10. Being in a body means one of two things: being in it as an accident, or as constituting the essence of the body, like a
natural form. Both are corporeal powers.
11. Some things which are in a body are divided with the division of the body. They are then divided per accidens, like
colors and other powers extending throughout the body. Some of the things which constitute the body are not divisible at
all, like soul and intellect.
12. Every power which extends throughout a body is finite, because all body is finite.
13. None of the kinds of change mentioned in 4 is continuous except motion of translation; and of this only circular
motion.
14. Motion of translation is the first by nature of the motions. For genesis and decay presuppose qualitative change; and
qualitative change presupposes the approach of the agent causing the change to the thing undergoing the change. And
there is no growth or diminution without antecedent genesis and decay.
15. Time is an accident following motion and connected with it. The one cannot exist without the other. No motion except
in time, and time cannot be conceived except with motion. Whatever has no motion does not come under time.
16. Whatever is incorporeal cannot be subject to number, unless it is a corporeal power; in which case the individual
powers are numbered with their matters or bearers. Hence the separate forms or Intelligences, which are neither bodies
nor corporeal powers, cannot have the conception of number connected with them, except when they are related to one
another as cause and effect.
17. Everything that moves, necessarily has a mover, either outside, like the hand moving the stone, or inside like the
animal body, which consists of a mover, the soul, and a moved, the body proper. Every mobile of the last kind is called a
self-moving thing. This means that the motor element in the thing is part of the whole thing in motion.
18. If anything passes from potentiality to actuality, the agent that caused this must be outside the thing. For if it were
inside and there was no obstruction, the thing would never be potential, but always actual; and if there was an
obstruction, which was removed, the agency which removed the obstruction is the cause which caused the thing to pass
from potentiality to actuality.
19. Whatever has a cause for its existence is a "possible" existent in so far as itself is concerned. If the cause is there,
the thing exists; if not, it does not. Possible here means not necessary.
20. Whatever is a necessary existent in itself, has no cause for its existence.
21. Every composite has the cause of its existence in the composition. Hence it is not in itself a necessary existent; for its
existence is dependent upon the existence of its constituent parts and upon their composition.
22. All body is composed necessarily of two things, matter and form; and it necessarily has accidents, viz., quantity,
figure, situation.
23. Whatever is potential and has in it a possibility may at some time not exist as an actuality.
24. Whatever is potential is necessarily possessed of matter, for possibility is always in matter.
25. The principles of an individual compound substance are matter and form; and there must be an agent, i. e., a mover
which moves the object or the underlying matter until it prepares it to receive the form. This need not be the ultimate
mover, but a proximate one having a particular function. The idea of Aristotle is that matter cannot move itself. This is the
great principle which leads us to investigate into the existence of the first mover.
Of these twenty-five propositions, Maimonides continues, some are clear after a little reflection, some again require many
premises and proofs, but they are all proved in the Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle and his commentators. My
purpose here is, as I said, not to reproduce the writings of the philosophers. I will simply mention those principles which
we must have for our purpose. I must add, however, one more proposition, which Aristotle thinks is true and more
deserving of belief than anything else. We will grant him this by way of hypothesis until we explain what we intend to
prove. The proposition is:
26. Time and motion are eternal and actual. Hence there must be a body moving eternally and existing actually. This is
the matter constituting the substance of the heavenly bodies. Hence the heavens are not subject to genesis and decay,
for their motion is eternal. This presupposes the possibility of accidental infinity (cf. above, p. 251). Aristotle regards this
as true, though it does not seem to me that he claims he has proved it. His followers and commentators maintain that it is
a necessary proposition and demonstrated. The Mutakallimun, on the other hand, think it is impossible that there should
be an infinite number of states in succession (cf. ibid.). It seems to me it is neither necessary nor impossible, but
possible. This is, however, not the place to discuss it.[273]
Now follows the classical proof of the existence of God from motion. It is in essence the same as that given by Ibn Daud,
but much more elaborate. We shall try to simplify it as much as possible. The numbers in parentheses in the sequel refer
to the preliminary propositions above given.
We start with something that is known, namely, the motion we see in the sublunar world, the motion which is involved in
all the processes of genesis and decay and change generally. This motion must have a mover (25). This mover must
have another mover to move it, and this would lead us to infinity, which is impossible (3). We find, however, that all
motion here below ends with the motion of the heaven. Let us take an example. The wind is blowing through an opening
in the wall. I take a stone and stop up the hole. Here the stone is moved by the hand, the hand by the tendons, the
tendons by the nerves, the nerves by the veins, the veins by the natural heat, the natural heat by the animal soul, the
animal soul by a purpose, namely, to stop the hole from which the wind comes, the purpose by the wind, the wind by the
motion of the heavenly sphere. But this is not the end. The sphere must also have a mover (17). This mover is either
outside the sphere it moves or within it. If it is something outside, it is either again a body like the sphere, or an
incorporeal thing, a "Separate Intelligence." If the mover of the sphere is something within the sphere, two alternatives
are again possible. The internal moving power of the sphere may be a corporeal force extended throughout the body of
the sphere and divisible with it like heat, or an indivisible power like soul or intellect (10, 11). We thus have four
possibilities in all. The mover of the heavenly sphere may be (a) a body external to the sphere; (b) a separate incorporeal
substance; (c) an internal corporeal power divisible with the division of the sphere; (d) an internal indivisible power. Of
these four, (a) is impossible. For if the mover of the sphere is another body, it is likewise in motion (9) and must have
another to move it, which, if a body, must have another, and so on ad infinitum, which is impossible (2). The third
hypothesis, (c), is likewise impossible. For as the sphere is a body it is finite (1), and its power is also finite (12), since it
is divisible with the body of the sphere (11). Hence it cannot move infinitely (26). Nor can we adopt the last alternative,
(d). For a soul residing within the sphere could not alone be the cause of continuous motion. For a soul that moves its
body is itself in motion per accidens (6); and whatever moves per accidens must necessarily sometime stop (8), and with
it the thing set in motion by it will stop also. There is thus only one alternative left, (b), viz., that the cause of the motion of
the sphere is a "separate" (i. e., incorporeal) power, which is itself not subject to motion either per se or per accidens;
hence it is indivisible and unchangeable (7, 5). This is God. He cannot be two or more, for "separate" essences which
are not body are not subject to number unless one is cause and the other effect (16). It follows, too, that he is not subject
to time, for there is no time without motion (15).
We have thus proved with one stroke God's existence as well as his unity and incorporeality. But, it will be observed, if
not for the twenty-sixth proposition concerning the eternity of motion, which implies an infinite power, we should not have
been forced to the alternative (b), and could have adopted (c) as well as (d). That is, we might have concluded that God
is the soul of the heavenly sphere resident within it, or even that he is a corporeal force pervading the extension of the
sphere as heat pervades an ordinary body. But we must admit that in this way we prove only the existence of a God who
is the cause of the heavenly motions, and through these of the processes of genesis and decay, hence of all the life of
our sublunar world. This is not the God of Jewish tradition, who creates out of nothing, who is the cause of the being of
the universe as well as of its life processes. Maimonides was aware of this defect in the Aristotelian view, and he later
repudiates the Stagirite's theory of eternal motion on philosophical as well as religious grounds. Before, however, we
speak of Maimonides's attitude in this matter, we must for completeness' sake briefly mention three other proofs for the
existence of God as given by Maimonides. They are not strictly Aristotelian, though they are based upon Peripatetic
principles cited above and due to the Arabian commentators of Aristotle.
The second proof is as follows. If we find a thing composed of two elements, and one of these elements is also found
separately, it follows that the other element is found separately also. Now we frequently find the two elements of causing
motion and being moved combined in the same object. And we also find things which are moved only, but do not cause
motion, as for example matter, or the stone in the last proof. It stands to reason therefore that there is something that
causes motion without being itself subject to motion. Not being subject to motion, it is indivisible, incorporeal and not
subject to time, as above.
The third proof is based upon the idea of necessary existence. There is no doubt that there are existing things, for
example the things we perceive with our senses. Now either all things are incapable of decay, or all are subject to
genesis and decay, or some are and some are not. The first is evidently untrue for we see things coming into, and
passing out, of being. The second hypothesis is likewise untrue. For if all things are subject to genesis and decay, there
is a possibility that at some time all things might cease to be and nothing should exist at all. But as the coming and going
of individuals in the various species in the world has been going on from eternity, the possibility just spoken of must have
been realized—a possibility that is never realized is not a possibility—and nothing existed at all at that moment. But in
that case how could they ever have come into being, since there was nothing to bring them into being? And yet they do
exist, as ourselves for example and everything else. There is only one alternative left, therefore, and that is that beside
the great majority of things subject to genesis and decay, there is a being not subject to change, a necessary existent,
and ultimately one that exists by virtue of its own necessity (19).
Whatever is necessary per se can have no cause for its existence (20) and can have no multiplicity in itself (21); hence it
is neither a body nor a corporeal power (12).
We can also prove easily that there cannot be two necessary existents per se. For in that case the element of necessary
existence would be something added to the essence of each, and neither would then be necessary per se, but per that
element of necessary existence which is common to both.
The last argument against dualism may also be formulated as follows. If there are two Gods, they must have something
in common—that in virtue of which they are Gods—and something in which they differ, which makes them two and not
one. If each of them has in addition to divinity a differential element, they are both composite, and neither is the first
cause or the necessary existent (19). If one of them only has this differentia, then this one is composite and is not the first
cause.
The fourth proof is very much like the first, but is based upon the ideas of potentiality and actuality instead of motion. But
when we consider that Aristotle defines motion in terms of potentiality and actuality, the fourth proof is identical with the
first. It reads in Maimonides as follows: We see constantly things existing potentially and coming into actuality. Every
such thing must have an agent outside (18). It is clear, too, that this agent was first an agent potentially and then became
one actually. This potentiality was due either to an obstacle in the agent himself or to the absence of a certain relation
between the agent and its effect. In order that the potential agent may become an actual agent, there is need of another
agent to remove the obstacle or to bring about the needed relation between the agent and the thing to be acted upon.
This agent requires another agent, and so it goes ad infinitum. As this is impossible, we must stop somewhere with an
agent that is always actual and in one condition. This agent cannot be material, but must be a "separate" (24). But the
separate in which there is no kind of potentiality and which exists per se, is God. As we have already proved him
incorporeal, he is one (16).[274]
We must now analyze the expressions incorporeal and one, and see what in strictness they imply, and how our logical
deductions agree with Scripture. Many persons, misled by the metaphorical expressions in the Bible, think of God as
having a body with organs and senses on the analogy of ours. Others are not so crude as to think of God in
anthropomorphic terms, nor are they polytheists, and yet for the same reason, namely, misunderstanding of Scriptural
expressions, ascribe a plurality of essential attributes to God. We must therefore insist on the absolute incorporeality of
God and explain the purpose of Scripture in expressing itself in anthropomorphic terms, and on the other hand
emphasize the absolute unity of God against the believers in essential attributes.
Belief in God as body or as liable to suffer affection is worse than idolatry. For the idolater does not deny the existence of
God; he merely makes the mistake of supposing that the image of his own construction resembles a being which
mediates between him and God. And yet because this leads to erroneous belief on the part of the people, who are
inclined to worship the image itself instead of God (for the people cannot discriminate between the outward act and its
idea), the Bible punishes idolatry with death, and calls the idolater a man who angers God. How much more serious is
the error of him who thinks God is body! He entertains an error regarding the nature of God directly, and surely causes
the anger of God to burn. Habit and custom and the evidence of the literal understanding of the Biblical text are no more
an excuse for this erroneous belief than they are for idolatry; for the idolater, too, has been brought up in his wrong ideas
and is confirmed in them by some false notions. If a man is not himself able to reason out the truth, there is no excuse for
his refusing to listen to one who has reasoned it out. A person is not an unbeliever for not being able to prove the
incorporeality of God. He is an unbeliever if he thinks God is corporeal.[275]
The expressions in the Bible which have led many to err so grievously in their conceptions of God are due to a desire on
the part of their authors to show all people, the masses including women and children, that God exists and is possessed
of all perfection, that he is existent, living, wise, powerful, and active. Hence it was necessary to speak of him as body,
for this is the only thing that suggests real existence to the masses. It was necessary to endow him with motion, as this
alone denotes life; to ascribe to him seeing, hearing, and so on, in order to indicate that he understands; to represent him
as speaking, in order to show that he communicates with prophets, because to the minds of common people this is the
only way in which ideas are communicated from one person to another. As we are active by our sense of touch, God,
too, is described as doing. He is given a soul, to denote that he is alive. Then as all these activities are among us done
by means of organs, these also are ascribed to God, as feet, hands, ear, eye, nose, mouth, tongue, voice, fingers, palm,
arm. In other words, to show that God has all perfections, certain senses are ascribed to him; and to indicate these
senses the respective organs are related to them, organs of motion to denote life, of sensation to denote understanding,
of touch to denote activity, of speech to denote revelation. As a matter of fact, however, since all these organs and
perceptions and powers in man and animals are due to imperfection and are for the purpose of satisfying various wants
for the preservation of the individual or the species, and God has no wants of any kind, he has no such powers or
organs.[276]
Having disposed of crude anthropomorphism we must now take up the problem of attributes, which endangers the unity.
It is a self-evident truth that an attribute is something different from the essence of a thing. It is an accident added to the
essence. Otherwise it is the thing over again, or it is the definition of the thing and the explanation of the name, and
signifies that the thing is composed of these elements. If we say God has many attributes, it will follow that there are
many eternals. The only belief in true unity is to think that God is one simple substance without composition or multiplicity
of elements, but one in all respects and aspects. Some go so far as to say that the divine attributes are neither God's
essence nor anything outside of his essence. This is absurd. It is saying words which have nothing corresponding to
them in fact. A thing is either the same as another, or it is not the same. There is no other alternative. The imagination is
responsible for this error. Because bodies as we know them always have attributes, they thought that God, too, is made
up of many essential elements or attributes.
Attributes may be of five kinds:
1. The attributes of a thing may be its definition, which denotes its essence as determined by its causes. This everyone
will admit cannot be in God, for God has no cause, hence cannot be defined.
2. An attribute may consist of a part of a definition, as when we say, "man is rational," where the attribute rational is part
of the definition of man, "rational animal" being the whole definition. This can apply to God no more than the first; for if
there is a part in God's essence, he is composite.
3. An attribute may be an expression which characterizes not the essence of the thing but its quality. Quality is one of the
nine categories of accident, and God has no accidents.
4. An attribute may indicate relation, such as father, master, son, slave. At first sight it might seem as if this kind of
attribute may be applicable to God; but after reflection we find that it is not. There can be no relation of time between
God and anything else; because time is the measure of motion, and motion is an accident of body. God is not corporeal.
In the same way it is clear that there cannot be a relation of place between God and other things. But neither can there
be any other kind of relation between God and his creation. For God is a necessary existent, while everything else is a
possible existent. A relation exists only between things of the same proximate species, as between white and black. If the
things have only a common genus, and still more so if they belong to two different genera, there is no relation between
them. If there were a relation between God and other things, he would have the accident of relation, though relation is
the least serious of attributes, since it does not necessitate a multiplicity of eternals, nor change in God's essence owing
to change in the related things.
5. An attribute may characterize a thing by reference to its effects or works, not in the sense that the thing or author of
the effect has acquired a character by reason of the product, like carpenter, painter, blacksmith, but merely in the sense
that he is the one who made a particular thing. An attribute of this kind is far removed from the essence of the thing so
characterized by it; and hence we may apply it to God, provided we remember that the varied effects need not be
produced by different elements in the agent, but are all done by the one essence.
Those who believe in attributes divide them into two classes, and number the following four as essential attributes, not
derived from God's effects like "creator," which denotes God's relation to his work, since God did not create himself. The
four essential attributes about which all agree are, living, powerful, wise, possessed of will. Now if by wise is meant
God's knowledge of himself, there might be some reason for calling it an essential attribute; though in that case it implies
"living," and there is no need of two. But they refer the attribute wise to God's knowledge of the world, and then there is
no reason for calling it an essential attribute any more than the word "creator," for example. In the same way "powerful"
and "having will" cannot refer to himself, but to his actions. We therefore hold that just as we do not say that there is
something additional in his essence by which he created the heavens, something else with which he created the
elements, and a third with which he created the Intelligences, so we do not say that he has one attribute with which he
exercises power, another with which he wills, a third with which he knows, and so on, but his essence is simple and
one.[277]
Four things must be removed from God: (1) corporeality, (2) affection, (3) potentiality, (4) resemblance to his creatures.
The first we have already proved. The second implies change, and the author of the change cannot be the same as he
who suffers the change and feels the affection. If then God were subject to affection, there would be another who would
cause the change in him. So all want must be removed from him; for he who is in want of something is potential, and in
order to pass into actuality requires an agent having that quality in actu. The fourth is also evident; for resemblance
involves relation. As there is no relation between God and ourselves, there is no resemblance. Resemblance can exist
only between things of the same species. All the expressions including "existent" are applied to God and to ourselves in a
homonymous sense (cf. above, p. 240). The use is not even analogical; for in analogy there must be some resemblance
between the things having the same name, but not so here. Existence in things which are determined by causes (and
this includes all that is not God), is not identical with the essence of those things. The essence is that which is expressed
in the definition, whereas the existence or non-existence of the thing so defined is not part of the definition. It is an
accident added to the essence. In God the case is different. His existence has no cause, since he is a necessary
existent; hence his existence is identical with his essence. So we say God exists, but not with existence, as we do.
Similarly he is living, but not with life; knowing, but not with knowledge; powerful, but not with power; wise, but not with
wisdom. Unity and plurality are also accidents of things which are one or many as the case may be. They are accidents
of the category of quantity. God, who is a necessary existent and simple cannot be one any more than many. He is one,
but not with unity. Language is inadequate to express our ideas of God. Wishing to say he is not many, we have to say
he is one; though one as well as many pertains to the accidents of quantity. To correct the inexactness of the expression,
we add, "but not with unity." So we say "eternal" to indicate that he is not "new," though in reality eternal is an accident of
time, which in turn is an accident of motion, the latter being dependent upon body. In reality neither "eternal" nor "new" is
applicable to God. When we say one, we mean merely that there is none other like him; and when Scripture speaks of
him as the first and the last, the meaning is that he does not change.
The only true attributes of God are the negative ones. Negative attributes, too, by excluding the part of the field in which
the thing to be designated is not contained, bring us nearer to the thing itself; though unlike positive attributes they do
not designate any part of the thing itself. God cannot have positive attributes because he has no essence different from
his existence for the attributes to designate, and surely no accidents. Negative attributes are of value in leading us to a
knowledge of God, because in negation no plurality is involved. So when we have proved that there is a being beside
these sensible and intelligible things, and we say he is existent, we mean that his non-existence is unthinkable. In the
same way living means not dead; incorporeal is negative; eternal signifies not caused; powerful means not weak; wise—
not ignorant; willing denotes that creation proceeds from him not by natural necessity like heat from fire or light from the
sun, but with purpose and design and method. All attributes therefore are either derived from God's effects or, if they
have reference to himself, are meant to exclude their opposites, i. e., are really negatives. This does not mean, however,
that God is devoid of a quality which he might have, but in the sense in which we say a ston