[Tsào Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count
the cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the
chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a
consideration of ways and means.]
1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field
a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred
thousand mail-clad soldiers,
[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu,
used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed
for purposes of defense. Li Chùan, it is true, says that the latter were
light, but this seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note the
analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric
Greeks. In each case, the war- chariot was the important factor,
forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain
number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we
are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen,
and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would
be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two
chariots and a hundred men.]
with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI,
[2.78 modern LI go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly
since Sun Tzu's time.]
the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of
guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on
chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver
per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. 2. When
you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's
weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay
siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. 3. Again, if the
campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to
the strain. 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor
damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other
chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no
man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must
ensue. 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.
[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the
commentators. Tsào Kung, Li Chùan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and
Mei Yao-chèn have notes to the effect that a general, though
naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of
rapidity. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves
expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be
very clever, but they bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades
the difficulty by remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army
growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and
distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the
occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory
can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness."
Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by implication,
about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy
operations. What he does say is something much more guarded,
namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness
can never be anything but foolish — if only because it means
impoverishment to the nation. In considering the point raised here by
Sun Tzu, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur
to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of
Rome against that of Hannibals's isolated army, because it seemed
to him that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in
a strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics
would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal it is true,
led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption in
their favor.]
6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged
warfare. 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils
of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it
on.
[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a
long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it
to a close. Only two commentators seem to favor this interpretation,
but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He
who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is
distinctly pointless.]
8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his
supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for
reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies, but
crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. This may seem an
audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from
Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time — that is,
being a little ahead of your opponent — has counted for more than
either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to
commissariat.]
9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy.
Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means
"things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.]
10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained
by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at
a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the
next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement,
moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some
corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese
commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense,
and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sun Tzu
used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment clearly
have reference to some system by which the husbandmen sent their
contributions of corn to the army direct. But why should it fall on them
to maintain an army in this way, except because the State or
Government is too poor to do so?]
11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go
up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained
away.
[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own
territory. Tsào Kung understands it of an army that has already
crossed the frontier.]
12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be
afflicted by heavy exactions. 13, 14. With this loss of substance and
exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare,
and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;
[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of
3/10, but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted
from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The PEOPLE being
regarded as the essential part of the State, and FOOD as the
people's heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value
and be careful of both?"]
while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,
breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,
protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to
four-tenths of its total revenue. 15. Hence a wise general makes a
point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's
provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single
PICUL of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.
[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of
transporting one cartload to the front. A PICUL is a unit of measure
equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]
16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger;
that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must
have their rewards.
[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers
see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture
spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your
men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account."]
17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have
been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own
flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots
mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers
should be kindly treated and kept. 18. This is called, using the
conquered foe to augment one's own strength. 19. In war, then, let
your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzu
here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to
enforce."]
20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of
the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation
shall be in peace or in peril.
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