry movement. Position the MGS
before the infantry begins moving, whether the MGSs are supporting by fire, being used as shields, or both.
(d) Preplan positions if possible, but devise a marking system and communication signals to designate situation-dependent positions to help maintain momentum. (For example, “The VS-17 panel from Building 2 means move to support by fire 3.”) (e) When using vehicles as a shield for infantry, move the vehicles as close to the start point as possible to allow the infantry freedom of movement when exiting the building.
(f) Vehicles need to move at the infantry’s rate of movement.
(g) When the distance between buildings is short, position vehicles to protect the infantry from enemy small-arms fire.
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(7) Use simple, clearly understood graphic control measures. The following are particularly useful for operations in urban combat (Figure 6-5):
• Phase lines.
• Number and lettering systems for buildings.
• Tentative support-by-fire positions.
• No-fire areas.
Figure 6-5. Graphic control measures.
Section II. OFFENSE
Offensive operations in urban areas are based on offensive doctrine modified to conform to the urban terrain. Urban combat imposes a number of demands that are different from ordinary field conditions, such as problems with troop requirements, maneuver, and use of equipment. As with all offensive operations, the company commander must retain his ability to fix and maneuver against enemy positions.
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6-3.
GENERAL OFFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Combat operations in a built-up area have a slower pace and tempo than operations in open terrain. Unlike in open terrain, SBCT infantry companies cannot maneuver platoons quickly. Due to the close environment and the restricted ability to use all available weapons systems, synchronization of maneuver and combat support assets is one of the SBCT infantry company commander’s main challenges. Missions in UO are more methodical. Normally, the infantry company conducts missions as part of a battalion operation, but the SBCT infantry company must be prepared to operate independently.
The company must also be prepared to conduct different but mutually supporting missions simultaneously, such as establish a checkpoint and clear a block at the same time.
a.
Troop Requirements. Due to the nature of combat in built-up areas, more troops are normally needed than in other combat situations. This is due to the number of tasks required: clear buildings, provide security, control civilians, and evacuate casualties (the probability of casualties is greater in UO).
(1) Because of the need to clear buildings and provide security, the number of troops required to accomplish an offensive mission is much greater. To prevent enemy forces from repositioning or counterattacking friendly forces, some forces must remain in a building once it is cleared.
(2) Commanders must also consider soldier fatigue. Room clearing techniques are physically demanding and quickly tire a force. Commanders must plan for the relief or rotation of their forces before they reach the point of exhaustion.
(3) Additional forces may be needed to control civilians in the built-up area. These forces must protect civilians, provide first aid, and prevent them from interfering with the tactical plan.
(4) Fighting in a built-up area normally results in a greater number of friendly casualties. The ability to see the enemy is fleeting and confined to very short ranges compared to combat in open terrain. Fratricide can become a serious problem and must be addressed in detail by the commander. Plan for CASEVAC and instruct subordinate units to conduct this task.
b.
Maneuver. Unlike in open terrain, the complex nature of the urban environment makes it difficult for commanders to maneuver their SBCT infantry company and its attachments quickly. Clearing buildings and looking for antiarmor ambushes, snipers, and booby traps degrade the ability of the company to maneuver platoons and squads. Due to the dense environment and its effects on weapons systems, the synchronization of combat power is one of the commander's main challenges. Offensive operations must be planned in detail, with subordinate elements given specific instructions and on-order missions.
c. Limitations. SBCT infantry company commanders attacking a built-up area must recognize some important limitations in the use of available assets: (1) Normally, the use of indirect fires, especially field artillery, is much more restricted in built-up areas than in open terrain. Leaders must consider the effects of indirect fire on the urban area and civilians, especially when extremely restrictive ROE
are in effect. When indirect fires are authorized, they must be fired in greater mass to achieve the desired effect.
(2) The rubbling caused by massive indirect fires adversely affects a unit's ability to maneuver during the attack.
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(3) The commander and leaders must consider the effect that city lights, fires, and background illumination have on night vision devices. These elements may limit the effectiveness of NVDs and make thermal imagery identification difficult.
(4) Communications equipment may not function to its maximum effectiveness because of the density in building construction. Therefore, intelligent use of graphic control measures and an understanding of the SBCT commander's intent (two levels up) become more important to mission accomplishment.
6-4. METT-TC
FACTORS
The SBCT infantry company commander's analysis of the factors of METT-TC is critical for successful planning and execution during UO.
a. Mission. The SBCT infantry company commander must receive, analyze, and understand the mission before he begins planning. He and his troops must clearly understand the conditions of the operation--either precision or high intensity--and the ROE. The company commander may be required to conduct different missions simultaneously.
(1) Common Missions. SBCT infantry companies should expect to receive similar types of offensive missions in urban terrain that they receive in other terrain. The following are common company missions in urban combat:
(a)
Isolation of an Urban Objective. The SBCT infantry company normally conducts this mission as part of an SBCT battalion. The SBCT infantry company deploys its platoons to secure the area around or near a building, block, or village in order to kill or capture any withdrawing enemy forces and prevent reinforcement of or a counterattack against the objective. Engineers or other CS and CSS assets may reinforce the company based on the ROE and factors of METT-TC. In view of the fact that many casualties may be inflicted on friendly units moving between buildings or down streets, this mission takes on significant importance.
(b)
Assault of a Building. SBCT infantry companies normally conduct this mission as part of an SBCT battalion operation when the building is too large for a platoon to assault and clear and the enemy defending the building requires a force larger than a platoon.
The company must enter the building, gain a foothold, and clear the building. The SBCT
battalion commander normally directs another SBCT infantry company (or other companies) to isolate the building. Engineers or other CS and CSS assets usually reinforce the SBCT infantry company consistent with the ROE and the factors of METT-TC.
(c)
Attack of a Block or Group of Buildings. SBCT infantry companies may attack a block or group of buildings. Again, the company normally conducts this mission as part of a battalion operation. If the company attacks a block as part of a battalion operation, it may be the battalion's main or supporting effort. Another friendly unit may isolate the objective, or the company may find that it must isolate the objective area in whole or in part. If an infantry company receives the mission to assault a block independently, then the company must isolate the objective area by itself.
(d)
Movement to Contact. SBCT infantry companies in UO may move through urban terrain in order to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Because the urban environment makes movement very challenging and the buildings reduce the capabilities of FBCB2, the company must make extra efforts to gain situational understanding (SU).
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This mission typically includes movement (often rapid) through an urban area to develop the situation by seizing or clearing blocks and buildings.
(e)
Hasty Attack of a Village. SBCT infantry companies may conduct a hasty attack of a village either independently or as part of an SBCT infantry battalion operation. The purpose of this mission is normally to reduce enemy control of a position and facilitate movement for other operations.
(f)
Seizure of Key Urban Terrain. SBCT infantry companies may seize key terrain in order to provide an advantage to friendly forces. Key terrain may be overpasses, building complexes, traffic circles, surrounding natural terrain or bridges, and so forth. The SBCT
infantry company usually conducts this mission independently to facilitate movement or other operations.
(g)
Raids. SBCT infantry companies may perform raids on urban terrain, which they plan similar to raids on other terrain. Objectives may be located in built-up areas, and the company may have to move through urban and other terrain in order to arrive at the objective. The company normally conducts this mission independently, but it may also conduct a raid in support of a battalion area raid (see Chapter 4).
(2)
Analysis of Mission. When conducting his analysis, the SBCT infantry company commander must consider his battalion commander’s intent and the end state of the operation. For example, the company commander must determine if clearance means every building, block by block (systematic clearance), or if the seizure of key terrain requires clearing only along the axis of advance (selective clearance). The company commander must also consider how and where the company must be postured in order to conduct follow-on missions and to facilitate the battalion and brigade missions. This influences the missions he gives to his platoon and attached element leaders.
(a) When the company is involved in clearing operations, bypassing buildings increases the risk of attack from the rear or flank unless planned support isolates and suppresses those buildings. Normally, the clearing platoons must not only enter, search, and clear each building in the company’s zone of action but also leave security behind to prevent reoccupation of buildings. This may not be feasible due to the nature of the mission, but if it is part of the plan, it should be made clear to the platoon leaders when orders are issued.
(b) The battle can transition quickly from precision to high intensity conditions, a transition that may be caused by enemy actions. An assault against a deliberate, prepared defense with obstacles becomes high intensity. Indications of an enemy-forced change of ROE (and a change from precision conditions to high intensity) include--
• The requirement to breach multiple obstacles.
• The use of booby traps by the enemy.
• The requirement to use repetitive explosive breaching to enter a building.
• Rooms that are so well prepared or barricaded that normal movement and clearing techniques cannot be employed.
(3)
Movement. Moving from building to building or between buildings presents a problem to platoons. Historical examples, recent operations in Somalia, and the Russian experience in Grozny have shown that many casualties occur during movement from building to building and down streets. Therefore, SBCT infantry company commanders should plan operations in a manner that allows subordinate elements to take maximum advantage of covered and concealed routes within the urban area. Additionally, company 6-12
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commanders must carefully analyze which buildings must be isolated, suppressed, and obscured, consistent with the ROE. They may use the MGS platoon and, if attached to mechanized units, any available tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) as shields for maneuvering platoons.
(4)
Coordination of Fire Support. Most fire support coordination occurs at battalion level to take into account the ROE. Prior coordination determines the techniques and procedures to use for communicating, identifying targets, and shifting fires. The FIST
chief should be extensively involved in this portion of the planning process. The company must plan fires consistent with the ROE, giving extra consideration to civilians, houses of worship, medical centers, schools, public services, and historical monuments.
(See Chapter 10 for further details about combat support assets.)
b.
Enemy. Key factors that affect the SBCT infantry company commander’s analysis are the type of enemy force that is expected in the urban area, the enemy’s probable courses of action, and the ROE. More restrictive ROE work to a defender’s advantage; conversely, less restrictive ROE work to an attacker’s advantage. The type of threat is one factor used to determine how the company should be task organized and how combat power should be synchronized to accomplish the mission. Additionally, the company commander must determine if there are any asymmetrical threats that may affect the company’s mission. For example, if the company has the mission to safeguard (seize) a water treatment facility that is determined to be key terrain, the commander needs to consider possible threats to the facility that may not be direct force-on-force actions.
(1)
Conventional Forces. Many third world countries have adopted techniques of urban combat from either the United States or the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Therefore, a future threat may consider the motorized or mechanized rifle battalion the most effective unit for urban combat because of its inherent mobility, armor protection, and ability to adapt buildings and other structures for defense quickly.
(a) In countries that have forces equipped and trained as in the former Warsaw Pact, there are standard urban defenses:
• Threat defenses are organized into two echelons to provide greater depth and reserves.
• Company strongpoints are prepared and form the basis for the battalion defensive position.
• The reserve is located in a separate strongpoint.
• Ambush locations are established in the gaps of the strongpoints, and dummy strongpoints are constructed to deceive the attacker.
• Positions for securing and defending the entrances to and exits from underground structures and routes are established.
• Security positions are prepared forward of first echelon defensive positions.
• A motorized or mechanized rifle company may defend several buildings or a single large building with mutually supporting fires.
• Each platoon defends one or two buildings, or one or two floors of a single building.
(b) In many third world countries, the forces are predominantly light with some outdated armored vehicles. Some countries may not have actual armed forces but have some form of armed militia(s). These forces normally do not fight a defense in the former
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Warsaw Pact style, but rather offer uncoordinated resistance, often extremely intense, as experienced in Somalia.
(2)
Unconventional (Asymmetric) Forces. Enemy analysis is similar to that for low intensity conflict during urban counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla, and counterterrorist operations.
c.
Terrain. Offensive operations must be tailored to the urban environment based on a detailed analysis of each urban terrain setting, its types of built-up areas, and existing structural forms. Commanders and subordinate leaders must incorporate the following special planning considerations for an urban environment when conducting an offensive operation:
• Military maps that may not provide enough detail for urban terrain analysis nor reflect the underground sewer system, subways, underground water system, mass transit routes, and utility facilities. (When available, the commander should utilize building or city plans, engineering prints, aerial photographs, tourist maps, or other aids that may assist him in his analysis of the terrain.)
• Natural terrain surrounding the built-up area.
• Key and decisive terrain (stadiums, parks, sports fields, school playgrounds, public buildings, media facilities, and industrial facilities).
• Construction and structural composition of buildings.
• Confined spaces that limit observation, fields of fire, and maneuver and prevent the concentration of fires at critical points.
• Covered and concealed routes to and within the built-up area.
• Limited ability to employ maximum combat power due to the need to minimize damage and rubbling effects (based on ROE).
• Problems with conducting effective reconnaissance during conventional operations. Reconnaissance by force is the most effective reconnaissance means, ROE permitting. This method involves probing a defense with successively larger units until enemy positions are disclosed and can be successfully attacked. During unconventional (asymmetric) operations or operations under restrictive ROE, the opposite is true. Reconnaissance and security are more easily accomplished by both sides and are more difficult to prevent.
• ROE that limit the use of firepower.
• Significant numbers of civilians who may have to be evacuated, some forcibly. Civilians may hinder operations on purpose or merely by their presence.
d.
Troops Available. An SBCT infantry company normally participates in an attack as part of an attacking SBCT battalion. In this case, the company may have to isolate the objective or seize a foothold. If the objective is a smaller built-up area, a company may be required to accomplish the entire mission independently, assigning required tasks to its platoons or squads. In either case, the maneuver platoons accomplish these tasks. The company mortar section normally supports the assault by providing indirect fire support.
(See Chapter 10 for detailed discussion of assets the company commander may have available.)
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(1)
MGS Vehicles. MGS vehicles may support by fire when lead units are seizing a foothold. During the attack of a built-up area, MGS vehicles overwatch the infantry's initial assault until an entry into the area has been secured. ICVs or MGS vehicles need the support of infantry in order to suppress enemy strongpoints and ATGMs while they move into overwatch positions. The commander must employ MGS vehicles to take advantage of the range of their main armament and their armored protection. He should also consider bringing the vehicles forward to secure a foothold or breach exterior walls for the infantry. He bases this decision on the ROE and the effectiveness of enemy antiarmor fires.
(2)
Direct Fire Artillery. If available, towed 155-mm howitzers can use direct fire to destroy bunkers, heavy fortifications, or enemy positions in reinforced concrete buildings (Figure 6-6). The towed 155-mm howitzer may also clear or create avenues of approach.
Whenever artillery is used in the direct fire role, it must be close to the infantry providing security against enemy ground attack. Prior coordination is necessary so the bulk of the field artillery unit's shells are HE.
Figure 6-6. Artillery in direct fire role.
e.
Time. Offensive operations in built-up areas have a slower pace and operational tempo. Consider the following issues when analyzing time available for an attack in urban terrain:
(1) Clearing buildings, blocks, or axes of advance in the dense environment of urban terrain requires more time than for operations in more open terrain.
(2) Troops tire more quickly because of stress and the additional physical exertion related to clearing urban terrain. Plan additional time to recover from fatigue.
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(3) Allow additional time for thorough reconnaissance and rehearsals in order to prevent excessive casualties and fratricide.
6-5. BATTLE
COMMAND
Units in built-up areas frequently fight separated and isolated from one another. Planning is centralized, but execution is decentralized. Therefore, it is critical that the commander clearly describe his visualization of the terrain and the enemy to his platoon and squad leaders. In all situations, leaders should position themselves well forward so that they can control the action and provide assistance to subordinate leaders. In urban terrain, this is even more critical due to obstacles, poor visibility, difficulty in communications, and the intensity of urban combat. SBCT infantry commanders must demand timely, accurate, and complete reporting and must plan for effective command and control to lessen the effects of the urban battlefield. The FBCB2 capability is not 100 percent; the leader on the ground reporting the situation as he sees it produces SU.
a.
Command. Subordinate units require mission-type orders that are restrictive in nature. SBCT infantry commanders should use detailed control measures to facilitate decentralized execution. Increased difficulties in command, control, and communications from higher headquarters demand increased responsibility and initiative from subordinate leaders. Graphic control measures common to other tactical environments are also used in combat in built-up areas. These and other control measures ensure coordination throughout the chain of command.
b. Control. Thorough rehearsals and detailed briefbacks also enhance control. It is important that subordinate leaders clearly understand the commander’s intent (two levels up) and desired mission end state in order to facilitate control. SBCT infantry company commanders should consider using subordinate leaders to control certain portions of the fight when the commander’s attention needs to be focused elsewhere (for example, using the XO to control the support element while the commander controls the assault elements).
(1)
Establish Communications. In built-up areas, radio communications are often less effective than field telephones and messengers. Communications equipment may not function properly because of the materials used in the construction of buildings and the environment. Wire laid at street level is easily damaged by rubble and vehicle traffic.
Pyrotechnic signals are hard to see because of buildings and smoke. The high noise level of battles within and around buildings makes sound signals and voice alerts difficult to hear, and voice communication can also signal the unit’s intention and location to the enemy. Line-of-sight (LOS) limitations affect both visual and radio communications.
Therefore, the time needed to establish an effective communications system might be greater in an urban environment. Leaders should consider these effects when they allocate time to establish communications. Since the effectiveness of normally dependable communications may be uncertain in UO, units may fight without continuous communications or the use of the tactical internet. Unit SOPs become significantly more important in urban terrain.
(2)
Graphic Control Measures. The use of graphic control measures to augment FBCB2 and understanding of the SBCT commander’s intent two levels up by all leaders becomes even more important to successful mission accomplishment in an urban 6-16
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environment. Leaders can use phase lines to report progress or to control the advance of attacking units and limits of advance (LOAs) to prevent fratricide.
(a) When attacking to seize a foothold, the SBCT infantry company normally assigns a building or a few small buildings as a platoon's first objective. When an objective extends to a street, only the near side of the street is included in the objective area. The company's final objective may be buildings at the far edge of the built-up area or key terrain on the far side. Key buildings or groups of buildings may also be assigned as intermediate objectives. To simplify assigning objectives and reporting, buildings along the route of attack should be identified by SOP. An example using numbers is shown in Figure 6-7.
Figure 6-7. Example of a numbering system.
(b) When the company is involved in clearing a zone, bypassing buildings increases the risk of attack from the rear or flank. Thus, the clearing unit must enter, search, and clear each building in its zone of action or isolate it by fire or other means. A single building may be an objective for a rifle squad or, if the building is large, for a rifle platoon or even a company. When the SBCT infantry commander's concept is based on speed or when conducting a hasty attack, a company may be directed not to cle