The psychology of Nations by G.E. Partridge - HTML preview

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CHAPTER XI

THE SYNTHESIS OF CAUSES

It appears to be no very difficult matter to discover causes of war,

and indeed a considerable number of causes. In fact the problem seems

to yield an embarrassment of riches, especially if our chief interest

happens to be a practical one, and we wish to find the causes of war

in order to see how they may be controlled. We might even have

discovered all the causes of war and still be as far as before from

any real understanding of the cause of war. Unless one can know the

relative importance of the causes, and the manner in which the causes

combine to produce wars; unless the results give in some way a

synthetic view of the causes of war, show _dominating_

causes, or

reveal a total cause which is not merely a summation of stimuli, but

is both a necessary and a sufficient situation for the production of

war; unless we have shown some fundamental cause and movement in the

social order, we are still left in search of the cause of war.

We have, indeed, found a number of causes of war, but at the same time

the causes have not appeared to exist as separate causes. We are

always catching sight of a movement in the development of nations and

of the world--of certain fundamental motives, the most basic of all,

the most general, being the motive of power. These causes of war do

not appear, however, to be of the nature of a _chain_, giving us the

impression that in order to break the habit of war, all we need do is

to discover the weakest link in the chain of causes, break the chain

there, and so interrupt the whole mechanism of war-making in the

world. Above all, although fortuitous events as causes of war must

not be overlooked, war is not continually being made anew by the

appearance again and again of accidental situations, which are thus to

be regarded as the cause of war.

War is, first of all, a natural expression of the social life, resting

primarily upon the fact of the existence, universally, of groups of

individuals acting as units. But here cause and effect are lost in one

another. Conflict cements the group, and the existence of the group,

again, is the cause of conflict. War is an aspect of the social

solidarity of the group acting under certain conditions, and these

conditions are the presence of deep desires that can, in general, be

satisfied only by the exertion of force on the part of communities

acting as wholes.

These primitive motives and moods of war that we find in the nature of

the social group itself, emerge finally in three aspects of the life

of nations, and it is these aspects of the life of nations that appear

to us as the causes of war. They are not separate and independent

features of the social life, and it is in part only for the sake of

convenience that they are sharply separated at all. They are all at

bottom manifestations of the motive of power that runs through all

history, and all the social and individual life. On one side this

motive appears in moods and impulses that we called the

"intoxication"

moods and impulses. National honor was found to be another effect of

it. The political motives of war are its concrete expression. These

motives all together--all being but phases of a deep, powerful energy

and purpose, are the source of the main movement in history out of

which war comes. In this movement all the motives of the social life

are always present and active at the same time. The good and the bad

of national life are phases of a single purpose and are not two

contrasted principles or moments. The past is always contained in the

present.

War, then, is the result of certain motives which are fundamental to

the group life. It is a natural form in which, given a certain degree

of intelligence and of complexity of the social life, these motives

express themselves. All the motives and forms of expression are

present in germ at least from the beginning of the development of the

social life. Considering the whole history of war we see that it is a

part of a very complex movement in human society, and yet that no war

appears to be the final term of a process of inexorable logic. Taking

history as a whole, we see that the natural laws involved and the

nature of the social consciousness make a state of war from time to

time highly probable, but war is not a necessary consequence of any

natural law. Nations are self-conscious personalities.

Perhaps in the

future they may change their ways, abandon voluntarily their desires,

subject themselves to discipline, or deliberately invent a plan of

international relations that will have the effect of eliminating war

from their lives altogether.

It is always dangerous, but at the same time it is always tempting to

try to explain national life, or all life and history, in terms of the

individual and his experience. Once more, however, we may yield to

that temptation and say that the world to-day is in a stage of

development which has many traits that show its relation in some very

significant ways to certain undeveloped conditions found in

individuals, which in fact always appear as phases of the life of all

individuals in some degree and form. Nations have acquired a high

degree of subjectivism, partly on account of the geographical

conditions under which they have lived, and the many barriers between

nations due to difference of origin and of language, and the

fundamental emotions of fear and jealousy which, as we have seen, play

so large a part in the life and conduct of groups.

Nations, however

close to one another, have remained isolated in spirit; they have

lacked both the initiative and the means for becoming definitely

related to one another in purposive and sustained activities.

Therefore all their relations have remained highly emotional,

subjective, influenced by mysticism, filled with hatred and fear, hero

worship and illusion. Nations have lacked both the power, and we might

say, the organs, for externalizing their spirit. They have dreamed

dreams and played plays, and followed their illusions of empire. Even

their wars have not, until perhaps now, become wholly real and serious

in a measure commensurate with their powers and resources. The present

war more than any other, and more than any other event in history,

represents an escape on the part of nations from their subjectivism,

and a beginning, it may be, of the realization of a more mature, or

shall we say more _normal_ conception of the world.

Nations have

played at being great and have really produced but little true

greatness. Now, let us say, their dream is over. We see that these

nations can no longer play. Their wooden weapons have at last been

turned to steel. They can fight no longer indeed without destroying

one another. They must now _live_ in practical and moral relations,

give up their bright dreams of empire after the old heroic order, and

be content to be imperial (if they are born to be imperial) by

performing distinguished service in the world, by their own genius of

leadership. There is work in the world for nations to do; there are

empires of the spirit, it may be, greater than have yet been dreamed

of in the nations' childish philosophies of life. The consciousness of

nations contains, it may be, unsuspected powers, suppressed in the

past by narrow nationalism, by fear, habit and convention. These

powers may now, if ever, blossom forth; they have been wasted too long

in patriotic feeling and in idle dreamery. They must now show what

they can do in a practical world that will have no more of mere

assertions.

The world stands to-day balanced between two ideals.

Human spirit, the

spirit of nations, is a free and plastic force; it is also a sum of

motives and desires; but most fundamentally of all it is a growing,

living, creative and personal spirit. It still clings to its luxuries

of feeling, to its provincial life, it is still fascinated by its

beautiful romance of empire. On the other hand we see the stirring of

a new idea. A new world arises, less dramatic in its appeal than the

old world, but a world appealing by its practical problems both to the

will and to the intellect. Shall we yield to the fascination of the

old romance and go back to our hero worship; or shall we be inspired

now by this vision of a new and greater social order, create out of

our own powers of imagination the forms this world must assume if it

is to appeal to the deepest feelings of all peoples, and make this new

world real by our own intelligence and determination?

We stand to-day at a dramatic moment in history; a more dramatic

moment than when the victory itself hung in the balance.

Perhaps our

sense of responsibility for the future is an illusion; perhaps we are

driven by an inexorable logic of history, and we do not after all

choose what our world shall be. But certainly the sense of human power

in the world has never been greater than now nor seemed better

justified; nor, if we are deceived, has the reality ever been more out

of harmony with the ambitions of man.