1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
sovereign. 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces,
he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before
pitching his camp.
["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence
between the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;"
and he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without
harmony in the State, no military expedition can be undertaken;
without harmony in the army, no battle array can be formed." In an
historical romance Sun Tzu is represented as saying to Wu Yuan: "As
a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all the
domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe."]
3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing
more difficult.
[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Tsào
Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign's
instructions until our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics
to be pursued are most difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or
maneuvers can hardly be said to begin until the army has sallied forth
and encamped, and Chìen Hao's note gives color to this view: "For
levying, concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there
are plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes when
we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that "the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing favorable
position."]
The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious
into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and
somewhat enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond. This
is how it is explained by Tsào Kung: "Make it appear that you are a
long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene
before your opponent." Tu Mu says: "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he
may be remiss and leisurely while you are dashing along with utmost
speed." Ho Shih gives a slightly different turn: "Although you may
have difficult ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter
this is a drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by
celerity of movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by
the two famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which
laid Italy at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later,
which resulted in the great victory of Marengo.]
4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy
out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the
goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the
town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Chìn army. The King
of Chao first consulted Lien Pò on the advisability of attempting a
relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening
country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She,
who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said:
"We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole—and the pluckier one
will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had only gone a
distance of 30 LI when he stopped and began throwing up
entrenchments. For 28 days he continued strengthening his
fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the intelligence to
the enemy. The Chìn general was overjoyed, and attributed his
adversary's tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the
Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies
had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting
for two days and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with
such astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding
position on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his
movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Chìn forces, who
were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat across
the border.]
5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined
multitude, most dangerous.
[I adopt the reading of the TÙNG TIEN, Cheng Yu-hsien and the TÙ
SHU, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order
to make sense. The commentators using the standard text take this
line to mean that maneuvers may be profitable, or they may be
dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the general.]
6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an
advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other
hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice
of its baggage and stores.
[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese
commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own
rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is
some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that
Sun Tzu does not approve of a lengthy march being undertaken
without supplies. Cf. infra, ss. 11.]
7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make
forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the
usual distance at a stretch,
[The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 LI; but on one
occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Tsào Tsào is said to have covered
the incredible distance of 300 li within twenty-four hours.]
doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all
your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. 8. The
stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on
this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
[The moral is, as Tsào Kung and others point out: Don't march a
hundred LI to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without
impedimenta. Maneuvers of this description should be confined to
short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships of forced
marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle." He did
not often call upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only
when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative,
that he sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ]
9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will
lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach
the goal.
[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be TORN AWAY."]
10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your
army will arrive.
[In the TÙNG TIEN is added: "From this we may know
the difficulty of maneuvering."]
11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage- train is
lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
[I think Sun Tzu meant "stores accumulated in depots." But Tu Yu
says "fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."]
12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the
designs of our neighbors. 13. We are not fit to lead an army on the
march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and
swamps. 14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account
unless we make use of local guides.
[ss. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. ss. 52.]
15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.
[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to
the numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position.
[2] ]
16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be
decided by circumstances. 17. Let your rapidity be that of the
wind,
[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift
but, as Mei Yao-chèn points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."]
your compactness that of the forest.
[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly
marching, order and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard
against surprise attacks. But natural forest do not grow in rows,
whereas they do generally possess the quality of density or
compactness.]
18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,
[Cf. SHIH CHING, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man
can check."]
in immovability like a mountain.
[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to
dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice
you into a trap.]
19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you
move, fall like a thunderbolt.
[Tu Yu quotes a saying of Tài Kung which has passed into a proverb:
"You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the
lighting—so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so
quickly that it cannot be parried.]
20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst
your men;
[Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by
insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which
may afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.]
when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit
of the soldiery.
[Chèn Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow
and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands
they invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some
of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of
Pan Chào who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years,
those of Fu-kàng-an and Tso Tsung-tàng.]
21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that we must not break
camp until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the
cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I.
ss. 13.]
22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.
[See supra, SS. 3, 4.]
Such is the art of maneuvering.
[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But
there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an
earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when
Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different
from that of Sun Tzu himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as
to its genuineness.]
23. The Book of Army Management says:
[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us
any information about this work. Mei Yao- Chèn calls it "an ancient
military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries
before Sun Tzu's time between the various kingdoms and
principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable that a collection of
military maxims should have been made and written down at some
earlier period.]
On the field of battle,
[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.]
the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of
gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough:
hence the institution of banners and flags. 24. Gongs and drums,
banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host
may be focused on one particular point.
[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the
same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be
like those of a single man."!]
25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either
for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.
[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance
against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a
story in this connection of Wu Chì, when he was fighting against the
Chìn State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man
of matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from
the enemy, and returned to camp. Wu Chì had the man instantly
executed, whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying:
"This man was a good soldier, and ought not to have been
beheaded." Wu Chì replied: "I fully believe he was a good soldier,
but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders."]
This is the art of handling large masses of men. 26. In night-fighting,
then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by
day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and
eyes of your army.
[Chèn Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi's night ride to Ho-yang at the head
of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with
torches, that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large
army, he did not dare to dispute their passage.]
27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;
["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be
irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy's soldiers will be keenest
when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our
cue not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardor and enthusiasm
have worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be
robbed of their keen spirit." Li Chùan and others tell an anecdote (to
be found in the TSO CHUAN, year 10, ss. 1) of Tsào Kuei, a protege
of Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Chì, and the
duke was about to join battle at Chàng-cho, after the first roll of the
enemy's drums, when Tsào said: "Not just yet." Only after their
drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack.
Then they fought, and the men of Chì were utterly defeated.
Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay,
Tsào Kuei replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now
the first roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second
it is already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I
attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence
our victory." Wu Tzu (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a whole
army—a mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man
alone: such is the influence of spirit!"]
a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general's most important
asset. It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to
inspire courage into the panic- stricken." The great general Li Ching
(A.D. 571-649) has a saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in
assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must
include the art of assailing the enemy's mental equilibrium."]
28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning;
[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle
of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting,
whereas Hannibal's men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy,
XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.]
by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent
only on returning to camp. 29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an
army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and
inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods. 30. Disciplined
and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst
the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession. 31. To be
near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while
the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is
famished:—this is the art of husbanding one's strength. 32. To refrain
from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to
refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident
array:—this is the art of studying circumstances. 33. It is a military
axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him
when he comes downhill. 34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates
flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen. 35. Do not
swallow bait offered by the enemy.
[Li Chùan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor,
take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been
poisoned by the enemy. Chèn Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out
that the saying has a wider application.]
Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by
saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to
the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too
dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of
Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth
homewards." A marvelous tale is told of Tsào Tsào's courage and
resource in ch. 1 of the SAN KUO CHI: In 198 A.D., he was besieging
Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view
to cutting off Tsào's retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his
troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who
were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged
himself. In this desperate plight Tsào waited until nightfall, when he
bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As
soon as the whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his
rear, while Tsào himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that
they were thrown into confusion and annihilated. Tsào Tsào said
afterwards: "The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and
brought me to battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to
overcome them."]
36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.
[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The
object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road
to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair."
Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."]
Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
[Chèn Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to
bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to
stake all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to
extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken from
the life of Yen-chìng. That general, together with his colleague Tu
Chung-wei was surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in
the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and desert-like, and the little
Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells
they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of
mud and sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at
last Fu Yen-chìng exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to
die for our country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A
strong gale happened to be blowing from the northeast and darkening
the air with dense clouds of sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for
waiting until this had abated before deciding on a final attack; but
luckily another officer, Li Shou- cheng by name, was quicker to see
an opportunity, and said: "They are many and we are few, but in the
midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory
will go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally."
Accordingly, Fu Yen-chìng made a sudden and wholly unexpected
onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in
breaking through to safety.]
37. Such is the art of warfare.
[1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426.
[2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne"
(Longmans, 1907), p. 29.
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