PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL
SECT. I MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIVed FROM REASON
There is an inconvenience which attends all abstruse reasoning that
it may silence, without convincing an antagonist, and requires the
same intense study to make us sensible of its force, that was at first
requisite for its invention. When we leave our closet, and engage in
the common affairs of life, its conclusions seem to vanish, like the
phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning; and it is
difficult for us to retain even that conviction, which we had attained
with difficulty. This is still more conspicuous in a long chain of
reasoning, where we must preserve to the end the evidence of the first
propositions, and where we often lose sight of all the most received
maxims, either of philosophy or common life. I am not, however, without
hopes, that the present system of philosophy will acquire new force as
it advances; and that our reasonings concerning morals will corroborate
whatever has been said concerning the UNDERSTANDING and the PASSIONS.
Morality is a subject that interests us above all others: We fancy the
peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it; and
it is evident, that this concern must make our speculations appear
more real and solid, than where the subject is, in a great measure,
indifferent to us. What affects us, we conclude can never be a chimera;
and as our passion is engaged on the one side or the other, we naturally
think that the question lies within human comprehension; which, in other
cases of this nature, we are apt to entertain some doubt of. Without
this advantage I never should have ventured upon a third volume of such
abstruse philosophy, in an age, wherein the greatest part of men seem
agreed to convert reading into an amusement, and to reject every thing
that requires any considerable degree of attention to be comprehended.
It has been observed, that nothing is ever present to the mind but
its perceptions; and that all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging,
loving, hating, and thinking, fall under this denomination. The mind can
never exert itself in any action, which we may not comprehend under the
term of perception; and consequently that term is no less applicable to
those judgments, by which we distinguish moral good and evil, than
to every other operation of the mind. To approve of one character, to
condemn another, are only so many different perceptions.
Now as perceptions resolve themselves into two kinds, viz. impressions
and ideas, this distinction gives rise to a question, with which we
shall open up our present enquiry concerning morals.
WHETHER IT IS
BY MEANS OF OUR IDEAS OR IMPRESSIONS WE DISTINGUISH
BETWIXT VICE AND
VIRTUE, AND PRONOUNCE AN ACTION BLAMEABLE OR
PRAISEWORTHY? This will
immediately cut off all loose discourses and declamations, and reduce us
to something precise and exact on the present subject.
Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that
there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the
same to every rational being that considers them; that the immutable
measures of right and wrong impose an obligation, not only on human
creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in
the opinion, that morality, like truth, is discerned merely by ideas,
and by their juxta-position and comparison. In order, therefore, to
judge of these systems, we need only consider, whether it be possible,
from reason alone, to distinguish betwixt moral good and evil, or
whether there must concur some other principles to enable us to make
that distinction.
If morality had naturally no influence on human passions and actions,
it were in vain to take such pains to inculcate it; and nothing would be
more fruitless than that multitude of rules and precepts, with which all
moralists abound. Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and
practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter
division, it is supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to
go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding. And this
is confirmed by common experience, which informs us, that men are often
governed by their duties, and are detered from some actions by the
opinion of injustice, and impelled to others by that of obligation.
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and
affections, it follows, that they cannot be derived from reason; and
that because reason alone, as we have already proved, can never have any
such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions.
Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular.
The rules of
morality therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
No one, I believe, will deny the justness of this inference; nor is
there any other means of evading it, than by denying that principle,
on which it is founded. As long as it is allowed, that reason has no
influence on our passions and action, it is in vain to pretend,
that morality is discovered only by a deduction of reason. An active
principle can never be founded on an inactive; and if reason be inactive
in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances, whether
it exerts itself in natural or moral subjects, whether it considers the
powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational beings.
It would be tedious to repeat all the arguments, by which I have proved
[Book II. Part III. Sect 3.], that reason is perfectly inert, and can
never either prevent or produce any action or affection, it will be easy
to recollect what has been said upon that subject. I shall only recall
on this occasion one of these arguments, which I shall endeavour
to render still more conclusive, and more applicable to the present
subject.
Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists
in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas,
or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not
susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being
true or false, and can never be an object of our reason.
Now it is
evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of
any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities,
compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions,
volitions, and actions. It is impossible, therefore, they can be
pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable
to reason.
This argument is of double advantage to our present purpose. For
it proves DIRECTLY, that actions do not derive their merit from a
conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it; and it
proves the same truth more INDIRECTLY, by shewing us, that as reason
can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or
approving of it, it cannot be the source of moral good and evil, which
are found to have that influence. Actions may be laudable or blameable;
but they cannot be reasonable: Laudable or blameable, therefore, are
not the same with reasonable or unreasonable. The merit and demerit
of actions frequently contradict, and sometimes controul our natural
propensities. But reason has no such influence. Moral distinctions,
therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive,
and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a
sense of morals.
But perhaps it may be said, that though no will or action can
be immediately contradictory to reason, yet we may find such a
contradiction in some of the attendants of the action, that is, in its
causes or effects. The action may cause a judgment, or may be obliquely
caused by one, when the judgment concurs with a passion; and by an
abusive way of speaking, which philosophy will scarce allow of, the same
contrariety may, upon that account, be ascribed to the action. How
far this truth or faishood may be the source of morals, it will now be
proper to consider.
It has been observed, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense,
can have influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it
excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is
a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and
effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion. These are the
only kinds of judgment, which can accompany our actions, or can be
said to produce them in any manner; and it must be allowed, that these
judgments may often be false and erroneous. A person may be affected
with passion, by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an object, which
has no tendency to produce either of these sensations, or which produces
the contrary to what is imagined. A person may also take false measures
for the attaining his end, and may retard, by his foolish conduct,
instead of forwarding the execution of any project.
These false
judgments may be thought to affect the passions and actions, which are
connected with them, and may be said to render them unreasonable, in
a figurative and improper way of speaking. But though this be
acknowledged, it is easy to observe, that these errors are so far
from being the source of all immorality, that they are commonly
very innocent, and draw no manner of guilt upon the person who is so
unfortunate as to fail into them. They extend not beyond a mistake of
fact, which moralists have not generally supposed criminal, as being
perfectly involuntary. I am more to be lamented than blamed, if I am
mistaken with regard to the influence of objects in producing pain or
pleasure, or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires.
No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character.
A fruit, for instance, that is really disagreeable, appears to me at a
distance, and through mistake I fancy it to be pleasant and delicious.
Here is one error. I choose certain means of reaching this fruit, which
are not proper for my end. Here is a second error; nor is there any
third one, which can ever possibly enter into our reasonings concerning
actions. I ask, therefore, if a man, in this situation, and guilty of
these two errors, is to be regarded as vicious and criminal, however
unavoidable they might have been? Or if it be possible to imagine, that
such errors are the sources of all immorality?
And here it may be proper to observe, that if moral distinctions be
derived from the truth or falshood of those judgments, they must take
place wherever we form the judgments; nor will there be any difference,
whether the question be concerning an apple or a kingdom, or whether the
error be avoidable or unavoidable. For as the very essence of morality
is supposed to consist in an agreement or disagreement to reason, the
other circumstances are entirely arbitrary, and can never either bestow
on any action the character of virtuous or vicious, or deprive it
of that character. To which we may add, that this agreement or
disagreement, not admitting of degrees, all virtues and vices would of
course be equal.
Should it be pretended, that though a mistake of fact be not criminal,
yet a mistake of right often is; and that this may be the source of
immorality: I would answer, that it is impossible such a mistake can
ever be the original source of immorality, since it supposes a real
right and wrong; that is, a real distinction in morals, independent of
these judgments. A mistake, therefore, of right may become a species
of immorality; but it is only a secondary one, and is founded on some
other, antecedent to it.
As to those judgments which are the effects of our actions, and which,
when false, give occasion to pronounce the actions contrary to truth
and reason; we may observe, that our actions never cause any judgment,
either true or false, in ourselves, and that it is only on others
they have such an influence. It is certain, that an action, on many
occasions, may give rise to false conclusions in others; and that a
person, who through a window sees any lewd behaviour of mine with my
neighbour's wife, may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my
own. In this respect my action resembles somewhat a lye or falshood;
only with this difference, which is material, that I perform not the
action with any intention of giving rise to a false judgment in another,
but merely to satisfy my lust and passion. It causes, however, a mistake
and false judgment by accident; and the falshood of its effects may be
ascribed, by some odd figurative way of speaking, to the action itself.
But still I can see no pretext of reason for asserting, that the
tendency to cause such an error is the first spring or original source
of all immorality.
[Footnote 12. One might think it were entirely superfluous
to prove this, if a late author [William Wollaston, THE
RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED (London 1722)], who has had
the good fortune to obtain some reputation, had not seriously affirmed, that such a falshood is the foundation
of all guilt and moral deformity. That we may discover the
fallacy of his hypothesis, we need only consider, that a
false conclusion is drawn from an action, only by means of
an obscurity of natural principles, which makes a cause be
secretly interrupted In its operation, by contrary causes,
and renders the connexion betwixt two objects uncertain and
variable. Now, as a like uncertainty and variety of causes
take place, even in natural objects, and produce a like
error in our judgment, if that tendency to produce error
were the very essence of vice and immorality, it should
follow, that even inanimate objects might be vicious and
immoral.
One might think It were entirely superfluous to prove this,
if a late author [William Wollaston, THE RELIGION
OF NATURE
DELINEATED (London 1722)], who has had the good fortune to
obtain some reputation, had not seriously affirmed, that
such a falshood is the foundation of all guilt and moral
deformity. That we may discover the fallacy of his hypothesis, we need only consider, that a false conclusion
is drawn from an action, only by means of an obscurity of
natural principles, which makes a cause be secretly interrupted In its operation, by contrary causes, and
renders the connexion betwixt two objects uncertain and
variable. Now, as a like uncertainty and variety of causes
take place, even in natural objects, and produce a like
error in our judgment, if that tendency to produce error
were the very essence of vice and immorality, it should
follow, that even inanimate objects might be vicious and
immoral.
It is in vain to urge, that inanimate objects act without
liberty and choice. For as liberty and choice are not
necessary to make an action produce in us an erroneous
conclusion, they can be, in no respect, essential to
morality; and I do not readily perceive, upon this system,
how they can ever come to be regarded by it. If the tendency
to cause error be the origin of immorality, that tendency
and immorality would in every case be inseparable.
Add to this, that if I had used the precaution of shutting
the windows, while I indulged myself in those liberties with
my neighbour's wife, I should have been guilty of no
immorality; and that because my action, being perfectly
concealed, would have had no tendency to produce any false
conclusion.
For the same reason, a thief, who steals In by a ladder at a
window, and takes all imaginable care to cause no disturbance, is in no respect criminal. For either he will
not be perceived, or if he be, it is impossible he can
produce any error, nor will any one, from these circumstances, take him to be other than what he really is.
It is well known, that those who are squint-sighted, do very
readily cause mistakes in others, and that we Imagine they
salute or are talking to one person, while they address
themselves to anther. Are they therefore, upon that account,
immoral?
Besides, we may easily observe, that in all those arguments
there is an evident reasoning in a circle. A person who
takes possession of another's goods, and uses them as his
own, in a manner declares them to be his own; and this
falshood is the source of the immorality of injustice. But
is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without
an antecedent morality?
A man that is ungrateful to his benefactor, in a manner
affirms, that he never received any favours from him. But in
what manner? Is it because it is his duty to be grateful?
But this supposes, that there is some antecedent rule of
duty and morals. Is it because human nature is generally
grateful, and makes us conclude, that a man who does any
harm never received any favour from the person he harmed?
But human nature is not so generally grateful, as to justify
such a conclusion. Or if it were, is an exception to a
general rule in every case criminal, for no other reason
than because it is an exception?
But what may suffice entirely to destroy this whimsical
system is, that it leaves us under the same difficulty to
give a reason why truth is virtuous and falshood vicious, as
to account for the merit or turpitude of any other action. I
shall allow, if you please, that all immorality is derived
from this supposed falshood in action, provided you can give
me any plausible reason, why such a falshood is immoral. If
you consider rightly of the matter, you will find yourself
in the same difficulty as at the beginning.
This last argument is very conclusive; because, if there be
not an evident merit or turpitude annexed to this species of
truth or falahood, It can never have any influence upon our
actions. For, who ever thought of forbearing any action,
because others might possibly draw false conclusions from
it? Or, who ever performed any, that he might give rise to
true conclusions?]
Thus upon the whole, it is impossible, that the distinction betwixt
moral good and evil, can be made to reason; since that distinction
has an influence upon our actions, of which reason alone is incapable.
Reason and judgment may, indeed, be the mediate cause of an action, by
prompting, or by directing a passion: But it is not pretended, that a
judgment of this kind, either in its truth or falshood, is attended
with virtue or vice. And as to the judgments, which are caused by our
judgments, they can still less bestow those moral qualities on the
actions, which are their causes.
But to be more particular, and to shew, that those eternal immutable
fitnesses and unfitnesses of things cannot be defended by sound
philosophy, we may weigh the following considerations.
If the thought and understanding were alone capable of fixing the
boundaries of right and wrong, the character of virtuous and vicious
either must lie in some relations of objects, or must be a matter of
fact, which is discovered by our reasoning. This consequence is evident.
As the operations of human understanding divide themselves into two
kinds, the comparing of ideas, and the inferring of matter of fact; were
virtue discovered by the understanding; it must be an object of one of
these operations, nor is there any third operation of the understanding.
which can discover it. There has been an opinion very industriously
propagated by certain philosophers, that morality is susceptible of
demonstration; and though no one has ever been able to advance a single
step in those demonstrations; yet it is taken for granted, that this
science may be brought to an equal certainty with geometry or algebra.
Upon this supposition vice and virtue must consist in some relations;
since it is allowed on all hands, that no matter of fact is capable
of being demonstrated. Let us, therefore, begin with examining this
hypothesis, and endeavour, if possible, to fix those moral qualities,
which have been so long the objects of our fruitless researches. Point
out distinctly the relations, which constitute morality or obligation,
that we may know wherein they consist, and after what manner we must
judge of them.
If you assert, that vice and virtue consist in relations susceptible
of certainty and demonstration, you must confine yourself to those four
relations, which alone admit of that degree of evidence; and in that
case you run into absurdities, from which you will never be able to
extricate yourself. For as you make the very essence of morality to lie
in the relations, and as there is no one of these relations but what is
applicable, not only to an irrational, but also to an inanimate object;
it follows, that even such objects must be susceptible of merit or
demerit. RESEMBLANCE, CONTRARIETY, DEGREES IN QUALITY, and PROPORTIONS
IN QUANTITY AND NUMBER; all these relations belong as properly
to matter, as to our actions, passions, and volitions.
It is
unquestionable, therefore, that morality lies not in any of these
relations, nor the sense of it in their discovery.
[Footnote 13. As a proof, how confused our way of thinking
on this subject commonly is, we may observe, that those who
assert, that morality is demonstrable, do not say, that
morality lies in the relations, and that the relations are
distinguishable by reason. They only say, that reason can
discover such an action, In such relations, to be virtuous,
and such another vicious. It seems they thought it sufficient, if they could bring the word, Relation, into the
proposition, without troubling themselves whether it was to
the purpose or not. But here, I think, is plain argument.
Demonstrative reason discovers only relations. But that
reason, according to this hypothesis, discovers also vice
and virtue. These moral qualities, therefore, must be
relations. When we blame any action, in any situation, the
whole complicated object, of action and situation, must form
certain relations, wherein the essence of vice consists.
This hypothesis is not otherwise intelligible. For what does
reason discover, when it pronounces any action vicious? Does
it discover a relation or a matter of fact? These questions
are decisive, and must not be eluded.]
Should it be asserted, that the sense of morality consists in
the discovery of some relation, distinct from these, and that our
enumeration was not compleat, when we comprehended all demonstrable
relations under four general heads: To this I know not what to reply,
till some one be so good as to point out to me this new relation. It is
impossible to refute a system, which has never yet been explained. In
such a manner of fighting in the dark, a man loses his blows in the air,
and often places them where the enemy is not present.