virtue run insensibly into each other, and may approach by such
imperceptible degrees as will make it very difficult, if not absolutely
impossible, to determine when the one ends, and the other begins; and
from this observation we may derive a new argument for the foregoing
principle. For whatever may be the case, with regard to all kinds
of vice and virtue, it is certain, that rights, and obligations, and
property, admit of no such insensible gradation, but that a man either
has a full and perfect property, or none at all; and is either entirely
obliged to perform any action, or lies under no manner of obligation.
However civil laws may talk of a perfect dominion, and of an imperfect,
it is easy to observe, that this arises from a fiction, which has no
foundation in reason, and can never enter into our notions of natural
justice and equity. A man that hires a horse, though but for a day, has
as full a right to make use of it for that time, as he whom we call its
proprietor has to make use of it any other day; and it was evident, that
however the use may be bounded in time or degree, the right itself is
not susceptible of any such gradation, but is absolute and entire, so
far as it extends. Accordingly we may observe, that this right both
arises and perishes in an instant; and that a man entirely acquires the
property of any object by occupation, or the consent of the proprietor;
and loses it by his own consent; without any of that insensible
gradation, which is remarkable in other qualities and relations, Since,
therefore, this is die case with regard to property, and rights, and
obligations, I ask, how it stands with regard to justice and
injustice? After whatever manner you answer this question, you run into
inextricable difficulties. If you reply, that justice and injustice
admit of degree, and run insensibly into each other, you expressly
contradict the foregoing position, that obligation and property are not
susceptible of such a gradation. These depend entirely upon justice and
injustice, and follow them in all their variations.
Where the justice is
entire, the property is also entire: Where the justice is imperfect, the
property must also be imperfect And vice versa, if the property admit of
no such variations, they must also be incompatible with justice. If you
assent, therefore, to this last proposition, and assert, that justice
and injustice are not susceptible of degrees, you in effect assert,
that they are not naturally either vicious or virtuous; since vice
and virtue, moral good and evil, and indeed all natural qualities,
run insensibly into each other, and are, on many occasions,
undistinguishable.
And here it may be worth while to observe, that though abstract
reasoning, and the general maxims of philosophy and law establish this
position, that property, and right, and obligation admit not of
degrees, yet in our common and negligent way of thinking, we find great
difficulty to entertain that opinion, and do even secretly embrace the
contrary principle. An object must either be in the possession of
one person or another. An action must either be performed or not The
necessity there is of choosing one side in these dilemmas, and the
impossibility there often is of finding any just medium, oblige us,
when we reflect on the matter, to acknowledge, that all property and
obligations are entire. But on the other hand, when we consider the
origin of property and obligation, and find that they depend on public
utility, and sometimes on the propensities of the imagination, which are
seldom entire on any side; we are naturally inclined to imagine, that
these moral relations admit of an insensible gradation.
Hence it is,
that in references, where the consent of the parties leave the referees
entire masters of the subject, they commonly discover so much equity and
justice on both sides, as induces them to strike a medium, and divide
the difference betwixt the parties. Civil judges, who have not this
liberty, but are obliged to give a decisive sentence on some one side,
are often at a loss how to determine, and are necessitated to proceed
on the most frivolous reasons in the world. Half rights and obligations,
which seem so natural in common life, are perfect absurdities in their
tribunal; for which reason they are often obliged to take half arguments
for whole ones, in order to terminate the affair one way or other.
(3) The third argument of this kind I shall make use of may be explained
thus. If we consider the ordinary course of human actions, we shall
find, that the mind restrains not itself by any general and universal
rules; but acts on most occasions as it is determined by its present
motives and inclination. As each action is a particular individual
event, it must proceed from particular principles, and from our
immediate situation within ourselves, and with respect to the rest of
the universe. If on some occasions we extend our motives beyond those
very circumstances, which gave rise to them, and form something like
general rules for our conduct, it is easy to observe, that these rules
are not perfectly inflexible, but allow of many exceptions. Since,
therefore, this is the ordinary course of human actions, we may
conclude, that the laws of justice, being universal and perfectly
inflexible, can never be derived from nature, nor be the immediate
offspring of any natural motive or inclination. No action can be either
morally good or evil, unless there be some natural passion or motive
to impel us to it, or deter us from it; and it is evident, that die
morality must be susceptible of all the same variations, which are
natural to the passion. Here are two persons, who dispute for an estate;
of whom one is rich, a fool, and a batchelor; the other poor, a man of
sense, and has a numerous family: The first is my enemy; the second
my friend. Whether I be actuated in this affair by a view to public or
private interest, by friendship or enmity, I must be induced to do my
utmost to procure the estate to the latter. Nor would any consideration
of the right and property of the persons be able to restrain me, were I
actuated only by natural motives, without any combination or convention
with others. For as all property depends on morality; and as all
morality depends on the ordinary course of our passions and actions; and
as these again are only directed by particular motives; it is evident,
such a partial conduct must be suitable to the strictest morality, and
coued never be a violation of property. Were men, therefore, to take
the liberty of acting with regard to the laws of society, as they do in
every other affair, they would conduct themselves, on most occasions, by
particular judgments, and would take into consideration the characters
and circumstances of the persons, as well as the general nature of the
question. But it is easy to observe, that this would produce an infinite
confusion in human society, and that the avidity and partiality of men
would quickly bring disorder into the world, if not restrained by some
general and inflexible principles. Twas, therefore, with a view to this
inconvenience, that men have established those principles, and have
agreed to restrain themselves by general rules, which are unchangeable
by spite and favour, and by particular views of private or public
interest. These rules, then, are artificially invented for a certain
purpose, and are contrary to the common principles of human nature,
which accommodate themselves to circumstances, and have no stated
invariable method of operation.
Nor do I perceive how I can easily be mistaken in this matter. I see
evidently, that when any man imposes on himself general inflexible
rules in his conduct with others, he considers certain objects as
their property, which he supposes to be sacred and inviolable. But
no proposition can be more evident, than that property is perfectly
unintelligible without first supposing justice and injustice; and that
these virtues and vices are as unintelligible, unless we have motives,
independent of the morality, to impel us to just actions, and deter us
from unjust ones. Let those motives, therefore, be what they will, they
must accommodate themselves to circumstances, and must admit of all the
variations, which human affairs, in their incessant revolutions, are
susceptible of. They are consequently a very improper foundation for
such rigid inflexible rules as the laws of nature; and it is evident
these laws can only be derived from human conventions, when men have
perceived the disorders that result from following their natural and
variable principles.
Upon the whole, then, we are to consider this distinction betwixt
justice and injustice, as having two different foundations, viz, that
of interest, when men observe, that it is impossible to live in society
without restraining themselves by certain rules; and that of morality,
when this interest is once observed and men receive a pleasure from the
view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness
from such as are contrary to it. It is the voluntary convention
and artifice of men, which makes the first interest take place;
and therefore those laws of justice are so far to be considered as
artifrial. After that interest is once established and acknowledged, the
sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally,
and of itself; though it is certain, that it is also augmented by a
new artifice, and that the public instructions of politicians, and the
private education of parents, contribute to the giving us a sense of
honour and duty in the strict regulation of our actions with regard to
the properties of others.
SECT. VII OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT
Nothing is more certain, than that men are, in a great measure, governed
by interest, and that even when they extend their concern beyond
themselves, it is not to any great distance; nor is it usual for
them, in common life, to look farther than their nearest friends and
acquaintance. It is no less certain, that it is impossible for men to
consult, their interest in so effectual a manner, as by an universal and
inflexible observance of the rules of justice, by which alone they can
preserve society, and keep themselves from falling into that wretched
and savage condition, which is commonly represented as the state of
nature. And as this interest, which all men have in the upholding of
society, and the observation of the rules of justice, is great, so is
it palpable and evident, even to the most rude and uncultivated of human
race; and it is almost impossible for any one, who has had experience of
society, to be mistaken in this particular. Since, therefore, men are
so sincerely attached to their interest, and their interest is so much
concerned in the observance of justice, and this interest is so certain
and avowed; it may be asked, how any disorder can ever arise in
society, and what principle there is in human nature so powerful as to
overcome so strong a passion, or so violent as to obscure so clear a
knowledge?
It has been observed, in treating of the passions, that men are mightily
governed by the imagination, and proportion their affections more to
the light, under which any object appears to them, than to its real and
intrinsic value. What strikes upon them with a strong and lively idea
commonly prevails above what lies in a more obscure light; and it
must be a great superiority of value, that is able to compensate this
advantage. Now as every thing, that is contiguous to us, either in space
or time, strikes upon us with such an idea, it has a proportional effect
on the will and passions, and commonly operates with more force than any
object, that lies in a more distant and obscure light.
Though we may be
fully convinced, that the latter object excels the former, we are
not able to regulate our actions by this judgment; but yield to the
sollicitations of our passions, which always plead in favour of whatever
is near and contiguous.
This is the reason why men so often act in contradiction to their known
interest; and in particular why they prefer any trivial advantage,
that is present, to the maintenance of order in society, which so much
depends on the observance of justice. The consequences of every breach
of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not able to counter-ballance
any immediate advantage, that may be reaped from it.
They are, however,
never the less real for being remote; and as all men are, in some
degree, subject to the same weakness, it necessarily happens, that
the violations of equity must become very frequent in society, and
the commerce of men, by that means, be rendered very dangerous and
uncertain. You have the same propension, that I have, in favour of
what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally
carried to commit acts of injustice as well as me. Your example both
pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new
reason for any breach of equity, by shewing me, that I should be the
cully of my integrity, if I alone should impose on myself a severe
restraint amidst the licentiousness of others.
This quality, therefore, of human nature, not only is very dangerous
to society, but also seems, on a cursory view, to be incapable of any
remedy. The remedy can only come from the consent of men; and if men be
incapable of themselves to prefer remote to contiguous, they will never
consent to any thing, which would oblige them to such a choice, and
contradict, in so sensible a manner, their natural principles and
propensities. Whoever chuses the means, chuses also the end; and if it
be impossible for us to prefer what is remote, it is equally impossible
for us to submit to any necessity, which would oblige us to such a
method of acting.
But here it is observable, that this infirmity of human nature becomes
a remedy to itself, and that we provide against our negligence about
remote objects, merely because we are naturally inclined to that
negligence. When we consider any objects at a distance, all their minute
distinctions vanish, and we always give the preference to whatever is in
itself preferable, without considering its situation and circumstances.
This gives rise to what in an improper sense we call reason, which is
a principle, that is often contradictory to those propensities that
display themselves upon the approach of the object. In reflecting on any
action, which I am to perform a twelve-month hence, I always resolve to
prefer the greater good, whether at that time it will be more contiguous
or remote; nor does any difference in that particular make a difference
in my present intentions and resolutions. My distance from the final
determination makes all those minute differences vanish, nor am I
affected by any thing, but the general and more discernible qualities of
good and evil. But on my nearer approach, those circumstances, which
I at first over-looked, begin to appear, and have an influence on my
conduct and affections. A new inclination to the present good springs
up, and makes it difficult for me to adhere inflexibly to my first
purpose and resolution. This natural infirmity I may very much regret,
and I may endeavour, by all possible means, to free my self from it. I
may have recourse to study and reflection within myself; to the advice
of friends; to frequent meditation, and repeated resolution: And having
experienced how ineffectual all these are, I may embrace with pleasure
any other expedient, by which I may impose a restraint upon myself, and
guard against this weakness.
The only difficulty, therefore, is to find out this expedient, by which
men cure their natural weakness, and lay themselves under the necessity
of observing the laws of justice and equity, notwithstanding their
violent propension to prefer contiguous to remote. It is evident such a
remedy can never be effectual without correcting this propensity; and as
it is impossible to change or correct any thing material in our nature,
the utmost we can do is to change our circumstances and situation, and
render the observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest,
and their violation our most remote. But this being impracticable with
respect to all mankind, it can only take place with respect to a few,
whom we thus immediately interest in the execution of justice. There are
the persons, whom we call civil magistrates, kings and their ministers,
our governors and rulers, who being indifferent persons to the greatest
part of the state, have no interest, or but a remote one, in any act of
injustice; and being satisfied with their present condition, and with
their part in society, have an immediate interest in every execution of
justice, which is so necessary to the upholding of society. Here then is
the origin of civil government and society. Men are not able radically
to cure, either in themselves or others, that narrowness of soul, which
makes them prefer the present to the remote. They cannot change their
natures. All they can do is to change their situation, and render the
observance of justice the immediate interest of some particular persons,
and its violation their more remote. These persons, then, are not
only induced to observe those rules in their own conduct, but also
to constrain others to a like regularity, and inforce the dictates of
equity through the whole society. And if it be necessary, they may also
interest others more immediately in the execution of justice, and
create a number of officers, civil and military, to assist them in their
government.
But this execution of justice, though the principal, is not the only
advantage of government. As violent passion hinder men from seeing
distinctly the interest they have in an equitable behaviour towards
others; so it hinders them from seeing that equity itself, and gives
them a remarkable partiality in their own favours. This inconvenience is
corrected in the same manner as that above-mentioned.
The same persons,
who execute the laws of justice, will also decide all controversies
concerning them; and being indifferent to the greatest part of the
society, will decide them more equitably than every one would in his own
case.
By means of these two advantages, in the execution and decision of
justice, men acquire a security against each others weakness and
passion, as well as against their own, and under the shelter of their
governors, begin to taste at ease the sweets of society and mutual
assistance. But government extends farther its beneficial influence; and
not contented to protect men in those conventions they make for their
mutual interest, it often obliges them to make such conventions, and
forces them to seek their own advantage, by a concurrence in some common
end or purpose. There is no quality in human nature, which causes more
fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever
is present to the distant and remote, and makes us desire objects more
according to their situation than their intrinsic value.
Two neighbours
may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because it is
easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the
immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the
whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a
thousand persons should agree in any such action; it being difficult for
them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for
them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the
trouble and expence, and would lay the whole burden on others. Political
society easily remedies both these inconveniences.
Magistrates find an
immediate interest in the interest of any considerable part of their
subjects. They need consult no body but themselves to form any scheme
for the promoting of that interest. And as the failure of any one piece
in the execution is connected, though not immediately, with the failure
of the whole, they prevent that failure, because they find no interest
in it, either immediate or remote. Thus bridges are built; harbours
opened; ramparts raised; canals formed; fleets equiped; and armies
disciplined every where, by the care of government, which, though
composed of men subject to all human infirmities, becomes, by one of the
finest and most subtle inventions imaginable, a composition, which is,
in some measure, exempted from all these infirmities.
SECT. VIII OF THE SOURCE OF ALLEGIANCE
Though government be an invention very advantageous, and even in some
circumstances absolutely necessary to mankind; it is not necessary in
all circumstances, nor is it impossible for men to preserve society
for some time, without having recourse to such an invention. Men, it is
true, are always much inclined to prefer present interest to distant
and remote; nor is it easy for them to resist the temptation of any
advantage, that they may immediately enjoy, in apprehension of an evil
that lies at a distance from them: But still this weakness is less
conspicuous where the possessions, and the pleasures of life are few,
and of little value, as they always are in the infancy of society. An
Indian is but little tempted to dispossess another of his hut, or to
steal his bow, as being already provided of the same advantages; and as
to any superior fortune, which may attend one above another in hunting
and fishing, it is only casual and temporary, and will have but small
tendency to disturb society. And so far am I from thinking with
some philosophers, that men are utterly incapable of society without
government, that I assert the first rudiments of government to arise
from quarrels, not among men of the same society, but among those of
different societies. A less degree of riches will suffice to this latter
effect, than is requisite for the former. Men fear nothing from public
war and violence but the resistance they meet with, which, because
they share it in common, seems less terrible; and because it comes from
strangers, seems less pernicious in its consequences, than when they are
exposed singly against one whose commerce is advantageous to them, and
without whose society it is impossible they can subsist.
Now foreign war
to a society without government necessarily produces civil war. Throw
any considerable goods among men, they instantly fall a quarrelling,
while each strives to get possession of what pleases him, without regard
to the consequences. In a foreign war the most considerable of all
goods, life and limbs, are at stake; and as every one shuns dangerous
ports, seizes the best arms, seeks excuse for the slightest wounds, the
laws, which may be well enough observed while men were calm, can now no
longer take place, when they are in such commotion.
This we find verified in the American tribes, where men live in concord
and amity among themselves without any established government and never
pay submission to any of their fellows, except in time of war, when
their captain enjoys a shadow of authority, which he loses after
their return from the field, and the establishment of peace with the
neighbouring tribes. This authority, however, instructs them in the
advantages of