[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzu
does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already
told us (V SS. 6-11) that such deflections from the ordinary course
are practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang
Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost
degree…. I do not know what Tsào Kung makes these Nine
Variations out to be, but it has been suggested that they are
connected with the Nine Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view
adopted by Chang Yu. The only other alternative is to suppose that
something has been lost—a supposition to which the unusual
shortness of the chapter lends some weight.]
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.
[Repeated from VII. ss. 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may
have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to
the chapter.]
2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high
roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in
dangerously isolated positions.
[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the
beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. ss. 43. q.v.). Chang
Yu defines this situation as being situated across the frontier, in
hostile territory. Li Chùan says it is "country in which there are no
springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin,
"one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to
advance."]
In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate
position, you must fight. 3. There are roads which must not be
followed,
["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says
Li Chùan, "where an ambush is to be feared."]
armies which must be not attacked,
[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be
attacked." Chèn Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival
advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from
attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men's strength."]
towns which must not be besieged,
[Cf. III. ss. 4 Tsào Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own
experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the
city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the
heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the
subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities.
Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot
be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." Hsun Ying, when
urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and well-fortified;
even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great feat of arms; whereas if
I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In the seventeenth
century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne
who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches
and maneuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in taking
a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province."
[1] ]
positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign
which must not be obeyed.
[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for
authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim:
"Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a
military commander is the negation of civil order!" The unpalatable
fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be
subordinated to military necessity.]
4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that
accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. 5.
The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted
with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his
knowledge to practical account.
[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only
securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in
every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is
characterized by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a
certain variability of plan. How it is possible to turn these natural
features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented
by versatility of mind?"]
6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying
his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages,
will fail to make the best use of his men.
[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally
advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it
must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town
is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can be
stormed, it must be attempted; and if consistent with military
operations, the ruler's commands must be obeyed." But there are
circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these
advantages. For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for
him, but if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the
enemy has laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile
force may be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed
and likely to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and
so on.]
7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and
of disadvantage will be blended together.
["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one,"
says Tsào Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to
your mind."]
8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may
succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we
must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the
enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into
our calculations."]
9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always
ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from
misfortune.
[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I
must consider not only the enemy's ability to injure me, but also my
own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels
these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in
liberating myself…. For instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy
and only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy
will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better
to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the
advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy's toils." See the
story of Tsào Tsào, VII. ss. 35, note.]
10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;
[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of
which would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the
enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left without
counselors. Introduce traitors into his country, that the government
policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus
sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By means of
every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and
waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading
him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with
lovely women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different
interpretation of Sun Tzu here: "Get the enemy into a position where
he must suffer injury, and he will submit of his own accord."]
and make trouble for them,
[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble
should be make for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we
might say, "assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of
commands." These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.]
and keep them constantly engaged;
[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent the from having any rest."]
hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given
point.
[Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use
of: "cause them to forget PIEN (the reasons for acting otherwise than
on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction."]
11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the
enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on
the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have
made our position unassailable. 12. There are five dangerous faults
which may affect a general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to
destruction;
["Bravery without forethought," as Tsào Kung analyzes it, which
causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such
an opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute
force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzu, chap.
IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to
pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only
one out of many qualities which a general should possess. The
merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights
recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be
condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, too, make the incisive remark: "Simply
going to one's death does not bring about victory."]
(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
[Tsào Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice"
as being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize
an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight
of danger." Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent
on returning alive," this is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as
Sun Tzu knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing
to take risks. Tài Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will
subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu
pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval
battle with him at the island of Chèng-hung. The loyal troops
numbered only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great
force. But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him
should be be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his
war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment's
notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers
was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from
windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in
the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were routed, had to burn all their
baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu
tells a somewhat similar story of Chao Ying-chì, a general of the
Chin State who during a battle with the army of Chù in 597 B.C. had
a boat kept in readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat
to be the first to get across.]
(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang
Mei, Teng Chìang and others shut himself up behind his walls and
refused to fight. Teng Chìang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric
temper and easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break
down his walls, then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can
bring his force to battle, it is doomed to be our prey." This plan was
acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-
yuan by the enemy's pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.]
(4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
[This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is really a
defect in a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an
exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned
man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-
chèn truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: "The seek
after glory should be careless of public opinion."]
(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and
trouble.
[Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be
careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is
the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage to the
immediate comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because
in the long run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best,
the prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A
mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a
beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary
to his military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated
efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many
strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the
end, relief came through the very man who started out with the
distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to
sentiment in favor of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who
failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to
defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his
men." By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him
out of Sun Tzu's mouth.]
13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the
conduct of war. 14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain,
the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let
them be a subject of meditation.
[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.
——————————————————————————————
——-
IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH
[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in ss. 1
than by this heading.]
1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the
army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over
mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys.
[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to
supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural
ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu Chìang was a robber captain in the time of the
Later Han, and Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate his gang. Chìang
having found a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force
a battle, but seized all the favorable positions commanding supplies
of water and forage. Chìang was soon in such a desperate plight for
want of provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He
did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of
valleys."]
2. Camp in high places,
[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the
surrounding country.]
facing the sun.
[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Chèn Hao "facing
east." Cf. infra, SS. 11, 13.
Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.
3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.
["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Tsào
Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your
evolutions." The TÙNG TIEN reads, "If THE ENEMY crosses a
river," etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly an
interpolation.]
4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not
advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army
get across, and then deliver your attack.
[Li Chùan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung
Chu at the Wei River. Turning to the CHÌEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, fol. 6
verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were
drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin
ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand
and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading half his army across,
he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time, pretending to have failed in
his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was
much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure
that Han Hsin was really a coward!" he pursued him and began
crossing the river in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open
the sandbags, thus releasing a great volume of water, which swept
down and prevented the greater portion of Lung Chu's army from
getting across. He then turned upon the force which had been cut off,
and annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The
rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in all
directions.]
5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader
near a river which he has to cross.
[For fear of preventing his crossing.]
6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.
[See supra, ss. 2. The repetition of these words in connection with
water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops
marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself;
in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing
the sun." The other commentators are not at all explicit.]
Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.
[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our
camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open
the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu- hou has
remarked that 'in river warfare we must not advance against the
stream,' which is as much as to say that our fleet must not be
anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would be able to
take advantage of the current and make short work of us." There is
also the danger, noted by other commentators, that the enemy may
throw poison on the water to be carried down to us.]
So much for river warfare. 7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole
concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.
[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage,
and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to
attack.]
8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass
near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.
[Li Chùan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous
where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect
the rear.]
So much for operations in salt-marches. 9. In dry, level country, take
up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and
on your rear,
[Tu Mu quotes Tài Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream
or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."]
so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for
campaigning in flat country. 10. These are the four useful branches of
military knowledge
[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3)
marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military Maxims," no.
1.]
which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several
sovereigns.
[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-chèn asks, with some
plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known of
Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The SHIH CHI (ch.
1 ad init.) speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Chìh Yu. In the
LIU TÀO it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified
the Empire." Tsào Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor
was the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of
whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li
Chùan tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who
received it from his Minister Feng Hou.]
11. All armies prefer high ground to low.
["High Ground," says Mei Yao-chèn, "is not only more agreeable and salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low
ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for
fighting."]
and sunny places to dark. 12. If you are careful of your men,
[Tsào Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you
can turn out your animals to graze."]
and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every
kind,
[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the
outbreak of illness."]
and this will spell victory. 13. When you come to a hill or a bank,
occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will
at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural
advantages of the ground. 14. When, in consequence of heavy rains
up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with
foam, you must wait until it subsides. 15. Country in which there are
precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows,
[The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks,
with pools of water at the bottom.]
confined places,
[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by
precipices on three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."]
tangled thickets,
[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that
spears cannot be used."]
quagmires
[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable
for chariots and horsemen."]
and crevasses,
[Defined by Mei Yao-chèn as "a narrow difficult way between
beetling cliffs." Tu Mu's note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague,
but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and
Chang Yu takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the
commentators certainly inclines to the rendering "defile." But the
ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a crack or fissure"
and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the
sentence indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think
that Sun Tzu is here speaking of crevasses.]
should be left with all possible speed and not approached. 16. While
we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to
approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have
them on his rear. 17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there
should be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass,
hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they
must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places
where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.
[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against
traitors who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our
weaknesses and overhearing our instructions."]
18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying
on the natural strength of his position.
[Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much of
which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual
like Gen. Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."]
19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious
for the other side to advance.
[Probably because we are in a st