1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to
take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is
not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to
destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire
than to destroy them.
[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted
nominally of 12500 men; according to Tsào Kung, the equivalent of a
regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists
from any number between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a
company contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last two, however,
Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.]
2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme
excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's
resistance without fighting.
[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the
old Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the capitulation of the
huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.]
3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans;
[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defense, whereby one
might be content to foil the enemy's stratagems one after another, but
an active policy of counter- attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in
his note: "When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we
must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."]
the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces;
[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzu, in
speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or
principalities into which the China of his day was split up.]
the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;
[When he is already at full strength.]
and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be
avoided.
[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it
in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before
Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that
they would have been masters of the situation before the British were
ready seriously to oppose them.]
The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various
implements of war, will take up three whole months;
[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as
"mantlets", described. Tsào Kung simply defines them as "large
shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Chùan, who says
they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city
walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman
TESTUDO, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles
used in repelling attacks, but this is denied by Chèn Hao. See supra
II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the
"movable shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several
commentators. They were wooden missile-proof structures on four
wheels, propelled from within, covered over with raw hides, and used
in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls, for the
purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that
they are now called "wooden donkeys."]
and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three
months more.
[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the
level of the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak points in the
defense, and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the
preceding note.]
5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to
the assault like swarming ants,
[This vivid simile of Tsào Kung is taken from the spectacle of an
army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing
patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm
the place before his engines of war are ready.]
with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still
remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port
Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.]
6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without
any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he
overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.
[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no
harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after
having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and
mother of the people."]
7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and
thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.
[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of
the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus,
the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."]
This is the method of attacking by stratagem. 8. It is the rule in war, if
our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one,
to attack him;
[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.]
if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it
appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts'ao Kung,
however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning: "Being two to the
enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the regular way,
and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu thus further
elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as numerous as that of the
enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy
in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack,
he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be
crushed in front." This is what is meant by saying that 'one part may
be used in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.'
Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one's army is simply an
irregular, just as concentrating it is the regular, strategical method,
and he is too hasty in calling this a mistake."]
9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;
[Li Chùan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If
attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able
general will fight."]
if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;
[The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is certainly a great
improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no
very good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the
saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a small difference in
numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and
discipline.]
if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. 10. Hence,
though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it
must be captured by the larger force. 11. Now the general is the
bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State
will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
[As Li Chùan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the
general's ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his
profession), his army will lack strength."]
12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon
his army:— 13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat,
being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling
the army.
[Li Chùan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a
thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally think
of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators
understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of Tài Kung: "A
kingdom should not be governed from without, and army should not
be directed from within." Of course it is true that, during an
engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy, the general
should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart.
Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and
give wrong orders.]
14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he
administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain
in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.
[Tsào Kung's note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the
civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle an army in kid
gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles
on which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and
flexibility, on the other hand, are military rather than civil virtues to
assimilate the governing of an army"—to that of a State, understood.]
15. (3) By employing the officers of his army
without discrimination,
[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.]
through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to
circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
[I follow Mei Yao-chèn here. The other commentators refer not to the
ruler, as in SS. 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu
says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must
not be entrusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The
skillful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the
covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in
establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in
action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the
stupid man has no fear of death."]
16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to
come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy
into the army, and flinging victory away. 17. Thus we may know that
there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when
to fight and when not to fight.
[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive;
if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will
invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive
or the defensive.]
(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior
forces.
[This is not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers correctly,
as Li Chùan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the saying
more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a
lesser force to defeat a greater, and vice versa. The secret lies in an
eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu
says: 'With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior
one, make for difficult ground.'"]
(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same
spirit throughout all its ranks. (4) He will win who, prepared
himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. (5) He will win who
has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "It is the sovereign's function to
give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of the
general." It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have
been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on the
part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of
his extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by
central authority.]
18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you
need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but
not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
[Li Chùan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Chìn, who in 383
A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When
warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services of
such men as Hsieh An and Huan Chùng, he boastfully replied: "I
have the population of eight provinces at my back, infantry and
horsemen to the number of one million; why, they could dam up the
Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into the stream.
What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were soon
after disastrously routed at the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat
a hasty retreat.]
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every
battle.
[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the
offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive."
He adds: "Attack is the secret of defense; defense is the planning of
an attack." It would be hard to find a better epitome of the root-
principle of war.]
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