Those political writers, who have had recourse to a promise, or original
contract, as the source of our allegiance to government, intended to
establish a principle, which is perfectly just and reasonable; though
the reasoning, upon which they endeavoured to establish it, was
fallacious and sophistical. They would prove, that our submission to
government admits of exceptions, and that an egregious tyranny in the
rulers is sufficient to free the subjects from all ties of allegiance.
Since men enter into society, say they, and submit themselves to
government, by their free and voluntary consent, they must have in view
certain advantages, which they propose to reap from it, and for which
they are contented to resign their native liberty. There is, therefore,
something mutual engaged on the part of the magistrate, viz, protection
and security; and it is only by the hopes he affords of these
advantages, that he can ever persuade men to submit to him. But
when instead of protection and security, they meet with tyranny and
oppression, they are freeed from their promises, (as happens in all
conditional contracts) and return to that state of liberty, which
preceded the institution of government. Men would never be so foolish as
to enter into such engagements as should turn entirely to the advantage
of others, without any view of bettering their own condition. Whoever
proposes to draw any profit from our submission, must engage himself,
either expressly or tacitly, to make us reap some advantage from his
authority; nor ought he to expect, that without the performance of his
part we will ever continue in obedience.
I repeat it: This conclusion is just, though the principles be
erroneous; and I flatter myself, that I can establish the same
conclusion on more reasonable principles. I shall not take such a
compass, in establishing our political duties, as to assert, that men
perceive the advantages of government; that they institute government
with a view to those advantages; that this institution requires a
promise of obedience; which imposes a moral obligation to a certain
degree, but being conditional, ceases to be binding, whenever the other
contracting party performs not his part of the engagement. I perceive,
that a promise itself arises entirely from human conventions, and is
invented with a view to a certain interest. I seek, therefore, some such
interest more immediately connected with government, and which may be
at once the original motive to its institution, and the source of our
obedience to it. This interest I find to consist in the security and
protection, which we enjoy in political society, and which we can never
attain, when perfectly free and independent. As interest, therefore, is
the immediate sanction of government, the one can have no longer being
than the other; and whenever the civil magistrate carries his oppression
so far as to render his authority perfectly intolerable, we are no
longer bound to submit to it. The cause ceases; the effect must cease
also.
So far the conclusion is immediate and direct, concerning the natural
obligation which we have to allegiance. As to the moral obligation, we
may observe, that the maxim would here be false, that when the cause
ceases, the effect must cease also. For there is a principle of human
nature, which we have frequently taken notice of, that men are mightily
addicted to general rules, and that we often carry our maxims beyond
those reasons, which first induced us to establish them.
Where cases
are similar in many circumstances, we are apt to put them on the same
footing, without considering, that they differ in the most material
circumstances, and that the resemblance is more apparent than real. It
may, therefore, be thought, that in the case of allegiance our moral
obligation of duty will not cease, even though the natural obligation of
interest, which is its cause, has ceased; and that men may be bound by
conscience to submit to a tyrannical government against their own and
the public interest. And indeed, to the force of this argument I so far
submit, as to acknowledge, that general rules commonly extend beyond
the principles, on which they are founded; and that we seldom make any
exception to them, unless that exception have the qualities of a general
rule, and be founded on very numerous and common instances. Now this I
assert to be entirely the present case. When men submit to the authority
of others, it is to procure themselves some security against the
wickedness and injustice of men, who are perpetually carried, by their
unruly passions, and by their present and immediate interest, to the
violation of all the laws of society. But as this imperfection is
inherent in human nature, we know that it must attend men in all their
states and conditions; and that these, whom we chuse for rulers, do not
immediately become of a superior nature to the rest of mankind, upon
account of their superior power and authority. What we expect from them
depends not on a change of their nature but of their situation, when
they acquire a more immediate interest in the preservation of order and
the execution of justice. But besides that this interest is only more
immediate in the execution of justice among their subjects; besides
this, I say, we may often expect, from the irregularity of human nature,
that they will neglect even this immediate interest, and be transported
by their passions into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition.. Our
general knowledge of human nature, our observation of the past history
of mankind, our experience of present times; all these causes must
induce us to open the door to exceptions, and must make us conclude,
that we may resist the more violent effects of supreme power, without
any crime or injustice.
Accordingly we may observe, that this is both the general practice and
principle of mankind, and that no nation, that coued find any remedy,
ever yet suffered the cruel ravages of a tyrant, or were blamed for
their resistance. Those who took up arms against Dionysius or Nero, or
Philip the second, have the favour of every reader in the perusal of
their history: and nothing but the most violent perversion of common
sense can ever lead us to condemn them. It is certain, therefore, that
in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as
that of passive obedience, but make allowances for resistance in the
more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression. The general opinion
of mankind has some authority in all cases; but in this of morals it
is perfectly infallible. Nor is it less infallible, because men cannot
distinctly explain the principles, on which it is founded. Few persons
can carry on this train of reasoning: Government is a mere human invention for the interest of society. Where
the tyranny of the governor removes this interest, it also removes the
natural obligation to obedience. The moral obligation is founded on the
natural, and therefore must cease where that ceases; especially where
the subject is such as makes us foresee very many occasions wherein the
natural obligation may cease, and causes us to form a kind of general
rule for the regulation of our conduct in such occurrences.
But though this train of reasoning be too subtile for the vulgar, it is
certain, that all men have an implicit notion of it, and are sensible,
that they owe obedience to government merely on account of the public
interest; and at the same time, that human nature is so subject to
frailties and passions, as may easily pervert this institution, and
change their governors into tyrants and public enemies.
If the sense of
common interest were not our original motive to obedience, I would fain
ask, what other principle is there in human nature capable of subduing
the natural ambition of men, and forcing them to such a submission?
Imitation and custom are not sufficient. For the question still recurs,
what motive first produces those instances of submission, which we
imitate, and that train of actions, which produces the custom? There
evidently is no other principle than public interest; and if interest
first produces obedience to government, the obligation to obedience
must cease, whenever the interest ceases, in any great degree, and in a
considerable number of instances.
SECT. X OF THE OBJECTS OF ALLEGIANCE
But though, on some occasions, it may be justifiable, both in sound
politics and morality, to resist supreme power, it is certain, that in
the ordinary course of human affairs nothing can be more pernicious
and criminal; and that besides the convulsions, which always attend
revolutions, such a practice tends directly to the subversion of all
government, and the causing an universal anarchy and confusion among
mankind. As numerous and civilized societies cannot subsist without
government, so government is entirely useless without an exact
obedience. We ought always to weigh the advantages, which we reap from
authority, against the disadvantages; and by this means we shall become
more scrupulous of putting in practice the doctrine of resistance. The
common rule requires submission; and it is only in cases of grievous
tyranny and oppression, that the exception can take place.
Since then such a blind submission is commonly due to magistracy, the
next question is, to whom it is due, and whom we are to regard as our
lawful magistrates? In order to answer this question, let us recollect
what we have already established concerning the origin of government and
political society. When men have once experienced the impossibility
of preserving any steady order in society, while every one is his own
master, and violates or observes the laws of society, according to his
present interest or pleasure, they naturally run into the invention of
government, and put it out of their own power, as far as possible, to
transgress the laws of society. Government, therefore, arises from the
same voluntary conversation of men; and it is evident, that the same
convention, which establishes government, will also determine the
persons who are to govern, and will remove all doubt and ambiguity in
this particular. And the voluntary consent of men must here have the
greater efficacy, that the authority of the magistrate does at first
stand upon the foundation of a promise of the subjects, by which they
bind themselves to obedience; as in every other contract or engagement.
The same promise, then, which binds them to obedience, ties them down to
a particular person, and makes him the object of their allegiance.
But when government has been established on this footing for some
considerable time, and the separate interest, which we have in
submission, has produced a separate sentiment of morality, the case
is entirely altered, and a promise is no longer able to determine the
particular magistrate since it is no longer considered as the foundation
of government. We naturally suppose ourselves born to submission; and
imagine, that such particular persons have a right to command, as we on
our part are bound to obey. These notions of right and obligation are
derived from nothing but the advantage we reap from government, which
gives us a repugnance to practise resistance ourselves, and makes us
displeased with any instance of it in others. But here it is remarkable,
that in this new state of affairs, the original sanction of government,
which is interest, is not admitted to determine the persons, whom we are
to obey, as the original sanction did at first, when affairs were on
the footing of a promise. A promise fixes and determines the persons,
without any uncertainty: But it is evident, that if men were to regulate
their conduct in this particular, by the view of a peculiar interest,
either public or private, they would involve themselves in endless
confusion, and would render all government, in a great measure,
ineffectual. The private interest of every one is different; and though
the public interest in itself be always one and the same, yet it becomes
the source of as great dissentions, by reason of the different opinions
of particular persons concerning it. The same interest, therefore,
which causes us to submit to magistracy, makes us renounce itself in
the choice of our magistrates, and binds us down to a certain form of
government, and to particular persons, without allowing us to aspire to
the utmost perfection in either. The case is here the same as in that
law of nature concerning the stability of possession. It is highly
advantageous, and even absolutely necessary to society, that possession
should be stable; and this leads us to the establishment of such a rule:
But we find, that were we to follow the same advantage, in assigning
particular possessions to particular persons, we should disappoint
our end, and perpetuate the confusion, which that rule is intended to
prevent. We must, therefore, proceed by general rules, and regulate
ourselves by general interests, in modifying the law of nature
concerning the stability of possession. Nor need we fear, that our
attachment to this law will diminish upon account of the seeming
frivolousness of those interests, by which it is determined. The impulse
of the mind is derived from a very strong interest; and those other more
minute interests serve only to direct the motion, without adding
any thing to it, or diminishing from it. It is the same case with
government. Nothing is more advantageous to society than such an
invention; and this interest is sufficient to make us embrace it with
ardour and alacrity; though we are obliged afterwards to regulate and
direct our devotion to government by several considerations, which are
not of the same importance, and to chuse our magistrates without having
in view any particular advantage from the choice.
The first of those principles I shall take notice of, as a foundation of
the right of magistracy, is that which gives authority to all the most
established governments of the world without exception: I mean, long
possession in any one form of government, or succession of princes. It
is certain, that if we remount to the first origin of every nation,
we shall find, that there scarce is any race of kings, or form of a
commonwealth, that is not primarily founded on usurpation and rebellion,
and whose title is not at first worse than doubtful and uncertain. Time
alone gives solidity to their right; and operating gradually on the
minds of men, reconciles them to any authority, and makes it seem just
and reasonable. Nothing causes any sentiment to have a greater influence
upon us than custom, or turns our imagination more strongly to any
object. When we have been long accustomed to obey any set of men,
that general instinct or tendency, which we have to suppose a moral
obligation attending loyalty, takes easily this direction, and chuses
that set of men for its objects. It is interest which gives the general
instinct; but it is custom which gives the particular direction.
And here it is observable, that the same length of time has a different
influence on our sentiments of morality, according to its different
influence on the mind. We naturally judge of every thing by comparison;
and since in considering the fate of kingdoms and republics, we embrace
a long extent of time, a small duration has not in this case a like
influence on our sentiments, as when we consider any other object. One
thinks he acquires a right to a horse, or a suit of cloaths, in a very
short time; but a century is scarce sufficient to establish any
new government, or remove all scruples in the minds of the subjects
concerning it. Add to this, that a shorter period of time will suffice
to give a prince a title to any additional power he may usurp, than will
serve to fix his right, where the whole is an usurpation. The kings of
France have not been possessed of absolute power for above two reigns;
and yet nothing will appear more extravagant to Frenchmen than to
talk of their liberties. If we consider what has been said concerning
accession, we shall easily account for this phaenomenon.
When there is no form of government established by long possession,
the present possession is sufficient to supply its place, and may
be regarded as the second source of all public authority. Right
to authority is nothing but the constant possession of authority,
maintained by the laws of society and the interests of mankind; and
nothing can be more natural than to join this constant possession to the
present one, according to the principles abovementioned. If the same
principles did not take place with regard to the property of private
persons, it was because these principles were counter-ballanced by
very strong considerations of interest; when we observed, that all
restitution would by that means be prevented, and every violence be
authorized and protected. And though the same motives may seem to
have force, with regard to public authority, yet they are opposed by a
contrary interest; which consists in the preservation of peace, and the
avoiding of all changes, which, however they may be easily produced in
private affairs, are unavoidably attended with bloodshed and confusion,
where the public is interested.
Any one, who finding the impossibility of accounting for the right of
the present possessor, by any received system of ethics, should resolve
to deny absolutely that right, and assert, that it is not authorized
by morality, would be justly thought to maintain a very extravagant
paradox, and to shock the common sense and judgment of mankind. No maxim
is more conformable, both to prudence and morals, than to submit quietly
to the government, which we find established in the country where we
happen to live, without enquiring too curiously into its origin and
first establishment. Few governments will bear being examined so
rigorously. How many kingdoms are there at present in the world, and
how many more do we find in history, whose governors have no better
foundation for their authority than that of present possession? To
confine ourselves to the Roman and Grecian empire; is it not evident,
that the long succession of emperors, from the dissolution of the Roman
liberty, to the final extinction of that empire by the Turks, coued not
so much as pretend to any other title to the empire? The election of the
senate was a mere form, which always followed the choice of the legions;
and these were almost always divided in the different provinces, and
nothing but the sword was able to terminate the difference. It was by
the sword, therefore, that every emperor acquired, as well as defended
his right; and we must either say, that all the known world, for so
many ages, had no government, and owed no allegiance to any one, or
must allow, that the right of the stronger, in public affairs, is to be
received as legitimate, and authorized by morality, when not opposed by
any other title.
The right of conquest may be considered as a third source of the
title of sovereigns. This right resembles very much that of present
possession; but has rather a superior force, being seconded by the
notions of glory and honour, which we ascribe to conquerors, instead
of the sentiments of hatred and detestation, which attend usurpers. Men
naturally favour those they love; and therefore are more apt to ascribe
a right to successful violence, betwixt one sovereign and another, than
to the successful rebellion of a subject against his sovereign.
[Footnote 23 It is not here asserted, that present possession or conquest are sufficient to give a title
against long possession and positive laws but only that they
have some force, and will be able to call the ballance where
the titles are otherwise equal, and will even be sufficient
sometimes to sanctify the weaker title. What degree of force
they have is difficult to determine. I believe all moderate
men will allow, that they have great force in all disputes
concerning the rights of princes.]
When neither long possession, nor present possession, nor conquest take
place, as when the first sovereign, who founded any monarchy, dies; in
that case, the right of succession naturally prevails in their stead,
and men are commonly induced to place the son of their late monarch
on the throne, and suppose him to inherit his father's authority. The
presumed consent of the father, the imitation of the succession to
private families, the interest, which the state has in chusing the
person, who is most powerful, and has the most numerous followers; all
these reasons lead men to prefer the son of their late monarch to any
other person.
[Footnote 24 To prevent mistakes I must observe, that this
case of succession is not the same with that of hereditary
monarchies, where custom has fix'd the right of succession.
These depend upon the principle of long possession above
explain'd.]
These reasons have some weight; but I am persuaded, that to one, who
considers impartially of the matter, it will appear, that there concur
some principles of the imagination, along with those views of interest.
The royal authority seems to be connected with the young prince even in
his father's life-time, by the natural transition of the thought; and
still more after his death: So that nothing is more natural than to
compleat this union by a new relation, and by putting him actually in
possession of what seems so naturally to belong to him.
To confirm this we may weigh the following phaenomena, which are pretty
curious in their kind. In elective monarchies the right of succession
has no place by the laws and settled custom; and yet its influence is
so natural, that it is impossible entirely to exclude it from the
imagination, and render the subjects indifferent to the son of their
deceased monarch. Hence in some governments of this kind, the choice
commonly falls on one or other of the royal family; and in some
governments they are all excluded. Those contrary phaenomena proceed
from the same principle. Where the royal family is excluded, it is
from a refinement in politics, which makes people sensible of their
propensity to chuse a sovereign in that family, and gives them a
jealousy of their liberty, lest their new monarch, aided by this
propensity, should establish his family, and destroy the freedom of
elections for the future.
The history of Artaxerxes, and the younger Cyrus, may furnish us with
some reflections to the same purpose. Cyrus pretended a right to the
throne above his elder brother, because he was born after his father's
accession. I do not pretend, that this reason was valid.
I would only
infer from it, that he would never have made use of such a pretext, were
it not for the qualities of the imagination abovementioned, by which
we are naturally inclined to unite by a new relation whatever objects we
find already united. Artaxerxes had an advantage above his brother, as
being the eldest son, and the first in succession: But Cyrus was more
closely related to the royal authority, as being begot after his father
was invested with it.
Should it here be pretended, that the view of convenience may be
the source of all the right of succession, and that men gladly take
advantage of any rule, by which they can fix the successor of their late
so