SECT. I DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT
As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and
ideas, so the impressions admit of another division into original and
secondary. This division of the impressions is the same with that which
I formerly made use of [Book I. Part I. Sect. 2.] when I distinguished
them into impressions of sensation and reflection.
Original impressions
or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent
perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from
the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external
organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from
some of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition
of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses,
and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and
other emotions resembling them.
It is certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere;
and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there
must be some impressions, which without any introduction make their
appearance in the soul. As these depend upon natural and physical
causes, the examination of them would lead me too far from my present
subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy. For this
reason I shall here confine myself to those other impressions, which
I have called secondary and reflective, as arising either from the
original impressions, or from their ideas. Bodily pains and pleasures
are the source of many passions, both when felt and considered by the
mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you
please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception. A fit of
the gout produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but
is not derived immediately from any affection or idea.
The reflective
impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the
VIOLENT. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in
action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the
passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This
division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music
frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions,
properly called PASSIONS, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to
become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are
more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity,
these impressions have been commonly distinguished from each other. The
subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here
take advantage of this vulgar and spacious division, that I may
proceed with the greater order; and having said ali I thought necessary
concerning our ideas, shall now explain those violent emotions or
passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects.
When we take a survey of the passions, there occurs a division of them
into DIRECT and INDIRECT. By direct passions I understand such as arise
immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such
as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other
qualities. This distinction I cannot at present justify or explain any
farther. I can only observe in general, that under the indirect passions
I comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy,
pity, malice, generosity, with their dependants. And under the direct
passions, desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and
security. I shall begin with the former.
SECT. II OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY, THEIR OBJECTS AND CAUSES
The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions,
it is impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just
definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions.
The utmost we
can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such
circumstances, as attend them: But as these words, PRIDE
and humility,
are of general use, and the impressions they represent the most common
of any, every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them,
without any danger of mistake. For which reason, not to lose time upon
preliminaries, I shall immediately enter upon the examination of these
passions.
It is evident, that pride and humility, though directly contrary, have
yet the same OBJECT. This object is self, or that succession of
related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and
consciousness. Here the view always fixes when we are actuated by either
of these passions. According as our idea of ourself is more or less
advantageous, we feel either of those opposite affections, and are
elated by pride, or dejected with humility. Whatever other objects may
be comprehended by the mind, they are always considered with a view to
ourselves; otherwise they would never be able either to excite these
passions, or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of them. When
self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for
pride or humility.
But though that connected succession of perceptions, which we call SELF,
be always the object of these two passions, it is impossible it can
be their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them.
For as these
passions are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were
their object also their cause; it coued never produce any degree of the
one passion, but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of
the other; which opposition and contrariety must destroy both. It is
impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and humble; and
where he has different reasons for these passions, as frequently
happens, the passions either take place alternately; or if they
encounter, the one annihilates the other, as far as its strength goes,
and the remainder only of that, which is superior, continues to operate
upon the mind. But in the present case neither of the passions coued
ever become superior; because supposing it to be the view only of
ourself, which excited them, that being perfectly indifferent to either,
must produce both in the very same proportion; or in other words, can
produce neither. To excite any passion, and at the same time raise an
equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and
must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent.
We must therefore, make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object
of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to
which they direct their view, when excited. Pride and humility, being
once raised, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard
that as their ultimate and final object; but there is something farther
requisite in order to raise them: Something, which is peculiar to one of
the passions, and produces not both in the very same degree. The first
idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive
principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that
passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of
self. Here then is a passion placed betwixt two ideas, of which the one
produces it, and the other is produced by it. The first idea, therefore,
represents the cause, the second the object of the passion.
To begin with the causes of pride and humility; we may observe, that
their most obvious and remarkable property is the vast variety of
subjects, on which they may be placed. Every valuable quality of the
mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit,
good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are the
cause of pride; and their opposites of humility. Nor are these passions
confined to the mind but extend their view to the body likewise. A man
may be proud of his beauty, strength, agility, good mein, address
in dancing, riding, and of his dexterity in any manual business
or manufacture. But this is not all. The passions looking farther,
comprehend whatever objects are in the least allyed or related to us.
Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens,
horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause either of pride
or of humility.
From the consideration of these causes, it appears necessary we shoud
make a new distinction in the causes of the passion, betwixt that
QUALITY, which operates, and the subject, on which it is placed. A man,
for instance, is vain of a beautiful house, which belongs to him, or
which he has himself built and contrived. Here the object of the passion
is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house: Which cause again is
sub-divided into two parts, viz. the quality, which operates upon the
passion, and the subject in which the quality inheres.
The quality is
the beauty, and the subject is the house, considered as his property or
contrivance. Both these parts are essential, nor is the distinction vain
and chimerical. Beauty, considered merely as such, unless placed upon
something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the
strongest relation alone, without beauty, or something else in its
place, has as little influence on that passion. Since, therefore, these
two particulars are easily separated and there is a necessity for their
conjunction, in order to produce the passion, we ought to consider them
as component parts of the cause; and infix in our minds an exact idea of
this distinction.
SECT. III WHENCE THESE OBJECTS AND CAUSES ARE DERIVED
Being so far advanced as to observe a difference betwixt the object
of the passions and their cause, and to distinguish in the cause the
quality, which operates on the passions, from the subject, in which it
inheres; we now proceed to examine what determines each of them to
be what it is, and assigns such a particular object, and quality, and
subject to these affections. By this means we shall fully understand the
origin of pride and humility.
It is evident in the first place, that these passions are derermined
to have self for their object, not only by a natural but also by an
original property. No one can doubt but this property is natural from
the constancy and steadiness of its operations. It is always self, which
is the object of pride and humility; and whenever the passions look
beyond, it is still with a view to ourselves, nor can any person or
object otherwise have any influence upon us.
That this proceeds from an original quality or primary impulse, will
likewise appear evident, if we consider that it is the distinguishing
characteristic of these passions Unless nature had given some original
qualities to the mind, it coued never have any secondary ones; because
in that case it would have no foundation for action, nor coued ever
begin to exert itself. Now these qualities, which we must consider as
original, are such as are most inseparable from the soul, and can be
resolved into no other: And such is the quality, which determines
the object of pride and humility. We may, perhaps, make it a greater
question, whether the causes, that produce the passion, be as natural as
the object, to which it is directed, and whether all that vast variety
proceeds from caprice or from the constitution of the mind. This doubt
we shall soon remove, if we cast our eye upon human nature, and consider
that in all nations and ages, the same objects still give rise to pride
and humility; and that upon the view even of a stranger, we can know
pretty nearly, what will either encrease or diminish his passions of
this kind. If there be any variation in this particular, it proceeds
from nothing but a difference in the tempers and complexions of men; and
is besides very inconsiderable. Can we imagine it possible, that while
human nature remains the same, men will ever become entirely indifferent
to their power, riches, beauty or personal merit, and that their pride
and vanity will not be affected by these advantages?
But though the causes of pride and humility be plainly natural, we
shall find upon examination, that they are not original, and that it is
utterly impossible they should each of them be adapted to these passions
by a particular provision, and primary constitution of nature, Beside
their prodigious number, many of them are the effects of art, and arise
partly from the industry, partly from the caprice, and partly from
the good fortune of men, Industry produces houses, furniture, cloaths.
Caprice determines their particular kinds and qualities.
And good
fortune frequently contributes to all this, by discovering the effects
that result from the different mixtures and combinations of bodies. It
is absurd, therefore, to imagine, that each of these was foreseen and
provided for by nature, and that every new production of art, which
causes pride or humility; instead of adapting itself to the passion by
partaking of some general quality, that naturally operates on the mind;
is itself the object of an original principle, which till then lay
concealed in the soul, and is only by accident at last brought to light.
Thus the first mechanic, that invented a fine scritoire, produced pride
in him, who became possest of it, by principles different from those,
which made him proud of handsome chairs and tables. As this appears
evidently ridiculous, we must conclude, that each cause of pride and
humility is not adapted to the passions by a distinct original quality;
but that there are some one or more circumstances common to all of them,
on which their efficacy depends.
Besides, we find in the course of nature, that though the effects be
many, the principles, from which they arise, are commonly but few and
simple, and that it is the sign of an unskilful naturalist to have
recourse to a different quality, in order to explain every different
operation. How much more must this be true with regard to the human
mind, which being so confined a subject may justly be thought incapable
of containing such a monstrous heap of principles, as would be necessary
to excite the passions of pride and humility, were each distinct cause
adapted to the passion by a distinct set of principles?
Here, therefore, moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural,
with regard to astronomy before the time of COPERNICUS.
The antients,
though sensible of that maxim, THAT NATURE DOES NOTHING
IN VAIN,
contrived such intricate systems of the heavens, as seemed inconsistent
with true philosophy, and gave place at last to something more simple
and natural. To invent without scruple a new principle to every
new phaenomenon, instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our
hypotheses with a variety of this kind; are certain proofs, that none of
these principles is the just one, and that we only desire, by a number
of falsehoods, to cover our ignorance of the truth.
SECT. IV OF THE RELATIONS OF IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS
Thus we have established two truths without any obstacle or difficulty,
that IT IS FROM NATURAL PRINCIPLES THIS VARIETY OF
CAUSES EXCITES PRIDE
AND HUMILITY, and that IT IS NOT BY A DIFFERENT
PRINCIPLE EACH DIFFERENT
CAUSE IS ADAPTED TO ITS PASSION. We shall now proceed to enquire how
we may reduce these principles to a lesser number, and find among the
causes something common, on which their influence depends.
In order to this we must reflect on certain properties of human nature,
which though they have a mighty influence on every operation both of
the understanding and passions, are not commonly much insisted on by
philosophers. The first of these is the association of ideas, which I
have so often observed and explained. It is impossible for the mind to
fix itself steadily upon one idea for any considerable time; nor can
it by its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy. But however
changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule and
method in their changes. The rule, by which they proceed, is to pass
from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produced by it.
When one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these
relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means
of that introduction.
The second property I shall observe in the human mind is a like
association of impressions. All resembling impressions are connected
together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow.
Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to
malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated.
In like manner our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws
itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride, and the other
resembling affections. It is difficult for the mind, when actuated by
any passion, to confine itself to that passion alone, without any
change or variation. Human nature is too inconstant to admit of any such
regularity. Changeableness is essential to it. And to what can it so
naturally change as to affections or emotions, which are suitable to the
temper, and agree with that set of passions, which then prevail? It is
evident, then, there is an attraction or association among impressions,
as well as among ideas; though with this remarkable difference, that
ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and
impressions only by resemblance.
In the THIRD place, it is observable of these two kinds of association,
that they very much assist and forward each other, and that the
transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same
object. Thus a man, who, by any injury from another, is very much
discomposed and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred subjects
of discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; especially
if he can discover these subjects in or near the person, who was
the cause of his first passion. Those principles, which forward the
transition of ideas, here concur with those, which operate on the
passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double
impulse. The new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater
violence, and the transition to it must be rendered so much more easy
and natural.
Upon this occasion I may cite the authority of an elegant writer, who
expresses himself in the following manner.
"As the fancy delights in every thing that is great, strange, or
beautiful, and is still more pleased the more it finds of these
perfections in the same object, so it is capable of receiving a new
satisfaction by the assistance of another sense. Thus any continued
sound, as the music of birds, or a fall of waters, awakens every moment
the mind of the beholder, and makes him more attentive to the several
beauties of the place, that lie before him. Thus if there arises a
fragrancy of smells or perfumes, they heighten the pleasure of the
imagination, and make even the colours and verdure of the landschape
appear more agreeable; for the ideas of both senses recommend each
other, and are pleasanter together than when they enter the mind
separately: As the different colours of a picture, when they are well
disposed, set off one another, and receive an additional beauty from the
advantage of the situation." [Addison, SPECTATOR 412, final paragraph.]
In this phaenomenon we may remark the association both of impressions
and ideas, as well as the mutual assistance they lend each other.
SECT. V OF THE INFLUENCE OF THESE RELATIONS ON PRIDE AND
HUMILITY
These principles being established on unquestionable experience, I begin
to consider how we shall apply them, by revolving over all the causes of
pride and humility, whether these causes be regarded, as the qualities,
that operate, or as the subjects, on which the qualities are placed. In
examining these qualities I immediately find many of them to concur
in producing the sensation of pain and pleasure, independent of those
affections, which I here endeavour to explain. Thus the beauty of our
person, of itself, and by its very appearance, gives pleasure, as well
as pride; and its deformity, pain as well as humility. A magnificent
feast delights us, and a sordid one displeases. What I discover to
be true in some instances, I suppose to be so in all; and take it for
granted at present, without any farther proof, that every cause of
pride, by its peculiar qualities, produces a separate pleasure, and of
humility a separate uneasiness.
Again, in considering the subjects, to which these qualities adhere, I
make a new supposition, which also appears probable from many obvious
instances, viz, that these subjects are either parts of ourselves, or
something nearly related to us. Thus the good and bad qualities of
our actions and manners constitute virtue and vice, and determine our
personal character, than which nothing operates more strongly on these
passions. In like manner, it is the beauty or deformity of our person,
houses, equipage, or furniture, by which we are rendered either vain or
humble. The same qualities, when transfered to subjects, which bear
us no relation, influence not in the smallest degree either of these
affections.
Having thus in a manner supposed two properties of the causes of these
affections, viz, that the qualities produce a separate pain or pleasure,
and that the subjects, on which the qualities are placed, are related
to self; I proceed to examine the passions themselves, in order to find
something in them, correspondent to the supposed properties of their
causes. First, I find, that the peculiar object of pride and humility
is determined by an original and natural instinct, and that it is
absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that
these passions should ever look beyond self, or that individual person.
of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious. Here
at last the view always rests, when we are actuated by either of these
passions; nor can we, in that situation of mind, ever lose sight of this
object. For this I pretend not to give any reason; but consider such a
peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality.
The SECOND quality, which I discover in these passions, and which I
likewise consider an an original quality, is their sensations, or the
peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and which constitute their
very being and essence. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility
a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in
reality no pride nor humility. Of this our very feeling convinces us;
and beyond our feeling, it is here in vain to reason or dispute.
If I compare, therefore, these two e