The making of religion by Andrew Lang. - HTML preview

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my eyes away a moment'--in which effort he probably failed.

The priest now began to mutter, and final y spoke in a mixed jargon of

scarcely intel igible dialects. He now yel ed, prayed, and foamed at the

mouth, till in about three quarters of an hour he was exhausted and

speechless. 'But in an instant he sprang upon his feet, notwithstanding at the time he was put in it appeared impossible for him to move either his

legs or arms, and shaking off his covering, as quick as if the bands with

which it had been bound were burst asunder,' he prophesied. The Great

Spirit did not say when the traders would arrive, but, just after high

noon, next day, a canoe would arrive, and the people in it would tell when the traders were to appear.

Next day, just after high noon, a canoe came round a point of land about a league away, and the men in it, who had met the traders, said they would

come in two days, which they did. Carver, professing freedom from any

tincture of credulity, leaves us 'to draw what conclusions we please.'

The natural inference is 'private information,' about which the only

difficulty is that Carver, who knew the topography and the chances of a

secret messenger arriving to prompt the Jossakeed, does not allude to this theory.[38] He seems to think such successes not uncommon.

Al that psychology can teach anthropology, on this whole topic of

'possession;' is that secondary or alternating personalities are facts

_in rerum natura_, that the man or woman in one personality may have no

conscious memory of what was done or said in the other, and that cases of

knowledge said to be supernormally gained in the secondary state are worth inquiring about, if there be a chance of getting good evidence.

A few fairly respectable savage instances are given in Dr. Gibier's 'Le

Fakirisme Occidental' and in Mr. Manning's 'Old New Zealand;' but, while

modern civilised paral els depend on the solitary case of Mrs. Piper (for

no other case has been well observed), no affirmative conclusion can be

drawn from Chinese, Maori, Zulu, or Red Indian practice.

[Footnote 1: _Among the Zulus_, p. 120.]

[Footnote 2:_ Burmah_, p. 107.]

[Footnote 3: Hodgson, _Proceedings_, S.P.E., vol. xiii. pt. xxxiii. Dr.

Hodgson by no means agrees with this view of the case--the case of Mrs.

Piper.]

[Footnote 4: _Prim. Cult_. ii. 184.]

[Footnote 5: Nevius's _Demon Possession in China_, a curious collection of examples by an American missionary. The reports of Catholic missionaries

abound in cases.]

[Footnote 6: Op. cit. p. 169.]

[Footnote 7: Putnam, 1881.]

[Footnote 8: Nevius, p. 33.]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. p. 35.]

[Footnote 10: Op. cit. p. 38.]

[Footnote 11: See 'Fetishism and Spiritualism.']

[Footnote 12: _Necroses et Idees Fixes_. Alcan, Paris, 1898. This is the

first of a series of works connected with the Laboratoire de Psychologie,

at the Salpetritere, in Paris.]

[Footnote 13: 'Macleod shal return, but Macrimmon shal never!']

[Footnote 14: See Ribot, _Les Maladies de la Personnalite,_; Bourru

et Burot, _Variations de la Personnalite_; Janet, _L'Automatisme

Psychologique_; James, _Principles of Psychology_; Myers, in _Proceedings_

of S.P.R., 'The Mechanism of Genius,' 'The Subliminal Self.']

[Footnote 15: _Prim. Cult_. ii. 133.]

[Footnote 16: Doolittle's _Chinese_, i. 143; ii. 110, 320.]

[Footnote 17: _Proceedings_, S.P.R., pt. xxxiii.]

[Footnote 18: _Proceedings_, S.P.R., vi. 436-650; viii. 1-167; xiii.

284-582].

[Footnote 19: _The Will to Believe_, p. 814.]

[Footnote 20: _Figaro_, January 14, 1895.]

[Footnote 21: _Proceedings_, vi. 605, 606.]

[Footnote 22: _Proceedings_, S.P.R, part xxxiii. vol. xiii.]

[Footnote 23: Op. cit. part xxxiii. p. 406.]

[Footnote 24: See 'Fetishism.' Compare Cal away, p. 328.]

[Footnote 25: Cal away, pp. 361-374.]

[Footnote 26: _Cock Lane and Common Sense_, p. 66.]

[Footnote 27: Brough Smyth, i. 475. This point is disputed, but I did not

invent it, and a case appears in Mr. Curr's work on the natives.]

[Footnote 28: _Prim. Cult_. i. 152.]

[Footnote 29: Eusebius, _Prap. Evang_. v. 9.]

[Footnote 30: Brough Smyth, i. 100, 113.]

[Footnote 31: Kirk, _Secret Commonwealth_ 1691.]

[Footnote 32: Crantz, p. 209.]

[Footnote 33: Pere Arnaud, in Hind's _Labrador_, ii. 102.]

[Footnote 34: Major Swan, 1791, official letter on the Creek Indians,

Schoolcraft, v. 270.]

[Footnote 35: Crantz, p. 237.]

[Footnote 36: _Polynesian Researches_, i. 519.]

[Footnote 37: 1 Kings xviii. 42.]

[Footnote 38: Carver, pp. 123, 184.]

VIII

FETISHISM AND SPIRITUALISM

It has been shown how the doctrine of souls was developed according to the anthropological theory. The hypothesis as to how souls of the dead were

later elevated to the rank of gods, or supplied models after which such

gods might be inventively fashioned, will be criticised in a later

chapter. Here it must suffice to say that the conception of a separable

surviving soul of a dead man was not only not essential to the savage's

idea of his supreme god, as it seems to me, but would have been whol y

inconsistent with that conception. There exist, however, numerous forms of savage religion in addition to the creed in a Supreme Being, and these

contribute their streams to the ocean of faith. Thus among the kinds of

belief which served in the development of Polytheism, was Fetishism,

itself an adaptation and extension of the idea of separable souls. In this regard, like ancestor-worship, it differs from the belief in a Supreme

Being, which, as we shal try to demonstrate, is not derived from the

theory of ghosts or souls at al .

_Fetish_ (_fetiche_) seems to come from Portuguese _feitico_, a talisman

or amulet, applied by the Portuguese to various material objects

regarded by the negroes of the west coast with more or less of religious

reverence. These objects may be held sacred in some degree for a number of incongruous reasons. They may be tokens, or may be of value in sympathetic magic, or merely _odd_, and therefore probably endowed with unknown mystic qualities. Or they may have been pointed out in a dream, or met in a

lucky hour and associated with good fortune, or they may (like a tree with an unexplained stir in its branches, as reported by Kohl) have seemed to

show signs of life by spontaneous movements; in fact, a thing may be what

Europeans cal a fetish for scores of reasons. For our present purpose, as Mr. Tylor says, 'to class an object as a fetish demands explicit statement that a spirit is considered as embodied in it, or acting through it, or

communicating by it, or, at least, that the people it belongs to do

habitually think this of such objects; or it must be shown that the object is treated as having personal consciousness or power, is talked with,

worshipped...' and so forth. The in-dwel ing spirit may be human, as when

a fetish is made out of a friend's skul , the spirit in which may even be

asked for oracles, like the Head of Bran in Welsh legend.

We have tried to show that the belief in human souls may be, in part at

least, based on supernormal phenomena which Materialism disregards. We

shal now endeavour to make it probable that Fetishism (the belief in the

souls tenanting inanimate objects) may also have sources which perhaps are not normal, or which at al events seemed supernormal to savages. We say

'perhaps not normal' because the phenomena now to be discussed are of the

most puzzling character. We may lean to the belief in a supernormal cause

of certain hal ucinations, but the alleged movements of inanimate objects

which probably supply one origin of Fetishism, one suggestion of the

presence of a spirit in things dead, leave the inquiring mind in

perplexity. In following Mr. Tylor's discussion of the subject, it is

necessary to combine what he says about Spiritualism in his fourth with

what he says about Fetishism in his fourteenth and later chapters. For

some reason his book is so arranged that he criticises 'Spiritualism'

long before he puts forward his doctrine of the origin and development of

the belief in spirits.

We have seen a savage reason for supposing that human spirits inhabit

certain lifeless things, such as skul s and other relics of the dead. But

how did it come to be thought that a spirit dwelt in a lifeless and

motionless piece of stone or stick? Mr. Tylor, perhaps, leads us to a

plausible conjecture by writing: 'Mr. Darwin saw two Malay women in

Keeling Island, who held a wooden spoon dressed in clothes like a dol :

this spoon had been carried to the grave of a dead man, and becoming

inspired at full moon, in fact lunatic, it danced about convulsively, like a table or a hat at a modern spirit seance.'[1] Now M. Lefebure has

pointed out (in 'Melusine') that, according to De Brosses, the African

conjurers gave an appearance of independent motion to small objects, which were then accepted as fetishes, being visibly animated. M. Lefebure

next compares, like Mr. Tylor, the alleged physical phenomena of

spiritualism, the flights and movements of inanimate objects apparently

untouched.

The question thus arises, Is there any truth whatever in these world-wide

and world-old stories of inanimate objects acting like animated things?

Has fetishism one of its origins in the actual field of supernormal

experience in the X region? This question we do not propose to answer,

as the evidence, though practical y universal, may be said to rest on

imposture and illusion. But we can, at least, give a sketch of the nature

of the evidence, beginning with that as to the apparently _voluntary_

movements of objects, _not_ untouched. Mr. Tylor quotes from John Bel 's

'Journey in Asia' (1719) an account of a Mongol Lama who wished to

discover certain stolen pieces of damask. His method was to sit on a

bench, when 'he carried it, or, as was commonly believed, it carried him,

to the very tent' of the thief. Here the bench is innocently believed to

be self-moving. Again, Mr. Rowley tel s how in Manganjah the sorcerer, to

find out a criminal, placed, with magical ceremonies, two staffs of wood

in the hands of some young men. 'The sticks whirled and dragged the men

round like mad,' and finally escaped and rolled to the feet of the

wife of a chief, who was then denounced as the guilty person.[2]

Mr. Duff Macdonald describes the same practice among the Yaos:[3]

'The sorcerer occasional y makes men take hold of a stick, which, after a

time, begins to move as if endowed with life, and ultimately carries them

off bodily and with great speed to the house of the thief.'

The process is just that of Jacques Aymard in the celebrated story of the

detection of the Lyons murderer.[4]

In Melanesia, far enough away, Dr. Codrington found a similar practice,

and here the sticks are explicitly said by the natives to be moved by

_spirits_.[5] The wizard and a friend hold a bamboo stick by each end, and ask what man's ghost is afflicting a patient. At the mention of the

right ghost 'the stick becomes violently agitated.' In the same way, the

bamboo 'would run about' with a man holding it only on the palms of his

hands. Again, a hut is built with a partition down the middle. Men sit

there with their hands _under_ one end of the bamboo, while the other end

is extended into the empty half of the hut. They then call over the names

of the recently dead, till 'they feel the bamboo moving in their hands.' A bamboo placed on a sacred tree, 'when the name of a ghost is cal ed, moves of itself, and will lift and drag people about.' Put up into a tree, it

would lift them from the ground. In other cases the holding of the sticks

produces convulsions and trance.[6] The divining sticks of the Maori are

also 'guided by spirits,'[7] and those of the Zulu sorcerers rise, fal ,

and jump about.[8]

These Zulu performances must be real y very curious. In the last chapter

we told how a Zulu named John, having a shilling to lay out in the

interests of psychical research, declined to pay a perplexed diviner, and

reserved his capital far a more meritorious performance. He tried a medium named Unomantshintshi, who divined by Umabakula, or dancing sticks--

'If they say "no," they fall suddenly; if they say "yes," they arise and jump about very much, and leap on the person who has come to inquire. They

"fix themselves on the place where the sick man is affected; ... if the head, they leap on his head.... Many believe in Umabakula more than in the diviner. But there are not many who have the Umabakula."'

Dr. Callaway's informant only knew two Umabakulists, John was quite

satisfied, paid his shilling, and went home.[9]

The sticks are about a foot long. It is not reported that they are moved

by spirits, nor do they seem to be regarded as fetishes.

Mr. Tylor also cites a form of the familiar pendulum experiment. Among the Karens a ring is suspended by a thread over a metal basin. The relations

of the dead strike the basin, and when he who was dearest to the ghost

touches it the spirit twists the thread till it breaks, and the ring falls into the basin. With us a ring is held by a thread over a tumbler, and our unconscious movements swing it till it strikes the hour. How the Karens

manage it is less obvious. These savage devices with animated sticks

clearly correspond to the more modern 'table-turning.' Here, when the

players are honest, the pushing is certainly _unconscious_.

I have tested this in two ways--first by trying the minimum of _conscious_

muscular action that would stir a table at which I was alone, and by

comparing the absolute unconsciousness of muscular action when the table

began to move in response to no _voluntary_ push. Again, I tried with a

friend, who said, 'You are pushing,' when I gently removed my hands

altogether, though they seemed to rest on the table, which still revolved.

My friend was himself unconsciously pushing. It is undeniable that, to

a solitary experimenter, the table _seems_ to make little darts of its own will in a curious way. Thus, the unconsciousness of muscular action on the part of savages engaged in the experiment with sticks would lead them to

believe that spirits were animating the wood. The same fallacy beset the

table-turners of 1855-65, and was, to some extent, exposed by Faraday.

Of course, savages would be even more convinced by the dancing spoon of

Mr. Darwin's tale, by the dancing sticks of the Zulus, and the rest,

whether the phenomena were supernormal or merely worked by unseen strings.

The same remark applies to modern experimenters, when, as they declare,

various objects move untouched, without physical contact.

Still more analogous than turning tables to the savage use of inspired

sticks for directing the inquirer to a lost object or to a criminal, is

the modern employment of the divining-rod--a forked twig which, held by

the ends, revolves in the hands of the performer when he reaches the

object of his quest. He, like the savage cited, is occasional y agitated

in a convulsive manner; and cases are quoted in which the twig writhes

when held in a pair of tongs! The best-known modern treatise on the

divining-rod is that of M. Chevreul, 'La Baguette Divinatoire' (1854). We

have also 'L'Histoire du Merveilleux dans les Temps Modernes,' by M.

Figuier (1860). In 1781 Thouvenel published his 600 experiments with

Bleton and others; and Hegel refers to Amoretti's collection of hundreds

of cases. The case of Jacques Aymard, who in the seventeenth century

discovered a murderer by the use of the rod in true savage fashion, is

wel known. In modern England the rod is used in the interests of private

individuals and public bodies (such as Trinity Col ege, Cambridge) for the discovery of water.

Professor Barrett has lately published a book of 280 pages, in which

evidence of failures and successes is col ected.[10] Professor Barrett

gives about one hundred and fifty cases, in which he was only able to

discover, on good authority, twelve failures. He gives a variety of tests

calculated to check frauds and chance coincidence, and he publishes

opinions, hostile or agnostic, by geologists. The evidence, as a general

rule, is what is called first-hand in other inquiries. The actual

spectators, and often the owners of the land, or the persons in whose

interest water was wanted, having been present, give their testimony; and

it is certain that the 'diviner' is cal ed in by people of sense and

education, commonly too practical to have a theory, and content with

getting what they want, especial y where scientific experts have

failed.[11]

In Mr. Barrett's opinion, the subconscious perception of indications of

the presence of water produces an equally unconscious muscular 'spasm,'

which twirls the rod till it often breaks. Yet 'it is almost impossible to imitate its characteristic movement by any voluntary effort.' I have

myself held the hands of an amateur performer when the twig was moving,

and neither by sight nor touch could I detect any muscular movement on his part, much less a spasm. The person was bailiff on a large estate, and,

having accidentally discovered that he possessed the gift, used it when he wanted wells dug for the tenants on the property.

The whole topic is obscure; nor am I concerned here with the successes or

failures of the divining-rod. But the movements of the twig have never, to my knowledge, been attributed by modern English performers to the

operation of spirits. They say 'electricity.' Mr. Tylor merely writes:

'The action of the famous divining-rod, with its curiously versatile

sensibility to water, ore, treasure, and thieves, seems to belong partly

to trickery and partly to more or less conscious direction by honester

operators.'

As the divining-rod is the only instance in which automatism, whatever its nature and causes, has been found of practical value by practical men, and as it is obviously associated with a number of analogous phenomena, both

in civilised and savage life, it certainly deserves the attention of

science. But no advance will be made till scientifical y trained inquirers themselves arrange and test a large number of experiments. Knowledge of

the geological ignorance of the dowsers, examples of fraud on their part,

and cases of failure or reported failure, with a general hostile bias, may prevent such experiments from being made by scientific experts on an

adequate scale. Such experts ought, of course, to avoid working the

dowsers into a state of irritation.

It is just worth while to notice cases in which the rod acts like those of the Melanesians, Africans, and other savages. A Mr. Thomas Welton

published an English translation of 'La Verge de Jacob' (Lyon, 1693). In

1651 he asked his servant to bring into the garden 'a stick that stood

behind the parlour door. In great terror she brought it to the garden, her hand firmly clutched on it, nor could she let it go.' When Mrs. Welton

took the stick, 'it drew her with very considerable velocity to nearly the centre of the garden,' where a wel was found. Mr. Welton is not likely to have known of the lately published savage examples. The coincidence with

the African and Melanesian cases is, therefore, probably undesigned.

Again, in 1694, the rod was used by le Pere Menestrier and others, just as it is by savages, to indicate by its movements answers to al sorts of

questions. Experiments of this kind have not been made by Professor

Barrett, and other modern inquirers, except by M. Richet, as a mode of

detecting automatic action. But it would be just as sensible to use the

twig as to use planchette or any other 'autoscopic' apparatus. If these

elicit knowledge unconsciously present to the mind, mere water-finding

ought not to be the sole province of the rod. In the same class as

these rods is the forked twig which, in China, is held at each end by

two persons, and made to write in the sand. The little apparatus called

_planchette_, or the other, the _ouija_, is of course, consciously or

unconsciously, pushed by the performers. In the case of the twig, as held

by water-seekers, the difficulty of consciously moving it so as to

escape close observation is considerable.

In the case of the _ouija_ (a little tripod, which, under the operators'

hands, runs about a table inscribed with letters at which it points), I

have known curious successes to be achieved by amateurs. Thus, in the

house of a lady who owned an old _chateau_ in another county, the _ouija_, operated on by two ladies known to myself, wrote a number of details about a visit paid to the _chateau_ for a certain purpose by Mary Stuart. That

visit, and its object, a purely personal one, are unknown to history, and

the _chateau_ is not spoken of in Mr. Hay Fleming's careful, but

unavoidably incomplete, itinerary of the Queen's residence in Scotland.

After the communication had been made, the owner of the _chateau_

explained that she was already acquainted with the circumstances

described, as she had recently read them in documents in her charter

chest, where they remain.

Of course, the belief we extend to such narratives is entirely conditioned by our knowledge of the personal character of the performers. The point

here is merely the civilised and savage practice of _automatism_, the

apparent eliciting of knowledge not otherwise accessible, by the

movements of a stick, or a bit of wood. These movements, made without

conscious exertion or direction, seem, to savage philosophy, to be caused

by in-dwelling spirits, the sources of Fetishism.

These examples, then, demonstrating unconscious movement of objects by the operators, make it clear that movements even of touched objects, may be

attributed, by some civilised and by savage amateurs, to 'spirits.' The

objects so moved may, by savages, be regarded in some cases as fetishes,

and their movements may have helped to originate the belief that spirits

can inhabit inanimate objects. When objects apparently quite untouched

become volatile, the mystery is deeper. This apparent animation and

frolicsome behaviour of inanimate objects is reported all through history, and attested by immense quantities of evidence of every degree. It would

be tedious to give a ful account of the antiquity and diffusion of reports about such occurrences. We find them among Neo-Platonists, in the English

and Continental Middle Ages, among Eskimo, Hurons, Algonkins, Tartars,

Zulus, Malays, Nasquapees, Maoris, in witch trials, in ancient Peru

(immediately after the Spanish Conquest), in China, in modern Russia, in

New England (1680), al through the career of modern spiritualism, in

Hayti (where they are attributed to 'Obeah'), and, sporadically,

everywhere.[12]

Among al these cases, we must dismiss whatever the modern paid medium

does in the dark. The only thing to be done with the ethnographic and

modern accounts of such marvels is to 'file them for reference.' If a

spontaneous example occurs, under proper inspection, we can then compare

our old tales. Professor James says: 'Their mutual resemblances suggest a

natural type, and I confess that till these records, or others like them,

are positively explained away, I cannot feel (in spite of such vast

amounts of detected frauds) as if the case of physical mediumship itself,

as a freak of nature, were definitely closed.... So long as the stories

multiply in various lands, and so few are positively explained away, it is bad method to ignore them.'[13] Here they are not ignored, because,

whatever the cause or causes of the phenomena, they would buttress, if

they did not originate, the savage belief in spirits tenanting inanimate

matter, whence came Fetishism. As to facts, we cannot, of course, 'explain away' events of this kind, which we know only through report. A conjurer

cannot explain a trick merely from a description, especial y a description by a non-conjurer. But, as a rule, nothing so much leads to doubt on this

theme as the 'explanation' given--except, of course, in the case of 'dark

seances' got up and prepared by paid mediums. We know, sometimes, how the

'explanation' arose.

Thus, the house of a certain M. Zol er, a lawyer and member of the Swiss

Federal Council, a house at Stans, in Unterwalden, was made simply

uninhabitable in 1860-1862. The disturbances, including movements of

objects, were of a truly odious description, and occurred in ful

daylight. M. Zol er, deeply attached to his home, which had many

interesting associations with the part his family played in the struggle

against revolutionary France, was obliged to abandon the place. He had

made every conceivable sort of research, and had cal ed in the local

police and _savants_, to no purpose.

But the affair was explained away thus: While the phenomena could still be concealed from public curiosity, a client cal ed to see M. Zol er, who was out. The client, therefore, remained in the drawing-room. Loud and heavy

blows resounded through the room. The client, as it chanced, had once felt the effects of an electric battery, for some medical reason, apparently.

M. Zoller writes: 'My eldest son was present at the time, and,