A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, - HTML preview

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But again, as facility converts pain into pleasure, so it often converts

pleasure into pain, when it is too great, and renders the actions of the

mind so faint and languid, that they are no longer able to interest and

support it. And indeed, scarce any other objects become disagreeable

through custom; but such as are naturally attended with some emotion or

affection, which is destroyed by the too frequent repetition. One

can consider the clouds, and heavens, and trees, and stones, however

frequently repeated, without ever feeling any aversion.

But when the

fair sex, or music, or good cheer, or any thing, that naturally ought

to be agreeable, becomes indifferent, it easily produces the opposite

affection.

But custom not only gives a facility to perform any action, but likewise

an inclination and tendency towards it, where it is not entirely

disagreeable, and can never be the object of inclination. And this

is the reason why custom encreases all active habits, but diminishes

passive, according to the observation of a late eminent philosopher. The

facility takes off from the force of the passive habits by rendering

the motion of the spirits faint and languid. But as in the active, the

spirits are sufficiently supported of themselves, the tendency of the

mind gives them new force, and bends them more strongly to the action.

SECT. VI OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE IMAGINATION ON THE

PASSIONS

It is remarkable, that the imagination and affections have close union

together, and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely

indifferent to the latter. Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a

new vivacity, the passions become more violent; and keep pace with

the imagination in all its variations. Whether this proceeds from

the principle above-mentioned, that any attendant emotion is easily

converted into the predominant, I shall not determine.

It is sufficient

for my present purpose, that we have many instances to confirm this

influence of the imagination upon the passions.

Any pleasure, with which we are acquainted, affects us more than any

other, which we own to be superior, but of whose nature we are wholly

ignorant. Of the one we can form a particular and determinate idea:

The other we conceive under the general notion of pleasure; and it is

certain, that the more general and universal any of our ideas are, the

less influence they have upon the imagination. A general idea, though

it be nothing but a particular one considered in a certain view, is

commonly more obscure; and that because no particular idea, by which we

represent a general one, is ever fixed or determinate, but may easily

be changed for other particular ones, which will serve equally in the

representation.

There is a noted passage in the history of Greece, which may serve for

our present purpose. Themistocles told the Athenians, that he had formed

a design, which would be highly useful to the public, but which it was

impossible for him to communicate to them without ruining the execution,

since its success depended entirely on the secrecy with which it should

be conducted. The Athenians, instead of granting him full power to

act as he thought fitting, ordered him to communicate his design to

Aristides, in whose prudence they had an entire confidence, and

whose opinion they were resolved blindly to submit to.

The design of

Themistocles was secretly to set fire to the fleet of all the Grecian

commonwealths, which was assembled in a neighbouring port, and which

being once destroyed would give the Athenians the empire of the sea

without any rival Aristides returned to the assembly, and told them,

that nothing coued be more advantageous than the design of Themistocles

but at the same time that nothing coued be more unjust: Upon which the

people unanimously rejected the project.

A late celebrated historian [Mons. Rollin {Charles Rollin, HISTOIRE

ANCIENNE.(Paris 1730-38)}.] admires this passage of antient history, as

one of the most singular that is any where to be met.

"Here," says he, "they are not philosophers, to whom it is easy in

their schools to establish the finest maxims and most sublime rules of

morality, who decide that interest ought never to prevail above justice.

It is a whole people interested in the proposal which is made to

them, who consider it as of importance to the public good, and who

notwithstanding reject it unanimously, and without hesitation, merely

because it is contrary to justice."

For my part I see nothing so extraordinary in this proceeding of the

Athenians. The same reasons, which render it so easy for philosophers to

establish these sublime maxims, tend, in part, to diminish the merit

of such a conduct in that people. Philosophers never ballance betwixt

profit and honesty, because their decisions are general, and neither

their passions nor imaginations are interested in the objects. And

though in the present case the advantage was immediate to the Athenians,

yet as it was known only under the general notion of advantage,

without being conceived by any particular idea, it must have had a

less considerable influence on their imaginations, and have been a

less violent temptation, than if they had been acquainted with all

its circumstances: Otherwise it is difficult to conceive, that a whole

people, unjust and violent as men commonly are, should so unanimously

have adhered to justice, and rejected any considerable advantage.

Any satisfaction, which we lately enjoyed, and of which the memory is

fresh and recent, operates on the will with more violence, than another

of which the traces are decayed, and almost obliterated.

From whence

does this proceed, but that the memory in the first case assists the

fancy and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions?

The image of the past pleasure being strong and violent, bestows these

qualities on the idea of the future pleasure, which is connected with it

by the relation of resemblance.

A pleasure, which is suitable to the way of life, in which we are

engaged, excites more our desires and appetites than another, which

is foreign to it. This phaenomenon may be explained from the same

principle.

Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind, than

eloquence, by which objects are represented in their strongest and most

lively colours. We may of ourselves acknowledge, that such an object

is valuable, and such another odious; but until an orator excites the

imagination, and gives force to these ideas, they may have but a feeble

influence either on the will or the affections.

But eloquence is not always necessary. The bare opinion of another,

especially when inforced with passion, will cause an idea of good or

evil to have an influence upon us, which would otherwise have been

entirely neglected. This proceeds from the principle of sympathy or

communication; and sympathy, as I have already observed, is nothing

but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of

imagination.

It is remarkable, that lively passions commonly attend a lively

imagination. In this respect, as well as others, the force of the

passion depends as much on the temper of the person, as the nature or

situation of the object.

I have already observed, that belief is nothing but a lively idea

related to a present impression. This vivacity is a requisite

circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the

violent; nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any considerable

influence upon either of them. It is too weak to take hold of the mind,

or be attended with emotion.

SECT. VII OF CONTIGUITY AND DISTANCE IN SPACE AND TIME

There is an easy reason, why every thing contiguous to us, either in

space or time, should be conceived with a peculiar force and vivacity,

and excel every other object, in its influence on the imagination.

Ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self

must partake of that quality. But where an object is so far removed

as to have lost the advantage of this relation, why, as it is farther

removed, its idea becomes still fainter and more obscure, would,

perhaps, require a more particular examination.

It is obvious, that the imagination can never totally forget the points

of space and time, in which we are existent; but receives such frequent

advertisements of them from the passions and senses, that however it

may turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is necessitated

every moment to reflect on the present. IOt is also remarkable, that in

the conception of those objects, which we regard as real and existent,

we take them in their proper order and situation, and never leap from

one object to another, which is distant from it, without running over,

at least in a cursory manner, all those objects, which are interposed

betwixt them. When we reflect, therefore, on any object distant from

ourselves, we are obliged not only to reach it at first by passing

through all the intermediate space betwixt ourselves and the object, but

also to renew our progress every moment; being every moment recalled to

the consideration of ourselves and our present situation. It is easily

conceived, that this interruption must weaken the idea by breaking the

action of the mind, and hindering the conception from being so intense

and continued, as when we reflect on a nearer object.

The fewer steps

we make to arrive at the object, and the smoother the road is, this

diminution of vivacity is less sensibly felt, but still may be observed

more or less in proportion to the degrees of distance and difficulty.

Here then we are to consider two kinds of objects, the contiguous and

remote; of which the former, by means of their relation to ourselves,

approach an impression in force and vivacity; the latter by reason of

the interruption in our manner of conceiving them, appear in a weaker

and more imperfect light. This is their effect on the imagination. If

my reasoning be just, they must have a proportionable effect on the will

and passions. Contiguous objects must have an influence much superior to

the distant and remote. Accordingly we find in common life, that men are

principally concerned about those objects, which are not much removed

either in space or time, enjoying the present, and leaving what is afar

off to the care of chance and fortune. Talk to a man of his condition

thirty years hence, and he will not regard you. Speak of what is to

happen tomorrow, and he will lend you attention. The breaking of a

mirror gives us more concern when at home, than the burning of a house,

when abroad, and some hundred leagues distant.

But farther; though distance both in space and time has a considerable

effect on the imagination, and by that means on the will and passions,

yet the consequence of a removal in space are much inferior to those of

a removal in time. Twenty years are certainly but a small distance

of time in comparison of what history and even the memory of some may

inform them of, and yet I doubt if a thousand leagues, or even the

greatest distance of place this globe can admit of, will so remarkably

weaken our ideas, and diminish our passions. A West-Indian merchant will

tell you, that he is not without concern about what passes in Jamaica;

though few extend their views so far into futurity, as to dread very

remote accidents.

The cause of this phaenomenon must evidently lie in the different

properties of space and time. Without having recourse to metaphysics,

any one may easily observe, that space or extension consists of a number

of co-existent parts disposed in a certain order, and capable of being

at once present to the sight or feeling. On the contrary, time or

succession, though it consists likewise of parts, never presents to us

more than one at once; nor is it possible for any two of them ever to

be co-existent. These qualities of the objects have a suitable effect on

the imagination. The parts of extension being susceptible of an union to

the senses, acquire an union in the fancy; and as the appearance of

one part excludes not another, the transition or passage of the thought

through the contiguous parts is by that means rendered more smooth and

easy. On the other hand, the incompatibility of the parts of time in

their real existence separates them in the imagination, and makes it

more difficult for that faculty to trace any long succession or series

of events. Every part must appear single and alone, nor can regularly

have entrance into the fancy without banishing what is supposed to have

been immediately precedent. By this means any distance in time causes a

greater interruption in the thought than an equal distance in space, and

consequently weakens more considerably the idea, and consequently the

passions; which depend in a great measure, on the imagination, according

to my system.

There is another phaenomenon of a like nature with the foregoing, viz,

the superior effects of the same distance in futurity above that in the

past. This difference with respect to the will is easily accounted for.

As none of our actions can alter the past, it is not strange it should

never determine the will. But with respect to the passions the question

is yet entire, and well worth the examining.

Besides the propensity to a gradual progression through the points of

space and time, we have another peculiarity in our method of thinking,

which concurs in producing this phaenomenon. We always follow the

succession of time in placing our ideas, and from the consideration of

any object pass more easily to that, which follows immediately after

it, than to that which went before it. We may learn this, among other

instances, from the order, which is always observed in historical

narrations. Nothing but an absolute necessity can oblige an historian to

break the order of time, and in his narration give the precedence to an

event, which was in reality posterior to another.

This will easily be applied to the question in hand, if we reflect on

what I have before observed, that the present situation of the person is

always that of the imagination, and that it is from thence we proceed

to the conception of any distant object. When the object is past, the

progression of the thought in passing to it from the present is contrary

to nature, as proceeding from one point of time to that which is

preceding, and from that to another preceding, in opposition to the

natural course of the succession. On the other hand, when we turn our

thought to a future object, our fancy flows along the stream of time,

and arrives at the object by an order, which seems most natural, passing

always from one point of time to that which is immediately posterior to

it. This easy progression of ideas favours the imagination, and makes

it conceive its object in a stronger and fuller light, than when we

are continually opposed in our passage, and are obliged to overcome the

difficulties arising from the natural propensity of the fancy. A small

degree of distance in the past has, therefore, a greater effect, in

interupting and weakening the conception, than a much greater in

the future. From this effect of it on the imagination is derived its

influence on the will and passions.

There is another cause, which both contributes to the same effect, and

proceeds from the same quality of the fancy, by which we are determined

to trace the succession of time by a similar succession of ideas. When

from the present instant we consider two points of time equally distant

in the future and in the past, it is evident, that, abstractedly

considered, their relation to the present is almost equal. For as the

future will sometime be present, so the past was once present. If we

coued, therefore, remove this quality of the imagination, an equal

distance in the past and in the future, would have a similar influence.

Nor is this only true, when the fancy remains fixed, and from the

present instant surveys the future and the past; but also when it

changes its situation, and places us in different periods of time. For

as on the one hand, in supposing ourselves existent in a point of time

interposed betwixt the present instant and the future object, we find

the future object approach to us, and the past retire, and become more

distant: so on the other hand, in supposing ourselves existent in a

point of time interposed betwixt the present and the past, the past

approaches to us, and the future becomes more distant.

But from the

property of the fancy above-mentioned we rather chuse to fix our thought

on the point of time interposed betwixt the present and the future, than

on that betwixt the present and the past. We advance, rather than retard

our existence; and following what seems the natural succession of time,

proceed from past to present, and from present to future. By which means

we conceive the future as flowing every moment nearer us, and the

past as retiring. An equal distance, therefore, in the past and in the

future, has not the same effect on the imagination; and that because we

consider the one as continually encreasing, and the other as continually

diminishing. The fancy anticipates the course of things, and surveys the

object in that condition, to which it tends, as well as in that, which

is regarded as the present.

SECT. VIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUed Thus we have accounted for three phaenomena, which seem pretty

remarkable. Why distance weakens the conception and passion: Why

distance in time has a greater effect than that in space: And why

distance in past time has still a greater effect than that in future. We

must now consider three phaenomena, which seem to be, in a manner, the

reverse of these: Why a very great distance encreases our esteem and

admiration for an object; Why such a distance in time encreases it

more than that in space: And a distance in past time more than that in

future. The curiousness of the subject will, I hope, excuse my dwelling

on it for some time.

To begin with the first phaenomenon, why a great distance encreases our

esteem and admiration for an object; it is evident that the mere view

and contemplation of any greatness, whether successive or extended,

enlarges the soul, and give it a sensible delight and pleasure. A wide

plain, the ocean, eternity, a succession of several ages; all these are

entertaining objects, and excel every thing, however beautiful, which

accompanies not its beauty with a suitable greatness.

Now when any very

distant object is presented to the imagination, we naturally reflect on

the interposed distance, and by that means, conceiving something great

and magnificent, receive the usual satisfaction. But as the fancy passes

easily from one idea to another related to it, and transports to the

second all the passions excited by the first, the admiration, which is

directed to the distance, naturally diffuses itself over the distant

object. Accordingly we find, that it is not necessary the object should

be actually distant from us, in order to cause our admiration; but that

it is sufficient, if, by the natural association of ideas, it conveys

our view to any considerable distance. A great traveller, though in

the same chamber, will pass for a very extraordinary person; as a Greek

medal, even in our cabinet, is always esteemed a valuable curiosity.

Here the object, by a natural transition, conveys our views to the

distance; and the admiration, which arises from that distance, by

another natural transition, returns back to the object.

But though every great distance produces an admiration for the distant

object, a distance in time has a more considerable effect than that in

space. Antient busts and inscriptions are more valued than Japan tables:

And not to mention the Greeks and Romans, it is certain we regard with

more veneration the old Chaldeans and Egyptians, than the modern Chinese

and Persians, and bestow more fruitless pains to dear up the history and

chronology of the former, than it would cost us to make a voyage, and

be certainly informed of the character, learning and government of the

latter. I shall be obliged to make a digression in order to explain this

phaenomenon.

It is a quality very observable in human nature, that any opposition,

which does not entirely discourage and intimidate us, has rather a

contrary effect, and inspires us with a more than ordinary grandeur

and magnanimity. In collecting our force to overcome the opposition, we

invigorate the soul, and give it an elevation with which otherwise it

would never have been acquainted. Compliance, by rendering our strength

useless, makes us insensible of it: but opposition awakens and employs

it.

This is also true in the universe. Opposition not only enlarges the

soul; but the soul, when full of courage and magnanimity, in a manner

seeks opposition.

SPUMANTEMQUE DARI PECORA INTER INERTIA VOTIS OPTAT

APRUM, AUT FULVUM

DESCENDERE MONTE LEONEM.

[And, among the tamer beasts, [he] longs to be granted, in answer to his

prayers, a slavering boar, or to have a tawny lion come down from the

mountain.]

Whatever supports and fills the passions is agreeable to us; as on the

contrary, what weakens and infeebles them is uneasy. As opposition

has the first effect, and facility the second, no wonder the mind, in

certain dispositions, desires the former, and is averse to the latter.

These principles have an effect on the imagination as well as on the

passions. To be convinced of this we need only consider the influence

of heights and depths on that faculty. Any great elevation of place

communicates a kind of pride or sublimity of imagination, and gives

a fancyed superiority over those that lie below; and, vice versa, a

sublime and strong imagination conveys the idea of ascent and elevation.

Hence it proceeds, that we associate, in a manner, the idea of whatever

is good with that of height, and evil with lowness.

Heaven is supposed

to be above, and hell below. A noble genius is called an elevate and

sublime one. ATQUE UDAM SPERNIT HUMUM FUGIENTE PENNA.

[Spurns the dank

soil in winged flight.] On the contrary, a vulgar and trivial conception

is stiled indifferently low or mean. Prosperity is denominated ascent,

and adversity descent. Kings and princes are supposed to be placed at

the top of human affairs; as peasants and day-labourers are said to be

in the lowest stations. These methods of thinking, and of expressing

ourselves, are not of so little consequence as they may appear at first

sight.

It is evident to common sense, as well as philosophy, that there is no

natural nor essential difference betwixt high and low, and that this