Watching through many exciting weeks the course of a Balkan Peace
Conference, I had the opportunity of seeing another phase of the
Near Eastern character in its various sub-divisions—the Turkish, the Grecian, the Roumanian, the Bulgarian, and the Serbian. It was in
certain general characteristics the same character with certain points
of difference, ranging from almost purely Oriental through various
grades until it reached to a phase which was rather more than half European. In various aspects it was naïve, wily, deceitful,
vainglorious, truculent, servile, stubborn, supple. At times it was very
trying. Usually it was distinctly amusing. There were some exceptions
among the Balkan statesmen, but as a rule they were men of very
ordinary ability and very extraordinary conceit. Close
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association with them dissipated for a time the extremely good
impression that Bulgarian, Serbian, Grecian, and Roumanian
peasants and officials and traders had made on me, meeting them as
soldiers or as wayside hosts.
When the Bulgarian progress towards Constantinople was stopped at
Chatalja, the Bulgarian authorities favoured negotiations for peace.
To this Greece very strenuously, and Serbia more gently, objected.
They offered as an alternative suggestion to send aid to the Chatalja
lines to help Bulgaria to force things to a conclusion there. But by this
time the Balkan Allies were at least as much suspicious of one
another as they were hostile to the Turk. The troubles after the fall of
Salonica had given a picturesque illustration of the hollowness of the
Balkan League. Greece and Bulgaria had raced armies down for the
capture of that city, and the Greeks had won in the race by bribing the
Turkish commander to surrender to them—the Bulgarians said sourly
(an absurd accusation!). Now Bulgarian and Greek were at the point
of open war in Salonica, and were doing a little odd killing of one another to keep their hands in practice. Around Adrianople Bulgarian
and
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Serbian were growling at one another, the Bulgarians treating their friends rather badly, so far as I could judge. Both racial sections of the army of siege were inclined to do very little, because each was waiting for the other to begin. Bulgaria, too, was extremely anxious to
have no more friendly allied troops in the areas which she had
marked out for herself. She was aware that the Greek population of Thrace was agitating for an autonomous Thrace instead of a
Bulgarian annexation, and feared that the presence of a Greek army
in the province would strengthen this movement.
In the upshot Serbia and Montenegro supported Bulgaria in the
signing of an armistice. Greece refused to sign an armistice, but
joined in the negotiations for a final peace which opened at the
Conference of St. James's, London, in December 1912. This
Conference quickly resolved itself into a wonderful acrobatic display of ground and lofty fiction, of strange childish "bluffs," of complicated efforts at mystery which would not deceive a Punch-and-Judy show
audience.
In the East and the Near East, the man who wants to buy a horse goes to the market-place
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in the first instance, and curses publicly all horses and thoughts of horses. He proclaims that he will see his father's tomb defiled before
he will ever touch a horse again. Hearing of this, a man who wishes
to sell a horse appears in public, and proclaims that the horse he has
in his stall is the sun and the moon and the stars of his life: that sooner than part with it he would eat filth and become as a dog. At this stage the negotiations for a bargain are in fair progress. After some days—the East and the Near East is not very thrifty with time—
a satisfactory bargain is struck.
The Balkan Peace Conference was carried on very much on those
lines. In a London winter atmosphere, among the unimaginative and
matter-of-fact London population, the effect was strangely fantastic.
In an early stage of the negotiations the Turkish delegates (who were
out to gain time in the desperate hope that something would turn up)
said one day that they must ask for instructions on some point, about
which they were as fully instructed as it was possible to be: said the
next sitting day that unfortunately their instructions had not arrived: and the next sitting day that their instructions had arrived but
unfortunately they could not
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decipher some of the words, and must refer to Constantinople again!
With all this it was difficult to believe that we lived in a civilised age of telegraphs and newspapers and railway trains. The mind was
transported back insensibly to the times of the great Caliph of
Bagdad.
Whilst the Turks dallied in the hope that something would turn up, and devoted a painstaking but painfully obvious industry to the task of
trying to sow dissensions among the Balkan Allies, these Balkan
Allies engaged among themselves in a vigorous Press campaign of
mutual abuse and insinuation. The seeds of dissension which the
Turk was scattering refused to germinate, because already the field which was sown had a full-grown crop. But the Balkan Allies had one
point of elementary common sense. They were resolved to take from
the Turk all that was possible before they fell out among themselves
as to the division of the spoil. (As it happened, they forgot to take into
account the contingency that after the division it would still be within the power of the Turk to seek some revenge if they abandoned their
League of Alliance, which alone had made the humiliation of the
Turkish Empire possible.)
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The first squabble between the Allies was over the appointment of a
leader or chief spokesman of the Balkan delegates. If there had been
a touch of imagination and real friendliness between them they would
have selected the senior Montenegrin delegate in acknowledgment of
the gallantry which had kept Montenegro during all the centuries
unsubdued by the Turkish invader. Or there were reasons why the
chief Greek delegate should have been chosen, as he was Prime
Minister in his own country, and therefore the senior delegate in
official position. But there was not enough good feeling among the Allies to allow of any such settlement. The delegation was left without
an official spokesman and there had to be a roster of Presidents in alphabetical order as the only way to soothe the embittered
jealousies of rival allies. That was the first of a series of childish incidents.
Some of the delegates talked with the utmost freedom to the Press: and if what they told was not always accurate it was nearly always interesting. The loathsome wiles of the other Balkan fellow and his black treachery were explained at length. It seemed seriously to be thought that British and European opinion would be
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influenced by this sort of fulmination in the more irresponsible Press.
Diplomacy under these conditions was bound to fail. The Turkish
position was at the time plainly desperate if only military
considerations were taken into account. A united front on the part of
the Balkan delegates, combining firmness with some suavity, would
have convinced even the procrastinating Turkish mind that the game
was up and the only thing to do was to make a peace on lines of
"cutting the loss." But the constant quarrels of the Balkan States'
representatives between themselves encouraged the Turks day by
day to think that a definite split must come between the Allies, and with a split the chance for Turkey to find a way out of her desperate
position. As it happened, Turkey played that game too long: and the
war was resumed and further heavy bloodshed caused. Then the
Peace Conference resumed with Turkey and Bulgaria, apparently
very anxious for peace on terms dictated by the Powers: and Greece
and Serbia anxious now for delays because they had made up their
minds that it was necessary to defend themselves against Bulgaria,
and they wished time for their preparations.
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Underwood & Underwood
ROUMANIAN SOLDIERS IN BUCHAREST
Throughout both Conferences Roumania hovered about in the offing
waiting confidently for an opportunity for pickings. Roumania had
learned well the lesson taught her by European diplomacy after the War of Liberation. Then she had done great work, made enormous
sacrifices, and won not rewards but robberies. In the Balkan Wars of
1912-13 she stood apart, risking nothing, and waiting for the
exhaustion of the combatants to put in her claims.
The second session of the Balkan Peace Conference came to an
abrupt end through practically an ultimatum from the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, that peace with Turkey on the lines
determined by the Powers must be signed at once. The Grecian and
Serbian delegates saw then that the game of delay could no longer be played, signed the Peace of London, and hurried away to their
homes expecting an attack from Bulgaria.
Some strange infatuation drove the Bulgarian leaders at that time to a
fit of madness. They had just wrung the last atom of concession from
Turkey, and had an enormous undisputed access of territory in
Thrace and in eastern Macedonia, with a good coastal frontage on
the Aegean.
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True, they were faced with a demand for a small territorial concession
by Roumania, and Greece disputed the right of Bulgaria to an area of
northern Macedonia, and Serbia disputed with her over her
Macedonian area. It would have been quite within the rules of Balkan
diplomacy for Bulgaria to have sought the help of one of her
neighbours, so that she might withstand the others. With proper
adroitness she might have robbed each in turn with the help of the others. But Bulgaria elected to fight all of them at once. To Roumania
she was rude, to Serbia stiff, to Greece provocative. By joining hands
with Serbia, which had helped her very gallantly at Adrianople, and was now much injured by the decision of the Powers that she was not
to keep the Adriatic territory which she had won in the war, Bulgaria
might have coerced Greece and Turkey at least, and perhaps have
struck a better bargain with Roumania. But she had conciliation for none.
The events that followed are as tragical as any that I can recall in history. Bulgaria had within a few weeks raised herself to a position which promised her headship of a Balkan Confederation. She might
have been the Prussia of
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a new Empire. Within a few days her blunders, her intolerance, and her bad faith had humbled her to the dust. As soon as she attacked
Greece and Serbia—to attack such a combination was absurd—
Roumania moved down upon her northern frontier, and the Turk
moved up from the south. Neither Roumanian nor Turk were
opposed. The whole Bulgarian strength was kept for her late Allies: and yet the Bulgarian forces were decisively routed by both Serbians
and Greeks.
Of the dark incidents of that fratricidal war no history will ever tell the
truth. No war correspondents nor military attachés accompanied the forces. From the accusations and counter-accusations of the
combatants, from the eloquent absence of prisoners, from the ghastly
gaps in the ranks of the armies when they returned from the field, it is
clear that the war was carried on as a rule without mercy and without
chivalry. There was no very plentiful supply of ammunition on either side. That fact enabled the combatants to approach one another
more closely and to inflict more savage slaughter. During the course
of the war with Turkey the Balkan Allies lost 75,000 slain. During the
war between themselves,
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though it lasted only a few days, it is said that this number was exceeded.
Roumania, whose army though invading Bulgaria engaged in no
battle, finally dictated terms of peace. The Peace of Bucharest
supplanted the Peace of London. Bulgaria, beaten to the ground, had
to give up all that Roumania demanded, and practically all that
Greece and Serbia demanded. It was a characteristic incident of
Balkan diplomacy that the unhappy Bulgarians, having the idea of
conciliating Roumania, conveyed the territory to that state with
expressions of joy and gratitude, to which expressions the wily
Roumanians gave exactly their true value.
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ADRIANOPLE
View looking across the Great Bridge
Turkey, meanwhile, had taken full advantage of the opportunity given
to her by Bulgaria. Beaten decisively she had had to agree to give up
all her European possessions with the exception of those beyond a
line drawn from Enos on the Black Sea to Midia on the Aegean. She
saw now Bulgaria powerless and calmly marched back, and seized
again practically all Thrace, including Adrianople, over which had
been fought such great battles, and Kirk Kilisse. The Bulgarians
protested, appealed to Europe, to
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Roumania in vain, then accepted the situation and professed a warm
friendship for Turkey. There seemed to be a movement for a joint
Turkish-Bulgarian attack upon Greece, which would have put the last
touch upon this tragic comedy of the Balkans. But the Powers vetoed
this enterprise if ever it were contemplated, and the Balkans for a while, except for a little massacring in Macedonia and Albania,
enjoyed an unquiet peace. But the forces of hate and revenge waited
latent.
The city which figured most prominently in the Balkan Wars of 1912-
13 and the intervening diplomacy was Adrianople, the city founded by
the Emperor Adrian. It has seen more bloodshed probably than any
other city of the world. It was before Adrianople that the Roman
Emperor Valerius and his army were destroyed by the Goths, and the
fate of the Roman Empire sealed (a.d. 378). It was Adrianople that was first captured by the Turkish invaders of the Balkans to serve as
their capital until they could at a later date capture Constantinople.
Many sieges and battles it saw until 1912, when the Bulgarians and Serbians gathered around its marshy plains, and after several months
of siege finally carried
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it by assault. Finally it was re-captured by a mere cavalry patrol of the
Turks.
Adrianople has its beauties seen from afar. The great mosque with
four slender minarets shines out from the midst of gardens and
picturesque villas over the wide plain which marks the confluence of
the Maritza and the Tchundra Rivers. But on nearer examination
Adrianople, like all other Turkish towns, is dirty, unkempt, squalid.
Most Turkish towns in the Balkans—Mustapha Pasha on the Maritza
was an exception, looking dirty and unattractive from any point of view—have a certain enchantment when they first catch the eye of
the traveller. It is the custom of the richer Turks to build their villas on the high ground around a town if there is any, and to surround them
with gardens. These embowered houses and the slender fingers
pointing skyward of the minarets, give a first impression of ample space, of delicacy in architecture. Closer knowledge discloses the
town as a herd of hovels, irregularly set in a sea of mud (in dry weather a dirty heap of dust), with the hilly outskirts alone tolerable.
I regret the wild Balkan diplomacy which doomed that Adrianople
should go back to the
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Turks. The Bulgarians would have made a fine clean city of it: and had a project to canalise the Maritza and bring to the old city of Adrian all the advantages of a seaport. Possibly, that will come in the
near future if, in renewing their strength, the Bulgarian nation learn also some sense of diplomacy and moderation in using it.
Now the position is that for the first time for very many years the old
principle has been broken that the Turkish tide may retreat but must
never advance in Europe. During the negotiations of the first session
of the Balkan Peace Conference, the Balkan Committee—a London
organisation which exists to befriend the Balkan States—urged:
Any district which should be restored to Turkish rule would be not only beyond the possibility of rehabilitation, but would suffer the second scourge of vengeance.... It would be intolerable that any such
districts should meet the fate meted out to Macedonia in 1878. There
is no ground for such restoration except the claim arising from the continued Turkish possessions of Adrianople. But compensation for
the brief period during which Adrianople may still be defended would
be represented by a district adjoining Chatalja, not exceeding, at all events, the vilayet of Constantinople....
It is clearly our duty to call attention to the governing
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principle laid down by Lord Salisbury that any district liberated from Turkish rule should not be restored to misgovernment.... The
ostensible ground for the action of Europe, and particularly of
England in 1878, was that the Powers themselves undertook the
reform of Turkish government in the restored provinces. They have
since that day persistently restrained the small States from
undertaking reform or liberation, while notoriously neglecting the task
themselves. The promise to undertake reform was regarded in 1878
in many quarters as sincere. But renewed restoration of Christian
districts to Turkey to-day would, after the experiences of the past, be
devoid of any shred of sincerity....
The restoration of European and civilised populations to Turkish rule
would be resented now, not merely by those who have sympathised
with the Balkan Committee, but by the entire public, which recognises
that the Allies have achieved a feat of arms of which even the
greatest Power would be proud.
In 1914 no more was heard of "Lord Salisbury's principle," and in public repute the Balkan States were in a position worse than any they had occupied for half a century. Coming after a successful war such a result condemns most strongly Balkan statesmen and
diplomats.
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GENERAL VIEW OF STARA ZAGORA, BULGARIA
Roumanian diplomacy during 1912-13 was subtle, wily, and
unscrupulous, enough to delight a Machiavelli. With all its ethical wickedness it was the most stable element in the wild disorders of 1913; was efficacious in insisting upon
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peace: and imposed a sort of rough justice on all parties. Grecian diplomacy was of the same character as the Roumanian, but not so
supremely able. The difference, it appeared to me, was that the
Roumanian sought a grand advantage with a humble air: the Greek
would seek an advantage, even a humble one, with a grand air. A
lofty dignity sits well on the diplomacy which is backed by great force:
there should be something more humble in the bearing of the
diplomat relying upon subtle wiles. The Greek is a little too conscious
of his heroic past not to spoil a little the working of his otherwise very
pliant diplomacy. The Serbian in diplomacy was not so childish as the
Bulgarian and a great deal more amiable and modest. Europe has
long given the Serbian a bad reputation for bounce and bluster. In the
events of 1912-13 he did nothing to earn such ill-repute. His work in
the field was done excellently and with little réclame. In Conference he was not aggressive, but moderate, and, in my experience, more
truthful than other Balkan types.
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