[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising ss. ss. 1-13, deals with
"terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six calamities" are discussed in SS. 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is
again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting,
perhaps, on that account.]
1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit:
(1) Accessible ground;
[Mei Yao-chèn says: "plentifully provided with roads and means
of communications."]
(2) entangling ground;
[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which
you become entangled."]
(3) temporizing ground;
[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."]
(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great
distance from the enemy.
[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification.
A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman's
unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross- divisions such as the
above.]
2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called
ACCESSIBLE. 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the
enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard
your line of supplies.
[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu
says, "not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of
Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the communications," [1]
we could wish that Sun Tzu had done more than skirt the edge of this
important subject here and in I. ss. 10, VII. ss. 11. Col. Henderson
says: "The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of
an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist
who finds his adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and
his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's
movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the
commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds
himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to
change all his plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated
detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he
has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary
failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army." [2]
Then you will be able to fight with advantage. 4. Ground which can be
abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called ENTANGLING. 5. From
a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth
and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and
you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will
ensue. 6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by
making the first move, it is called TEMPORIZING ground.
[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the
situation remains at a deadlock."]
7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer
us an attractive bait,
[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But
this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our
position.]
it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing
the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we
may deliver our attack with advantage. 8. With regard to NARROW
PASSES, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly
garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.
[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and
by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy
at our mercy."]
9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after
him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.
10. With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS, if you are beforehand
with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots,
and there wait for him to come up.
[Tsào Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and
defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy."
[For the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. ss. 2].
Chang Yu tells the following anecdote of Pèi Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-
682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes.
"At night he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been
completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders
that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly
displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the extra
fatigue which it would entail on the men. Pèi Hsing- chien, however,
paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as
quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which
flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve
feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned
that they had been in the wrong. 'How did you know what was going
to happen?' they asked. Pèi Hsing-chien replied: 'From this time
forward be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary
questions.' From this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high
and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also
because they are immune from disastrous floods."]
11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but
retreat and try to entice him away.
[The turning point of Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D. against the
two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-chùng,
Prince of Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spike of
which Tou Chien-te persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-
yang, was defeated and taken prisoner. See CHIU TÀNG, ch. 2, fol.
5 verso, and also ch. 54.]
12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the
strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle,
[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and
wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be
exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."]
and fighting will be to your disadvantage.
13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.
[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. ss.
8.]
The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to
study them. 14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not
arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is
responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse;
(4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6) rout. 15. Other conditions being
equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the
result will be the FLIGHT of the former. 16. When the common
soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is
INSUBORDINATION.
[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of Tìen Pu [HSIN TÀNG SHU, ch.
148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army
against Wang Tìng-tsòu. But the whole time he was in command,
his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted
his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands
at a time. Tìen Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and
when, after some months had passed, he made an attempt to engage
the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in every direction.
After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his
throat.]
When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak,
the result is COLLAPSE.
[Tsào Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press
on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."]
17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on
meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of
resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he
is in a position to fight, the result is RUIN.
[Wang Hsìs note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause,
and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his
subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an
avalanche of ruin upon his head."]
18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders
are not clear and distinct;
[Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with
decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are
made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about
doing their duty." General Baden- Powell says, italicizing the words:
"The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in
one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf.
also Wu Tzu ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a military leader is
difference; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from
hesitation."]
when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men,
[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."]
and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result
is utter DISORGANIZATION. 19. When a general, unable to estimate
the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one,
or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to
place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be ROUT.
[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues:
"Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be
appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the
resolution of our own men and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the
primi ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).]
20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully
noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.
[See supra, ss. 13.]
21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally;
[Chèn Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season
are not equal to those connected with ground."]
but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of
victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and
distances, constitutes the test of a great general. 22. He who knows
these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win
his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely be
defeated. 23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight,
even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then
you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding.
[Cf. VIII. ss. 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Chìn dynasty, who is said
to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the SAN
LUEH, has these words attributed to him: "The responsibility of
setting an army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if
advance and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results
will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened
monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country's
cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that
"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military
commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying:
"Decrees from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a
camp."] 24. The general who advances without coveting fame and
retreats without fearing disgrace,
[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all
for a soldier is to retreat.]
whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for
his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.
[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior."
Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment,
would not regret his conduct."]
25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you
into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons,
and they will stand by you even unto death.
[Cf. I. ss. 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging
picture of the famous general Wu Chì, from whose treatise on war I
have frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes
and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to
have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own
surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with
his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu
Chì himself sucked out the virus. The soldier's mother, hearing this,
began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do
you cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-
in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his sore.' The woman
replied, 'Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my
husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death at
the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the same for my
son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.'" Li Chùan mentions
the Viscount of Chù, who invaded the small state of Hsiao during the
winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of the soldiers are
suffering severely from the cold." So he made a round of the whole
army, comforting and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt
as if they were clothed in garments lined with floss silk.]
26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority
felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and
incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be
likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.
[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you,
they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of
stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng
was occupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders
to his army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them
by force. Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner,
who happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a
bamboo hat belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over
his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng
considered that the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should
not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly
he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his face,
however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the army with
wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles dropped in the
highway were not picked up.]
27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are
unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only
halfway towards victory.
[That is, Tsào Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."]
28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that
our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only
halfway towards victory.
[Cf. III. ss. 13 (1).]
29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that
our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature
of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only
halfway towards victory. 30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in
motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at
a loss.
[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his
measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does
not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move,
he makes no mistakes."]
31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your
victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth,
you may make your victory complete.
[Li Chùan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three things—
the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages
of earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."]
[1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47.
[2] "The Science of War," chap. 2.
[3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.
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