A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, - HTML preview

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PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED

SECT. I OF THE OBJECT AND CAUSES OF LOVE AND HATRED

It is altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions

of love and hatred; and that because they produce merely a simple

impression, without any mixture or composition. Twould be as unnecessary

to attempt any description of them, drawn from their nature, origin,

causes and objects; and that both because these are the subjects of

our present enquiry, and because these passions of themselves are

sufficiently known from our common feeling and experience. This we

have already observed concerning pride and humility, and here repeat it

concerning love and hatred; and indeed there is so great a resemblance

betwixt these two sets of passions, that we shall be obliged to begin

with a kind of abridgment of our reasonings concerning the former, in

order to explain the latter.

As the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical

person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately

conscious; so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of

whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious. This is

sufficiently evident from experience. Our love and hatred are always

directed to some sensible being external to us; and when we talk

of self-love, it is not in a proper sense, nor has the sensation it

produces any thing in common with that tender emotion which is excited

by a friend or mistress. It is the same case with hatred. We may be

mortified by our own faults and follies; but never feel any anger or

hatred except from the injuries of others.

But though the object of love and hatred be always some other person, it

is plain that the object is not, properly speaking, the cause of these

passions, or alone sufficient to excite them. For since love and hatred

are directly contrary in their sensation, and have the same object in

common, if that object were also their cause, it would produce these

opposite passions in an equal degree; and as they must, from the very

first moment, destroy each other, none of them would ever be able to

make its appearance. There must, therefore, be some cause different from

the object.

If we consider the causes of love and hatred, we shall find they are

very much diversifyed, and have not many things in common. The virtue,

knowledge, wit, good sense, good humour of any person, produce love

and esteem; as the opposite qualities, hatred and contempt. The same

passions arise from bodily accomplishments, such as beauty, force,

swiftness, dexterity; and from their contraries; as likewise from the

external advantages and disadvantages of family, possession, cloaths,

nation and climate. There is not one of these objects, but what by its

different qualities may produce love and esteem, or hatred and contempt.

From the view of these causes we may derive a new distinction betwixt

the quality that operates, and the subject on which it is placed. A

prince, that is possessed of a stately palace, commands the esteem

of the people upon that account; and that first, by the beauty of the

palace, and secondly, by the relation of property, which connects it

with him. The removal of either of these destroys the passion; which

evidently proves that the cause Is a compounded one.

Twould be tedious to trace the passions of love and hatred, through all

the observations which we have formed concerning pride and humility,

and which are equally applicable to both sets of passions. Twill be

sufficient to remark in general, that the object of love and hatred is

evidently some thinking person; and that the sensation of the former

passion is always agreeable, and of the latter uneasy.

We may also

suppose with some shew of probability, THAT THE CAUSE OF

BOTH THESE

PASSIONS IS ALWAYS RELATED TO A THINKING BEING, AND THAT

THE CAUSE OF

THE FORMER PRODUCE A SEPARATE PLEASURE, AND OF THE

LATTER A SEPARATE

UNEASINESS.

One of these suppositions, viz, that the cause of love and hatred must

be related to a person or thinking being, in order to produce these

passions, is not only probable, but too evident to be contested. Virtue

and vice, when considered in the abstract; beauty and deformity, when

placed on inanimate objects; poverty and riches when belonging to a

third person, excite no degree of love or hatred, esteem or contempt

towards those, who have no relation to them. A person looking out at a

window, sees me in the street, and beyond me a beautiful palace, with

which I have no concern: I believe none will pretend, that this person

will pay me the same respect, as if I were owner of the palace.

It is not so evident at first sight, that a relation of impressions is

requisite to these passions, and that because in the transition the one

impression is so much confounded with the other, that they become in a

manner undistinguishable. But as in pride and humility, we have easily

been able to make the separation, and to prove, that every cause of

these passions, produces a separate pain or pleasure, I might here

observe the same method with the same success, in examining particularly

the several causes of love and hatred. But as I hasten a full and

decisive proof of these systems, I delay this examination for a moment:

And in the mean time shall endeavour to convert to my present purpose

all my reaaonings concerning pride and humility, by an argument that

is founded on unquestionable examination.

There are few persons, that are satisfyed with their own character, or

genius, or fortune, who are nor desirous of shewing themselves to the

world, and of acquiring the love and approbation of mankind. Now it is

evident, that the very same qualities and circumstances, which are the

causes of pride or self-esteem, are also the causes of vanity or the

desire of reputation; and that we always put to view those particulars

with which in ourselves we are best satisfyed. But if love and esteem

were not produced by the same qualities as pride, according as these

qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding

would be very absurd, nor coued men expect a correspondence in

the sentiments of every other person, with those themselves have

entertained. It is true, few can form exact systems of the passions, or

make reflections on their general nature and resemblances. But without

such a progress in philosophy, we are not subject to many mistakes in

this particular, but are sufficiently guided by common experience, as

well as by a kind of presentation; which tells us what will operate on

others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves. Since then the same

qualities that produce pride or humility, cause love or hatred; all

the arguments that have been employed to prove, that the causes of the

former passions excite a pain or pleasure independent of the passion,

will be applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the latter.

SECT. II EXPERIMENTS TO CONFIRM THIS SYSTEM

Upon duly weighing these arguments, no one will make any scruple to

assent to that condusion I draw from them, concerning the transition

along related impressions and ideas, especially as it is a principle,

in itself, so easy and natural. But that we may place this system beyond

doubt both with regard to love and hatred, pride and humility, it will

be proper to make some new experiments upon all these passions, as well

as to recal a few of these observations, which I have formerly touched

upon.

In order to make these experiments, let us suppose I am in company with

a person, whom I formerly regarded without any sentiments either of

friendship or enmity. Here I have the natural and ultimate object of all

these four passions placed before me. Myself am the proper object of

pride or humility; the other person of love or hatred.

Regard now with attention the nature of these passions, and their

situation with respect to each other. It is evident here are four

affections, placed, as it were, in a square or regular connexion with,

and distance from each other. The passions of pride and humility, as

well as those of love and hatred, are connected together by the identity

of their object, which to the first set of passions is self, to the

second some other person. These two lines of communication or connexion

form two opposite sides of the square. Again, pride and love are

agreeable passions; hatred and humility uneasy. This similitude of

sensation betwixt pride and love, and that betwixt humility and hatred

form a new connexion, and may be considered as the other two sides of

the square. Upon the whole, pride is connected with humility, love

with hatred, by their objects or ideas: Pride with love, humility with

hatred, by their sensations or impressions.

I say then, that nothing can produce any of these passions without

bearing it a double relation, viz, of ideas to the object of the

passion, and of sensation to the passion itself. This we must prove by

our experiments. First Experiment. To proceed with the greater order

in these experiments, let us first suppose, that being placed in the

situation above-mentioned, viz, in company with some other person, there

is an object presented, that has no relation either of impressions

or ideas to any of these passions. Thus suppose we regard together an

ordinary stone, or other common object, belonging to neither of us, and

causing of itself no emotion, or independent pain and pleasure: It is

evident such an object will produce none of these four passions. Let

us try it upon each of them successively. Let us apply it to love, to

hatred, to humility, to pride; none of them ever arises in the smallest

degree imaginable. Let us change the object, as oft as we please;

provided still we choose one, that has neither of these two relations.

Let us repeat the experiment in all the dispositions, of which the mind

is susceptible. No object, in the vast variety of nature, will, in any

disposition, produce any passion without these relations.

Second Experiment. Since an object, that wants both these relations

can never produce any passion, let us bestow on it only one of these

relations; and see what will follow. Thus suppose, I regard a stone or

any common object, that belongs either to me or my companion, and by

that means acquires a relation of ideas to the object of the passions:

It is plain, that to consider the matter a priori, no emotion of any

kind can reasonably be expected. For besides, that a relation of ideas

operates secretly and calmly on the mind, it bestows an equal impulse

towards the opposite passions of pride and humility, love and hatred,

according as the object belongs to ourselves or others; which opposition

of the passions must destroy both, and leave the mind perfectly free

from any affection or emotion. This reasoning a priori is confirmed

by experience. No trivial or vulgar object, that causes not a pain or

pleasure, independent of the passion, will ever, by its property or

other relations either to ourselves or others, be able to produce the

affections of pride or humility, love or hatred.

Third Experiment. It is evident, therefore, that a relation of ideas is

not able alone to give rise to these affections. Let us now remove

this relation, and in its stead place a relation of impressions, by

presenting an object, which is agreeable or disagreeable, but has

no relation either to ourself or companion; and let us observe the

consequences. To consider the matter first a priori, as in the preceding

experiment; we may conclude, that the object will have a small, but an

uncertain connexion with these passions. For besides, that this relation

is not a cold and imperceptible one, it has not the inconvenience of

the relation of ideas, nor directs us with equal force to two contrary

passions, which by their opposition destroy each other.

But if we

consider, on the other hand, that this transition from the sensation

to the affection is not forwarded by any principle, that produces

a transition of ideas; but, on the contrary, that though the one

impression be easily transfused into the other, yet the change of

objects is supposed contrary to all the principles, that cause a

transition of that kind; we may from thence infer, that nothing will

ever be a steady or durable cause of any passion, that is connected with

the passion merely by a relation of impressions. What our reason would

conclude from analogy, after balancing these arguments, would be, that

an object, which produces pleasure or uneasiness, but has no manner of

connexion either with ourselves or others, may give such a turn to the

disposition, as that may naturally fall into pride or love, humility or

hatred, and search for other objects, upon which by a double relation,

it can found these affections; but that an object, which has only one of

these relations, though the most advantageous one, can never give rise

to any constant and established passion.

Most fortunately all this reasoning is found to be exactly conformable

to experience, and the phaenomena of the passions.

Suppose I were

travelling with a companion through a country, to which we are both

utter strangers; it is evident, that if the prospects be beautiful,

the roads agreeable, and the inns commodious, this may put me into good

humour both with myself and fellow-traveller. But as we suppose, that

this country has no relation either to myself or friend it can never be

the immediate cause of pride or love; and therefore if I found not the

passion on some other object, that bears either of us a closer relation,

my emotions are rather to be considerd as the overflowings of an elevate

or humane disposition, than as an established passion.

The case is the

same where the object produces uneasiness.

Fourth Experiment. Having found, that neither an object without any

relation of ideas or impressions, nor an object, that has only one

relation, can ever cause pride or humility, love or hatred; reason alone

may convince us, without any farther experiment, that whatever has a

double relation must necessarily excite these passions; since it is

evident they must have some cause. But to leave as little room for doubt

as possible, let us renew our experiments, and see whether the event in

this case answers our expectation. I choose an object, such as virtue,

that causes a separate satisfaction: On this object I bestow a relation

to self; and find, that from this disposition of affairs, there

immediately arises a passion. But what passion? That very one of pride,

to which this object bears a double relation. Its idea is related

to that of self, the object of the passion: The sensation it causes

resembles the sensation of the passion. That I may be sure I am not

mistaken in this experiment, I remove first one relation; then another;

and find, that each removal destroys the passion, and leaves the object

perfectly indifferent. But I am not content with this. I make a still

farther trial; and instead of removing the relation, I only change

it for one of a different kind. I suppose the virtue to belong to my

companion, not to myself; and observe what follows from this alteration.

I immediately perceive the affections wheel to about, and leaving pride,

where there is only one relation, viz, of impressions, fall to the side

of love, where they are attracted by a double relation of impressions

and ideas. By repeating the same experiment, in changing anew the

relation of ideas, I bring the affections back to pride; and by a new

repetition I again place them at love or kindness. Being fully convinced

of the influence of this relation, I try the effects of the other; and

by changing virtue for vice, convert the pleasant impression, which

arises from the former, into the disagreeable one, which proceeds from

the latter. The effect still answers expectation. Vice, when placed

on another, excites, by means of its double relations, the passion of

hatred, instead of love, which for the same reason arises from virtue.

To continue the experiment, I change anew the relation of ideas, and

suppose the vice to belong to myself. What follows? What is usual. A

subsequent change of the passion from hatred to humility. This humility

I convert into pride by a new change of the impression; and find after

all that I have compleated the round, and have by these changes brought

back the passion to that very situation, in which I first found it.

But to make the matter still more certain, I alter the object; and

instead of vice and virtue, make the trial upon beauty and deformity,

riches and poverty, power and servitude. Each of these objects runs

the circle of the passions in the same manner, by a change of their

relations: And in whatever order we proceed, whether through pride,

love, hatred, humility, or through humility, hatred, love, pride, the

experiment is not in the least diversifyed. Esteem and contempt, indeed,

arise on some occasions instead of love and hatred; but these are at

the bottom the same passions, only diversifyed by some causes, which we

shall explain afterwards.

Fifth Experiment. To give greater authority to these experiments, let

us change the situation of affairs as much as possible, and place the

passions and objects in all the different positions, of which they are

susceptible. Let us suppose, beside the relations abovementioned, that

the person, along with whom I make all these experiments, is closely

connected with me either by blood or friendship. He is, we shall

suppose, my son or brother, or is united to me by a long and familiar

acquaintance. Let us next suppose, that the cause of the passion

acquires a double relation of impressions and ideas to this person; and

let us see what the effects are of all these complicated attractions and

relations.

Before we consider what they are in fact, let us determine what they

ought to be, conformable to my hypothesis. It is plain, that, according

as the impression is either pleasant or uneasy, the passion of love or

hatred must arise towards the person, who is thus connected to the cause

of the impression by these double relations, which I have all along

required. The virtue of a brother must make me love him; as his vice

or infamy must excite the contrary passion. But to judge only from the

situation of affairs, I should not expect, that the affections would

rest there, and never transfuse themselves into any other impression. As

there is here a person, who by means of a double relation is the object

of my passion, the very same reasoning leads me to think the passion

will be carryed farther. The person has a relation of ideas to myself,

according to the supposition; the passion, of which he is the object, by

being either agreeable or uneasy, has a relation of impressions to pride

or humility. It is evident, then, that one of these passions must arise

from the love or hatred.

This is the reasoning I form in conformity to my hypothesis; and am

pleased to find upon trial that every thing answers exactly to my

expectation. The virtue or vice of a son or brother not only excites

love or hatred, but by a new transition, from similar causes, gives rise

to pride or humility. Nothing causes greater vanity than any shining

quality in our relations; as nothing mortifies us more than their vice

or infamy. This exact conformity of experience to our reasoning is

a convincing proof of the solidity of that hypothesis, upon which we

reason.

Sixth Experiment. This evidence will be still augmented, if we reverse

the experiment, and preserving still the same relations, begin only with

a different passion. Suppose, that instead of the virtue or vice of a

son or brother, which causes first love or hatred, and afterwards pride

or humility, we place these good or bad qualities on ourselves,

without any immediate connexion with the person, who is related to us:

Experience shews us, that by this change of situation the whole chain is

broke, and that the mind is not conveyed from one passion to another,

as in the preceding instance. We never love or hate a son or brother

for the virtue or vice we discern in ourselves; though it is evident

the same qualities in him give us a very sensible pride or humility. The

transition from pride or humility to love or hatred is not so natural

as from love or hatred to pride or humility. This may at first sight be

esteemed contrary to my hypothesis; since the relations of impressions

and ideas are in both cases precisely the same. Pride and humility are

impressions related to love and hatred. Myself am related to the person.

It should, therefore, be expected, that like causes must produce like

effects, and a perfect transition arise from the double relation, as in

all other cases. This difficulty we may easily solve by the following

reflections.

It is evident, that as we are at all times intimately conscious of

ourselves, our sentiments and passions, their ideas must strike upon us

with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments and passions of

any other person. But every thing, that strikes upon us with vivacity,

and appears in a full and strong light, forces itself, in a manner, into

our consideration, and becomes present to the mind on the smallest hint

and most trivial relation. For the same reason, when it is once present,

it engages the attention, and keeps it from wandering to other

objects, however strong may be their relation to our first object.

The imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas, but with

difficulty from lively to obscure. In the one case the relation is aided

by another principle: In the other case, it is opposed by it.

Now I have observed, that those two faculties of the mind, the

imagination and passions, assist each other in their operations when

their propensities are similar, and when they act upon the same object.

The mind has always a propensity to pass from a passion to any other

related to it; and this propensity is forwarded when the object of the

one passion is related to that of the other. The two impulses concur

with each other, and render the whole transition more smooth and easy.

But if it should happen, that while the relation of ideas, strictly

speaking, continues the same, its influence, in causing a transition

of the imagination, should no longer take place, it is evident its

influence on the passions must also cease, as being dependent entirely

on that transition. This is the reason why pride or humility is not

transfused into love or hatred with the same ease, that the latter

passions are changed into the former. If a person be my brother I am

his likewise: but though the relations be reciprocal they have very

different effects on the imagination. The passage is smooth and open

from the consideration of any person related to us to that of ourself,

of whom we are every moment conscious. But when the affections are once

directed to ourself, the fancy passes not with the same facility from

that object to any other person, how closely so ever connected with us.

This easy or difficult transition of the imagination operates upon the

passions, and facilitates or ret