The devastating blow delivered by Imperial Jan at Pearl Harbour on the 7th December 1941 effectively introduced the Americans to ‘total war’. Nothing experienced by any nation in both world wars even remotely compared with the catastrophic naval defeat suffered by the United States on that fateful day in world history. Their unsuspecting fleet was caught completely unawares when over 350 aircraft from 6 Japanese carriers decimated the US Pacific Battle Fleet, inflicting the worst military defeat suffered in America's 200-year history, leaving them totally bewildered and completely astonished.
In terms of military achievement and for sheer audacity the raid on Pearl Harbor is without parallel and merits a special place in naval warfare. In a masterful stroke, a Japanese carrier task force steamed undetected across 5 000 kilometres of open sea to launch the greatest combined air/sea operation of all time. Japan’s success at Pearl Harbor was made possible due to superb training and remarkable duplicity. As a result she was placed in a position of overwhelming strength throughout the Far East.
In a wave of conquest unmatched in both world wars, several operations were launched simultaneously against British, Dutch and American possessions stretching 10 000 kilometres. One by one the great bastions of white supremacy and white prestige fell before the Japanese onrush. One of the few international statesmen with the vision to realise the consequences of this development was none other than South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts.
Even as the attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet was taking place at Hawaii, Japanese troops were already landing on the Malay Peninsula and preparing to advance overland to Singapore, later to capitulate after Japan inflicted on the British army the most humiliating defeat in its history. This was accomplished by skilfully executed tactics that almost entirely eliminated their British adversaries as combatants in the Far East.
Pearl Harbor proved to be a fatal blow to western imperialism and facilitated the coup de grace that was administered at Singapore. On the 10th of December, just three days after Pearl Harbour; HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse under the command of an admiral totally disbelieving in air power, also made history by becoming the first capital ships to be sunk from the air in open sea. In an era when the battleship was considered, with unshakable conviction, to be the ultimate maritime weapon, the fate of these two great ships proved once and for all that powerful battleships were not immune to destruction from the air. With great reluctance it was now accepted that naval air power had come of age. Ironically, this was only accepted after every allied battleship in the Far East, ten in all, were either sunk or put out of action.
The story of Pearl Harbor has for too long been over-simplified. The question of why Japan caught the United States napping is exceedingly controversial and one must constantly keep in mind that nothing takes place in a vacuum. The background to this calamitous event goes back to the end of World War One when the US and Japan became increasing aware that war between them was inevitable and both countries planned for such an event. Japan believed the Western Powers were hostile and looked down on them as being an inferior race. Relations became strained due to US opposition to Japan’s imperialism and expansionist policies; thus reducing Japan's dependency on the US for supplies, in order to create a ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’.
This political concept was to promote a self-sufficient bloc of Asian nations led by Japan, free of Western colonialism and influence. In reality it was nothing more than a scheme to control countries in which puppet governments would manipulate its economies and peoples for the benefit of Imperial Japan. Without these economic resources and raw materials Japan would never become a dominant power in the region.
Japan’s invasion of China in 1937 and the Tripartite Alliance formed in 1940 between Japan and the other two Axis dictatorships, namely Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, resulted in America applying economic sanctions that included an oil embargo. Tensions continued to escalate when President Roosevelt moved the US Pacific Fleet from California to Hawaii in the hope of discouraging Japanese aggression in Asia. The Commander in Chief Admiral Richardson told Roosevelt this move was not a deterrent but an incitement to Japanese aggression. Roosevelt sacked him.
In July 1941 tensions further intensified when Japan occupied French Indochina, causing the US to impose a total trade ban and freeze Japanese assets. Facing economic collapse and withdrawal from recently acquired territories, Japan could either agree to US demands and restore normal trade practices or use force to gain access to resources. By November 1941, the Japanese though still continuing to negotiate with the United States, had come to the conclusion that further talks towards the lifting of sanctions were futile. Their only alternative was war, or the abandonment of their objectives to dominate the Far East.
On this basis, if there had to be war, then the present time seemed opportunistic for Japan. At this stage the German armies were threatening both Moscow and Egypt. A great part of the United States Navy was engaged in an undeclared war in the Atlantic against the U-Boat menace. Therefore, the Japanese military leaders prepared to exploit this deepening world crisis and seize the mineral rich territories in Asia; which, they considered to be theirs by right and were prepared to challenge the Western powers for possession.
Other factors prevalent in November 1941 were that Great Britain was in such a defensive position that, even if she survived, her entire war-making potential would be exhausted in the desperate defence of her homeland never mind her empire. Potential enemy forces that could be deployed in the Far East, particularly in the air, were insufficient to prevent the fully trained and mobilised forces of Japan from achieving her goals. Hitler's Germany had neutralised any threat from the Soviet Union, who appeared to be on the verge of collapse. In accordance with this scenario, the Japanese Army was given the primary responsibility for conquering Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and Burma. Simultaneous attacks would be launched on Java and Sumatra with the intention of isolating Australia and New Zealand. The navy would play a supporting role by embarking on several combined operations. But in doing so, Japanese naval forces would most probably have to contend with the American Pacific fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Yamamoto the commander of Japan’s Combined Fleet proposed a sudden and paralysing knockout on the U.S. fleet at Hawaii. Yamamoto believed if there was to be war with the US, Japan would have no hope of winning unless the US Fleet in Hawaii was destroyed. He calculated that the United States would be so weakened by this proposed attack that she would be unable to mobilise sufficient strength to go over to the offensive for about two years. By that time, the conquered territory would be fortified and Japanese stubborn resistance would undermine American determination to continue the war. The Japanese speculated that the United States, in the face of potentially unacceptable losses would probably compromise, thus allowing Japan to retain a substantial portion of her territorial gains. When one considers what happened years later in Vietnam, perhaps this hopeful speculation was not entirely unfounded.
However, returning to 1941, Yamamoto had been strongly influenced by the successful British Fleet Air Arm operation at Taranto the previous year when three Italian battleships had been put out of action by only twenty-one obsolete Swordfish torpedo planes launched from a single aircraft carrier. Consequently, Yamamoto planned and organised a massive Strike Force consisting of 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers and 11 destroyers to attack Pearl Harbor in a pre-emptive strike. The Philippines would be seized to deny the US a base for possible retaliation.
On 26th November, the strike force left Japan and proceeded in utmost secrecy on a mission intended to deal a fatal blow to the U.S. Pacific fleet. Just prior to launching their aircraft at dawn on 7th December from a point 350km north of Hawaii, the Japanese received an intelligence report that no American aircraft carriers were at Pearl Harbor. This was a disappointment, but, there were still eight battleships in the harbour anchored in pairs at Battleship Row and these were the primary targets. As previously noted, the battleship at this time, was still considered to be the principal capital ship and the aircraft carrier, merely a support vessel.
Diplomatic negotiations with the US continued and if successful the ships were to return to base and no one would have been any the wiser. Reports confirmed that no defensive measures were in place indicating complete surprise. An hour before the Japanese air strike on Pearl Harbor, the first action of the Pacific war took place when a US Destroyer sighted, attacked and sunk a Japanese midget submarine outside the harbour entrance. Paradoxically, the first shots fired to launch the Pacific war, came from the United States and not from Japan, and the first casualties were Japanese not American. The Destroyer captain promptly reported this encounter with the Japanese submarine, but unfortunately for the Americans, no one took any interest. If the alarm had been raised it would most certainly have provided sufficient time for Pearl Harbor fighter aircraft to take to the air and enabled American ships to raise steam and make for the open sea.
Ninety six warships, of all shapes and sizes were in harbour. Anti-Aircraft guns were manned but ammunition was locked up and the keys held by officers, some of whom were ashore. Army OC Lt General Walter C. Short had received a signal from Washington stating “hostile Japanese action at any moment”.
Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was notified that the Japanese were burning their codes and had changed call signs twice during the month. Of major importance he was also informed that Naval Intelligence were unaware of the location of the Japanese Carriers. Amazingly, Admiral Kimmel had received a dispatch from his military chiefs in Washington on 27th November stating clearly and comprehensively - “consider this to be a war warning”. This dispatch, delivered 10 days before the Japanese onslaught, informed him that diplomatic efforts had failed and Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within a few days. General Short, was of a similar frame of mind as Kimmel; he did not even remotely contemplate that disaster was about to strike and openly boasted that Pearl Harbor was “the best defended naval base in the world”.
He had become obsessed and totally preoccupied with preventing acts of sabotage. Therefore, he ordered the aircraft to be close-packed on airfields rather than dispersed and ready for action. Thus, on the morning of 7th December the aircraft for the defence of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor were huddled together and no ammunition was readily available. American air strength at Hawaii was about to be completely shattered, and two thirds of the entire American aircraft in the Pacific theatre destroyed.
The military commanders in Hawaii could not even conceive the type of attack that the Japanese would launch. Not at any time did they envisage an air strike aimed at the destruction of the U.S. Pacific Battle Fleet. So, when the attack did come, it was a traumatic shock to them. General Short actually thought this was an air raid intended to soften up the defences prior to the Japanese invasion of Hawaii. Meanwhile the military authorities in Washington expected their men on the spot to take full defensive measures at Pearl Harbor. They anticipated that submarines would be sent out on patrol and the battleships with their protective vessels would be at sea deployed in readiness for war. Antiaircraft defences were expected to be placed on full alert around the clock.
This was not an unreasonable deduction; after all, it is the responsibility of the military commanders on the spot to prepare for the worst possible contingency whether in peace or war. However, the commanders at Hawaii convinced themselves that the Philippines or Malaya would be the prime Japanese targets, not Pearl Harbor. They therefore, took no action in preparation for war. Their view was that Japan would never deliberately initiate war with the United States. The idea was considered too preposterous. For the defenders of Pearl Harbor, events were about to go irretrievably and horribly wrong.
To this day, it is quite inconceivable that Pearl Harbor was not put on the state of high alert that it should have been. The senior military commanders concluded, despite the many warnings, that there was no reason to believe an attack was imminent. Therefore, anti-aircraft guns were unmanned and most ammunition boxes, in accordance with peacetime regulations were kept locked.
December 7th was a Sunday morning and many officers and crewmen were allowed to go ashore despite the war warnings. Taking all of this into consideration it is understandable why the Japanese surprise attack was so complete and how they were to rapidly gain air superiority during the crucial first phase of the strike. The Army Radio Station detected a large number of aircraft 140 miles away to the north heading for Oahu. The operators tried to raise the alarm but as the carriers were at sea and a flight of B-17 s were expected from the US mainland nobody at the Info Centre was interested.
When the attack did start, Japanese Zero fighter planes made low level strafing sweeps, shooting up aircraft as well as ground installations. Thus permitting coordinated attacks on the battleships moored in battleship row by dive bombers, level bombers and torpedo planes. The primary attack led by Commander Fuchida consisted of 184 aircraft and caused the greatest amount of damage in a very short space of time. From endlessly repeated practice runs and the meticulous study of maps and models of Pearl Harbor, every Japanese pilot knew exactly what they had to do and aimed at their targets with cool precision.
Struck by three torpedoes, Oklahoma capsized almost immediately; trapping below decks four hundred and fifteen men. One aerial bomb blew up the forward magazine of Arizona, while another dropped down the funnel and exploded in the engine room. The ship went down with over one thousand, men out of a crew of one thousand five hundred. A torpedo and two bombs hit the Nevada. The Japanese then launched their second carrier strike to complete the work of the first wave.
Numerous aircraft were observed over Ford Island as smoke and debris shot into the air. Japanese aircraft skimmed low over the harbour accompanied by muffled explosions. Within 5 minutes, 4 battleships had been holed or severely damaged below the waterline by torpedoes. Dive bombers smashed the decks, bridges and gun turrets to finish off the job. Within half an hour Battleship Row had been devastated and out of 148 first line aircraft 112 were destroyed. The 1st attack wave withdrew having lost only 9 aircraft. One hundred and seventy one aircraft attacked in a 2nd wave consisting of 36 fighter’s and135 bombers to attack smaller warships, airfields and targets of opportunity. This was far less effective than the 1st attack and more aircraft were lost due to the Americans being better prepared.
A 3rd Wave attack which may have devastated what remained of Pearl Harbor was called off by Admiral Nagumo, despite being urged by his staff to go ahead with it. Fuel storage tanks which held more fuel than Japan had in its strategic reserve were still intact. As were dockyard facilities and command control structures. Admiral Nagumo, however, decided to withdraw because he believed the objective, the neutralising of the US Pacific Fleet, had been achieved. Further considerations relating to another attack were the probable disproportional increase in aircraft losses, and the unknown whereabouts of the US Carriers. While this was taking place, a Japanese midget submarine succeeded in penetrating the harbour, passing through the entrance gate that had been carelessly left open. This submarine was sighted firing a torpedo at the Oklahoma and was promptly depth charged and sunk.
When the smoke lifted over Pearl Harbor, more than two thousand four hundred Americans were dead and one thousand three hundred more were wounded. Some 230 aircraft had been destroyed or heavily damaged. The Japanese lost just 29 planes and less than one hundred men. Eighteen ships had been hit and Battleship Row was a shambles. The Arizona and the Oklahoma were a total loss. The California and the West Virginia were sunk at their moorings. The Nevada, the Maryland, the Tennessee, and the Pennsylvania were all heavily damaged.
Once the Japanese aircraft withdrew, General Short prepared for the invasion that he thought was bound to follow. Now the alertness and preparedness that could have provided such a hot reception for the Japanese was brought to life after the enemy departed. Nervous sentries opened fire at anything that moved and friendly planes were shot down in the belief this was a renewed aerial assault.
On 8th December President Roosevelt at a Joint Session of Congress delivered his famous “Day of Infamy speech”. In less than an hour the US was officially at war with Japan; declaring that a state of war existed between the United States and the Empire of Japan. The President then proceeded to waste little time in sacking Admiral Kimmel and General Short for a gross neglect of duty. The entire blame was laid squarely on their shoulders for ignoring all the warnings and indications of obvious Japanese intentions. Pearl Harbor resulted from a vast combination of interrelated factors. On the one hand, bountiful human errors, false assumptions, and a vast store of intelligence information badly handled. On the other, precise planning, tireless training, fanatical dedication, iron determination and tactical excellence. It was a daring and brilliant naval operation.
The military supremo's on both sides were far off the mark in their evaluation of the military threats posed by each other. Japan gambled on the US agreeing to negotiate when faced with a sudden and massive defeat. The effect was the exact opposite. It united US public opinion to declare war on Japan. A major flaw in Japanese naval strategy was a belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought between battleships in Japanese waters. Failure to attack shore facilities enabled the Pacific Fleet to continue operating from Pearl Harbor. Thus the threat to Japan’s Eastern flank still remained. Japan didn’t get the 12 month respite she needed to secure her gains and 6 months later the tide of war turned against her at the Battle of Midway
The presence of the US Pacific Fleet in Hawaii failed to deter Japanese aggression and against all expectations resulted in a great tactical victory for Japan. The US believed the Imperial Japanese Navy was too widely committed and thus unable to attack the Pacific Fleet. This air of invincibility was well and truly shaken to the bone. Loss of her battleships forced the US to use carriers and submarines to take on the Japanese at sea which was to reverse the Japanese advance and lead to her defeat. The battleship, regarded as the most powerful and significant element of naval power was relegated to a support role.
One Japanese Naval Commander summed up the result when he remarked “We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war”. Embracing so much so suddenly so unexpectedly and so spectacularly; it still seems inexplicable and mysterious.
What has been addressed so far may be considered to be the traditional view of which most historians are familiar. But, in probing a little deeper and analysing other aspects of this world-shattering event, several theories emerge. Considering the explosive force that Japan deployed in her conquest of Southeast Asia, one is stunned by the irresponsible propaganda that was put out in the American press about Japanese military strength.
The West hopelessly underestimated Japan’s military capacity and offensive capability. In their ignorance they claimed as a well-established fact that due to a deficiency of vitamin C the Japanese lacked good vision; hence, they would make poor air pilots and their naval personnel would be no match for their Western adversaries, particularly after sunset. What is more, the Americans held the Japanese in utter contempt, viewing them as funny little creatures with buckteeth and horn-rimmed glasses covering slanted eyes. They were viewed as slow brained, inefficient, and incapable. The Americans assured themselves that Japan was virtually bankrupt and exhausted from being bogged down in China. They considered Japan to be 100 years behind the times, and if she engaged in a major conflict, her fragile economy would simply shatter. This is quite amazing, considering that on the eve of Pearl Harbor, more than half of Japan’s budgetary expenditure for the year 1941 went on armaments.
The British and American press maintained that the Japanese navy consisted of only 4 small aircraft carriers and 200 aircraft that could not possibly meet the requirements of a modern war. Perhaps, this only goes to prove how successful the Japanese were in concealing their military strength from foreign observers. Nevertheless, these ludicrous assumptions accurately reflect the Western underestimation of Japanese air power and this is best illustrated by the reliance they placed upon the antiquated Brewster Buffalo fighter plane. The Americans actually thought this aircraft was far superior to anything that the Japanese could put in the air.
It was propagated quite arrogantly, that Japanese planes and Japanese airmen were no match for their British and American counterparts and that Japanese aircraft were poor imitations of outdated allied aircraft. In actual fact, as the Western powers were soon to realise at a terrible cost, the Japanese aircrews were superbly trained for a whole range of offensive and defensive missions. The daring and expertise of first rate experienced airmen contributed immeasurably to Japan’s early conquests.
In 1941, the Japanese had the best naval arm in the world and were the pioneers of the large carrier striking force, and by the time of Pearl Harbor, Japanese pilots had undoubtedly attained the world’s highest bombing standards and were extremely skilful. They had torpedoes that were of a far superior design and much more effective than the Allied torpedoes. The Allies mistakenly thought the Japanese were incapable of producing anything like the Spitfire or the Messerschmitt. They soon received a monumental shock. The Japanese Zero fighter was scornfully described by an American aviation expert as “nothing more than a light sports plane”. While in fact, in the hands of highly trained Japanese carrier pilots, the Zero was a most effective and deadly weapon.
The Zero was faster than any opposing plane of the period, and it could out manoeuvre, out-climb, outrange and packed a heavier punch than opposing aircraft. At the start of the Pacific war, the Zero’s quickly gained air control over any battle area. American and British aircraft fell like flies before the agile Zero fighters; especially the Brewster's that literally flew on suicide missions against the Zero’s.
Not everything however, went entirely the way of Japan. From a realistic perspective, they also made mistakes. The most notable being the refusal to order a third strike at Pearl Harbor. They could easily have destroyed the repair facilities and, more importantly, the oil storage tanks. This vital target stored four and a half million barrels of oil and escaped undamaged. The Japanese carrier commander later explained that he thought the Americans still had a large number of land based aircraft in operational condition at Hawaii and considered it too risky to remain within their range. Perhaps this was being over cautious, or was it being pragmatic? After all, a successful counter strike by the Americans against the Japanese carriers would have reversed the entire situation. The defenders at Pearl Harbor, although caught napping, had quickly recovered as had been observed by the much heavier losses incurred during the second strike. Undoubtedly, a third strike would have met with strong opposition and would possibly render Japanese losses disproportionate to any additional damage inflicted.
However, in effect, this was a grave error because the loss of the oil supplies at Pearl Harbor would have hindered American naval operations in the Pacific far more than the damage done to the fleet; considering that a single destroyer steaming at full power uses up its fuel supply in 30 to 40 hours. This gives some idea of the staggering needs of an entire fleet. Also it must be borne in mind that Hawaii produced no oil and every drop had to be transported almost 4 000 km's from the mainland. This accumulated fuel reserve would have taken many months to replace. Without it, the Pacific fleet could not have been able to operate from Pearl Harbor and the surviving warships would have been entirely immobilised and incapacitated. The failure to destroy the fuel tanks and service facilities reflected Japanese preoccupation with tactical rather than logistical targets.
Perhaps it was the very ease of their Pearl Harbor operation that threw the Japanese off-balance. Against all expectations and without as much as even a scratch on any of their ships they possibly lost sight of their primary objective, which was to inflict the maximum amount of damage on Pearl Harbor. They now thought only of the minimum damage to themselves. Furthermore, and this was to prove critical to the outcome of the war, escaping damage from the attack, were the three all-important American aircraft carriers in the Pacific, the Lexington, the Enterprise and the Saratoga. In failing to seek out and dispatch the American carriers, Japan committed its first and probably its greatest strategical error of the entire Pacific conflict.
Allegations have been made that some members of Roosevelt’s administration, including the President himself, had advanced knowledge of the attack but purposely ignored them and deliberately exposed Pearl Harbor to force the US into war. The number of intelligence reports from diverse sources that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, creates suspicions that this may have been the case. The alternative is dereliction of duty and gross incompetence at a very high level. Did the Americans actually know of the forthcoming attack on Pearl Harbor? Bearing in mind that Washington had managed to ‘break’ the Japanese diplomatic codes. But before proceeding with this line of thought, the sequence of events leading up to Pearl Harbor and the immediate aftermath needs to be recapped.
Saturday, 6th December - U.S. intelligence intercepts a Japanese coded message instructing their embassy staff to destroy all codebooks and prepare to depart. This information was passed on to President Roosevelt, who commented “This means war”. So, there is little doubt that a Japanese attack was imminent.
Sunday, 7th December - The U.S. War Department sends out an alert but uses a commercial telegraph because radio contact with Hawaii is faulty. The telegraph is not marked urgent and is only delivered 4 hours after the attack had begun. Pearl Harbor radar operators detect Japanese aircraft approaching, but the report is disregarded on the assumption that the incoming aircraft are American. At 07 53 hours still on 7th December, the first Japanese assault wave commences the attack, taking the Americans completely by surprise.
Monday 8th December - The United States and Britain declare war on Japan announcing 7th December, "a date which will live in infamy”.
Thursday, 11th December - Germany and Italy declare war on the United States. The conflict has become global with the Axis powers; Japan, Germany and Italy, ranged against the allied powers, America, Britain, and Russia.(Japan and Russia had a neutrality agreement until Russia invaded Manchuria in August 1945).
From coast to coast, the Americans initially reeled in traumatic shock after Pearl Harbor. But this subsequently turned to fury. The Japanese attack united one hundred and thirty million Americans in a relentless determination to push the war against all odds to final victory. On the bridge of the U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise as she headed back to Pearl Harbor on 9th December, Rear-Admiral Halsey, at the sight of the wrecks at Ford Island uttered: “Before we’re through with them, the Japanese language will be spoken only in hell”!
When the news of the ‘sneak attack’ was broadcast to the American public, it sent a shockwave across the nation; resulting in a tremendous influx of young volunteers into the U.S armed forces. The attack also united the nation in a cyclone of wrath and effectively ended any isolationist sentiment in the country. December 7th mobilised all American resources and raised a mighty wave of indignation across the United States, which would eventually break on Japan with colossal force. The American people were aroused, as no other event in their history had ever done and a lot of people went absolutely berserk. They went as far as chopping down Japanese cherry trees and even slaughtered Japanese deer in New York Central Park. To every American the Japanese were the embodiment of the evil enemy, the cowardly stab-in-back aggressors. The wave of American hatred against Japan was staggering.
What did Japan actually achieve by the attack on Pearl Harbor? From a military viewpoint, Yamamoto actually removed an albatross from around the neck of American naval policy; because many American admirals had never accepted the aircraft carrier as a capital ship. They believed that the coming war would he fought in