Little is known of the life of Joseph ben Jacob ibn Zaddik. He lived in Cordova; he was appointed Dayyan, or Judge of
the Jewish community of that city in 1138; and he died in 1149. He is praised as a Talmudic scholar by his countryman
Moses ibn Ezra, and as a poet by Abraham ibn Daud and Harizi, though we have no Talmudic composition from his pen,
and but few poems, whether liturgical or otherwise.[162] His fame rests on his philosophical work, and it is this phase of
his career in which we are interested here. "Olam Katon" or "Microcosm" is the Hebrew name of the philosophical treatise
which he wrote in Arabic, but which we no longer possess in the original, being indebted for our knowledge of it to a
Hebrew translation of unknown authorship.[163] Maimonides knew Joseph ibn Zaddik favorably, but he was not familiar
with the "Microcosm." In a letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, the translator of his "Guide of the Perplexed," Maimonides tells us
that though he has not seen the "Olam Katon" of Ibn Zaddik, he knows that its tendency is the same as that of the
Brothers of Purity (cf. above, p. 60).[164] This signifies that its trend of thought is Neo-Platonic, which combines
Aristotelian physics with Platonic and Plotinian metaphysics, ethics and psychology.
An examination of the book itself confirms Maimonides's judgment. In accordance with the trend of the times there is
noticeable in Ibn Zaddik an increase of Aristotelian influence, though of a turbid kind; a decided decrease, if not a
complete abandonment, of the ideas of the Kalam, and a strong saturation of Neo-Platonic doctrine and point of view. It
was the fashion to set the Kalam over against the philosophers to the disadvantage of the former, as being deficient in
logical knowledge and prejudiced by theological prepossessions. This is attested by the attitude towards the
Mutakallimun of Judah Halevi, Maimonides, Averroes. And Ibn Zaddik forms no exception to the rule. The circumstance
that it was most likely from Karaite writings, which found their way into Spain, that Ibn Zaddik gained his knowledge of
Kalamistic ideas, was not exactly calculated to prepossess him, a Rabbanite, in their favor. And thus while we see him in
the manner of Saadia and Bahya follow the good old method, credited by Maimonides to the Mutakallimun, of starting his
metaphysics with proofs of the world's creation, and basing the existence of God, his unity, incorporeality and other
attributes on the creation of the world as a foundation, he turns into an uncompromising opponent of these much
despised apologetes when he comes to discuss the nature of God's attributes, of the divine will, and of the nature of evil.
And in all these cases the target of his attack seems to be their Karaite representative Joseph al-Basir, whose
acquaintance we made before (p. 48 ff.).
He laid under contribution his predecessors and contemporaries, Saadia, Bahya, Pseudo-Bahya, Gabirol; and his
sympathies clearly lay with the general point of view represented by the last, and his Mohammedan sources; though he
was enough of an eclectic to refuse to follow Gabirol, or the Brethren of Purity and the other Neo-Platonic writings, in all
the details of their doctrine; and there is evidence of an attempt on his part to tone down the extremes of Neo-Platonic
tendency and create a kind of level in which Aristotelianism and Platonism meet by compromising. Thus he believes with
Gabirol that all things corporeal as well as spiritual are composed of matter and form;[165] but when it comes to defining
what the matter of spiritual things may be, he tells us that we may speak of the genus as the matter of the species—a
doctrine which is not so Neo-Platonic after all. For we do not have to go beyond Aristotle to hear that in the definition of
an object, which represents its intelligible (opposed to sensible) essence, the genus is like the matter, the difference like
the form. Of the universal and prime matter underlying all created things outside of God, of which Gabirol says that it is
the immediate emanation of God's essence and constitutes with universal form the Universal Intelligence, Ibn Zaddik
knows nothing. Nor do we find any outspoken scheme of emanation, such as we see in Plotinus or with a slight
modification in the cyclopœdia of the Brethren of Purity, or as it is presupposed in the "Fons Vitæ" of Gabirol. Ibn Zaddik
does refer to the doctrine of the divine Will, which plays such an important rôle in the philosophy of Gabirol and of the
Pseudo-Empedoclean writings, which are supposed to have been Gabirol's source.[166] But here, too, the negative side
of Ibn Zaddik's doctrine is developed at length, while the positive side is barely alluded to in a hint. He takes pains to
show the absurdity of the view that the divine will is a momentary entity created from time to time to make possible the
coming into being of the things and processes of our world—a view held by the Mutakallimun as represented by their
spokesman al-Basir, but when it comes to explaining his own view of the nature of the divine will, and whether it is
identical with God or not, he suddenly becomes reticent, refers us to the writings of Empedocles, and intimates that the
matter is involved in mystery, and it is not safe to talk about it too plainly and openly. Evidently Ibn Zaddik was not ready
to go all the length of Gabirol's emanationism and Neo-Platonic mysticism.
The Aristotelian ideas, of which there are many in the "Microcosm," are probably not derived from a study of Aristotle's
works, but from secondary sources. This we may safely infer from the way in which he uses or interprets them. An
Aristotelian definition is a highly technical proposition in which every word counts, and requires a definition in turn to be
understood. In the Aristotelian context the reader sees the methodical derivation of the concept; and the several technical
terms making up the definition are made clear by illustrative examples. Aside from the context the proposition is obscure
even in the original Greek. Now conceive an Arabic translation of an Aristotelian definition taken out of its context, and
you do not wonder that it is misunderstood; particularly when the interpreter's point of view is taken from a school of
thought at variance with that of Aristotle. This is exactly what happens to Ibn Zaddik. He quotes approvingly Aristotle's
definition of the soul, and proceeds to interpret it in a manner not intended by the author of the "De Anima."[167] If he had
read the context he could not have misunderstood the definition as he did.
Unlike his predecessors, Ibn Zaddik did not confine himself to a special topic in philosophy or to the metaphysical
aspects of Judaism. Isaac Israeli and Gabirol discuss special questions in Physics and Metaphysics without bringing
them into relation with Judaism or the text of the Bible. Saadia takes cognizance of philosophical doctrine solely with a
view to establishing and rationalizing Jewish dogma, and only in so far as it may thus be utilized. Bahya and Abraham bar
Hiyya confine their philosophical outlook within still narrower limits, having Jewish ethics as their primary concern. All of
the latter make a feature of Biblical interpretation, which lends to their work the Jewish stamp and to their style the
element of homeliness and variety. To this they owe in a measure their popularity, which, however, cannot be said for
Abraham bar Hiyya, whose "Hegyon ha-Nefesh" was not printed until the second half of last century. The "Microcosm" of
Ibn Zaddik is the first compendium of science, philosophy and theology in Jewish literature. And yet it is a small book; for
Ibn Zaddik does not enter into lengthy discussions, nor does he adorn his style with rhetorical flourishes or copious
quotations from Bible and Talmud. The "Olam Katon" is clearly meant for beginners, who require a summary and
compendious view of so much of physics, psychology, metaphysics and ethics as will give them an idea of the position of
man in the world, and his duties, theoretical and practical, in this life, that he may fulfil his destiny for which he was
created. It is very possible that Ibn Zaddik modelled his work on the Encyclopædia of the Brethren of Purity, leaving out
all that he regarded as unessential or objectional and abridging the rest.
Accordingly, the "Microcosm" is divided into four parts. The first part treats of what is called in the Aristotelian
classification of the sciences Physics, i. e., the principles and constitution of the corporeal world and its processes. The
second treats of man, including anthropology and psychology. The third is devoted to a discussion of the existence,
unity, incorporeality and other attributes of God, based upon the doctrine of the creation of the world. This bears the
stamp of the Kalam, and is indebted to the writings of Saadia, Bahya and Joseph al-Basir. It covers the topics usually
treated by the Mutakallimun in the division of their works, known by the name of "Bab al Tauhid," treatise on Unity. The
fourth part corresponds to the "Bab al Adi" of the Kalam, i. e., the second division of Kalamistic works devoted to
theodicy, or vindication of God's justice in his dealings with mankind. Hence it includes theological questions of an ethical
nature, like freedom of the will, reasons for divine worship, the nature of reward and punishment, and so on.
The book was written, Ibn Zaddik tells us, in answer to the question of a pupil concerning the meaning of such terms as
"perfection" and "permanent good," used by philosophers. They are not of this world these men say, and yet every man
of intelligence should seek them. This is a very difficult subject, made more so by the small number of persons engaged
in its study. Particularly in our own generation is this true, that the value of knowledge and investigation is not
recognized. People are Jews in name only, and men only in outward appearance. Former ages were much superior in
this regard.
Two fundamental requisites are necessary for the knowledge of our subject. They are the knowledge of God, and
performance of his will. For this purpose we must understand the works of the philosophers. But these in turn require a
knowledge of the preliminary sciences of arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy, and logic. This takes a long time and is
likely to weary the student, especially the beginner. I have therefore made it my purpose to show how a man can know
himself, for from a knowledge of self he will come to a knowledge of all. Man is called "Microcosm," a world in miniature,
because he has in him represented all the elements of the universe. His body resembles the corporeal world; his rational
soul the spiritual world. Hence the importance of knowing himself, and hence the definition of philosophy as a man's
knowledge of himself. Philosophy is the science of sciences and the end thereof, because it is the path to a knowledge
of the Creator.[168]
Here we see at the outset Ibn Zaddik's Neo-Platonic tendency to make a short cut to knowledge through the study of
man instead of the painful and laborious mastery of the preliminary sciences. And so it was that the Neo-Platonists
added little to Aristotle's study of nature, concentrating their attention upon the intelligible or spiritual world.
The first thing we must do then is to show that the human body is similar to the corporeal world. This will require an
analysis of the structure of the latter. But before examining the objects of knowledge, we must say a word about the
process of knowing. Man perceives things in two ways—through sense and through intellect. His senses give him the
accidents of things, the shell or husk, so to speak. He perceives color through sight, sound through hearing, odor
through smell, and so on. It takes reason to penetrate to the essence of an object. Take as an example a book. The
sense of sight perceives its color, and through the color its form. This is then apprehended by the power of imagination
or representation. The latter in turn hands it over to the cogitative power of the rational soul, from the reflection of which
results the spiritual reality of the object, which is its knowledge. So we see that the reason knows the essence and reality
of a thing, whereas the senses know only its husk and its accidents. This same thing is stated by the philosopher in
another form. The senses, he says, know only the particular, the universal can be known by the intellect only. This is
because the soul is fine and penetrating, while the body is gross, and can reach the surface only.
We may also classify knowledge from another point of view as necessary (or immediate), and demonstrated (or mediate).
Necessary knowledge is that which no sane man can deny. Such knowledge may be of the senses, as the sight of the
sun or the sound of thunder; or it may be of the reason, such as that the whole is greater than its parts. We may then
enumerate four kinds of things known directly without the help of other knowledge, (1) The percepts of the senses. (2)
Truths generally admitted by reason of their self-evidence. (3) Traditional truths, i. e., truths handed down by a reliable
and wise man, or by a community worthy of credence. (4) First principles or axioms. These four can be easily reduced to
two; for traditional truths ultimately go back to the testimony of the senses; while first principles or axioms are included in
self-evident propositions. We thus have two kinds of necessary or immediate knowledge, the data of sense, and self-
evident propositions. The latter kind is superior to the former, because man shares sense knowledge with the lower
animals; whereas rational propositions are peculiar to him alone.
Demonstrated knowledge is built upon necessary knowledge, and is derived from it by means of logical inference.[169]
We may now proceed to discuss the principles of the corporeal world. Matter is the foundation and principle of a thing. All
things, natural as well as artificial, are composed of matter and form. Wood is the common matter of chair and bed. Their
forms are different. So the common matter of the four elements is the prime matter endowed with the form of corporeality,
i. e., with the capacity of filling place. This form of corporeality makes the prime matter corporeal substance. Matter is
relative to form, form is relative to matter.
Spiritual things also have matter and form. In corporeal artificial things like ring or bracelet, the matter is gold, the form is
the form of ring or bracelet, the efficient cause is the art of the goldsmith, the final cause or purpose is the adornment. In
spiritual things we may compare genus to matter, species to form, specific difference to efficient cause, the individual to
the final cause.
Everything exists either by itself (per se) or in something else. Matter exists by itself, form exists in something else, in
matter. Matter is potentially substance; after it assumes a form it becomes actual substance. In reality there is no matter
without form, but in thought we can remove the form and leave the matter.
Substance may be described as that which bears opposite and changing qualities. No substance can be the opposite of
another substance through its substantiality, but through its accidents; for opposition resides in quality. Matter receiving
form is substance. Absolute substance is simple and spiritual, for it cannot be perceived through the five senses. When
the philosophers say that all body is substance, and that the individual is a substance, they use substance in
contradistinction to accident, meaning that the individual exists by itself, and needs not another for its existence, unlike
accidents, which must have something to exist in.
This absolute substance, which is simple and spiritual, seems to be identical with Gabirol's "substantia quæ sustinet
decem prædicamenta," the substance which supports the ten categories. Gabirol means by it that which remains of a
corporeal substance when we take away from it everything that qualifies it as being here or there, of a particular nature
or size, in a given relation, and so on.
The expression corporeal world includes the celestial spheres and all which is under them. To be sure, the body of the
sphere is different from the other bodies in matter and form and qualities. It consists of a fifth nature, different from the
four elements. It is not cold, or it would move downward like earth and water. It is not warm, or it would move upward like
air and fire. It is not wet, for it would then roll like the waves of the sea. Nor is it dry, for it would condense and not move
at all. Not being any one of these qualities, which constitute our four elements, the sphere is not a composite of them
either; for the simple is prior to the composite, and we cannot regard the elements of the sublunar world as prior and
superior to the spheres.
The sphere is neither light nor heavy. For light and heavy are relative terms. An object is heavy when out of its natural
place, light when in its natural place. Thus a stone is heavy when it is away from the earth, which is its natural place, but
is light when it comes to rest where it belongs. The sphere is never out of its place or in its place, as it moves constantly
in a circle. Hence it is neither light nor heavy.
Ibn Zaddik's definition of light and heavy as being relative, and dependent on the relation of the object to its natural place
is peculiar, and would lead him to say that fire and air are also heavy when out of their natural place, which is outside of,
and above earth and water. But this does not seem in consonance with the Aristotelian use of these terms. According to
Aristotle an object is heavy if its tendency is to move to the centre of the world; it is light if it moves away from the centre
to the circumference. Hence earth and water are heavy, fire and air are light. The natural place of a body or element is
that to which it has a tendency to move, or in which it has a tendency to rest, when left to itself. Hence a body will always
move to its natural place when away from it and under no restriction; and its heaviness or lightness does not change with
its position.
To continue, the sphere moves in a circle, the most perfect of all motions, having neither beginning nor end. It is more
perfect than all bodies, and the knowledge of God is not hidden from it as it is hidden from us. Whatever moves in a
circle must move around a body at rest; for if it moves around another moving body, this second body must have another
body around which it moves, and this third body another, and so on ad infinitum, which is impossible. Hence the sphere
moves around a body at rest. This is the earth.
The four elements of the sublunar world are, fire, air, water, earth. In their purity these elements have neither color nor
taste, nor odor nor any other sensible property. For the elements are simple bodies, whereas the sensible qualities are
the result of the composition of the elements. If air had color, we should see it as we see all colored things; and all other
things would appear to us in the color of air, as is the case when we look through a colored glass. The same argument
applies to water.
The elements change into each other. We see water changing under the effect of heat into vapor, and the vapor
condenses again under the influence of cold and changes back to water, namely, rain. Air changes into fire when flint
strikes iron. Fire cannot exist here unless it has something to take hold of; otherwise it changes into air. Earth and water
change into each other very slowly, because earth is hard to change.
The basis of the four elements is a substance filling place as a result of its assuming the form of corporeality, i. e.,
extension in three directions. Filling place, it moves; moving, it becomes warm. When its motion is completed, it
necessarily comes to rest and becomes cold. Heat and cold are the active powers, wet and dry are the passive qualities,
wet being associated with heat, dry with cold. The mixture of these qualities with the corporeal basis results in the four
elements.
The three natures, mineral, plant, animal are composed of the four elements. When a seed is put in the ground it cannot
grow without water, and sunshine and air. These form its food, and food is assimilated to the thing fed. Our bodies are
composed of the four elements, because they are nourished by plants. The general process of the sublunar world is that
of genesis and dissolution. The genesis of one thing is the dissolution of another. The dissolution of the egg is the
genesis of the chicken; the dissolution of the chicken is the genesis of the four elements; for in the living being the
elements are potential, and they become actual when the animal dies. This continuous process of genesis and
dissolution proves that this world is not permanent, for the basis of its processes is change.[170]
The human body corresponds to the corporeal world, and is similar to it in its nature and matter. Man's body is subject to
genesis and decay like other objects. It is composed of the elements and returns to them. It has in it the nature of
minerals, plants and animals. It has the power of growth, sustenance and reproduction like plants. Man is like animal in
having motion and sensation. He has the spirited power and the appetitive like other animals. His body is perfect
because it has resemblances to all kinds of plants and animals. His body as a whole resembles great trees, his hair is
like grass and shrubs. Animals have various qualities according to the relation of the animal soul to the body. Thus the
lion has strength, the lamb meekness, the fox shrewdness, and so on. Mankind includes all of these qualities. In the
same way various animals have various instincts resembling arts, such as the weaving of the spider, the building of the
bird and the bee, and so on. They also subsist on various foods. Man alone combines all arts and all kinds of food.
The human body has three dimensions like inanimate bodies. It is also similar to the bodies of plants and animals, and at
the same time is distinguished alone among animals by its erect position. This is due to the fact that man's nature is
proportionate, and his body is purer and finer than other bodies. Thus we see when oil is pure, its flame rises in a
straight line; when the oil is impure the flame is not straight. Another thing proving that man's nature is superior to that of
other animals is that the latter live in that element which is akin to their constitution—fish in water, birds in air,
quadrupeds on land. Man alone can inhabit all three. Another reason for man's erect position is that he is a plant
originating in heaven. Hence his head, which is the root, faces heaven.[171]
Man has three souls, a plant soul, an animal soul and a rational soul. He must have a plant soul to account for the fact
that man grows like other plants and dies like them. For if he can grow without a plant soul, plants can do the same. And
if this too is granted, then there is no reason why mountains and stones should not grow also. Again, if man can grow
without a plant soul, he can live without an animal soul, and know without a rational soul, which is absurd.
The faculty of the vegetative soul is the appetitive power, whose seat is in the liver. Its subordinate powers are those of
nutrition and growth. Through it man feels the need of food and other natural desires. He has this in common with the
lower animals. It is the first power that appears in man while he is still in his mother's womb. First comes the power which
forms the combined seed of the male and the female into a human being in its proper form and nature. In doing this it
requires the assistance of the "growing" power, which begins its activity as soon as the first member is formed, and
continues until the period of youth is completed. This power in turn needs the assistance of the nourishing power, which
accompanies the other two from the beginning of their activity to the end of the person's life. All this constitutes the plant
soul, and it must not be supposed that these powers are separated from one another, and that one is in one place and
another in another place. They are all spiritual powers derived from the universal powers in the upper world.
When the form of the being is complete, the animal soul makes its appearance. This soul is carried in the spirit of the
animal or man, which is found in the pure blood of the arteries. There are two membranes in every artery, making two
passages, one for blood and the other for the spirit or wind. The seat of the animal soul is in the heart, and it is borne in
the pure red blood. This is why we see in the heart two receptacles; in one is spirit, in the other, blood. Hence after death
we find congealed blood in the one, while the other is empty. Death happens on account of the defective "mixture" of the
heart. This means that the four humors of which the body is composed, namely, blood, yellow and black gall and phlegm,
lose the proper proportionality in their composition, and one or other of them predominates. An animal does not die
unless the mixture of the heart is injured, or the heart is wounded seriously. Death is also caused by disease or injury of
the brain. For the brain is the origin of the nerves which control the voluntary activities by means of contraction and
expansion. If the chest does not contract, the warm air does not come out; if it does not expand, the cold air does not
come in; and if the air does not come in or out, the heart loses its proportionality, and the animal dies. The functions of
the animal soul are sensation and motion. This motion may be active as well as passive. The active motions are those of
the arteries, and the expansion and contraction of the chest which results in respiration. The passive motions give rise to
the emotions o