In Judah Halevi the poet got the better of the rationalist. Not that Judah Halevi was not familiar with philosophical thinking
and did not absorb the current philosophical terminology as well as the ideas contained therein. Quite the contrary. He
shows a better knowledge of Aristotelian ideas than his predecessors, and is well versed in Neo-Platonism. While he
attacks all those views of philosophers which are inconsistent to his mind with the religion of Judaism, he speaks in other
respects the philosophic language, and even makes concessions to the philosophers. If the reason should really demand
it, he tells us, one might adopt the doctrine of the eternity of matter without doing any harm to the essence of
Judaism.[178] As for the claims of reason to rule our beliefs, he similarly admits that that which is really proved in the
same absolute manner as the propositions in mathematics and logic cannot be controverted. But this opinion need cause
one no difficulty as there is nothing in the Bible which opposes the unequivocal demands of the reason.[179] He cannot
consistently oppose all philosophy and science, for he maintains that the sciences were originally in the hands of the
Jews, and that it was from them that the Chaldeans borrowed them and handed them over to the Persians, who in turn
transferred them to Greece and Rome, their origin being forgotten.[180] At the same time he insists that philosophy and
reason are not adequate means for the solution of all problems, and that the actual solutions as found in the writings of
the Aristotelians of his day are in many cases devoid of all demonstrative value. Then there are certain matters in theory
as well as in practice which do not at all come within the domain of reason, and the philosophers are bound to be wrong
because they apply the wrong method. Revelation alone can make us wise as to certain aspects of God's nature and as
to certain details in human conduct; and in these philosophy must fail because as philosophy it has no revelation. With all
due respect therefore to the philosophers, who are the most reliable guides in matters not conflicting with revelation, we
must leave them if we wish to learn the truth concerning those matters in which they are incompetent to judge.
This characterization of Judah Halevi's attitude is brief and inadequate. But before proceeding to elaborate it with more
detail and greater concreteness, it will be well to sketch very briefly the little we know of his life.[181]
Judah Halevi was born in Toledo in the last quarter of the eleventh century. This is about the time when the city was
taken from the Mohammedans by the emperor Alphonso VI, king of Leon, Castile, Galicia and Navarre. At the same time
Toledo remained Arabic in culture and language for a long while after this, and even exerted a great influence upon the
civilization of Christendom. The Jews were equally well treated in Toledo by Mohammedan emir and Christian king. The
youth of Halevi was therefore not embittered or saddened by Jewish persecutions. It seems that he was sent to Lucena,
a Jewish centre, where he studied the Talmud with the famous Alfasi, and made friends with Joseph ibn Migash, Alfasi's
successor, and Baruh Albalia, the philosopher. A poet by nature, he began to write Hebrew verses early, and soon
became famous as a poet of the first order in no manner inferior to Gabirol. His living he made not from his verses, but
like many others of his day by practicing the art of medicine. Later in life he visited Cordova, already in its decline
through the illiberal government of the Almoravid dynasty. The rulers were strict religionists, implicit followers of the
"fukaha," the men devoted to the study of Mohammedan religion and law; and scientific learning and philosophy were
proscribed in their domains. Men of another faith were not in favor, and the Jews who, unlike the Christians, had no
powerful emperor anywhere to take their part, had to buy their lives and comparative freedom with their hard earned
wealth. Here Halevi spent some time as a physician. He was admitted in court circles, but his personal good fortune
could not reconcile him to the sufferings of his brethren, and his letters give expression to his dissatisfaction. He wrote a
variety of poems on subjects secular and religious; but what made him famous above all else was his strong nationalism,
and those of his poems will live longest which give expression to his intense love for his people and the land which was
once their own. That it was not mere sentiment with Judah Halevi he proved late in life when he decided to leave his
many friends and his birthplace and go to Palestine to end his life on the soil of his ancestors. It was after 1140 that he
left Spain for the East. Unfavorable winds drove him out of course to Egypt, and he landed at Alexandria. From there he
went to Cairo at the invitation of his admirers and friends. Everywhere he was received with great honor, his fame
preceding him, and he was urged to remain in Egypt. But no dissuasion could keep him from his pious resolve. We find
him later in Damietta; we follow him to Tyre and Damascus, but beyond the last city all trace of him is lost. We know not
whether he reached Jerusalem or not. Legend picks up the thread where history drops it, and tells of Judah Halevi
meeting his death at the gates of the holy city as with tears he was singing his famous ode to Zion. An Arab horseman,
the story goes, pierced him through with his spear.
This sketch of Halevi's life and character, brief and inadequate as it is, will prepare us to understand better his attitude to
philosophy and to Judaism. His was not a critical intellect whose curiosity is not satisfied until the matter in dispute is
proved in logical form. Reason is good enough in mathematics and physics where the objects of our investigation are
accessible to us and the knowledge of their nature exhausts their significance. It is not so with the truths of Judaism and
the nature of God. These cannot be known adequately by the reason alone, and mere knowledge is not enough. God
and the Jewish religion are not simply facts to be known and understood like the laws of science. They are living entities
to be acquainted with, to be devoted to, to love. Hence quite a different way of approach is necessary. And not everyone
has access to this way. The method of acquaintance is open only to those who by birth and tradition belong to the family
of the prophets, who had a personal knowledge of God, and to the land of Palestine where God revealed himself.[182]
We see here the nationalist speaking, the lover of his people and of their land and language and institutions. David
Kaufmann has shown that Judah Halevi's anti-philosophical attitude has much in common with that of the great Arab
writer Al Gazali, from whom there is no doubt that he borrowed his inspiration.[183] Gazali began as a philosopher, then
lost confidence in the logical method of proof, pointed to the contradictions of the philosophers, to their disagreements
among themselves, and went over to the Sufis, the pietists and mystics of the Mohammedan faith. There are a number of
resemblances between Gazali and Halevi as Kaufmann has shown, and there is no doubt that skepticism in respect of
the powers of the human reason on the one hand, and a deep religious sense on the other are responsible for the point
of view of Gazali as well as Halevi. But there is this additional motive in Halevi that he was defending a persecuted race
and a despised faith against not merely the philosophers but against the more powerful and more fortunate professors of
other religions. He is the loyal son of his race and his religion, and he will show that they are above all criticism, that they
are the best and the truest there are. Maimonides, too, found it necessary to defend Judaism against the attacks of
philosophy. But in his case it was the Jew in him who had to be defended against the philosopher in him. It was no
external enemy but an internal who must be made harmless, and the method was one of reconciliation and
harmonization. It is still truer to say that with Maimonides both Judaism and philosophy were his friends, neither was an
enemy. He was attached to one quite as much as to the other. And it was his privilege to reconcile their differences, to
the great gain, as he thought, of both. Judah Halevi takes the stand of one who fights for his hearth and home against
the attacks of foreign foes. He will not yield an inch to the adversary. He will maintain his own. The enemy cannot
approach.
Thus Halevi begins his famous work "Kusari": "I was asked what I have to say in answer to the arguments of
philosophers, unbelievers and professors of other religions against our own." Instead of working out his ideas
systematically, he wanted to give his subject dramatic interest by clothing it in dialogue form. And he was fortunate in
finding a historical event which suited his purpose admirably.
Some three or four centuries before his time, the king of the Chazars, a people of Turkish origin living in the Caucasus,
together with his courtiers and many of his subjects embraced Judaism. Hasdai ibn Shaprut, the Jewish minister and
patron of learning of Cordova, in the tenth century corresponded with the then king of the Chazars, and received an
account of the circumstances of the conversion. In brief it was that the king wishing to know which was the true religion
invited representatives of the three dominant creeds, Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism, and questioned them
concerning the tenets of their respective faiths. Seeing that the Christian as well as the Mohammedan appealed in their
arguments to the truth of the Hebrew Bible, the king concluded that Judaism must be the true religion, which he
accordingly adopted. This story gave Halevi the background and framework for his composition. He works out his own
ideas in the form of a dialogue between the Jewish Rabbi and the king of the Chazars, in which the former explains to the
king the essentials of the Jewish religion, and answers the king's questions and criticisms, taking occasion to discuss a
variety of topics, religious, philosophical and scientific, all tending to show the truth of Judaism and its superiority to other
religions, to philosophy, Kalam, and also to Karaism.
The story is, Halevi tells us, in the introduction to his book, that the king of the Chazars had repeated dreams in which an
angel said to him, "Your intentions are acceptable to God, but not your practice." His endeavors to be faithful to his
religion, and to take part in the services and perform the sacrifices in the temple in person only led to the repetition of the
dream. He therefore consulted a philosopher about his belief, and the latter said to him, "In God there is neither favor nor
hatred, for he is above all desire and purpose. Purpose and intention argue defect and want, which the fulfilment of the
intention satisfies. But God is free from want. Hence there is no purpose or intention in his nature.
"God does not know the particular or individual, for the individual constantly changes, whereas God's knowledge never
changes. Hence God does not know the individual man and, needless to say, he does not hear his prayer. When the
philosophers say God created man, they use the word created metaphorically, in the sense that God is the cause of all
causes, but not that he made man with purpose and intention.
"The world is eternal, and so is the existence of man. The character and ability of a person depend upon the causes
antecedent to him. If these are of the right sort, we have a person who has the potentialities of a philosopher. To realize
them he must develop his intellect by study, and his character through moral discipline. Then he will receive the influence
of the 'Active Intellect,' with which he becomes identified so that his limbs and faculties do only what is right, and are
wholly in the service of the active Intellect.
"This union with the active Intellect is the highest goal of man; and he becomes like one of the angels, and joins the
ranks of Hermes, Æsculapius, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. This is the meaning of the expression 'favor of God.' The
important thing is to study the sciences in order to know the truth, and to practice the ethical virtues. If one does this, it
matters not what religion he professes, or whether he professes any religion at all. He can make his own religion in order
to discipline himself in humility, and to govern his relations to society and country. Or he can choose one of the
philosophical religions. Purity of heart is the important thing, and knowledge of the sciences. Then the desired result will
come, namely, union with the active intellect, which may also result in the power of prophecy through true dreams and
visions."
The king was not satisfied with the statement of the philosopher, which seemed to him inadequate because he felt that
he himself had the necessary purity of heart, and yet he was told that his practice was not satisfactory, proving that there
is something in practice as such apart from intention. Besides, the great conflict between Christianity and Islam, who kill
one another, is due to the difference in religious practice, and not in purity of heart. Moreover, if the view of the
philosophers were true, there should be prophecy among them, whereas in reality prophecy is found among those who
did not study the sciences rather than among those who did.
The king then said, I will ask the Christians and the Mohammedans. I need not inquire of the Jews, for their low condition
is sufficient proof that the truth cannot be with them. So he sent for a Christian sage, who explained to him the essentials
of his belief, saying among other things, We believe in the creation of the world in six days, in the descent of all men from
Adam, in revelation and Providence, in short, in all that is found in the law of Moses and in the other Israelitish
Scriptures, which cannot be doubted because of the publicity which was given to the events recorded therein. He also
quoted the words of the gospel, I did not come to destroy any of the commandments of Israel and of Moses their teacher;
I came to confirm them.
The king was not convinced by the Christian belief, and called a Mohammedan doctor, who in describing the specific
tenets of Mohammedanism also mentioned the fact that in the Koran are quoted the Pentateuch and Moses and the
other leaders, and the wonderful things they did. These, he said, cannot be denied; for they are well known.
Seeing that both Christian and Mohammedan referred to the law of Moses as true, and as evidence that God spoke to
man, the king determined to call a Jewish sage also, and hear what he had to say.
The Jewish "Haber," as Judah Halevi calls him, began his discourse by saying, We Jews believe in the God of Abraham,
Isaac and Jacob, who took the children of Israel out of Egypt, supported them in the wilderness, gave them the land of
Canaan, and so on.
The king was disappointed and said, I had determined not to consult the Jews in this matter at all, because their abject
condition in the world did not leave them any good quality. You should have said, he told the Jew, that you believe in him
who created the world and governs it; who made man and provides for him. Every religionist defends his belief in this
way.
The Jew replied, The religion to which you refer is a rational religion, established by speculation and argument, which
are full of doubt, and about which there is no agreement among philosophers, because not all the arguments are valid or
even plausible. This pleased the king, and he expressed a wish to continue the discourse. The Rabbi then said, The
proper way to define one's religion is by reference to that which is more certain, namely, actual experience. Jews have
this actual experience. The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob spoke to Moses and delivered the Israelites out of Egypt.
This is well known. God gave Israel the Torah. To be sure, all others not of Israel who accept the Law will be rewarded,
but they cannot be equal to Israel. There is a peculiar relation between God and Israel in which the other peoples do not
share. As the plant is distinguished from the mineral, the animal from the plant, and man from the irrational animal, so is
the prophetic individual distinguished above other men. He constitutes a higher species. It is through him that the masses
became aware of God's existence and care for them. It was he who told them things unknown to them; who gave them an
account of the world's creation and its history. We count now forty-five hundred years from the creation. This was
handed down from Adam through Seth and Enos to Noah, to Shem and Eber, to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, to Moses,
and finally to us. Moses came only four hundred years after Abraham in a world which was full of knowledge of heavenly
and earthly things. It is impossible that he should have given them a false account of the division of languages and the
relations of nations without being found out and exposed.
The philosophers, it is true, oppose us by maintaining that the world is eternal. But the philosophers are Greeks,
descended from Japheth, who did not inherit either wisdom or Torah. Divine wisdom is found only in the family of Shem.
The Greeks had philosophy among them only during the short time of their power. They borrowed it from the Persians,
who had it in turn from the Chaldeans. But neither before nor after did they have any philosophers among them.
Aristotle, not having any inherited tradition concerning the origin of the world, endeavored to reason it all out of his own
head. Eternity was just as hard to believe in as creation. But as he had no true and reliable tradition, his arguments in
favor of eternity seemed to him to be the stronger. Had he lived among a people who had reliable traditions on the other
side, he would have found arguments in favor of creation, which is more plausible than eternity. Real demonstration
cannot be controverted; and there is nothing in the Bible which opposes what the reason unequivocally demands. But
the matter of eternity or creation is very difficult. The arguments on one side are as good as those on the other. And
tradition from Adam to Noah and Moses, which is better than argument, lends its additional weight to the doctrine of
creation. If the believer in the Torah were obliged to hold that there is a primitive eternal matter from which the world was
made, and that there were many worlds before this one, there would be no great harm, as long as he believes that this
world is of recent origin and Adam was the first man.[184]
We see now the standpoint of Judah Halevi, for the "Haber" is of course his spokesman. Philosophy and independent
reasoning on such difficult matters as God and creation are after all more or less guess work, and cannot be made the
bases of religion except for those who have nothing better. The Jews fortunately have a surer foundation all their own.
They have a genuine and indisputable tradition. History is the only true science and the source of truth; not speculation,
which is subjective, and can be employed with equal plausibility in favor of opposite doctrines. True history and tradition
in the case of the Jews goes back ultimately to first hand knowledge from the very source of all truth. The prophets of
Israel constitute a higher species, as much superior to the ordinary man as the ordinary man is to the lower animal, and
these prophets received their knowledge direct from God. In principle Judah Halevi agrees with the other Jewish
philosophers that true reason cannot be controverted. He differs with them in the concrete application of this abstract
principle. He has not the same respect as Maimonides for the actual achievements of the unaided human reason, and an
infinitely greater respect for the traditional beliefs of Judaism and the Biblical expressions taken in their obvious meaning.
Hence he does not feel the same necessity as Maimonides to twist the meaning of Scriptural passages to make them
agree with philosophical theories.
According to this view Judah Halevi does not find it necessary with the philosophers and the Mutakallimun painfully to
prove the existence of God. The existence of the Jewish people and the facts of their wonderful history are more
eloquent demonstrations than any that logic or metaphysics can muster. But more than this. The philosophical view of
God is inadequate in more ways than one. It is inaccurate in content and incorrect in motive. In the first place, they lay a
great deal of stress on nature as the principle by which objects move. If a stone naturally moves to the centre of the
world, they say this is due to a cause called nature. And the tendency is to attribute intelligence and creative power to
this new entity as an associate of God. This is misleading. The real Intelligence is God alone. It is true that the elements,
and the sun and moon, and the stars exert certain influences, producing heat and cold, and various other effects in
things material, by virtue of which these latter are prepared for the reception of higher forms. And there is no harm in
calling these agencies Nature. But we must regard these as devoid of intelligence, and as mere effects of God's wisdom
and purpose.[185]
The philosopher denies will in God on the ground that this would argue defect and want. This reduces God to an
impersonal force. We Jews believe God has will. The word we use does not matter. I ask the philosopher what is it that
makes the heavens revolve continually, and the outer sphere carry everything in uniform motion, the earth standing
immovable in the centre? Call it what you please, will or command; it is the same thing that made the air shape itself to
produce the sounds of the ten commandments which were heard, and that caused the characters to form on the Tables
of Stone.[186]
The motive of the philosopher is also different from that of the believer. The philosopher seeks knowledge only. He
desires to know God as he desires to know the exact position and form of the earth. Ignorance in respect to God is no
more harmful in his mind than ignorance respecting a fact in nature. His main object is to have true knowledge in order to
become like unto the Active Intellect and to be identified with it. As long as he is a philosopher it makes no difference to
him what he believes in other respects and whether he observes the practices of religion or not.[187]
The true belief in God is different in scope and aim. What God is must be understood not by means of rational proofs, but
by prophetic and spiritual insight. Rational proofs are misleading, and the heretics and unbelievers also use rational
proofs—those for example who believe in two original causes, in the eternity of the world, or in the divinity of the sun and
fire. The most subtle proofs are those used by the philosophers, and they maintain that God is not concerned about us,
and pays no attention to our prayers and sacrifices; that the world is eternal. It is different with us, who heard his words,
his commands and prohibitions, and felt his reward and his punishment. We have a proper name of God, Jhvh,
representative of the communications he made to us, and we have a conviction that he created the world. The first was
Adam, who knew God through actual communication and the creation of Eve from one of his ribs. Cain and Abel came
next, then Noah and Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and so on to Moses and the Prophets, who came after him. All these
called him Jhvh by reason of their insight. The people who received the teaching of the Prophets, in whom they believed,
also called him Jhvh, because he was in communication with men; and the select among them saw him through an
intermediate agency, called variously, Form, Image, Cloud, Fire, Kingdom, Shekinah, Glory, Rainbow, and so on, proving
that he spoke to them.[188]
As the sun's light penetrates different objects in varying degrees, for example, ruby and crystal receive the sun's light in
the highest degree; clear air and water come next, then bright stones and polished surfaces, and last of all opaque
substances like wood and earth, which the light does not penetrate at all; so we may conceive of different minds varying
in the degree to which they attain a knowledge of God. Some arrive only as far as the knowledge of "Elohim," while
others attain to a knowledge of Jhvh, which may be compared to the reception of the sun's light in ruby and crystal.
These are the prophets in the land of Israel. The conception involved in the name "Elohim" no intelligent man denies;
whereas many deny the conception of Jhvh, because prophecy is an unusual occurrence even among individuals, not to
speak of a nation. That is why Pharaoh said (Exod. 5, 2), "I know not Jhvh." He knew "Elohim," but not Jhvh, that is a
God who reveals himself to man. "Elohim" may be arrived at by reasoning; for the reason tells us that the world has a
ruler; though the various classes of men differ as to details, the most plausible view being that of the philosophers. But
the conception of Jhvh cannot be arrived at by reason. It requires that prophetic vision by which a person almost
becomes a member of a new species, akin to angels. Then the doubts he formerly had about "Elohim" fall away, and he
laughs at the arguments which led him to the conception of God and of unity. Now he becomes a devotee, who loves the
object of his devotion, and is ready to give his life in his love for him, because of the great happiness he feels in being
near to him, and the misery of being away from him. This is different from the philosopher, who sees in the worship of
God only good ethics and truth, because he is greater than all other existing things; and in unbelief nothing more than
the fault of choosing the untrue.[189]
Here there is clearly a t