(A) The Mongol Epoch (1280-1368)
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
140/257
8/15/12
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
1 Beginning of new foreign rules
During more than half of the third period of "Modern Times" which now began, China was under alien rule. Of the 631 years from 1280 to 1911, China was under national rulers for 276 years and under alien rule for 355.
The alien rulers were first the Mongols, and later the Tungus Manchus. It is interesting to note that the alien rulers in the earlier period came mainly from the north-west, and only in modern times did peoples from the north-east rule over China. This was due in part to the fact that only peoples who had attained a certain level of civilization were capable of dominance. In antiquity and the Middle Ages, eastern Mongolia and Manchuria were at a
relatively low level of civilization, from which they emerged only gradualy through permanent contact with other nomad peoples, especialy Turks. We are dealing here, of course, only with the Mongol epoch in China and not
with the great Mongol empire, so that we need not enter further into these questions.
Yet another point is characteristic: the Mongols were the first alien people to rule the whole of China; the
Manchus, who appeared in the seventeenth century, were the second and last. Al alien peoples before these two
ruled only parts of China. Why was it that the Mongols were able to be so much more successful than their
predecessors? In the first place the Mongol political league was numericaly stronger than those of the earlier alien peoples; secondly, the military organization and technical equipment of the Mongols were exceptionaly
advanced for their day. It must be borne in mind, for instance, that during their many years of war against the Sung dynasty in South China the Mongols already made use of smal cannon in laying siege to towns. We have
no exact knowledge of the number of Mongols who invaded and occupied China, but it is estimated that there
were more than a milion Mongols living in China. Not al of them, of course, were realy Mongols! The name
covered Turks, Tunguses, and others; among the auxiliaries of the Mongols were Uighurs, men from Central
Asia and the Middle East, and even Europeans. When the Mongols attacked China they had the advantage of al
the arts and crafts and al the new technical advances of western and central Asia and of Europe. Thus they had attained a high degree of technical progress, and at the same time their number was very great.
2 " Nationality legislation"
It was only after the Hsia empire in North China, and then the empire of the Juchên, had been destroyed by the Mongols, and only after long and remarkably modern tactical preparation, that the Mongols conquered South
China, the empire of the Sung dynasty. They were now faced with the problem of ruling their great new empire.
The conqueror of that empire, Kublai, himself recognized that China could not be treated in quite the same way as the Mongols' previous conquests; he therefore separated the empire in China from the rest of the Mongol
empire. Mongol China became an independent realm within the Mongol empire, a sort of Dominion. The Mongol
rulers were wel aware that in spite of their numerical strength they were stil only a minority in China, and this implied certain dangers. They therefore elaborated a "nationality legislation", the first of its kind in the Far East.
The purpose of this legislation was, of course, to be the protection of the Mongols. The population of conquered China was divided into four groups—(1) Mongols, themselves faling into four sub-groups (the oldest Mongol
tribes, the White Tatars, the Black Tatars, the Wild Tatars); (2) Central Asian auxiliaries (Naimans, Uighurs, and various other Turkish people, Tanguts, and so on); (3) North Chinese; (4) South Chinese. The Mongols formed
the privileged ruling class. They remained militarily organized, and were distributed in garrisons over al the big towns of China as soldiers, maintained by the state. Al the higher government posts were reserved for them, so that they also formed the heads of the official staffs. The auxiliary peoples were also admitted into the
government service; they, too, had privileges, but were not al soldiers but in many cases merchants, who used
their privileged position to promote business. Not a few of these merchants were Uighurs and Mohammedans;
many Uighurs were also employed as clerks, as the Mongols were very often unable to read and write Chinese,
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
141/257
8/15/12
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
and the government offices were bilingual, working in Mongolian and Chinese. The clever Uighurs quickly
learned enough of both languages for official purposes, and made themselves indispensable assistants to the
Mongols. Persian, the main language of administration in the western parts of the Mongol empire besides
Uighuric, also was a lingua franca among the new rulers of China.
In the Mongol legislation the South Chinese had the lowest status, and virtualy no rights. Intermarriage with them was prohibited. The Chinese were not alowed to carry arms. For a time they were forbidden even to learn the
Mongol or other foreign languages. In this way they were to be prevented from gaining official positions and
playing any political part. Their ignorance of the languages of northern, central, and western Asia also prevented them from engaging in commerce like the foreign merchants, and every possible difficulty was put in the way of their traveling for commercial purposes. On the other hand, foreigners were, of course, able to learn Chinese, and so to gain a footing in Chinese internal trade.
Through legislation of this type the Mongols tried to build up and to safeguard their domination over China. Yet their success did not last a hundred years.
3 Military position
In foreign affairs the Mongol epoch was for China something of a breathing space, for the great wars of the
Mongols took place at a remote distance from China and without any Chinese participation. Only a few
concluding wars were fought under Kublai in the Far East. The first was his war against Japan (1281): it ended in complete failure, the fleet being destroyed by a storm. In this campaign the Chinese furnished ships and also
soldiers. The subjection of Japan would have been in the interest of the Chinese, as it would have opened a
market which had been almost closed against them in the Sung period. Mongol wars folowed in the south. In
1282 began the war against Burma; in 1284 Annam and Cambodia were conquered; in 1292 a campaign was
started against Java. It proved impossible to hold Java, but almost the whole of Indo-China came under Mongol
rule, to the satisfaction of the Chinese, for Indo-China had already been one of the principal export markets in the Sung period. After that, however, there was virtualy no more warfare, apart from smal campaigns against
rebelious tribes. The Mongol soldiers now lived on their pay in their garrisons, with nothing to do. The old
campaigners died and were folowed by their sons, brought up also as soldiers; but these young Mongols were
born in China, had seen nothing of war, and learned of the soldiers' trade either nothing or very little; so that after about 1320 serious things happened. An army nominaly 1,000 strong was sent against a group of barely fifty
bandits and failed to defeat them. Most of the 1,000 soldiers no longer knew how to use their weapons, and
many did not even join the force. Such incidents occurred again and again.
4 Social situation
The results, however, of conditions within the country were of much more importance than events abroad. The
Mongols made Peking their capital as was entirely natural, for Peking was near their homeland Mongolia. The
emperor and his entourage could return to Mongolia in the summer, when China became too hot or too humid
for them; and from Peking they were able to maintain contact with the rest of the Mongol empire. But as the city had become the capital of a vast empire, an enormous staff of officials had to be housed there, consisting of
persons of many different nationalities. The emperor naturaly wanted to have a magnificent capital, a city realy worthy of so vast an empire. As the many wars had brought in vast booty, there was money for the building of
great palaces, of a size and magnificence never before seen in China. They were built by Chinese forced labour, and to this end men had to be brought from al over the empire—poor peasants, whose fields went out of
cultivation while they were held in bondage far away. If they ever returned home, they were destitute and had
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
142/257
8/15/12
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
lost their land. The rich gentry, on the other hand, were able to buy immunity from forced labour. The immense increase in the population of Peking (the huge court with its enormous expenditure, the mass of officials, the great merchant community, largely foreigners, and the many servile labourers), necessitated vast supplies of food.
Now, as mentioned in earlier chapters, since the time of the Later T'ang the region round Nanking had become
the main centre of production in China, and the Chinese population had gone over more and more to the
consumption of rice instead of pulse or wheat. As rice could not be grown in the north, practicaly the whole of the food supplies for the capital had to be brought from the south. The transport system taken over by the
Mongols had not been created for long-distance traffic of this sort. The capital of the Sung had lain in the main centre of production. Consequently, a great fleet had suddenly to be built, canals and rivers had to be regulated, and some new canals excavated. This again caled for a vast quantity of forced labour, often brought from afar to the points at which it was needed. The Chinese peasants had suffered in the Sung period. They had been
exploited by the large landowners. The Mongols had not removed these landowners, as the Chinese gentry had
gone over to their side. The Mongols had deprived them of their political power, but had left them their estates, the basis of their power. In past changes of dynasty the gentry had either maintained their position or been
replaced by a new gentry: the total number of their class had remained virtualy unchanged. Now, however, in
addition to the original gentry there were about a milion Mongols, for whose maintenance the peasants had also to provide, and their standard of maintenance was high. This was an enormous increase in the burdens of the
peasantry.
Two other elements further pressed on the peasants in the Mongol epoch—organized religion and the traders.
The upper classes among the Chinese had in general little interest in religion, but the Mongols, owing to their historical development, were very religious. Some of them and some of their alies were Buddhists, some were
stil shamanists. The Chinese Buddhists and the representatives of popular Taoism approached the Mongols and
the foreign Buddhist monks trying to enlist the interest of the Mongols and their alies. The old shamanism was unable to compete with the higher religions, and the Mongols in China became Buddhist or interested themselves in popular Taoism. They showed their interest especialy by the endowment of temples and monasteries. The
temples were given great estates, and the peasants on those estates became temple servants. The land belonging to the temples was free from taxation.
We have as yet no exact statistics of the Mongol epoch, only approximations. These set the total area under
cultivation at some six milion ch'ing (a ch'ing is the ideal size of the farm worked by a peasant family, but it was rarely held in practice); the population amounted to fourteen or fifteen milion families. Of this total tilage some 170,000 ch'ing were alotted to the temples; that is to say, the farms for some 400,000 peasant families were taken from the peasants and no longer paid taxes to the state. The peasants, however, had to make payments to
the temples. Some 200,000 ch'ing with some 450,000 peasant families were turned into military settlements; that is to say, these peasants had to work for the needs of the army. Their taxes went not to the state but to the army.
Moreover, in the event of war they had to render service to the army. In addition to this, al higher officials received official properties, the yield of which represented part payment of their salaries. Then, Mongol nobles and dignitaries received considerable grants of land, which was taken away from the free peasants; the peasants had then to work their farms as tenants and to pay dues to their landlords, no longer to the state. Finaly,
especialy in North China, many peasants were entirely dispossessed, and their land was turned into pasturage
for the Mongols' horses; the peasants themselves were put to forced labour. On top of this came the exploitation of the peasants by the great landowners of the past. Al this meant an enormous diminution in the number of free peasants and thus of taxpayers. As the state was involved in more expenditure than in the past owing to the large number of Mongols who were its virtual pensioners, the taxes had to be continualy increased. Meanwhile the
many peasants working as tenants of the great landlords, the temples, and the Mongol nobles were entirely at
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
143/257
8/15/12
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
their mercy. In this period, a second migration of farmers into the southern provinces, mainly Fukien and
Kwangtung, took place; it had its main source in the lower Yangtze valey. A few gentry families whose relatives had accompanied the Sung emperor on their flight to the south, also settled with their folowers in the Canton
basin.
The many merchants from abroad, especialy those belonging to the peoples alied to the Mongols, also had in
every respect a privileged position in China. They were free of taxation, free to travel al over the country, and received privileged treatment in the use of means of transport. They were thus able to accumulate great wealth, most of which went out of China to their own country. This produced a general impoverishment of China.
Chinese merchants fel more and more into dependence on the foreign merchants; the only field of action realy
remaining to them was the local trade within China and the trade with Indo-China, where the Chinese had the
advantage of knowing the language.
The impoverishment of China began with the flow abroad of her metalic currency. To make up for this loss, the
government was compeled to issue great quantities of paper money, which very quickly depreciated, because
after a few years the government would no longer accept the money at its face value, so that the population could place no faith in it. The depreciation further impoverished the people.
Thus we have in the Mongol epoch in China the imposing picture of a commerce made possible with every
country from Europe to the Pacific; this, however, led to the impoverishment of China. We also see the rising of mighty temples and monumental buildings, but this again only contributed to the denudation of the country. The Mongol epoch was thus one of continual and rapid impoverishment in China, simultaneously with a great display
of magnificence. The enthusiastic descriptions of the Mongol empire in China offered by travelers from the Near East or from Europe, such as Marco Polo, give an entirely false picture: as foreigners they had a privileged
position, living in the cities and seeing nothing of the situation of the general population.
5 Popular risings: National rising
It took time for the effects of al these factors to become evident. The first popular rising came in 1325. Statistics of 1329 show that there were then some 7,600,000 persons in the empire who were starving; as this was only
the figure of the officialy admitted sufferers, the figure may have been higher. In any case, seven-and-a-half milions were a substantial percentage of the total population, estimated at 45,000,000. The risings that now
came incessantly were led by men of the lower orders—a cloth-seler, a fisherman, a peasant, a salt smuggler,
the son of a soldier serving a sentence, an office messenger, and so on. They never attacked the Mongols as
aliens, but always the rich in general, whether Chinese or foreign. Wherever they came, they kiled al the rich and distributed their money and possessions.
As already mentioned, the Mongol garrisons were unable to cope with these risings. But how was it that the
Mongol rule did not colapse until some forty years later? The Mongols parried the risings by raising loans from the rich and using the money to recruit volunteers to fight the rebels. The state revenues would not have sufficed for these payments, and the item was not one that could be included in the military budget. What was of much
more importance was that the gentry themselves recruited volunteers and fought the rebels on their own account, without the authority or the support of the government. Thus it was the Chinese gentry, in their fear of being kiled by the insurgents, who fought them and so bolstered up the Mongol rule.
In 1351 the dykes along the Yelow River burst. The dykes had to be reconstructed and further measures of
conservancy undertaken. To this end the government impressed 170,000 men. Folowing this action, great new
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
144/257
8/15/12
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
revolts broke out. Everywhere in Honan, Kiangsu, and Shantung, the regions from which the labourers were
summoned, revolutionary groups were formed, some of them amounting to 100,000 men. Some groups had a
religious tinge; others declared their intention to restore the emperors of the Sung dynasty. Before long great parts of central China were wrested from the hands of the government. The government recognized the menace
to its existence, but resorted to contradictory measures. In 1352 southern Chinese were permitted to take over certain official positions. In this way it was hoped to gain the ful support of the gentry, who had a certain interest in combating the rebel movements. On the other hand, the government tightened up its nationality laws. Al the
old segregation laws were brought back into force, with the result that in a few years the aim of the rebels
became no longer merely the expulsion of the rich but also the expulsion of the Mongols: a social movement thus became a national one. A second element contributed to the change in the character of the popular rising. The
rebels captured many towns. Some of these towns refused to fight and negotiated terms of submission. In these
cases the rebels did not murder the whole of the gentry, but took some of them into their service. The gentry did not agree to this out of sympathy with the rebels, but simply in order to save their own lives. Once they had taken the step, however, they could not go back; they had no alternative but to remain on the side of the rebels.
In 1352 Kuo Tz[)u]-hsing rose in southern Honan. Kuo was the son of a wandering soothsayer and a blind
beggar-woman. He had success; his group gained control of a considerable region round his home. There was
no longer any serious resistance from the Mongols, for at this time the whole of eastern China was in ful revolt.
In 1353 Kuo was joined by a man named Chu Yüan-chang, the son of a smal peasant, probably a tenant
farmer. Chu's parents and al his relatives had died from a plague, leaving him destitute. He had first entered a monastery and become a monk. This was a favourite resource—and has been almost to the present day—for
poor sons of peasants who were threatened with starvation. As a monk he had gone about begging, until in 1353
he returned to his home and colected a group, mostly men from his own vilage, sons of peasants and young
felows who had already been peasant leaders. Monks were often peasant leaders. They were trusted because
they promised divine aid, and because they were usualy rather better educated than the rest of the peasants. Chu at first also had contacts with a secret society, a branch of the White Lotus Society which several times in the course of Chinese history has been the nucleus of rebelious movements. Chu took his smal group which
identified itself by a red turban and a red banner to Kuo, who received him gladly, entered into aliance with him, and in sign of friendship gave him his daughter in marriage. In 1355 Kuo died, and Chu took over his army, now many thousands strong. In his campaigns against towns in eastern China, Chu succeeded in winning over some
capable members of the gentry. One was the chairman of a committee that yielded a town to Chu; another was a
scholar whose family had always been opposed to the Mongols, and who had himself suffered injustice several
times in his official career, so that he was glad to join Chu out of hatred of the Mongols.
These men gained great influence over Chu, and persuaded him to give up attacking rich individuals, and instead to establish an assured control over large parts of the country. He would then, they pointed out, be permanently enriched, while otherwise he would only be in funds at the moment of the plundering of a town. They set before him strategic plans with that aim. Through their counsel Chu changed from the leader of a popular rising into a fighter against the dynasty. Of al the peasant leaders he was now the only one pursuing a definite aim. He
marched first against Nanking, the great city of central China, and captured it with ease. He then crossed the Yangtze, and conquered the rich provinces of the south-east. He was a rebel who no longer slaughtered the rich or plundered the towns, and the whole of the gentry with al their folowers came over to him en masse. The armies of volunteers went over to Chu, and the whole edifice of the dynasty colapsed.
The years 1355-1368 were ful of smal battles. After his conquest of the whole of the south, Chu went north. In 1368 his generals captured Peking almost without a blow. The Mongol ruler fled on horseback with his
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
145/257
8/15/12
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
immediate entourage into the north of China, and soon after into Mongolia. The Mongol dynasty had been
brought down, almost without resistance. The Mongols in the isolated garrisons marched northward wherever
they could. A few surrendered to the Chinese and were used in southern China as professional soldiers, though
they were always regarded with suspicion. The only serious resistance offered came from the regions in which
other Chinese popular leaders had established themselves, especialy the remote provinces in the west and southwest, which had a different social structure and had been relatively little affected by the Mongol regime.
Thus the colapse of the Mongols came for the folowing reasons: (1) They had not succeeded in maintaining their armed strength or that of their alies during the period of peace that folowed Kublai's conquest. The Mongol
soldiers had become effeminate through their life of idleness in the towns. (2) The attempt to rule the empire through Mongols or other aliens, and to exclude the Chinese gentry entirely from the administration, failed
through insufficient knowledge of the sources of revenue and through the abuses due to the favoured treatment of aliens. The whole country, and especialy the peasantry, was completely impoverished and so driven into revolt.
(3) There was also a psychological reason. In the middle of the fourteenth century it was obvious to the Mongols that their hold over China was growing more and more precarious, and that there was little to be got out of the impoverished country: they seem in consequence to have lost interest in the troublesome task of maintaining their rule, preferring, in so far as they had not already entirely degenerated, to return to their old home in the north. It is important to bear in mind these reasons for the colapse of the Mongols, so that we may compare them later
with the reasons for the colapse of the Manchus.
No mention need be made here of the names of the Mongol rulers in China after Kublai. After his death in 1294, grandsons and great-grandsons of his folowed each other in rapid succession on the throne; not one of them was of any personal significance. They had no influence on the government of China. Their life was spent in intriguing against one another. There were seven Mongol emperors after Kublai.
6 Cultural
During the Mongol epoch a large number of the Chinese scholars withdrew from official life. They lived in
retirement among their friends, and devoted themselves mainly to the pursuit of the art of poetry, which had been elaborated in the Later Sung epoch, without themselves arriving at any important innovations in form. Their
poems were built up meticulously on the rules laid down by the various schools; they were routine productions
rather than the outcome of any true poetic inspiration. In the realm of prose the best achievements were the
"miscelaneous notes" already mentioned, colections of learned essays. The foreigners who wrote in Chinese during this epoch are credited with no better achievements by the Chinese historians of literature. Chief of them were a statesman named Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, a Kitan in the service of the Mongols; and a Mongol named T'o-t'o
(Tokto). The former accompanied Genghiz Khan in his great campaign against Turkestan, and left a very
interesting account of his journeys, together with many poems about Samarkand and Turkestan. His other works
were mainly letters and poems addressed to friends. They differ in no way in style from the Chinese literary
works of the time, and are neither better nor worse than those works. He shows strong traces of Taoist
influence, as do other contemporary writers. We know that Genghiz Khan was more or less inclined to Taoism,
and admitted a Taoist monk to his camp (1221-1224). This man's account of his travels has also been
preserved, and with the numerous European accounts of Central Asia written at this time it forms an important
source. The Mongol Tokto was the head of an historical commission that issued the annals of the Sung dynasty,
the Kitan, and the Juchên dynasty. The annals of the Sung dynasty became the largest of al the historical works, but they were fiercely attacked from the first by Chinese critics on account of their style and their hasty
composition, and, together with the annals of the Mongol dynasty, they are regarded as the worst of the annals www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
146/257
8/15/12
www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11367/pg11367.html
preserved. Tokto himself is less to blame for this than the circumstance that he was compeled to work in great haste, and had not time to put into order the overwhelming mass of his material.
The greatest literary achievements, however, of the Mongol period belong beyond question to the theatre (or,
rather, opera). The emperors were great theatre-goers, and the wealthy private families were also enthusiasts, so that gradualy people of education devoted themselves to writing librettos for the operas, where in the past this work had been left to others. Most of the authors of these librettos remained unknown: they used pseudonyms,
partly because playwriting was not an occupation that befitted a scholar, and partly b