4-49. Once operations stabi-
Figure 4-7. Factors Influencing
lize, installation teams can di-
Mountain Installations
rect and assist engineers in the
construction of fixed alpine paths. Fixed alpine paths consist of permanent or semi-permanent mountain aids that assist troops in traversing rugged mountain terrain and facilitate the movement of equipment and supplies to and from forward areas.
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FM 3-97.6
SECTION II – OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
4-50. Offensive operations in the mountains vary depending on the degree of restrictions dictated by mountains of different heights and character, but are normally planned and conducted utilizing the movement to contact and the attack. Exploitation and pursuit are conducted, but less frequently than in other environments.
4-51. Mountain operations will most likely be fought to gain control of key or decisive terrain. The goal is to seize objectives that are important for continuing the battle, such as lines of communication, passes, ridges, and choke points. Every attempt must be made to fight from the heights down. Frontal attacks against defended heights have little chance of success and attacks are usually made along the flanks and to the rear of the enemy. Consequently, envelopment becomes the preferred form of maneuver.
4-52. The missions assigned to units operating in a mountainous region remain the same as those in lowland regions. Commanders should place an increased emphasis on:
• Limited-visibility operations.
• Mobility and survivability.
• Securing friendly lines of communications while severing those of the enemy.
• Reconnaissance and security.
• Centralized planning and decentralized small-unit actions.
• Environmental factors favoring operations of short duration and violent execution.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-53. When conducting offensive operations in the mountains, surprise is often a dominant consideration, rather than a supporting one. Units achieve surprise by achieving superior situational understanding, especially of the terrain, and by using that knowledge to do the unexpected. Friendly forces should conduct bold and imaginative operations to exploit enemy weaknesses or inability to operate in a mountainous environment. A well-trained force can achieve surprise by infiltrating and attacking the enemy’s rear or attacking during periods of limited visibility, such as night, rain, or snow. They can use helicopters and their technical mountaineering skills to conduct decisive operations anywhere in the AO. The effects of surprise can be dramati-cally increased if commanders select objectives in restrictive terrain that decrease the enemy’s mobility and ability to react effectively.
4-54. The mountainous terrain increases the threat to concentrated formations. Usually, it is difficult to coordinate all forces by time and location so that they can rapidly support each other and achieve massed effects. The compartmented terrain separates adjacent units, precluding mutual support, and may adversely affect supporting distances. Therefore, it is critical to anticipate the concentration of forces and fires before the battle begins to achieve effective synchronization.
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4-55. Commanders usually select decisive points for the attack based, in part, on their ability to seize and control key terrain. Each of these objectives often necessitates the seizure of one or more intermediate objectives. The compartmented terrain and resulting dispersion make it difficult for commanders to visualize the entire AO and complicates command and control, while the terrain often affords the defender excellent observation and decreases the attacker’s ability to concentrate forces undetected.
4-56. Once a battle is joined, helicopters are the only rapid means for massing forces on terrain higher than Level I. When weather conditions permit, attack helicopters and tactical air assets are essential because they can move and strike over a large AO in a short time. Therefore, the suppression of enemy air defense may become a high priority during offensive operations.
4-57. Commanders must personally acquaint themselves with the terrain to the fullest extent possible. They combine this knowledge with other factors of METT-TC to develop simple, yet precise plans and orders. As previously discussed, compartmented terrain tends to divide the battle into many isolated engagements that are difficult to control. A complex and inflexible plan will not withstand the changing situations associated with this type of decentralized combat. An uncomplicated plan with a well-thought-out intent that is clearly communicated ensures understanding at the lowest level and allows subordinates to exploit battlefield opportunities even if communications fail.
PREPARATION
4-58. The length of the preparatory phase is typically longer in a mountainous environment. An offensive action against an enemy defensive position must be based on thorough reconnaissance and orderly preparation. The primary factor in determining the technique to be used in destroying the enemy position is the strength of the enemy’s defenses. The stronger the defenses, the more deliberate the attack must be. In mountainous terrain, evaluation and exploitation of the ground are essential. Commanders must prepare plans of attack that take advantage of the weaknesses found in the enemy's defensive system. In the mountains, a larger number of reconnaissance assets and additional time may be needed to determine the strength of enemy positions on the objective and all surrounding heights, and favorable routes to and past the objective.
4-59. Difficult approach routes should be marked and prepared for safe passage. Easily traversed slopes, broad hills, plateaus, and valley floors, as well as mountainous terrain with well-developed road and transportation nets, permit deployment in breadth. High ranges with ridges and crests leading to the objective require organization in depth with extended lines of communications.
4-60. In trackless mountain terrain, company-sized teams usually conduct attacks. If the area assigned to a battalion permits, companies should approach the objective separately on multiple routes. In restrictive terrain, adequate maneuver space may not always be available and several units may be required to move along the same avenue of approach. It may even be necessary to conduct shaping operations to seize sections of terrain from which the enemy can dominate the forces' movement and approach.
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FM 3-97.6
4-61. The preparatory phase may also include feints and demonstrations to shape the battlefield. In mountainous terrain, the defending force has a number of advantages that allow it to defeat an attacking force much larger than its own, such as long-range observation, rugged natural cover, concealment, advance siting of weapons, and operations on familiar terrain. Feints and demonstrations mask friendly operations, expose enemy vulnerabilities, dis-organize the defense, and allow the attacking force to engage the enemy discriminately. In a mountain area of operations, the benefits achieved from a successful deception effort may well outweigh the difficulties involved in mounting it.
FORMS OF MANEUVER
4-62. The forms of offensive maneuver are common to all environments, to include mountainous terrain. While frequently used in combination, each form of maneuver attacks the enemy in a different way, and some pose different challenges to the commander attacking in the mountains.
INFILTRATION
4-63. Infiltration is frequently used in the mountains. The difficult terrain and recurring periods of limited visibility allow for undetected movement. Infiltration in a mountainous environment is used to shape the battlefield by attacking enemy positions from the flank or the rear, securing key terrain in support of the decisive operations, or disrupting enemy sustaining operations.
Infiltration is normally conducted using one of three techniques: movement in small groups along one axis, movement in one group, or movement in small groups along several routes at the same time. Regardless of the technique used, units must move in a covert manner to reduce the chance of enemy contact.
4-64. With movement in small groups along one axis, all members of the force use the best route. Small groups are harder to detect and easier to control, and do not compromise the total force if detected. This technique may require an excessive amount of time and an increased number of guides and lead climbing teams, and does require an assembly area or linkup point prior to conduct of the decisive action. If the lead group is detected, other groups may be ambushed.
4-65. The enemy can more easily detect movement in one group. If the force is detected, the overall mission may be endangered. However, this technique has no reassembly problems, since reassembly is not required. Everyone uses the same route, easing navigation and reducing the number of guides and lead climbing teams required. A large force can fight out of a dangerous situation more easily than a small one. This technique minimizes coordination problems with other infiltrating units.
4-66. Movement in small groups along several routes at the same time has several advantages. It avoids putting the total force in danger and is less likely to be seen. It forces the enemy to react in many locations and makes it harder for him to determine the size of the force or its mission. Groups trav-elling over severely restrictive terrain may have significant assembly, 4-18
Chapter 4
control, and sustainment difficulties, and may require more guides, lead climbing teams, and installation teams.
ENVELOPMENT AND TURNING MOVEMENT
4-67. The envelopment and its variant, the turning movement, are used extensively in mountain operations. Both forms of maneuver seek to avoid the enemy’s strength and attack the enemy at a decisive point or points where the enemy is weakest or unprepared, and both rely on superior agility. In the mountains, the ability to react faster than the enemy may be achieved through greater mountaineering skills, using airborne and air assaults, and, depending on the specific AO, amphibious assaults.
PENETRATION
4-68. Mountainous terrain normally makes penetration extremely dangerous or impossible because of the difficulty in concentrating overwhelming combat power in the area of penetration. Due to mobility restrictions, it is also difficult to develop and maintain the momentum necessary to move quickly through a gap and on toward the objective. The area of penetration is always vulnerable to flank attack, and this vulnerability significantly increases in mountainous terrain. A penetration may be useful when attacking an enemy that is widely dispersed or overextended in his defense. If a penetration must be conducted, flank defensive positions must be eliminated before the initial breach of enemy positions. Successful penetration of a defensive position in restrictive mountainous terrain requires using limited visibility, stealth, and covered and concealed terrain at selected breach points.
FRONTAL ATTACK
4-69. Frontal attacks in hilly or mountainous areas, even when supported by heavy direct and indirect fires, have a limited chance of success. Mountain terrain adds to the relative combat power of the defender. The frontal attack exposes the attacker to the concentrated fire of the defender while simultaneously limiting the effectiveness of the attacker's own fires. In the mountains, the frontal attack is an appropriate form of maneuver to conduct as a shaping operation designed to fix a force, while the decisive operation uses another form, such as the envelopment, to defeat the enemy.
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
4-70. The fundamentals regarding movement to contact also apply in a mountainous environment with the added likelihood of surprise attack and ambush. Limited mobility and dependence on restrictive terrain make it difficult to rapidly deploy from the movement formation. Plans and movement formations and techniques should be based on maintaining flexibility and providing continuous security.
4-71. During a movement to contact, the advance guard normally advances in column, moving continuously or by bounds, until it makes contact. While requiring less physical exertion, movement along the topographical crest of a ridgeline increases the possibility of enemy observation and should normally be avoided. Given adequate concealment, this exposure may be reduced by 4-19
FM 3-97.6
moving along the military crest. Ridgelines and crests can often provide a tactical advantage to the force that controls them. Their control may allow rapid movement from one terrain compartment to another and afford excellent observation into lower terrain levels. In all cases, commanders must address the control or clearance of ridgelines that dominate their planned avenues of approach.
4-72. The main body should never be committed to canalizing terrain before forward elements have advanced far enough to ensure that the main body will not become encircled. This is a critical factor when employing mixed heavy and light forces that have sharp differences in operational tempo.
Combat service support must be decentralized and readily available to sustain the combat elements. Major terrain compartments may physically separate maneuver units moving as part of a larger force. Continuous reconnaissance to the front and flank security is essential to prevent the enemy from infiltrating the gaps between units.
4-73. As the enemy situation becomes better known, commanders may shorten the distance between elements to decrease reaction time, or they may begin to deploy in preparation for the attack. Lateral movement between adjacent columns is frequently difficult or impossible. However, every attempt should be made to maintain at least visual contact. Commanders must emphasize the use of checkpoint reporting, contact patrols, and phased operations to coordinate and control the movement of the overall force. Control measures should not be so numerous as to impede operations and stifle initiative. Proper control ensures that units and fires are mutually supporting, objectives are correctly identified, and units are in position to attack.
ATTACK
4-74. Speed, flexibility, and surprise, normally advantages enjoyed by the attacker, are limited by restrictive terrain and the defender’s increased ability to see and acquire targets at greater distances. These limitations make it difficult for units above the company team level to conduct a hasty attack against prepared positions. In the mountains, commanders usually need more time to coordinate fire support, pick routes to prevent enemy observation and detection, and select control measures to coordinate and control the operation. Therefore, deliberate attacks requiring a detailed scheme of maneuver and well-developed fire support plan become the norm at battalion-level and above. Since daylight contributes to the defender’s ability to see and, thereby, reduces the attacker’s chances of success, commanders should seek opportunities to exploit the advantages of limited visibility. Although these conditions slow movement even more and make coordinating forces more difficult, they decrease the enemy’s ability to accurately sense what is happening and react effectively.
4-75. In planning and conducting the attack, commanders should recognize that the enemy will generally seek to control the valleys and trail networks, including adjacent slopes and high ground. Defenses normally be anchored around obstacles, and long-range, direct fire weapons employed in poorly trafficable terrain, often on slopes and protruding high ground. The enemy will attempt to engage the attacker in the valleys and low ground with flanking 4-20
Chapter 4
fires and artillery, often in a direct fire mode. Commanders must analyze the terrain to determine not only how the enemy will organize his defensive positions, but also how the terrain might contribute to the enemy’s ability to counterattack. As friendly forces attempt to deploy for the attack, the enemy, using his advance knowledge of the terrain and prepared routes, may maneuver forces to counterattack from the flank or rear.
4-76. All terrain features that can be occupied by even a small enemy force should be secured. In many instances, overwatch positions may not be readily available within the range capability of organic weapons. Infiltration, technical climbing, and extensive breaching may be required to position weapons to support the assault. On many occasions artillery support, especially in high mountains, may not be available. In other instances, commanders may need to identify intermediate objectives for maneuver forces based on the need to ensure that artillery units have suitable, secure firing positions to range the enemy and support the attack. As in all environments, commanders must identify fire support requirements and allocate fires based on the ability to support and available ammunition. Because resupply may be limited and extremely difficult, they may need to place restrictions on the amount of ammunition expended on specific targets.
4-77. Fire and movement during the assault are extremely difficult. In situations where machine guns can be positioned effectively, a rifle platoon can provide itself with support from a flank or from a height. However, during an assault up a slope, supporting fire cannot come from an overwatch position and must originate from the flanks or through gaps between the assaulting soldiers. Control is difficult to maintain when the assault is in steeply rising terrain. Commanders must pay special attention to the dangers of fratricide.
4-78. Fire and movement are easier in an assault over a downward slope.
Down-slope assaults often have the advantage of good observation, but dead spaces and intervening terrain may reduce the effectiveness of supporting fires. Defensive positions laid out by a skillful enemy on a reverse slope significantly increase the effect of unfavorable down-slope conditions. This type of defense compels the attacking force to position its supporting weapons and observation posts on exposed crests. In this situation, support elements must be positioned to avoid terrain masking and crest clearance problems.
4-79. Breaching obstacles and preparing bypass routes that allow the assault force to move into the defensive position must be an integral part of the commander's plan. In rugged terrain, man-made obstacles that are covered by fire create a particularly dangerous and formidable barrier. Command and control of a covert, in-stride, deliberate, or assault breaches is more difficult than in open terrain, and mobility support is extensive if the obstacle cannot be reduced. Assaults in mountainous terrain almost always involve preparing routes that allow the assault force to rapidly move over difficult natural obstacles and into the objectives.
4-80. Commanders should maintain a strong reserve, if possible. In the mountains, as elsewhere, commanders can use their reserves to restore the momentum of a stalled attack, defeat enemy counterattacks, and exploit success. Reserves must be carefully positioned and organized so difficult terrain, limited road networks, or unpredictable weather does not delay their arrival.
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FM 3-97.6
Once committed, commanders make every effort to reconstitute another reserve from available units.
4-81. An attack should not be halted on a summit or on a ridgeline objective, which enemy artillery and mortar fire will likely target. Reorganization is generally best conducted well forward of a crest line on the next suitable slope. Commanders must ensure that the enemy is not allowed the opportunity to counterattack to recapture key terrain. Rapid adjustment of positions and coordination with flanking units are essential. Support weapons, especially mortars, should be brought forward as quickly as possible. Helicopters are useful for this purpose and may be used for backhaul of casualties.
COUNTERATTACK
4-82. Counterattacks in the mountains must exploit the aspects of terrain that impair enemy momentum and make it difficult for him to mass and maneuver. Obstructing terrain that canalizes movement and restricts mobility significantly increases the potential for counterattacks. In planning a counterattack, the commander must carefully consider the enemy's weaknesses or inability to operate in a mountainous environment. A counterattack, even on a very small scale, can have a decisive impact in mountainous terrain.
RAID AND AMBUSH
4-83. The restrictive terrain also affords increased opportunities to conduct raids and ambushes. These operations should take advantage of limited visibility and terrain that the enemy may consider impassable. In steep terrain, movement time increases significantly, and only light equipment can be taken. The force should use special climbing techniques to negotiate the difficult routes during limited visibility. Commanders must carefully consider the routes and methods used for extraction to ensure that the combat force does not become isolated after executing the mission. They can ensure a successful operation by avoiding detection through proper movement techniques and by skillfully using natural cover and concealment. It may be necessary to reposition some indirect fire support assets to cover dead space or use attack helicopters and close air support. The ambush or raid commander must know in advance if supporting fires cannot cover his routes to and from the objective.
DEMONSTRATIONS AND FEINTS
4-84. Because maneuver space is usually limited or confined and restricts the number of avenues of approach for heavier forces, deception plays an important part in the mountain battle. To mislead the enemy regarding friendly intentions, capabilities, and objectives, commanders should plan systematic measures of deception.
EXPLOITATION AND PURSUIT
4-85. In a mountainous environment, exploitation and pursuit operations must be conducted discriminately and the mountain commander must always prepare for success. A battalion may exploit its own success to a limited extent, but it normally participates in the exploitation as part of a larger force.
Air assault and attack helicopter units can be used to augment exploitation 4-22
Chapter 4
and pursuit operations. The exploiting commander must compensate for the ground mobility restrictions imposed by terrain and weather. Speed can best be achieved by isolating enemy positions with the smallest force possible. Engineer support should be well forward with the necessary equipment to allow combat troops to maintain momentum and avoid delay by enemy obstacles.
The commander must be careful to prevent overextending either the exploiting force or its sustaining logistics. A withdrawing force is capable of establishing numerous strong points and firing positions on heights that allow it to quickly dissipate the combat power of the exploiting force.
MOTTI TACTICS
4-86. Motti tactics are presented here to demonstrate how forces can exploit superior mobility skills and knowledge of the mountainous terrain and environment to defeat the enemy. The Finns developed these tactics during the Finnish-Russian War in 1939-1940. They are characterized by attacks on rear areas, bivouac sites, and command posts.
4-87. The Finnish word "motti" means a pile of logs ready to be sawed into lumber – in effect, setting the conditions so that a larger force can be defeated in detail. These tactics were most successful in the forested areas of Finland during the arctic winters. During the Finnish-Russian War, the Soviets were neither prepared for, nor trained for, warfare under such conditions. They were almost totally trail-bound, with few ski troops. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union experienced similar difficulties in the mountains of Afghanistan. In both instances, the road and trail-bound nature of their forces and their basic tactics left them vulnerable to motti tactics in mountainous terrain.
4-88. Generally, the force utilizing motti tactics never becomes decisively engaged. It disrupts the enemy’s supply lines, denies him warmth and shelter, infiltrates his bivouacs, and destroys his rear areas to the point where he must remain in a high state of alert. These attacks, in combination with the environment, help to destroy the enemy’s will to fight. Commanders should not only develop a thorough understanding of how to apply these tactics, but also understand the conditions that may leave their own forces vulnerable to its use (see Figure 4-8 on page 4-24).
Motti tactics generally follow the sequence of:
1. Locating and fixing the enemy.
2. Isolating the enemy.
3. Attacking to defeat or destroy the enemy.
4-89. Reconnaissance is conducted to locate an enemy force moving in or toward an area that will restrict his movements to roads, trails, or linear terrain. Once identified, the force must be fixed so that it presents a linear target along the axis of advance to which it is bound. This is accomplished using obstacles and a series of squad and platoon sized ambushes and raids. Obstacles may be natural, such as snow, crevices, deep mud, steep terrain, and 4-23
FM 3-97.6
water obstacles, or man-made, for example mines, landslides, avalanches, or destroyed bridges.
4-90. The ambushes
and raids not only fix
FORCES CAN USE MOTTI TACTICS
the enemy, they also
WHEN THEY:
disturb his composure,
create an air of uncer-
• Have superior technical mobility skills
tainty, and prevent
necessary to negotiate Class 4 and 5
uninterrupted sleep and
terrain
rest. Friendly units at-
• Are able to operate effectively in a
tack the enemy from the
noncontiguous area of operations with
high ground. They make
limited support, and despite temperature
maximum use of night
extremes and inclement mountain
vision devices, as well
weather
•
as the difficult restric-
Are able to navigate in high mountainous
tive terrain. They avoid
terrain, dense vegetation, darkness,
enemy security and in-
storms, and fog while making good use
terdict his operations.
of available cover and concealment
•
As a further result of
Maintain the element of surprise
these actions, the en-
emy is compelled to use
FORCES ARE VULNERABLE TO
more forces on security
MOTTI TACTICS WHEN THEY:
tasks. Unless the enemy
• Operate within noncontiguous areas of
can be easily defeated or
operations
destroyed, the attacking
• Have limited mobility skills restricting
force rapidly withdraws
their movements to roads, trails, and
after forcing the enemy
Class 1 and 2 terrain
to deploy. In general,
• Have inadequate reconnaissance and
this series of attacks
security
confuses the enemy as
to the friendly unit’s ex-
act location and intent,
Figure 4-8. Conditions Affecting the Use of
and slows his decision-
Motti Tactics
making cycle so that he
reacts ineffectively to subsequent operations.
4-91. The attacking force then isolates the enemy into smaller groups. Once isolated, the friendly force maneuvers to envelop and attacks to defeat or destroy the isolated elements. As the enemy exhausts himself in an effort to break out, the attacking force may regroup and repeat the sequence. It is imper