73. See Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and ]ustice Sector Assistance, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 09, 2010).
74. See Ernesto Londono, "In Afghanistan, Anti-corruption Fight Goes Local," Washington Post, October 18, 2010.
75. See General Stanley A. McChrystal, "Commander's Initial Assessment to Secretary Gates," ISAF, August 30, 2009.
76. See, for example, Ann Marlowe, "Shura to Fail?" New Republic, May 13, 2010. This reached its height in the period immediately following the troop surge when various extreme forms of localized engagement were encouraged. This strategy was perhaps best embodied by Jim Gant's One Tribe at a Time Approach, a controversial self-published treatise calling for local engagement that was praised by some military leaders and highly criticized by others for Gant's neocolonial willingness to insert himself into local conf licts of which he had little knowledge. For more on the treatise, see Jim Gant, A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan: One Tribe at a Time (Los Angeles, CA: Nine Sister Import Inc., 2009).
77. For more on related issues, particularly the incorrect assumption that development necessarily leads to stability, see Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan (Medford, MA: The Feinstein International Center, January 2012) .
78. See Interagency Planning and Implementation Team (