If any single ship could be said to have been the embodiment of the British Empire, and British sea power, it was the ‘Mighty Hood’. For more than 20 years HMS Hood upheld the pride and the traditions of the Royal Navy in every corner of the globe. By the late 1930’s however, the Hood, though still a majestic warship, had begun to show her age. She was an old lady now, one of the oldest capital ships in the navy and no longer a match for more modern battleships.
On 24th May 1941, at the Battle of the Denmark Straits, the Royal Navy ships HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales engaged the German ships Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. The Hood was defeated and destroyed with a large loss of life. Out of a complement of one thousand four hundred and nineteen officers and men, only three were rescued. The sentimental favourite of the Royal Navy that had been looked upon with a blend of affection, admiration and awe, not only at home but the world over was gone after only a few minutes of action. Why was this, why was the ‘Mighty Hood’ sunk so suddenly and dramatically?
The reality of the situation is that the term ‘Mighty Hood’ was actually a misnomer. She was not a battle ship but a battle-cruiser and the difference was quite significant for the following reason. At the beginning of the 20th century, Admiral Fisher, Britain's premiere naval visionary made it his objective to ensure that the Royal Navy was not only the largest in the world but also the first truly modern navy of the 20th century. His most notable achievement was the revolutionary Dreadnought battleship that combined large calibre long-range guns with heavy armour protection. At a stroke this innovative breed of vessel rendered all pre Dreadnought battleships obsolete and the design soon became the benchmark for all future battleships. As a consequence of this inspired leap of faith or paradigm shift, no nation or even alliance of nations could successfully stand ‘toe-to-toe’ with the Royal Navy in fleet engagements.
Fisher came to the conclusion that the only course of action for potential enemies would be commerce raiding to strike at the empire’s supply lines. The problem therefore was how best to counter such threats and protect shipping lanes stretched around the globe? The submarine, whilst showing great potential, which the Germans would take maximum advantage of, was at this time still largely unproven. Destroyers and cruisers, though fast, lacked sufficient firepower. Something new was required and this motivated
Fisher to devise the ‘battle-cruiser’. He envisioned ships similar in size and firepower to the dreadnoughts, but much faster due to reduced armour protection. They would be the ‘cavalry of the sea’ and ensure Britain’s supremacy. Fisher's belief was that ‘speed coupled with heavy firepower would be the battle cruisers best protection’. They would have the capacity to either out-run or out-gun existing warships. Hence the concept of the ‘battle-cruiser’ was born and by the outbreak of World War One in 1914, Britain had built a number of them. Their tactical role was, however, converted to scouting for the Grand Fleet when deployed during wartime and Fisher’s argument that speed was armour would prove to be a tragic error.
On 31st May 1916, the great naval battle at Jutland took place and although the Royal Navy achieved a strategic victory, they were made to pay a high price. Three battle cruisers, The Invincible, The Queen Mary, and The Indefatigable all blew up incurring an appalling loss of life. Plunging German shells easily penetrated their deck armour to detonate magazines to reveal critical faults in battle cruiser design. These tragedies made it abundantly clear that battle cruiser deck armour protection was inadequate. However, the Admiralty in general terms chose to disregard the main lessons of Jutland and proceeded to prepare designs for the new and larger ‘Admiral’ class of battle-cruisers. Therefore future battle-cruisers were destined to suffer from the same flaws as their predecessors.
Battle-cruiser Hood was the largest of these new design vessels to be built for the Royal Navy. She was 860 feet long, had a displacement of 36 000 tons and was capable of reaching a speed of 32 knots.
Although she was designed for speed, her 15-inch broadside firepower could match that of anything then afloat. Hood was the ultimate battle-cruiser. But she had that one great defect; a lack of armour on her upper decks and events would prove that this fatal error would be the Hood’s ‘Achilles’ heel’. The design and protection of this ship were such that penetration of the magazines by high velocity armour piercing shells was quite possible. The Hood’s condition could be likened to all intents and purposes as a microcosm of the British Empire at that time; ancient, glorious, biggest in the world, shrouded in ceremony, but hopelessly out of date and defective. The myth of the pre-war British Empire and The Hood’s invincibility was a gigantic bluff.
HMS Hood, was built at John Brown shipyard in Glasgow and was named in honour of the Hood family who had given the Royal Navy four famous admirals since the 1700's. Lady Hood, the widow of Admiral Horace Hood who had been killed at Jutland when the battlecruiser Invincible blew up, launched her. The Hood was the fastest, the most elegant as well as the biggest warship in the world. Between the wars, when the colour red for Britain’s empire covered a quarter of the globe, the Hood showed the flag on cruises to Scandinavia, South America, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific.
Her most famous cruise took place from November 1923 to September 1924, when in company with the Repulse, (another fated battle-cruiser) she embarked on the ‘Empire Cruise’. On this cruise HMS Hood logged over 38 000 miles and visited numerous countries. Literally millions of people came to see her and in South Africa she called on Cape Town, East London and Durban. It was a highly successful public relations exercise and served as a subtle reminder to friend and foe alike that Britannia ostensibly still ruled the waves.
Towards the end of the 1930’s when the war clouds were gathering in Europe the Hood was scheduled for a long overdue refit, which would include the reinforcement of her deck armour. This upgrade was intended to make her as potent a weapon as the newest battleships. But the threat of impending war once more with Germany caused the refit to be postponed. When World War Two eventually broke out in September 1939, the Admiralty immediately rushed the Hood into wartime service even though she was no match for modern battleships, so why then did the Admiralty press her into service at the start of the War?
The probable answer is the ‘larger than life’ legend and reputation that had made her so widely respected and feared the world over. This inflated reputation may also have impaired the Admiralty's judgment. She had come to be thought of as a fast battleship and had been looked upon as the ‘Mighty Hood’ for so long that many at the Admiralty actually thought her to be invincible. In the end she proved to be, just as invincible as HMS Invincible, the very first battle cruiser to be sunk at Jutland.
In May 1940, Hitler’s blitzkrieg in the west, followed by the evacuation at Dunkirk created a chaotic situation for the Anglo French allies. On 16th June, the French government, who by this stage consisted of a group of defeatists headed by Petain, informed Britain that they intended to seek an armistice with Germany. This immediately raised concerns regarding the future of the quite significant French fleet. Churchill announced that Britain would continue the fight and thereby insisted that French warships be dispatched immediately to British ports or be neutralised. The French declared that their Fleet would never be surrendered and would be scuttled if any attempt were made to seize the ships by the axis powers of Germany or Italy. Churchill considered this to be too risky and decided that direct action was necessary to prevent the French fleet from falling into enemy hands, which would tilt the balance of naval power in their favour. Surprisingly the Americans who would not enter the war for another eighteen months gave their support.
At Gibraltar, Vice-Admiral Somerville, the commander of Force ‘H’ was ordered to secure the transfer of the French warships at Oran in North Africa, otherwise put them out of action. The French squadron consisted of two battleships, two battle-cruisers, twelve light cruisers and destroyers, and four submarines.
Force ‘H’ included the capital ships Hood, Valiant, Resolution, and the new aircraft carrier Ark Royal. On arrival at the French port, Somerville informed the French that their ships would not be allowed to leave harbour unless British terms were accepted. The stubborn French naval commander refused to comply with any of the conditions laid down and ordered all the French ships to prepare to put to sea. At this point Somerville, aboard his flagship HMS Hood, received an Admiralty message instructing him to settle matters quickly or he would have French reinforcements from Toulon and Algiers to deal with. The British battleships then opened fire, the first shots fired by the British against the French since Waterloo.
The 15-inch salvos from Hood and other Royal Navy’s capital ships overwhelmed the French vessels and the battleship ‘Bretagne’ blew up. Shore batteries and the French warships immediately replied and heavy shells began falling near the Hood inflicting minor damage.
The French guns were soon put out of action and extensive damage was observed to a number of their ships. Force ‘H’ then returned to Gibraltar and the Admiralty expressed deep regret to France for the tragedy in which almost one thousand four hundred French sailors had been killed. The Vichy government was outraged and ordered immediate reprisals against their former ally. Consequently, diplomatic relations with Britain were severed and French planes attacked Gibraltar but little damage was caused. France actually came very close to declaring war on Britain and bitterness lingers amongst the French to this day regarding this incident.
The next major action involving the Hood Almost a year later, proved to be her last. In 1941 Germany brought the Bismarck into service. This magnificent battleship represented the state of the art in German ship design and was the most powerful warship afloat. Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, head of the German navy was hopeful that the surface warships combined with the U-boats would successfully blockade and starve Britain into submission. Britain was barely holding her own at this stage of the war.
Bismarck was of comparable size and main armament to HMS Hood, but here the similarity ended. The German ship was far superior to the Hood, possessing excellent up-to-date electronics and superb armour protection. In effect, Bismarck was 20 years in advance of the Hood and this was reflected by the high quality technological developments which had taken place since the Hood was built.
In April 1941 the German navy planned to form a battle group combining Bismarck, Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau, for Operation Rheinübung. This lethal squadron was the nucleus of the big battle fleet then being developed and would be capable of taking on even the most heavily defended convoys and would have the necessary speed to escape. These fast powerful vessels in the great spaces of the Atlantic Ocean would subject the Royal Navy to a trial of the first magnitude. (Scharnhorst would not be ready before July due to repairs required to her boilers.). So the Bismarck and the equally new Prinz Eugen practiced together while Captain Lindemann awaited his final orders. If all went according to plan, the mission would commence during the last week of April.
Churchill was aware of the danger this threat posed and ordered the RAF and Coastal Command to make every effort to sink them regardless of the risks involved. On 6th April, 1941, Gneisenau was put out of commission by a torpedo hit during a British Coastal Command torpedo strike. At dawn Flying Officer Kenneth Campbell VC piloted his torpedo bomber towards the Gneisenau. He was flying on his twentieth operational sortie and was known for determination and unwavering courage in the face of odds. Sighting the Gneisenau, he dived down to mast height and flew steadily through the blazing flak crossfire. (Brest harbour was the most heavily defended harbour in occupied France, with over 1 000 antiaircraft guns). Campbell would have to make sure his torpedo cleared the stone mole guarding the harbour. On his approach, he lined up his aircraft and aimed to drop the torpedo as he crossed the mole, thus giving it the longest possible run to the German ship.
He did not have much time from the moment of sighting the Gneisenau to the dropping of the torpedo. The distance was almost too close for his torpedo to run effectively. But, without hesitation he skimmed over the water through the concentrated barrage to drop his torpedo accurately towards the Gneisenau's stern. The aircraft and torpedo crossed the mole independently. Every anti-aircraft ship and land gun in the harbour was firing at him.
After releasing the torpedo, Campbell immediately pulled up to make a climbing turn, desperate to clear the surrounding hills and reach the sanctuary of low cloud. He was a steadfast man of resolution, a cool head and undoubted courage. He would have reached safety within moments. However, he was hit by a withering hail of fire. Nothing could have survived such a wall of steel and the doomed aircraft went out of control to crash in flames into the harbour waters. There were no survivors and this gallant crew was never to know the results of their courage and determination. Flying Officer Kenneth Campbell VC had done his job, his torpedo, running true struck the Gneisenau below the water line and the ship began to list heavily. There was extensive damage and only the efficiency of salvage vessels prevented her from sinking. Had she been at sea, she most certainly would have been sunk!
Due to the crucial action of Kenneth Campbell VC, Operation Rheinübung was now reduced to Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Then on 23rd April, the Prinz Eugen fell victim to a magnetic mine, which damaged her propeller shafts and ruptured the bulkheads in some of her fuel tanks, and had to go into dry-dock for repairs until 2nd May. As a result, the Bismarck’s departure was delayed until the latter half of May. Grand Admiral Raeder insisted on sending Bismarck into the Atlantic convoy routes accompanied only by the new heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. Raeder was influenced by his World War One experience where the idle German fleet became a breeding ground for communist revolutionaries that led to the mutiny at the end of World War One.
Facing Raeder and Lütjens was Admiral Sir John Tovey aboard his new flagship King George V. Tovey was commander in chief of the British Home Fleet based at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands just off the north-eastern tip of Scotland. Of course, Tovey had the disadvantage of being on the defensive from the outset. Bad weather and communication problems were big factors in the war at sea. Fifty-six year old Admiral Tovey had been in the navy since the age of fifteen, had commanded a destroyer at the Battle of Jutland in 1916, and had moved steadily up the ranks since then. Diminutive but brimming with self-confidence, he was a warm and humorous man who seldom spoke in anger. A popular commander who inspired great confidence in his subordinates, he wasn't afraid to make a decision or stick to it and was willing to stand up to his superiors if necessary. This did not endear him to Churchill, who fancied himself a naval strategist and preferred admirals who agreed with him. He had found one in Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, his aging and ailing First Sea Lord.
Tovey knew the Bismarck task force could have any one of several purposes, including the transporting of military stores for northern Norway. But there were two eventualities he had to guard against. One was a raiding expedition against Iceland; it was of enormous importance that this strategic island remain in British hands. The other and most likely was an attempt to break out into the Atlantic and prey on ocean convoys.
Early on the evening of 21st May, as soon as Tovey received the report that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were in the Bergen fjords, he ordered aerial reconnaissance from Greenland to the Orkneys, covering the area of a potential breakout, and he dispatched additional ships to guard the two main escape routes into the Atlantic. The cruiser Norfolk was already patrolling the narrow Denmark Strait. Now he ordered the cruiser Suffolk, then in port in Iceland, to join her. The cruisers Birmingham and Manchester, patrolling the much wider Iceland-Faroes gap, were ordered to refuel immediately and return to their patrol. At the same time Tovey ordered Vice Admiral Lancelot Holland aboard the battle cruiser Hood to leave Scapa Flow with the brand-new battleship Prince of Wales and sail for Iceland, where they could move to intercept a breakout through the Denmark Strait. The fleet remaining at Scapa was warned to be ready to sail on short notice to reinforce the patrols in the Iceland-Faroes passage. As well as King George V, this included the aircraft carrier Victorious and would soon include the battle-cruiser Repulse. If Lütjens attempted an immediate breakout, the Home Fleet would be perfectly positioned to block him.
The Hood's greatest weakness was her lightly armoured decks. In her day, this saving in weight had given her a greater speed than other big warships, but a plummeting shell lobbed from long distance had a good chance of penetrating to her vital innards. And while Prince of Wales was well armoured above, she was a brand-new battleship less than three weeks out of the shipyard and still working out the kinks in her main armament. In fact, civilian crews from Vickers-Armstrong had been on board when she received orders to sail and were still working on the guns as she went into battle. In real battle conditions the likelihood of major malfunction in her heavy guns was very high. (Throughout the ensuing battle the Germans would continue to mistake her for her slightly older sister ship, the King George V, unable to believe so green a ship would be pressed into service.)
To make the most of the forces at his disposal, Admiral Holland hatched a daring plan. If he continued on his current course he would intercept the Germans during the darkest part of the night. But if he altered course to the north, he could intercept the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen at about 02 00 hours, just after sunset in these latitudes in late May. There were two important advantages to this strategy. The Hood would approach the enemy ships almost head-on at high speed and so could quickly close the distance (the combined speed of the two vessels would be roughly 56 knots). This would minimize the amount of time when the enemy's shells would be most dangerous (the closer the range, the flatter the shell's trajectory). Equally important, by emerging out of darkness while the enemy was silhouetted against the still-bright sky to the north-northwest, there was the possibility of surprise.
The Hood and Prince of Wales would take on the Bismarck while the Norfolk and Suffolk engaged the Prinz Eugen. Even if the Germans were not caught napping, it was a brilliant plan that gave the attackers every possible advantage, but at the price of exposing the onrushing British ships to the full main battery of the Bismarck while only able to return the fire with their forward turrets. But everything depended on the Bismarck's shadowers keeping her on their radar and being able to mirror every change in course and speed.
The mood on board the Hood and Prince of Wales was one of high anticipation. The German ships were now less than one hundred miles away, and Admiral Holland prepared for battle. He knew that although his two capital ships outgunned the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen by a margin of eighteen big guns to eight (all on the Bismarck), his superiority was very fragile. The Bismarck was faster and better armoured than either British ship. And she was more sturdily built and far better armoured than the aging Hood, launched just after World War One.
At 00 15 hours, Admiral Holland sent out the long-awaited signal: ‘Prepare for Action’. Aboard Hood, Prince of Wales and their escorting destroyers, the big white battle ensigns were raised. Most of the seamen were going into action for the first time. But they would have to wait somewhat longer. Around midnight the Bismarck had disappeared into a snow squall, and the Suffolk and Norfolk lost contact. Suddenly Holland's bold plan was in jeopardy.
Because the coast of Greenland prevented the Bismarck from turning to the west, Holland knew there were three possibilities: the Germans might continue on the current southwest course, they might turn or they might double back for the Denmark Strait. It seemed most likely that Lütjens would head south, toward the open Atlantic. On this assumption, Holland turned north and reduced speed. If he was right, he still might surprise the Germans with a head-on approach. If he was wrong, he was still keeping them in range. Meanwhile, he sent his destroyers to continue on the intercept course.
In fact, the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had turned slightly to the west to the edge of the Greenland ice pack. As a result, Holland's destroyers passed within ten miles of the Germans without spotting them. Suffolk finally regained contact at 02 47 hours, and Hood and Prince of Wales immediately altered course to intercept and increased their speed. But now the Bismarck and the Hood were steaming on almost parallel south-westerly courses roughly thirty-five miles apart, with the British to the south of the Germans. Instead of a favourable high-speed, head-on approach, Holland was forced to close with the enemy slowly and from the beam. His other options were too risky. If he tried to outrace the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, then come round to meet them head-on, he could lose them altogether. The next time Suffolk lost contact might be the last. It now appeared the battle would finally be joined just after dawn.
Most of the men aboard the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen knew the name of the Hood, the bogeyman of their battle practices. But only a few of the more experienced sailors had caught a glimpse of her between the wars, when she came to represent British sea power in every corner of the globe. Until the beginning of World War Two, the Hood had never fired a gun in battle; her power had been implied, not realized.
Throughout the pale night Lütjens tried to elude his pursuers. He altered course, hid in squalls and snowstorms, even tried making a feint toward them. But each time he thought he had succeeded, there were the Suffolk and Norfolk on his tail. He was becoming frustrated and increasingly gloomy. How long could it be before other British ships appeared?
The crew on board the Bismarck spent half the night on watch. But the four hours between watches wasn't enough time to rest properly. Besides, who could sleep soundly while their ship was racing with the enemy and some sort of action seemed only a matter of time? Time passed very slowly. As the Arctic night waned, the sailors on Hood and Prince of Wales, who had already spent hours at their battle stations, were tense and exhausted, kept going only by adrenalin. They had already ridden an emotional roller coaster. Action was imminent, then delayed. Now they were about to go over the top again. In all, seven thousand officers and men on four great ships were racing toward a fateful meeting.
The captain of the Prince of Wales, John Leach, sat in his chair on the dimly lit compass platform and worried. Would his untried crew come through? Would there be effective fire from his balky big guns? He already knew that one of his forward 14-inch guns had proved defective and would likely be good for only a single salvo. How long would the other nine last? Just after 05 00 hours, Holland turned to the flag lieutenant next to him and gave the order: "Signal instant readiness for action”: Moments later, the Hood flashed the message to the Prince of Wales.
Captain Lindemann nodded gravely as he read the message from Captain Brinkmann: shortly after 05 00 hours, the Prinz Eugen's hydrophones had picked up the sound of high-speed propellers. It seemed that more British ships were about to arrive on the scene. What would Admiral Lütjens do? Lindemann asked himself. Would he try to outrun the enemy, or would he turn and fight? As the alarm bells indicating general quarters sounded through the Bismarck, Lindemann walked to the port wing of the captain's bridge and stared at the southern horizon. After a few minutes, dark smudges of smoke appeared - a sure indication of big ships making top speed. Then, at about 05 45 hours, mast tips came into view and began to grow rapidly into the unmistakable forms of warships. But what ships were these? And where had they come from so quickly?
From the bridge of the Hood, the dark shapes of the German ships could now be seen on the horizon. The weather was calm, but there was a fair swell. Because of the similarity of their silhouettes, it was almost impossible to tell German ships apart from such a distance. Admiral Holland himself was temporarily fooled, assuming the lead ship, Prinz Eugen, was his primary target. At 05 46 hours, the enemy was fourteen miles away. On their present slowly converging course, the lightly armoured decks of the Hood would remain exposed for far too long. So Holland ordered a sharp turn to the west, toward the Germans. This meant he would close more quickly, but neither he nor Prince of Wales would be able to use their after turrets on the enemy. The number of heavy guns he could bring to bear would thus be reduced from eighteen to ten. The First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, later described this as "going into battle with one hand when you have two”. But Holland felt he had no choice. At 05 49 hours, he signalled Captain Leach to concentrate fire on the lead ship, which he still believed was the Bismarck.
The British opened fire at 05 52 hours. The sky above was overcast but the rising sun lit the horizon. From the size of the flashes followed by great clouds of dark-brown cordite smoke, it was obvious to any gunnery officer that the adversaries were indeed capital ships. But why didn't Lütjens respond? Was he hoping to outrun them? As the first salvoes from the British arced across the thirteen-mile gap, the gunnery crews aboard the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen waited in a kind of suspended animation for permission to fire.
"The Hood - it's the Hood”! One of the officers was heard to shout. But still Lindemann did not give the order. Admiral Lütjens was hesitating. "Enemy bearing two-ten-0. Distance 20 kilometres". The first salvo from the Hood fell harmlessly astern of the Prinz Eugen, throwing up great geysers of water close to the ship. But Captain Leach aboard Prince of Wales had realized their mistake before Admiral Holland, and without awaiting permission, opened fire on the Bismarck. The Hood and Prince of Wales, in close formation, were closing rapidly. "I will not let my ship be shot out from under my ass”, Lindemann was heard to mutter. Still the admiral waited. Finally, with tension among the gunnery officers and crews about to explode, the order came. "Permission to fire!"
Even deep within the heavily armoured ‘citadel’ of the Bismarck's middle platform deck, they could hear and feel that first salvo as the eight 15-inch guns fired in close succession. There was a distant rumble and an accompanying vibration, something like an earthquake. "Short," muttered the gunnery officer. Adjusting the angle and bearing of the guns, he ordered another salvo. "Long”. Even deeper inside the Bismarck the battle was also being waged to maintain maximum steam power.
For those on the bridge, in the fire control stations or, worst of all, in the turrets themselves, each salvo was a bone-rattling, mind-numbing experience - something like being next to a bomb going off. The roar was deafening, the sudden increase in air pressure made it almost impossible to breathe, and the thick cordite smoke choked and blinded. Unlike most modern forms of warfare, where the senior officers are far from the sting of battle, on board a battleship admirals and captains are more exposed than most of the ordinary sailors - and their positions are extremely vulnerable to an enemy hit.
The battle, but a few minutes old, was going poorly for Admiral Holland. Because he continued to keep his two ships in close formation, they presented a single target for the German gunners who were rapidly homing in. He had realised after his first salvo that he was concentrating his fire on the wrong ship, while both German vessels were blasting away at him for all they were worth. But it took his inexperienced gun crews inordinately long to switch fire. Meanwhile the Prince of Wales kept firing; her seventh salvo straddled the Bismarck.
The first German salvo had fallen just ahead of the Hood. The second fell just astern, and the splashes from the plunging shells blinded the forward rangefinders on the Prince of Wales, which followed close behind. Then a shell from Prinz Eugen's second salvo exploded at the base of the Hood's mainmast, touching off ammunition stored there. Shells loaded with cordite propellant started a spectacular fire that soon spread to nearby ammunition. As the fire continued to blaze, a blue pendant shot out the Hood's yardarm, signalling a 20 degree turn to port. Holland had decided he could wait no longer to bring all his heavy guns to bear.
On the Bismarck, gunnery officers, helped by the fire on the Hood, had found their range with their third salvo, which straddled. The fourth proved deadly accurate. As the Hood was still turning to port, one or more shells from this barrage - no one will ever know for sure - hit the pride of the British navy forward of her after turrets, pierced her thin deck armor and exploded somewhere inside the ship, probably in the 4inch magazine that then set off the 15-inch ammunition stored nearby. What followed was horrifying to friend and foe alike.
In the Bismarck's after fire control position, watch was still kept in case the Norfolk and Suffolk attacked from that quarter. (It is one of the puzzles of this famous battle that Admiral Holland failed to communicate his intentions to Admiral Wake-Walker on the Norfolk, who therefore never ordered his two ships to engage the enemy and simply watched the horrible events from a distance.)
The gun crew of Bismarck knew something big was happening when the gunnery officer’s, emotionless voice intoning range and direction corrections suddenly blurted out, "My God, she's blowing up!" Other eyewitnesses involuntarily voiced their astonishment at what was happening to the British ship