CHAPTER THREE
NIMITZ
Admiral Chester Nimitz was born in Texas, of German descent in 1885. He served in World War One as Chief-of-Staff to the Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Submarine Force, and is considered by many to have been an astute tactician and strategist. Nimitz, was commissioned in the US Navy in 1907. After a shaky start (he grounded a destroyer), he rose to prominence as a submariner.
After World War One he was an integral member of the team that set up the Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the University of California, then he headed the destroyer base at San Diego. Other inter-war positions included captain of the cruiser Augusta and assistant chief of the Bureau of Navigation in Washington. Besides submarine warfare, he was also an expert in ship power plants, developing a system of refuelling ships whilst still at sea, and mastered the integration of aircraft carriers into task forces.
Perhaps his most valuable contribution was during an advanced course at the Naval War College when he declared; "The enemy in our war games is always Japan”. The courses were so thorough that when World War Two commenced, nothing that happened in the Pacific was really strange or unexpected. With the Japanese threat growing more ominous, he took command of a heavy cruiser division in the Far East; his familiarity with the region would prove a valuable commodity. He was promoted to rear admiral in 1938, commanding a battleship division. In 1939, with the rank of admiral, he was appointed head of the navy's Bureau of Navigation, a key administrative post in which he oversaw the service's rapid expansion. On 17th December 1941, the highly capable Admiral Chester W. Nimitz replaced Admiral Husband E. Kimmel as CINCPAC (Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet), when the latter was blamed for being caught unawares at Pearl Harbor.
Nimitz immediately began efforts to rebuild the shattered Pacific Fleet and halt the Japanese advance across the Pacific. His appointment transformed his men's morale, infecting them with his own calm confidence. He also started to gather a team of gifted subordinates, such as the brilliant strategist Rear Admiral Forrest Sherman. Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur were made responsible for the conduct of the entire Pacific war. Urged on by Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief of the US Navy, Nimitz sent Vice Admiral William Halsey to attack the Marshall Islands and Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher to raid the Gilbert Islands, starting the early phases of his island hopping strategy. This strategy clashed with those of the other Pacific region personalities, which includes MacArthur's wish to strike directly at the Philippines, and King's plan to take Taiwan.
Nimitz decided to mount a series of raids on Japanese-held islands in the Pacific to harass the enemy, maintain the morale of his crews and give them valuable operational experience. The first attempted raid, against Wake Island in January 1942, had to be called off when an oiler was torpedoed. But on 1st February Vice Admiral William F. (‘Bull') Halsey, with the carriers Enterprise and Yorktown, attacked Japanese bases in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands. Then in late February and early March he took the Enterprise group to hit Wake and Marcus, the latter just 1 180 miles from Tokyo. These raids excited an American public crying out for success.
As considerable as his tactical skills were, perhaps Nimitz's greatest gift was his leadership ability. Naval historian Robert Love writes that Nimitz possessed "a sense of inner balance and calm that steadied those around him. He also had the ability to pick able subordinates and the courage to let them do their jobs with little interference. He moulded such disparate personalities as the quiet, introspective Raymond A. Spruance and the ebullient, aggressive William F. Halsey Jr. into an effective team”.
Of course, these same qualities helped ease Nimitz's relationship with MacArthur, no small feat given the amount of coordination called for between their two services. It is indeed most fortunate that Nimitz did not share MacArthur's need for publicity; even the vast Pacific would not have been big enough for two great military leaders. Journalist Robert Sherrod, who spent time in both of their headquarters, said that "the Admiral was frequently the despair of his public relations men; it simply was not in him to make sweeping statements or to give out colourful interviews”.
The Japanese had made great gains in the vast Pacific Ocean. The conquest of the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies had cost the Japanese Navy only 23 warships and none had been larger than a destroyer. 67 transport ships had also been lost. The Japanese naval command had expected far greater losses, therefore, encouraged by such success, they looked to expand still further.
The very success which the Japanese had achieved in implementing their initial war plans had raised a fresh series of questions in the minds of those responsible for shaping Japanese naval strategy. Admiral Yamamoto and the staff of the Combined Fleet, regarded the first priority as being the destruction of the United States aircraft carriers in the Pacific. He urged early operations against Midway, to the eastward, seeing this as necessary for an attack on Hawaii. The Japanese calculated that the United States fleet would certainly be drawn out into a decisive battle, and could be dealt with before the Allies brought their emerging superior resources to bear against Japan.
It was the Americans who forced the hand of the Japanese. On 18th April 1942, the unique Doolittle raid on Tokyo, launched from the aircraft-carrier Hornet, created much confusion and inevitably strengthened the case for the Midway operation. Particularly in the failure to keep the capital immune from bombing attacks. Any opposition promptly vanished. By 5th May, Yamamoto was ordered to occupy Midway Island.
However, the Japanese had already decided on a course of action that spilt their forces. The attack on New Guinea could not be called off as it was too far advanced. Therefore, Yamamoto, could not call on all the forces he would have preferred to muster for an attack on Midway Island as some were concentrated in the Coral Sea to the south-east of New Guinea, thereby, forcing upon the Japanese two concurrent strategies which were destined to over-extend their forces.
Nimitz's carrier forces won a strategic victory at the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, which halted Japanese efforts to capture Port Moresby, New Guinea. This was the first carrier versus carrier engagement, where ships on both sides never sighted one another. The Japanese labelled the attack on Port Moresby as "Operation MO". The main part of the Japanese plan was to move through the Jomard Passage, to the south-east of New Guinea, allowing it to attack Port Moresby.
The Carrier Strike Force left Truk on 1st May and by the afternoon of 5th May it was in position. Its opposition was Task Force 17 with the aircraft-carriers Lexington and Yorktown. The Americans had a slight edge over the Japanese in aircraft. They also had radar, but above all they had the benefit of superior intelligence about the Japanese dispositions.
Since Pearl Harbor, the United States had succeeded in completely breaking the Japanese naval code, and therefore possessed accurate and fairly detailed intelligence concerning the Japanese plans. Not only had the Americans broken the code, so that Admiral Nimitz and his staff knew exactly what the Japanese objectives would be, but there was a constant flow of reports from the Australian 'Coastwatcher’s', who reported sightings of Japanese ship movements.
The Japanese were also aware that about 200 land-based aircraft were operating from airfields in northern Australia, and that American air activity made the concealment of their ship movements difficult. However, it was estimated that Allied naval forces in the area were 'not great', and that only one aircraft-carrier, the Saratoga, would be available. The Japanese hoped that the prior occupation of Tulagi, due to be taken on 3rd May, and the establishment of a seaplane base there, would make it more difficult for the Allies to follow Japanese movements from their nearest bases at Port Moresby and Noumea. The Support and Covering Groups and the Striking Force would cover the Port Moresby Invasion Group which would leave Rabaul on 4th May, and on 7th May land a sizeable force.
To the Allies, Port Moresby was vital not only for the security of Australia, but also as a springboard for future offensives in the south-west Pacific. Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur thus gave the threat the attention it merited. Before 17th April, reports had reached CINCPAC headquarters that a group of transports, protected by the light aircraft-carrier Shoho and a striking force that included two large aircraft-carriers, would soon enter the Coral Sea. By the 20th Nimitz had concluded that Port Moresby was the objective, with the attack likely to develop on or after 3rd May.
It was one thing to know the nature of the task, but yet another to be able to summon up the resources to meet the situation. The Saratoga was undergoing repairs for torpedo damage sustained in January. The aircraft-carriers Enterprise and Hornet did not return from the Tokyo raid until 25th April, and were unlikely to reach the Coral Sea in time to participate in the coming battle.
The problem with the American command structure was the rigid demarcation of command between Nimitz and MacArthur, according to the decision of the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff, whereby CINCPAC could exercise control over all naval operations in the Pacific, but could not usurp MacArthur's command of ground forces or land based aircraft within the latter's area. Thus Nimitz could not readily call upon the 300 odd land-based aircraft of the USAAF and the RAAF for air searches in the area.
Knowing, however, that he would have to rely mainly on air strike to frustrate Japanese plans, Nimitz decided to utilise what' remaining aircraft-carrier strength was available to him. For this task, he called upon the air groups of the Yorktown and Lexington. The Yorktown task force (No. 17) included 3 heavy cruisers, 6 destroyers, and the tanker Neosho.
The Lexington task force (No. 11) was fresher, having left Pearl Harbour on 16th April, after three weeks" maintenance. With the 'Lady Lex', as she was affectionately known, were 2 heavy cruisers and 5 destroyers. The Lexington could truly be called a happy ship; many of her crew had served with her since she was commissioned in 1927, while her air group included such notable naval aviators as 'Butch' O'Hare and John Thach. Rear-Admiral Aubrey Fitch, a distinguished carrier-tactician, had been on the flag bridge since 3rd April. Task Force 17, with the Yorktown, was commanded by Rear-Admiral Frank Fletcher, and had already been in the area for two months.
Task Force 1, operating out of San Francisco, consisted mainly of pre-war battleships; these were simply not fast enough to keep up with the aircraft-carriers, nor could the oilers be spared to attend to their fuel requirements. The Australian heavy cruisers Australia and Hobart, then in Sydney, were ordered to rendezvous with Fletcher in the Coral Sea on 4th May. The heavy cruiser USS Chicago and a destroyer were ordered to join the same commander three days earlier.
On 29th April, Nimitz completed his plans. Fletcher was to exercise tactical command of the whole force and ordered to operate in the Coral Sea commencing 1st May. The manner in which Inouye's threat was to be met was left almost entirely to Fletcher. At 07 00 hours, Fletcher commenced refuelling from the Neosho. In the light of reports of the enemy's approach, Fletcher steamed out into the middle of the Coral Sea to search for the Japanese. He headed west on the 2nd, leaving orders for Fitch to rejoin him by daylight on the 4th.
By 08 00 hours on 3rd May, Fletcher and Fitch were over 100 miles apart, each ignorant of the enemy's detailed movements, when a report was received which Fletcher 'had been waiting two months' to hear: the Japanese were landing at Tulagi. The news brought about an immediate change in Fletcher's plans. Ordering Fitch to proceed in an easterly direction to re-join Yorktown 300 miles south of Guadalcanal. Fletcher headed north at 24 knots, determined to strike Tulagi with the Yorktown's available aircraft.
Fortunately for Fletcher, the Japanese had estimated that, once Tulagi was in their hands, it would remain unmolested. The groups, which had supported the operation, had consequently retired at 11 00 hours on 3rd May, after the island had been secured. First blood went to the Americans, when the invasion transports in Tulagi harbour were sighted. At 06 30 hours on 4th May, the first strike was launched from Yorktown, consisting of 12 Devastator torpedo-bombers and 28 Dauntless dive-bombers. With only 18 fighters available for patrol over the carrier, they were forced to rely on their own machine guns for protection. According to the practice of the time, each squadron attacked independently. As so often happened during the war, the pilots overestimated what they saw, mistaking a minelayer, for a light cruiser, minesweepers for transports, and landing barges for gunboats. Beginning their attacks at 08 15 hours, aircraft of the two Dauntless squadrons and the Devastator squadron were back on Yorktown by 09 31 hours, having irreparably damaged a destroyer and sunk minesweepers. A second strike later destroyed 2 seaplanes and damaged a patrol craft, at the cost of 1 torpedo-bomber; while a third attack of 21 Dauntlesses, launched at 14 00 hours, dropped 21 half-ton bombs, but sank only 4 landing barges.
By 16 32 hours the last returning aircraft were safely landed on the Yorktown, and the 'Battle' of Tulagi was over. Only 3 aircraft had been lost, the other two being Wildcat fighters which had lost their way returning to the aircraft-carrier and had crash-landed on Guadalcanal, the pilots being picked up that night. But, in the words of Nimitz: “The Tulagi operation was certainly disappointing in terms of ammunition expended to results obtained”.
Fletcher headed the whole force south for his rendezvous with Fitch. Once again luck had been with him; for Takagi was by now making his best speed south-eastward from Bougainville, having received calls for help from Tulagi at noon that day. If Fletcher had not achieved complete surprise in his Tulagi strike, and Takagi had moved earlier, the Yorktown would have met the Japanese aircraft-carriers on her own.
On the 6th May, the tension grew, as Fletcher knew that the clash was bound to come soon. He decided that it was now time to put into effect his operational order of 1st May, and accordingly redeployed his force for battle. An attack group, under Rear-Admiral Kinkaid, was formed from the four heavy cruisers, the light cruiser Astoria, plus five destroyers. The heavy cruisers Australia, Hobart, and Chicago, with two destroyers formed a support group, while the air group, comprised the Yorktown, Lexington, and four destroyers. The oiler Neosho, escorted by the destroyer Sims, was detached from Task Force 17, and ordered to head south for the next fuelling rendezvous, which was reached next morning.
If the air searches of either side had been more successful, the main action of the Coral Sea might have taken place on 6th May. Some elements of the Japanese force had, however, been sighted. B-17s from Australia had located and bombed the Shoho, south of Bougainville. The bombs had fallen wide, but Allied planes then turned south to locate the Port Moresby Invasion force. The Japanese were in an optimistic mood, that very day they had heard the news of the fall of the Philippines and the surrender of General Wainwright's forces on Corregidor.
Fletcher launched a search mission from Yorktown. One of her reconnaissance aircraft reported 'two carriers and four heavy cruisers' about 225 miles to the northwest. Assuming that this was the main striking force, Fletcher launched .a total of 93 aircraft between 09 26 and 10 30 hours, leaving 47 for combat patrol. However, no sooner had Yorktown's attack group become airborne than her scouts returned, and it immediately became obvious that the 'two carriers and four heavy cruisers' should have read 'two heavy cruisers and two destroyers'. Fletcher, now knowing that he had sent a major strike against a minor target, courageously allowed the strike to proceed, thinking that with the invasion force nearby there must be some profitable targets in the vicinity.
The next day the battle began in earnest. 15 high-level bombers attacked, but failed to hit their targets. However, about noon, a further attack by 36 dive-bombers sealed the fate of the destroyer Sims. Three 500 pound bombs hit the Sims, of which two exploded in her engine room. The ship buckled and sank stern first within a few minutes, with the loss of 379 lives. Meanwhile, 20 dive-bombers had- turned their attention to the oiler Neosho, scoring seven direct hits and causing blazing gasoline to flow along her decks. Neosho was to drift in a westerly direction until the oiler was scuttled. But the sacrifice of these two ships was not vain, for if Japanese planes had not been drawn off in this way, the Japanese might have found and attacked Fletcher.
In a belated attempt to save the day, the Japanese launched another strike at the Yorktown, but an error in calculating the target's position led the strike astray. On their way back they were hammered by the Yorktown's Combat Air Patrol (CAP), which shot down 9 aircraft for the loss of 2 of their own. The survivors then lost their way and 4 even tried to land on Yorktown in error, until the carriers opened fire.
The Japanese had wasted almost 20 percent of their strength, all for an oiler and a destroyer, and still the American carriers had not been located. The Japanese carriers turned northwards, while the Yorktown turned southeast to clear a patch of bad weather which was hindering flying, but during the night the Japanese reversed their course so as to be able to engage shortly after dawn. They kept in touch with the Yorktown's movements and were able to launch a dawn search next morning, with a strike to follow as soon as the target was located.
Fletcher ordered Rear-Admiral Fitch in the Lexington, to launch a big search to be flown off at 06 25 hours. At about 08 00 hours a Japanese plane radioed a sighting report which was intercepted by the Americans and passed to Fitch, but almost immediately this disquieting news was followed by a report that the Japanese carriers had been found. A combined strike of 84 aircraft was put up by the Lexington and Saratoga, but 30 minutes earlier the Japanese had launched their own strike of 69 aircraft. The world's first carrier-versus-carrier battle had started.
The two American carriers' strikes were about 20 minutes apart and so Yorktown struck first with nine torpedo bombers and 24 dive-bombers. The torpedo strike was a failure, but two bombs hit Shokaku, one forward which started an avgas (aviation fuel) fire, and one aft which wrecked the engine repair workshop. The Japanese attack began at 11 18 hours, with 51 bombers and 18 fighters operating as a single unit. The raid was detected at nearly 70 miles range on Lexington's radar, but a series of errors positioned the defending Wildcats at the wrong altitude. To make matters worse they were not stationed at a reasonable distance from the carrier, so that only three fighters made contact before the attack developed. There were also 12 Dauntless dive-bombers stationed at 2 000 feet three miles outside the screen to try to break up the torpedo-bombers' attacks. The Japanese torpedo-bombers were flying much higher than anticipated, and they simply flew over the Dauntlesses to take up their dropping height inside the carriers' destroyer screen, but were largely ineffective.
The attack group from Lexington, well ahead of the Yorktown aircraft, was nearing the target location shortly after 11 00 hours, when they spotted an aircraft-carrier, two or three cruisers, and some destroyers, about 25 miles to the starboard. This was the Shoho. The first attack, succeeded only in blowing 5 aircraft over the Shoho's side, but was closely followed by 10 Dauntlesses and the Lexington's torpedo squadron. Under such a concentrated attack, the Shoho stood little chance: soon she was on fire and dead in the water and sank soon after. Only 6 American aircraft were lost in the attack. Back on the American aircraft-carriers, listeners in the radio rooms heard the jubilant report from Lieutenant Commander Dixon, leading Lexington’s other Dauntless squadron: “Dixon to carrier; scratch one flat-top”!
With the air groups safely landed again, Fletcher decided to call-off any further strikes, as he now knew, from intercepted radio messages, that his own position was known. The worsening weather dissuaded him from further searches, he thus set a westerly course during the night in the anticipation that the Japanese invasion force would come through the Jomard Passage the next morning. The 7th May had been a day of serious blunders from the Japanese viewpoint, and they were determined to destroy the American aircraft-carriers before the next day; Selecting the 27 pilots best qualified in night operations, they launched a strike from the Shokaku and Zuikaku just before 16 30 hours.
The gamble came near to success. Although the Japanese aircraft passed close to Task Force 17, they failed to locate owing to foul weather and poor visibility. The American combat air-patrol, vectored out by radar, intercepted and shot down 9 precious aircraft. An hour later, some of the returning Japanese laid a course for home right over the American carriers, which they mistook for their own. Twenty minutes later, 3 more attempted to join the Yorktown's landing circle, and 1 was shot down. Only six of the original 27 got back safely.
Next morning, one of Lexington's scouts, reported that the Japanese were 175 miles to the north-east of Fletcher's position. The Yorktown’s group of 24 bombers and 9 torpedo-bombers with fighters, departed ten minutes before the Lexington aircraft. The dive-bombers spotted the Japanese first, at 10 30 hours, and took cloud cover to await the arrival of the Devastators. While Shokaku was engaged in launching further combat patrols, Zuikaku disappeared into a rain squall. The attack thus fell only on the Shokaku. Although the Yorktown pilots coordinated their attack well, only moderate success was achieved. The slow American torpedoes were either avoided or failed to explode, and only two bomb hits were scored on the Shokaku, one damaging the flight-deck well forward on the starboard bow and setting fire to fuel, while the other destroyed a repair compartment aft. The Shokaku, now burning, could still recover aircraft, but could no longer launch any.
The Japanese had begun launching at about the same time as the Americans, but their attack group of 18 torpedo-bombers, 33 bombers, and 18 fighters was larger, better balanced, and more accurately directed to the target. Although the American radar picked them up 70 miles away, Fitch had far too few fighters to intercept successfully, and was forced to rely mainly on his anti-aircraft gunners for protection. At 11 18 hours the battle 'busted out', as one American sailor described it. The Yorktown, with a smaller turning circle than the Lexington, successfully avoided eight torpedoes launched on her port quarter. Five minutes later she came under dive-bomber attack but, skilfully handled, escaped unscathed until 11 27 hours, when she received her only hit from an 800 pound bomb which penetrated to the fourth deck, but did not impair flight operations. During this time, the evasive manoeuvres gradually drew the American aircraft carriers apart and, although the screening vessels divided fairly evenly between them, the breaking of their defensive circle contributed to Japanese success.
The Lexington, larger than the Yorktown, had a turning circle of 1 500 to 2 000 yards in diameter, compared with the 1 000-yard tactical diameter of her consort. Moreover, she had the misfortune to suffer an 'anvil' attack from the Japanese torpedo-bombers, which came in on both bows to launch their missiles at the 'Lady Lex'. Despite valiant manoeuvres, she received one torpedo hit on the port side forward at 11 20 hours, quickly followed by a second opposite the bridge. At the same time a dive-bombing attack commenced from 17 000 feet, the Lexington receiving two hits from small bombs. One exploded in a ready-ammunition box on the port side, while the other hit the smokestack structure. To add to the din of battle, the ship's siren jammed as a result of an explosion and shrieked weirdly throughout most of the attack.
Some 19 minutes later, the aircraft-carrier battle was, to all intents and purposes, at an end. At this point, honours were more or less equal, but for the Americans the real tragedy was still to come. At first it appeared that the doughty Lexington had survived to 'fight another day. A list of 7 degrees caused by the torpedo hits was corrected by shifting oil ballast, while her engines remained unharmed. To her returning pilots she did not appear to be seriously damaged, and the recovery of the air group went ahead. Minutes later, at 12 47 hours, a tremendous internal explosion, caused by the ignition of fuel vapours by a motor generator which had been left running, shook the whole ship. Although the Lexington continued landing her planes, a series of further violent explosions seriously disrupted internal communications. Yet another major detonation occurred at 14 45 hours, and the fires soon passed beyond control. The need for evacuation became increasingly apparent. At 19 56 hours the destroyer Phelps was ordered to deliver the 'coup de grace' with 5 torpedoes, and the Lexington sank at 20 00 hours, a final explosion occurring as she slipped beneath the waves.
The Yorktown had been luckier. Her fires were soon brought under control and at no time was her operational efficiency seriously impaired. But the elated Japanese pilots had seen her burning furiously and reported that both she and the Lexington had been sunk. The Shokaku, badly damaged by fire, was unable to recover her aircraft. She limped back to Japan with so much water on board that she nearly capsized in a gale. Her sister ship Zuikaku also needed attention for minor defects and so the two best Japanese carriers were out of action for some time.
The Battle of the Coral Sea was now over. The Japanese pilots had reported sinking both American aircraft-carriers, and acceptance of this evaluation influenced the decision to detach the Shokaku for repairs, as well as the order that the Striking Force should be withdrawn. Tactically, the battle had been a victory for the Japanese. Although they had lost 43 aircraft as against 33 lost by the Americans, and had been left with only 9 operational aircraft after the Zuikaku had proved unable to take on all Shokaku's aircraft. Their air strikes had achieved greater results. The sinking of the Lexington, Neosho, and Sims far outweighed the loss of the Shoho and the various minor craft sunk.
Strategically, however, Coral Sea was an American victory: the whole object of the Japanese operation, the capture of Port Moresby, had been thwarted. Moreover, the damage to the Shokaku, and the need to re-form the battered air groups of the Zuikaku, was to keep both these carriers out of the Midway battle, where their presence might have been decisive. The battle was the first naval engagement in history in which the participating ships never sighted or fired directly at each other. Instead, manned aircraft acted as the offensive artillery for the ships involved. Thus, the respective commanders were participating in a new type of warfare, carrier-versus-carrier, with which neither had any experience. The commanders "had to contend with uncertain and poor communications in situations in which the area of battle had grown far beyond that prescribed by past experience but in which speeds had increased to an even greater extent, thereby compressing decision-making time". Because of the greater speed with which decisions were required, the Japanese were at a disadvantage as command Inoue was too far away at Rabaul to effectively direct naval forces. The Japanese admirals involved were often slow to communicate important information to each other.
While the Americans did not perform as expected, they did learn from their mistakes in the battle and made improvements to their carrier tactics and equipment, including fighter tactics, strike coordination, torpedo bombers, and defensive strategies, such as anti-aircraft gunnery, which contributed to better results in later battles. Radar gave the Americans a limited advantage in this battle, but its value to the U.S. Navy would increase over time as the technology improved and the Allies learned how to employ it more effectively. Following the loss of Lexington, improved methods for containing aviation fuel and better damage control procedures were implemented by the Americans. Coordination between the Allied land-based air forces and the U.S. Navy was poor during this battle, but this too would improve over time.
Since Yamamoto had decided the decisive battle with the Americans was to take place at Midway, he should not have diverted any of his important assets, especially fleet carriers, to a secondary operation like MO. If either operation was important enough to commit fleet carriers, then all of the Japanese carriers should have been committed to each in order to ensure success. By committing crucial assets to MO, Yamamoto made the more important Midway operation dependent on the secondary operation's success. Moreover, Yamamoto apparently missed the other implications of the Coral Sea battle: the unexpected appearance of American carriers in exactly the right place and time to effectively contest the Japanese, and U.S. Navy carrier aircrews demonstrating sufficient skill and determination to do significant damage to the Japanese carrier forces.
Due to remarkable American code breaking intelligence, Admiral Nimitz, was now aware that the Japanese fleet was intent on throwing down a challenge, which, in spite of local American inferiority, had to be accepted. The proceeding Battle of Midway ranks among one of the truly decisive battles in history. In<