1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground:
(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4)
open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground;
(7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground. 2.
When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.
[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and
anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the
opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their
advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack the valor of desperation,
and when they retreat, they will find harbors of refuge."]
3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great
distance, it is facile ground.
[Li Chùan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating,"
and the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu
remarks: "When your army has crossed the border, you should burn
your boats and bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that
you have no hankering after home."]
4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either
side, is contentious ground.
[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Tsào
Kung says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the
many and the strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Chùan. Thus, Thermopylae was of this classification because the
possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the entire
invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzu,
ch. V. ad init.: "For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten,
there is nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was
returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D.,
and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator
of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of
Chìn, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the
province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-chàng, counseled him, saying:
"Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are
vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of
the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a
different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the
Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when
his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms
without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off,
we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer.
The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be expended in
vain against the enormous strength of these two positions." Liang
Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away
by the invader.]
5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open
ground.
[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this
type of ground. Tsào Kung says it means "ground covered with a
network of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on
which intercommunication is easy."]
6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,
[Tsàu Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy's and
a third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the
small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by
Chì, on the west by Chin, and on the south by Chù.]
so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his
command,
[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain
most of them to become his allies.]
is a ground of intersecting highways. 7. When an army has
penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of
fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.
[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has
reached such a point, its situation is serious."]
8. Mountain forests,
[Or simply "forests."]
rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to
traverse: this is difficult ground. 9. Ground which is reached through
narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths,
so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large
body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. 10. Ground on which we
can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is
desperate ground.
[The situation, as pictured by Tsào Kung, is very similar to the
"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible:
"A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible,
retreat blocked." Chèn Hao says: "to be on 'desperate ground' is like
sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu
quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus
entrapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid
of local guides: — it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's
mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so
perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots
carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no
choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to
range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming
strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere
take a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We
seek a pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none
of us has a moment's respite. If we simply maintain our ground,
whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move,
we have to sustain the enemy's attacks on front and rear. The
country is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in
the necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out,
all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow
that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten thousand;
all means of offense in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage
already forfeited by ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even though we
had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could
they be employed with the slightest effect?" Students of Greek history
may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the
agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See
Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].]
11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt
not. On contentious ground, attack not.
[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the
advantageous position first. So Tsào Kung. Li Chùan and others,
however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already
forestalled us, sot that it would be sheer madness to attack. In the
SUN TZU HSU LU, when the King of Wu inquires what should be
done in this case, Sun Tzu replies: "The rule with regard to
contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage
over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the
enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to
flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash for
other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise
a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best
troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will
sally forth to the rescue."]
12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.
[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking
force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available
here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Tsào Kung's
brief note: "Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut off.]
On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.
[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighboring states."]
13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.
[On this, Li Chùan has the following delicious note: "When an army
penetrates far into the enemy's country, care must be taken not to
alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the
Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Chìn territory was marked
by no violation of women or looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was
in 207 B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies
that entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In
the present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not
'plunder,' but 'do not plunder.'" Alas, I fear that in this instance the
worthy commentator's feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least,
has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on 'serious ground,'
there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no
possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted
resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close
watch on the enemy."]
In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
[Or, in the words of VIII. ss. 2, "do not encamp.]
14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
[Tsàu Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu
Yu amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must
be devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed
in deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped." This is exactly
what happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed
in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum, and to all
appearances entrapped by the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which
Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which
Tìen Tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before.
[See IX. ss. 24, note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were
fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified
animals being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards
the passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of
these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans
that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army passed
safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.]
On desperate ground, fight.
[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is a
chance of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your corner."]
15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to
drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear;
[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each
other."]
to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to
hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from
rallying their men. 16. When the enemy's men were united, they
managed to keep them in disorder. 17. When it was to their
advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped
still.
[Mei Yao-chèn connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded
in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to
secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be
gained, they would remain where they were."]
18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly
array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin
by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be
amenable to your will."
[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in mind. Tsào Kung thinks it
is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu
Mu says: "The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on
the accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to
capture our favorable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3)
to guard his own communications." Our object then must be to thwart
his plans in these three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf.
III. ss. 3.] By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw
the other side on the defensive.]
19. Rapidity is the essence of war:
[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in
warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military
science, and the chief business of the general." The following
anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the importance attached to speed
by two of China's greatest generals. In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor
of Hsin-chèng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating
defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence
with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-
ma I was then military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng
Ta's treachery, he at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt,
having previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly
import. Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has
leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly
investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is
an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once,
while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask."
Then, by a series of forced marches, be brought his army under the
walls of Hsin-chèng with in a space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had
previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 LI from here.
When the news of my revolt reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform
his imperial master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can
be taken, and by that time my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-
ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will be sent
against us are not worth troubling about." The next letter, however,
was filled with consternation: "Though only eight days have passed
since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates.
What miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- chèng had
fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See CHIN SHU, ch. 1, f. 3.] In
621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from Kùei-chou in Ssu-chùan to reduce
the successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the
modern Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze
being then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary
would venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently
made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss
of time, and was just about to start when the other generals implored
him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous
state for navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming
speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss
opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even
knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the present
moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before his capital
with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before you
have time to stop your ears against it. [See VII. ss. 19, note.] This is
the great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he
will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to
oppose us. Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about
as he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly
stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer the
penalty of death.]
take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by
unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. 20. The following
are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The further
you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your
troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. 21. Make
forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.
[Cf. supra, ss. 13. Li Chùan does not venture on a note here.]
22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,
[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give
them plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally."]
and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your
strength.
[Chèn recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous
general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the
success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Chù State, where
a universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the
temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remained
strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Chù general try to force a
battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not
come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the
affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be
well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for
bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld
them into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had
elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were
amusing themselves. The answer was, that they were contending
with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping. When Wang
Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits, he
knew that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch and
that they were now ready for fighting. By this time the Chù army,
after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away
eastwards in disgust. The Chìn general immediately broke up his
camp and followed them, and in the battle that ensued they were
routed with great slaughter. Shortly afterwards, the whole of Chù
was conquered by Chìn, and the king Fu-chù led into captivity.]
Keep your army continually on the move,
[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It
has struck me, however, that the true reading might be "link your
army together."]
and devise unfathomable plans. 23. Throw your soldiers into
positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to
flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve.
[Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3): "If one man were
to run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else
tried to get our of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had
courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is,
that a desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not
meet on even terms."]
Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.
[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will
surely exert their united strength to get out of it."]
24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there
is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country,
they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight
hard. 25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be
constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do
your will;
[Literally, "without asking, you will get."]
without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they
can be trusted. 26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with
superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need
be feared.
[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate
into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes
Huang Shih-kung: "'Spells and incantations should be strictly
forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the
fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers' minds should be seriously
perturbed.' The meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and
scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution
until they die."]
27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because
they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is
not because they are disinclined to longevity.
[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life
are things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they
burn or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that
they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is
slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general
to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown
in their way.]
28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may
weep,
[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate
more genuine grief than tears alone.]
those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting
the tears run down their cheeks.
[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Tsào Kung says, "all
have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember
that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their
emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the I River
between Ching Kò and his friends, when the former was sent to
attempt the life of the King of Chìn (afterwards First Emperor) in 227
B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell
and uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the
burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ]
But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage
of a Chu or a Kuei.
[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State
and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by
Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his
sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly of
a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was
immediately hacked to pieced by the king's bodyguard. This was in
515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Tsào Kuei (or Tsào Mo),
performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years
earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by Chì, and was just
about to conclude a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory, when
Tsào Kuei suddenly seized Huan Kung, the Duke of Chì, as he
stood on the altar steps and held a dagger against his chest. None of
the duke's retainers dared to move a muscle, and Tsào Kuei
proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring the Lu was being
unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker state. Huan
Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Tsào
Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the
terrified assemblage without having so much as changed color. As
was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the
bargain, but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him
the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold
stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched
battles.]
29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the SHUAI-JAN. Now the
SHUAI-JAN is a snake that is found in the Chàng mountains.
["Shuai-jan" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements.
Through this passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be
used in the sense of "military maneuvers."]
Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail,
and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will
be attacked by head and tail both. 30. Asked if an army can be made
to imitate the SHUAI-JAN,
[That is, as Mei Yao-chèn says, "Is i