CHAPTER FOUR
PATTON
General George Patton Jr. was a strange mixture of bloodthirsty ravings and military sentimentality. On the one hand he would scream at his soldiers: “Remember, war is kill, kill, and kill! You kill them or they'll kill you. The Nazis are the enemy. Wade into 'em and spill their blood! Shoot 'em in the belly and rip out their guts with your bayonets”! On the other hand he could raise a glass and, with tears in his eyes, propose a toast to his officers and their ladies: “Here's to Army wives. God bless 'em”!
Few military commanders have ever exhibited such glaring eccentric contrasts of character. The tough, weather-beaten face; the profane and extravagant speech; the appeals to God to lay on good weather for his soldiers; the endless reiteration of 'Kraut-killing' and the insistence on Third Army's great mission.
Seeking to inspire his men, Patton developed a flashy image and routinely wore a highly polished helmet, cavalry pants and boots, and a pair of ivory-handled pistols. His speeches were frequently laced with profanity and espoused the utmost confidence in his men. While his behaviour was popular with his troops, Patton was prone to indiscreet remarks which often distressed Eisenhower, and caused tension among the Allies.
Born on 11th November, 1885 in San Gabriel, CA, Patton was the son of George S. Patton, Sr. and Ruth Patton. He was descended from Revolutionary War Brigadier General Hugh Mercer and several of his relatives fought for the Confederacy during the Civil War. During his childhood, Patton met former Confederate raider John S. Mosby who was a family friend. The old veteran's war stories fuelled Patton's desire to become a soldier. He enrolled at the Virginia Military Institute in 1903, before transferring to West Point the following year.
Compelled to repeat his first year due to poor grades in mathematics, Patton reached the position of cadet adjutant before graduating in 1909. Assigned to the cavalry, Patton went on to compete in the modern pentathlon at the 1912 Olympics in Stockholm. Finishing fifth overall, he returned to the United States and was posted to Fort Riley, Kansas. Assigned to the 8th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, Texas, he took part in Brigadier General Pershing's Punitive Expedition against Pancho Villa in 1916.
During the expedition, Patton led the US Army's first armoured attack when he assaulted an enemy position with three armoured cars. With the US entry into World War I in April 1917, Pershing had Patton promoted to captain and took the young officer to France. Desiring a combat command, Patton was posted to the new US Tank Corps, and saw action at the Battle of Cambrai late that year.
Swiftly advancing through the ranks to colonel in the wartime army, Patton was given command of a Tank Brigade in August 1918. Fighting as part of the 1st US Army, he was wounded in the leg at the Battle of St. Mihiel that September. Recovering, he took part in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and Distinguished Service Medal. With the end of the war, he reverted to his peacetime rank of captain and was assigned to Washington, DC.
While there, he met Captain Eisenhower. Becoming good friends, the two officers began developing new armoured doctrines and devising improvements for tanks. Promoted to major in July 1920, Patton tirelessly worked as an advocate for the establishment of a permanent armoured force. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1934 and colonel four years later, Patton was placed in command of Fort Myer in Virginia.
With the formation of the 2nd Armoured Division in 1940, Patton was selected to lead its 2nd Armoured Brigade and promoted to brigadier general in October. He was given command of the division with the rank of major general in April 1941. In the US Army's build-up prior to World War Two, Patton took the division to the Desert Training Centre in California. Given command of the 1st Armoured Corps, Patton relentlessly trained his men in the desert through the summer of 1942. In this role, Patton led the Western Task Force during Operation Torch.
Torch had been in preparation for only three months, but in conception much longer. At the Arcadia Conference in Washington, the first Allied meeting following Pearl Harbour, Churchill put forward the 'North-West Africa Project’ as the first step towards ‘closing and tightening the ring around Germany’. However, Roosevelt's service advisers were dubious about its practicability preferring an early and more direct attack against Hitler's Europe. They were of the view that this diversion to the Mediterranean would only prolong Allied efforts; preferring an early cross-Channel attack to be launched by August or September 1942. This was aimed at meeting Stalin's demand for the opening of a 'Second Front' to relieve pressure on Russia.
The President and his strategic advisers had already decided on a ‘Germany first’ strategy. The United States would remain on the defensive against Japan while exerting every effort to defeat Germany and of course Italy. They could then turn to the Pacific and eliminate Japan. This commitment to Germany First was heartening to Churchill, but the enthusiasm to fight the Germans immediately was unrealistic. The British Prime Minister emphasised the drawbacks of a premature landing in Europe with inadequate strength; pointing out the risks of being overwhelmed, without bringing any appreciable relief to the Russians.
He was aware that American military forces were in the process of expanding, organising, and training for combat; therefore, they were hardly a match for their strong and veteran foe. Churchill cabled to Roosevelt that the plan for a landing in France in 1942, should be discarded, and went on to urge, once again, the case for Torch as the sole means by which the U.S. could strike at Hitler. The American Chiefs of Staff reacted with renewed objections.
Then, a major event occurred that was to change the entire situation. Rommel's unexpected counterstroke dislocated the 8th Army's westward advance and forced the British to retreat more than two hundred miles to the Gazala Line. This was followed in June by the collapse at Tobruk. So, instead of advancing westward as planned, the 8th Army was thrown back in disorder a further four hundred miles before halting at Alamein. Alamein was the last possible stop-line short of Alexandria, Cairo, and the Nile Delta. Churchill was in Washington with his Chiefs of Staff when he learned of the disaster at Tobruk. A joint Allied operation in North Africa was now viewed as essential. The operation was approved and Roosevelt promised to provide three hundred Sherman tanks to the 8th Army.
Considering the long ties of Franco-American friendship, ‘Operation Torch’ would have to be in essence an outwardly American show. The French still remained bitter about the British attack on their fleet shortly after France fell and would certainly oppose a British landing. The initial landing waves would therefore consist solely of American troops; also the commander of the overall operation would have to be an American.
For this reason, Eisenhower was appointed the Allied Commander-in-Chief. He had never been in combat, but had impressed his superiors with his thorough grasp of military matters, and his ability to make people of different backgrounds work together. Yet he was relatively unknown and "Torch", a complicated venture to be undertaken in considerable haste, would be a serious challenge. As it turned out, he grew in stature and self-confidence resulting in a meteoritic military and later political career.
Eisenhower chose Major-General Mark Clark as his Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Clark would prove invaluable in dealing with the French in North Africa. Lt. General Kenneth Anderson was to command British ground forces and the flamboyant and charismatic Major-General George Patton the American. Patton was aggressive and experienced in combat, and he would soon gain the reputation as America's best fighting general. A Combined Planning Staff, responsible to Eisenhower was established with the overall strategic objective of gaining control of North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea.
Torch had profound political implications that were to influence the campaign. The Americans had hopes that the French would greet them as liberators. But, in the event that they resisted, Allied forces would have to overwhelm and defeat them. This was one of the great imponderables of "Operation Torch".
The next stage was to co-ordinate plans for Eisenhower's forces to push into Tunisia and link up with the British 8th Army under Montgomery. This would entrap and eliminate Axis forces, thus giving the Allies complete control over the northern shore of Africa. It would open the possibility of further operations across the Mediterranean into the European continent and secure Middle East oil supplies for the Allies.
Close coordination among Allied land, sea, and air forces would be essential. Major air units included a fleet carrier and 4 escort carriers, which embarked 180 fighters, 36 dive bombers, and 26 torpedo bombers. The entire task force also included 3 battleships, 7 cruisers, 38 destroyers, 4 submarines, 30 troop transports, plus numerous support vessels; a vast undertaking of over one hundred thousand men.
"Torch" would consist of three major landings; the Western, Centre and Eastern Task Forces. The Western Task Force was to be wholly American and would sail across the Atlantic from Norfolk, Virginia. Patton would sail on board the flagship, USS Augusta, and planned to come ashore near Casablanca in French Morocco.
The Centre Task Force would consist of American troops transported from the United Kingdom to Oran in Algeria. The Eastern Task Force was also formed in the United Kingdom and would be predominantly British. Making the initial landings near Algiers, however, would be a relatively small American force. Air support during the first few critical days would be from the carriers. Once the French airfields came into Allied hands, carrier borne aircraft would be flown to those airfields.
Regarding the complicated political situation; officially, French leaders in North Africa pledged their support for Vichy to defend their colonies against any attacker. But, covertly, many of them conspired against the Axis; realising that the only chance of liberating their country was through an Allied victory.
Robert Murphy, the chief American diplomat in North Africa, had been actively engaged in discreet meetings with French officers sympathetic to the Allies. As a result, the French now urged that a senior Allied military representative should come secretly to Algiers for talks. Accordingly, General Mark Clark flew to Gibraltar with four key staff officers. The party was then transported by a British submarine to a rendezvous west of Algiers. Clark told the French that a large Anglo-American force was being dispatched to North Africa. In the interests of security, however, he abstained from giving details of the time and places of the Allied landings.
An important issue discussed was the choice of the most suitable French leader to rally the French forces in North Africa to the Allied side. Admiral Darlan, Vichy's second in command, had by chance happened to be in Algiers visiting his sick son in hospital. Darlan was the highest governmental official on the scene, and he represented the legal authority of France. He was, however, anti-British, this rendered him doubtful in view of the fact that the British were playing a major role in Torch.
De Gaulle was also ruled out. Roosevelt had developed a deep distrust of him and disliked his arrogance. Roosevelt actually insisted that all information about Torch should be withheld from de Gaulle. In these circumstances the Americans, from the President downward, readily accepted the view that General Giraud was the most acceptable candidate for the leadership of the French in North Africa. Giraud, had been taken prisoner by the Germans in May 1940, but had managed to escape and reach North Africa. Here he met many officers, who shared his desire to liberate France.
The Allies still hoped that the French would not resist. For that reason there would be no pre-assault bombing or naval bombardment. Only the task force commanders could initiate the general engagement of French forces.
Patton’s western task force route took it south of the Azores and had the good fortune that no Axis submarines spotted it. By 6th November, as the task force approached the Moroccan coast, the weather took a turn for the worse. It was nevertheless decided to keep to schedule, despite a heavy surf along the coast. The Western Task Force split into three attack groups and took up positions off the shore line defended by coastal defence guns, and the 15-inch guns of the battleship Jean Bart.
Patton, on board the flagship, USS Augusta had intended to be part of the initial landings, just north of Casablanca. However, as the Augusta had to join several other capital ships in controlling shelling from the shore batteries at Casablanca and French naval vessels in the harbour, Patton’s landing was delayed.
Once the beach-heads were secured, Patton’s attack group would break out and advance on Casablanca. A major threat was the French fleet based less than fifteen miles from the landing beaches. It consisted of a light cruiser, ten destroyers, and eleven submarines. The U.S. Navy, therefore, placed its most powerful ships close to the Assault Groups. This included the new battleship Massachusetts armed with nine 16-inch guns. Heavy cruisers armed with 8-inch guns, including Augusta with Patton aboard, plus light cruisers and destroyers.
As the first waves hit the beaches, shipboard loudspeakers blared across the water in French “Don't shoot, we are your friends, we are American”. But the French did resist the landings, and the sea erupted from coastal defence guns plus Jean Bart firing on U.S. Ships. The French Fleet then attacked and several U.S. vessels were hit. The US ships immediately engaged.
By early afternoon five French destroyers had been sunk, and a cruiser driven ashore. Additionally, Jean Bart’s main guns were put out of action following several hits from the Massachusetts. More troops stormed ashore north of the harbour and began to fan out while simultaneously overrunning artillery positions. Overhead there were numerous dogfights between French and U.S. aircraft. Dive bombers sank three French submarines in the port. The threat of a French naval attack was thus eliminated. There was a great deal of disorder on the beach. Many landing craft had overturned in the surf and numerous landings had occurred well away from the designated sites. Furthermore, there were delays in unloading supplies from the transport ships. However, later that day, Patton was nonetheless able to set up his HQ ashore.
The advance on Casablanca got going on the second day, and met no serious opposition, but it was halted due to lack of equipment, which was piling up on the beaches. Even on the third day little progress was made. It was not until evening that the airport was captured.
With over five thousand French troops in or near the city, and reinforcements on the way, there was the potential for a major battle near the heavily populated city. But by the morning of 10th November, French opposition began to collapse. Darlan, after a brief discussion with his staff, ordered a cease-fire.
Meanwhile, the Americans were landing at Oran. The plan was to capture the port by a double envelopment. The operation started well, surprise was complete and no opposition was met on the beaches. The advance from the beach-heads got going and soon reached the airfield that was readied to receive aircraft. By 10 30 hours the first carrier borne P–40's landed at the airfield and the Port was firmly in American hands. American casualties totalled two hundred and seventy five killed, three hundred and twenty five wounded, and fifteen missing.
Algiers was the most important objective of "Torch" as it was closest to Tunis. Following a small American detachment, the first wave of British troops came ashore west of Algiers. The operations went surprisingly smoothly. French units in the area reported they had been ordered not to resist and on 8th November, the British had taken their objectives.
The Axis powers were now, as anticipated, dispatching forces to Tunisia. German and Italian aircraft started to arrive near Tunis and heavy equipment was brought over to Bizerta.
The success of the British 8th Army had immediately placed expectations that the ‘Torch’ troops would unite with Montgomery's desert veterans to destroy the Germans and Italians before Christmas. Unfortunately, these hopes were proved unfounded. Northern Tunisia’s, airfields and ports were readily accessible to the Axis. Tunis was five hundred and sixty miles away from Algiers over mountainous country across which there were only two metalled roads and an indifferent railway.
A stalemate now set in to bring the initial stage of ‘Torch’ to an end. The Germans aided by the weather and the terrain, were able to stabilize a line in the mountains west of the Tunisian Plains; thus frustrating Allied hopes of capturing Tunis and Bizerta by Christmas. The stalemate was disappointing. But much had gone well, the intricate organization had been effective and had proved it possible to form integrated American and British staffs.
Despite the aspirations of the US Chiefs of Staff, Torch did not initially bring American troops into contact with the armed forces of Germany. That confrontation would only take place in 1943. But the quick and perhaps injudicious success over the French resulted in American overconfidence, even arrogance.
Having observed this, Rommel and his commanders were openly contemptuous of the Americans" ability to fight. After a build-up that included heavy Tiger tanks mounting the 88mm gun, the Afrika Korps shattered the Americans at Kasserine Pass and drove them back. Kasserine Pass was a bitter introduction for the Americans and would teach them much about the Wehrmacht.
The American M3 Lee and Grant tanks were no match for the German Mark IV and Tiger Panzers. American tactical doctrine was inflexible and did not account for the rapid German advance. As a result, the Americans suffered heavy losses at Kasserine.
The Germans analysed captured American equipment and sent back unfavourable reports, which would entice German commanders to underestimate them in the future. Whereas, the Americans studied the action of the Kasserine Pass more intently than the Germans. This resulted in a change of leadership and gave junior officers the authority to make on-the-spot decisions.
Major General Fredendall, was replaced by the more aggressive Patton. The M3 tank was quickly replaced with the M4 Sherman. While it was never the equal of the German tanks, it was easier to maintain and had greater range. Most importantly Kasserine Pass taught the Americans the doctrine of massed firepower, and to coordinate aircraft with ground forces.
Montgomery’s 8th Army attacked from the east and in a series of probing battles weakened the Axis forces. There was a break-through at the Mareth line and the Allies linked up on 8th April, 1943. Rommel, a sick and exhausted man, had already been flown out, too ill to continue the battle. The besieged Panzerarmee was now confronted by the Royal Navy that was gathering for ‘Operation Retribution’. A Dunkirk in reverse for which Admiral Cunningham had issued instructions – Sink, Burn, Destroy, let nothing pass. The Axis forces were rapidly running out of food, ammunition and fuel. By 13th May, 1943, the day the last resistance ended, two hundred and forty thousand Italian and German prisoners were rounded up.
The Allied victory in North Africa opened a second front against the Axis to remove the threat to British supply lines to Asia and Africa. It was critically important to the course of the war. The Torch landings represented the first major British-American combined offensive, and it set the pattern for Allied unity and cohesion in subsequent coalition ventures.
Largely improvised, ‘Torch’ was a triumph of planning and execution. It required an unprecedented effort to build up an American assault force in the United States, separated by three thousand miles from the other two assault forces; then to arrange for the entire task force to converge simultaneously on the North African coast. "Torch" was the largest joint amphibious operation undertaken up to that time. Thus it was in many ways a watershed event.
The number of issues that had to be considered and resolved was enormous. The joint services had never conducted an operation like this. The coordination and control of naval gunfire and air support was also in its infancy during ‘Torch’. The capabilities of land, sea, and air forces had to be carefully orchestrated, especially since the enemy was, at least on paper, numerically equal or in some areas superior.
It was the overall capability of the joint force that resulted in the timely accomplishment of the mission. Certainly the inexperienced forces that took part in ‘Torch’ were fortunate that the French did not put up protracted resistance. Had the Vichy troops been more determined, had the Navy not been able to quickly suppress their defences, or had the enemy been better alerted, the landings could have been much more costly. The United States could not afford a defeat at this stage of the war. Strategically, it would have been an enormous setback if their first offensive had ended in defeat.
In July 1943, Operation Husky saw Patton's Seventh US Army land on Sicily with General Sir Bernard Montgomery's 8th British Army. Tasked with covering Montgomery's left flank as the Allies moved on Messina, Patton grew impatient as the advance bogged down. Taking the initiative, he sent troops north and captured Palermo, before turning east to Messina. While the Allied campaign was successfully concluded in August, Patton damaged his reputation when he slapped a private at a field hospital, and called him a coward, having no patience for ‘battle fatigue’.
Patton’s reputation was enhanced by ‘Torch’. On the second day of the operation, Patton spent 18 hours on the beaches driving his raw troops inland. Despite Patton’s overbearing and swashbuckling manner, his actual method of command, matters of strategy and tactics were freely discussed by his subordinate commanders and staff in a democratic way; a practice utterly foreign to the British way of war. And, having decided what was to be done, Patton then allowed his officers to get on with it. “Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity”! Coming from a man who was a Virginian by descent and autocratic by inclination this was surprising and sound advice.
In the wake of the US II Corps defeat at Kasserine Pass in February 1943, Eisenhower appointed Patton to rebuild the unit. Assuming command with the rank of lieutenant general. Patton diligently worked to restore discipline and fighting spirit to II Corps. Taking part in the offensive against the Germans in Tunisia, II Corps performed well. Immediately after the fall of Tunis and recognizing Patton's achievement, Eisenhower delegated him to aid in planning the invasion of Sicily; code named "Operation Husky".
The Allies turned to the task of securing air dominance over Sicily which must be gained before a single ship could safely approach it or one soldier step ashore. First, the Allied aircraft ranged far and wide against strategic targets in Italy. Then they began an intense bombardment of the enemy airfields and radar stations within striking distance of Sicily arid the proposed routes of the convoys. Tedder interrupted the first stage of his air plan to seize Pantellaria; the island fortress Mussolini had constructed to rival Malta.
Starting in May, 1943, the bombardment of this island gradually increased in intensity till 7th June. Thereafter for four days it rose to a crescendo: over 5 000 tons of bombs were dropped. On 10th June, the third anniversary of Italy's entry into the war, a force from 1st British Division approached the island covered by a precision attack by American flying Fortress B17 bombers. The garrison of 4 600 surrendered without a struggle. For the first time victory had been gained by air power alone.
At the end of June, Alexander's plans for the assault were complete. Montgomery’s 8th Army, was to land on a 30-mile front with two corps, 13th Corps (Lieutenant General Dempsey) just south of Syracuse and 30th Corps (Lieutenant General Leese) astride the Pachino peninsula to capture the airfield there. Patton planned to land his Seventh Army on a 70-mile front in three simultaneous seaborne assaults; two on the east flank by Major General Bradley's 2nd Corps with 45th Division at Scoglitti and the 1st at Gela and 3rd Division (Major General Truscott), directly under his own command, at Licata. As a floating reserve he had 2nd Armoured Division and part of 9th Division. All were battle-hardened with the exception of 45th Division.
Initially Alexander prescribed the establishment of beachheads and the early seizure of Syracuse, the Pachino and Ponte Oliyo airfields and the port of Licata. Thereafter Montgomery was to seize the Augusta airfields. Patton planned to advance about 15 to 20 miles inland on the first day. Both armies were to link up on a common boundary, the Yellow Line. But what was to be done thereafter was, unfortunately, not clear. Patton suspected (with good reason) that the major role of exploitation would be given to Montgomery. He protested to Alexander but when over-ruled, like a good soldier for the moment raised no further objection. Both British and American landings were to be preceded by airborne assaults; the British 1st Airborne Division in gliders and the 82nd American Airborne Division parachuting.
Meanwhile, in early June, General Guzzoni, had assumed command of the Italian forces on the island with his Sixth Army headquarters at Enna. He found, even by Italian standards at this stage of the war, an appalling situation. There was a total Italian garrison of thirty thousand men and 1 500 guns but only four divisions out of 12 were relatively mobile. The rest were scattered in low grade coast defence units on the scale of 41 men to the mile. Many of them were of local origin and virtually untrained; the standard of their officers was exceptionally low. Most of their arms and equipment were obsolete and the coast defences, except near the ports, were either perfunctory or non-existent. One Corps headquarters presided over the destinies of these depressing troops at the east end of the island and another at the west. Only German assistance gave cause for any hope
In July 1943, "Operation Husky" saw Patton's Seventh US Army land on Sicily with Montgomery's 8th British Army. Tasked with covering Montgomery's left flank as the Allies moved on Messina, Patton grew impatient as the advance bogged down. Taking the initiative, he sent troops north and captured Palermo, before turning east to Messina. While the Allied campaign was successfully concluded in August, Patton damaged his reputation when he slapped a private at a field hospital, and called him a coward, having no patience for "battle fatigue".
Though tempted to send Patton home in disgrace, Eisenhower, after consultations with Chief of Staff General George Marshall, retained the wayward commander after a reprimand and apology. Knowing that the Germans feared Patton, Eisenhower brought him to England and assigned him to lead the First US Army Group (FUSAG). A dummy command, FUSAG was part of "Operation Fortitude" which was intended to make the Germans think that the Allied landings in France would occur at Calais. Though unhappy with losing his combat command, Patton was effective in his new role.
It was in the Normandy battles of July to August 1944, and the lessons learned during the North African and Sicilian campaigns that Patton came into his own. The break-out from the Normandy bridgehead was exactly the task most suited to his talents. It has always been Montgomery's contention that the British and Canadian armies had tied down the German Panzer divisions in the eastern part of the Normandy bridgehead so that when the right moment came the Americans under Patton would have little difficulty in bursting out of the western part.
On 15th July, 1944, Field Marshal Rommel, commanding the forces containing the Allied bridgehead, had expressed that before long the enemy would succeed in breaking through the thinly held line and thrust deep into France. Ten days later the American break-out operation began. The initial advance was to be made by Bradley’s First Army. Patton (his Third Army almost ready for action) was to follow up. By his rapid manoeuvres between 28/30 July, Patton succeeded in cutting through the gaps made by Bradley's attacks. He then advanced on Avranches, fanned out from there across the River Selune and reached Brittany.
Patton sent one Corps to motor straight for Brest and Lorient, while another made for Rennes. In doing so, he disobeyed all the rules of movement, discipline, and traffic control; by sending division after division over the vulnerable bottleneck of the Avranches bridge; he moved so fast that no fewer than seven divisions, one hundred thousand men and 15 000 vehicles, were despatched along this one road in three days.
His orders were: 'get going and keep going till you get to Brest". In this fashion the Third Army swept on to Orleans. Patton's divisions were sometimes covering 50 miles a day; a speed which astonished even those German generals who had developed and applied the doctrine of blitzkrieg. They had not foreseen that the Americans would think and act with such initiative and daring. They had reckoned without Patton.
Like all controversial figures Patton inspired many revealing comments from those who served with him. Eisenhower, the most balanced of all World War Two American commanders, regarded command of an Army as the ideal position for Patton because “for certain types of action he was the outstanding soldier our country has produced”. The Supreme Commander meant bold, cavalry-type moves with a powerful and flexible force, large enough to influence the outcome of battles, but not so large that grand strategic ideas were involved.
Fortunately, Patton himself agreed with this estimate. Eisenhower recognized that underneath all the 'Blood and Guts' bravado lay a real studen