theories of the epicycle and eccentric, especially the first. For the epicycle is a sphere which changes place in the
circumference of the large sphere.
Finally, an important objection to the doctrine of eternity as taught by Aristotle, involving as it does necessity and
absolute changelessness of natural phenomena, is that it subverts the foundations of religion, and does away with
miracles and signs. The Platonic view (cf. above, p. 269) is not so bad and does not necessitate the denial of miracles;
but there is no need of forcing the Biblical texts to that opinion so long as it has not been proved. As long as we believe
in creation all possible questions concerning the reasons for various phenomena such as prophecy, the various laws, the
selection of Israel, and so on, can be answered by reference to the will of God, which we do not understand. If, however,
the world is a mechanical necessity, all these questions arise and demand an answer.[284]
It will be seen that Maimonides's objections to eternity and mechanical necessity (for these two are necessarily
connected in his mind), are twofold, philosophic and religious. The latter objection we may conceive Maimonides to insist
upon if he were living to-day. Mechanical necessity as a universal explanation of phenomena would exclude free will and
the efficacy of prayer as ordinarily understood, though not necessarily miracles, if we mean by miracle simply an
extraordinary phenomenon not explicable by the laws of nature as we know them, and happening only on rare occasions.
But in reality this is not what we mean by miracle. A miracle is a discontinuity in the laws of nature brought to pass on a
special occasion by a personal being in response to a prayer or in order to realize a given purpose. In this sense
miracles are incompatible with the doctrine of necessity, and Maimonides's objections hold to-day, except for those to
whom religion is independent of the Bible, tradition or any external authority.
As concerns the scientific objections, the case is different. We may allow Maimonides's negative criticism of the
Aristotelian arguments, namely, that they are not convincing. His positive criticism that Aristotle's interpretation of
phenomena on the mechanical principle does not explain all the facts is not valid. Aristotle may be wrong in his actual
explanations of particular phenomena and yet be correct in his method. Modern science, in fact, has adopted the
mechanical method of interpreting phenomena, assuming that this is the only way in which science can exist at all. And if
there is any domain in which mechanical causation is still denied, it is not the celestial regions about which Maimonides
was so much concerned—the motions of the heavenly bodies have been reduced to uniformity in accordance with
natural law quite as definitely as, and in some cases more definitely than, some terrestrial phenomena—but the regions
of life, mind and will. In these domains the discussion within the scientific and philosophic folds is still going on. But in
inanimate nature modern science has succeeded in justifying its method by the ever increasing number of phenomena
that yield to its treatment. Maimonides fought an obsolete philosophy and obsolete scientific principles. It is possible that
he might have found much to object to in modern science as well, on the ground that much is yet unexplained. But an
objection of this sort is captious, particularly if we consider what Maimonides desires to place in science's stead. Science
is doing its best to classify all natural phenomena and to discover the uniformities underlying their behavior. It has
succeeded admirably and is continually widening its sphere of activity. It has been able to predict as a result of its
method. The principle of uniformity and mechanical necessity is becoming more and more generally verified with every
new scientific discovery and invention.
And what does Maimonides offer us in its stead? The principle of intelligent purpose and design. This, he says, is not
open to the objections which apply to the Aristotelian principles and methods. It is as if one said the coward is a better
man than the brave warrior, because the latter is open to the danger of being captured, wounded or killed, whereas the
former is not so liable. The answer obviously would be that the only way the coward escapes the dangers mentioned is
by running away, by refusing to fight. Maimonides's substitution is tantamount to a refusal to fight, it is equivalent to flight
from the field of battle.
Aristotle tries to explain the variation in speed of the different celestial motions, and succeeds indifferently. Another man
coming after Aristotle and following the same method may succeed better. This has actually been the case. Leverrier
without ever looking into a telescope discovered Neptune, and told the observers in what part of the heavens they
should look for the new planet. Substitute Maimonides's principle, and death to science! Why do the heavenly bodies
move as they do? Maimonides replies in effect, because so God's wisdom has determined and his wisdom is
transcendent. There is no further impulse to investigation in such an answer. It is the reply of the obscurantist, and it is
very surprising that Maimonides the rationalist should so far have forgotten his own ideal of reason and enlightenment.
He is here playing into the hands of those very Mutakallimun whom he so severely criticises. They were more consistent.
Distrustful of the irreligious consequences of the philosophical theories of Aristotle and his Arabian followers, they
deliberately denied causation and natural law, and substituted the will of God as interfering continuously in the
phenomena of nature. A red object continues red because and as long as God creates the "accident" red and attaches it
to the atoms of which the object is composed. Fire taking hold of wood burns it and reduces it to ashes because God
wills at the particular moment that this shall be the result. The next moment God may will otherwise and the fire and the
wood will lie down in peace together and no harm done. This makes miracles possible and easy. Maimonides would not
think of going so far; he has no names harsh enough to describe this unscientific, unphilosophic, illogical, irrational,
purely imaginary procedure. But we find that he is himself guilty of the same lack of scientific insight when he rejects a
method because it is not completely successful, and substitutes something else which will always be successful because
it will never tell us anything at all and will stifle all investigation. Were Maimonides living in our day, we may suppose he
would be more favorably inclined to the mechanical principle as a scientific method.
Having laid the philosophical foundations of religion in proving the existence, unity and incorporeality of God, and
purposeful creation in time, Maimonides proceeds to the more properly religious doctrines of Judaism, and begins with
the phenomenon of prophecy. Here also he follows Aristotelian ideas as expressed in the writings of the Arabs Alfarabi
and Avicenna, and was anticipated among the Jews by Ibn Daud. His distinction here as elsewhere is that he went
further than his model in the manner of his elaboration of the doctrine.
He cites three opinions concerning prophecy:
1. The Opinion of the Masses. God chooses any person he desires, be he young or old, wise or ignorant, and inspires
him with the prophetic spirit.
2. The Opinion of the Philosophers. Prophecy is a human gift and requires natural aptitude and hard preparation and
study. But given these qualifications, and prophecy is sure to come.
3. The Opinion of Judaism. This is very much like that of the philosophers, the only difference being that a man may
have all the qualifications and yet be prevented from prophesying if God, by way of punishment, does not desire that he
should.
Prophecy is an inspiration from God, which passes through the mediation of the Active Intellect to the rational power first
and then to the faculty of the imagination. It is the highest stage a man can attain and is not open to everyone. It requires
perfection in theoretical wisdom and in morals, and perfect development of the imaginative power. This latter does its
work when the senses are at rest, giving rise to true dreams, and producing also prophetic visions. Dream and prophecy
differ in degree, not in kind. What a man thinks hard in his waking state, that the imagination works over in sleep. Now if
a person has a perfect brain; develops his mind as far as a man can; is pure morally; is eager to know the mysteries of
existence, its causes and the First Cause; is not susceptible to the purely animal desires, or to those of the spirited soul
ambitious for dominion and honor—if a man has all these qualifications, he without doubt receives through his
imagination from the Active Intellect divine ideas. The difference in the grade of prophets is due to the difference in these
three requirements—perfection of the reason, perfection of the imagination and perfection of moral character.
According to the character and development of their reasons and imaginations men may be divided into three classes.
1. Those whose rational faculties are highly developed and receive influences from the Active Intellect, but whose
imagination is defective constitutionally, or is not under the influence of the Active Intellect. These are wise men and
philosophers.
2. When the imagination also is perfect in constitution and well developed under the influence of the Active Intellect, we
have the class of prophets.
3. When the imagination alone is in good condition, but the intellect is defective, we have statesmen, lawgivers,
magicians, dreamers of true dreams and occult artists. These men are so confused sometimes by visions and reveries
that they think they have the gift of prophecy.
Each of the first two classes may be further divided into two according as the influence from above is just sufficient for
the perfection of the individual himself, or is so abundant as to cause the recipient to seek to impart it to others. We have
then authors and teachers in the first class, and preaching prophets in the second.
Among the powers we have in varying degrees are those of courage and divination. These are innate and can be
perfected if one has them in any degree. By means of the power of divination we sometimes guess what a person said or
did under certain conditions, and guess truly. The result really follows from a number of premises, but the mind passes
over these so rapidly that it seems the guess was made instantaneously. The prophet must have these two faculties in a
high degree. Witness Moses braving the wrath of a great king. Some prophets also have their rational powers more
highly developed than those of an ordinary person who perfects his reason by theoretical study. The same inspiration
which renders the activity of the imagination so vivid that it seems to it its perceptions are real and due to the external
senses—this same inspiration acts also upon the rational power, and makes its ideas as certain as if they were derived
by intellectual effort.
The prophetic vision (Heb. Mar'ah) is a state of agitation coming upon the prophet in his waking state, as is clear from
the words of Daniel, "And I saw this great vision, and there remained no strength in me: for my comeliness was turned in
me into corruption, and I retained no strength" (Dan. 10, 8). In vision also the senses cease their functions, and the
process is the same as in sleep.
Whenever the Bible speaks of prophecy coming to anyone, it is always through an angel and in a dream or vision,
whether this is specifically stated or not. The expression, "And God came to ... in a dream of the night," does not denote
prophecy at all. It is merely a dream that comes to a person warning him of danger. Laban and Abimelech had such
dreams, but no one would credit these heathens with the prophetic power.
Whenever an angel is met in Scripture speaking or communicating with a person, it is always in a dream or vision.
Examples are, Abraham and the three men, Jacob wrestling with the angel, Balaam and the ass, Joshua and the angel at
Jericho;—all these were in a dream or vision. Sometimes there is no angel at all, but merely a voice that is heard by such
as are not deserving of prophecy, for example Hagar, and Manoah and his wife.
The prophets see images in their visions. These images are sometimes interpreted in the vision itself; sometimes the
interpretation does not appear until the prophet wakes up. Sometimes the prophet sees a likeness, sometimes he sees
God speaking to him, or an angel; or he hears an angel speaking to him, or sees a man speaking to him, or sees nothing
at all but only hears a voice.
In this way we distinguish eleven grades of prophecy. The first two are only preparatory, not yet constituting one who
has them a prophet.
1. When one is endowed by God with a great desire to save a community or a famous individual, and he undertakes to
bring it about, we have the first grade known as the "Spirit of God." This was the position of the Judges. Moses always
had this desire from the moment he could be called a man, hence he killed the Egyptian and chided the two quarreling
men, and delivered the daughters of Jethro from the shepherds, and so on. The same is true of David. Not everyone,
however, who has this desire is a prophet until he succeeds in doing a very great thing.
2. When a person feels something come upon him and begins to speak—words of wisdom and praise or of warning, or
relating to social or religious conduct—all this while in a waking state and with full consciousness, we have the second
stage called the "Holy Spirit." This is the inspiration which dictated the Psalms, the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of
Songs, Daniel, Job, Chronicles and the other sacred writings (Hagiographa). Balaam's discourses also belong to this
class. David, Solomon and Daniel belong here, and are not in the same class with Isaiah, Jeremiah, Nathan, Ahiah, and
so on. God spoke to Solomon through Ahiah the Shilonite; at other times he spoke to him in a dream, and when Solomon
woke up, he knew it was a dream and not a prophecy. Daniel's visions were also in dreams. This is why his book is
classed in the third division of the Biblical writings (Hagiographa), and not in the second (Prophets).
3. This is the first grade of real prophecy, i. e., when a prophet sees a picture in a dream under the proper conditions,
and the picture is explained to him in the dream itself. Most of the dreams of Zechariah are of this nature.
4. When he hears speech in a prophetic dream, but does not see the speaker, as happened to Samuel in the beginning
of his career.
5. When a man speaks to him in a dream, as we find in some of the prophecies of Ezekiel, "And the man said unto me,
son of man...."
6. When an angel speaks to him in a dream. This is the condition of most prophets, as is indicated in the expression,
"And an angel of God said to me in a dream."
7. When it seems to him in a prophetic dream as if God is speaking to him; as we find in Isaiah, "I saw the Lord ... and he
said, whom shall I send and who will go for us" (Isa. 6, 1, 8).
8. When a vision appears to him and he sees pictures, like Abraham at the covenant of the pieces (Gen. 15).
9. When he hears words in a vision, as in the case of Abraham, "And, behold, the word of the Lord came unto him
saying, This man shall not be thine heir" (Gen. 15, 4).
10. When he sees a man speaking to him in a prophetic vision. Examples, Abraham in the plain of Mamre, Joshua in
Jericho.
11. When he sees an angel speaking to him in a vision, like Abraham in the sacrifice of Isaac. This is the highest degree
of prophecy, excepting Moses. The next higher stage would be that a prophet should see God speaking to him in a
vision. But this seems impossible, as it is too much for the imaginative faculty. In fact it is possible that in a vision speech
is never heard at all, but only likenesses are seen. In that case the eleven grades are reduced to eight.
All the details of actions and travels that are described in prophetic visions must not be understood as having actually
taken place, as for example Hosea's marrying a harlot. They appear only in the prophet's vision or dream. Many
expressions in the prophets are hyperbolical or metaphorical, and must not be taken literally.
Moses was the greatest of the prophets. He alone received his communications direct from God. All the others got their
divine messages through an angel. Moses performed his miracles before the whole people as no one else did. The
standing still of the sun produced by Joshua was not in the presence of all the people. Besides it may be the meaning is
that that day seemed to the people the longest of any they experienced in those regions. Moses alone, by reason of his
superiority to all other prophets before or after, called the people to the Law. No one before him did this, though there
were many prophets before Moses. Abraham taught a few people, and so did others. But no one like Moses said to the
people, "The Lord sent me to you that you may do thus and so." After Moses all the prophets urge upon the people
obedience to the law of Moses. This shows that the law of Moses will never change. For it is perfect, and any change in
any direction would be for the worse.[285]
From the theoretical part of philosophy we pass to the practical. This includes ethics and other topics related thereto,
theodicy, providence, free will and its compatibility with God's omniscience. To give his ethical doctrine a scientific
character, Maimonides bases it upon a metaphysical and psychological foundation. The doctrine of matter and form
gives him a convenient formula underlying his ethical discussion. Sin and vice are due to matter, virtue and goodness to
form. For sensuous desires, which are due to matter, are at the basis of vice; whereas intellectual pursuits, which
constitute the noblest activity of the soul, the form of the living body, lead to virtue. We may therefore state man's ethical
duty in broad philosophical terms as follows: Despise matter, and have to do with it only so far as is absolutely
necessary.[286] This is too general to be enlightening, and it is necessary to have recourse to psychology. Ethics has for
its subject-matter the improvement and perfection of character. Making use of a medical analogy we may say that as it is
the business of the physician to cure the body, so it is the aim of the moral teacher to cure the soul. We may carry this
figure further and conclude that as the physician must know the anatomy and physiology of the body before he can
undertake to cure it of its ills, so the moralist must know the nature of the soul and its powers or faculties.
In the details of his psychology Maimonides follows Alfarabi instead of Avicenna who was the model of Judah Halevi and
Ibn Daud (pp. 175, 211).
The soul consists of five parts or faculties: the nutritive, the sensitive, the imaginative, the appetitive and the rational.
The further description of the nutritive soul pertains to medicine and does not concern us here. The sensitive soul
contains the well known five senses. The imaginative faculty is the power which retains the forms of sensible objects
when they are no longer present to the external senses. It also has the function of original combination of sense
elements into composite objects having no real existence in the outside world. This makes the imagination an unreliable
guide in matters intellectual.
The appetitive faculty is the power of the soul by which a person desires a thing or rejects it. Acts resulting from it are the
pursuit of an object and its avoidance; also the feelings of anger, favor, fear, courage, cruelty, pity, love, hate, and so on.
The organs of these powers, feelings and activities are the members of the body, like the hand, which takes hold of an
object; the foot, which goes toward a thing or away from it; the eye, which looks; the heart, which takes courage or is
stricken with fear; and so with the rest.
The rational faculty is the power of the soul by which a person reflects, acquires knowledge, discriminates between a
praiseworthy act and a blameworthy. The functions of the rational soul are practical and theoretical. The practical activity
of the reason has to do with the arts directly, as in learning carpentry, agriculture, medicine, seamanship; or it is
concerned with reflecting upon the methods and principles of a given art. The theoretical reason has for its subject-
matter the permanent and unchangeable, what is known as science in the true sense of the term.[287]
Now as far as the commandments, mandatory and prohibitive, of the Bible are concerned, the only parts of the soul
which are involved are the sensitive and the appetitive. For these are the only powers subject to control. The nutritive
and the imaginative powers function in sleep as well in waking, hence a person cannot be held responsible for their
activities, which are involuntary. There is some doubt about the rational faculty, but it seems that here too a person is
responsible for the opinions he holds, though no practical acts are involved.
Virtues are divided into ethical and intellectual (dianoetic); and so are the contrary vices. The intellectual virtues are the
excellencies of the reason. Such are science, which consists in the knowledge of proximate and remote causes of things;
pure reason, having to do with such innate principles as the axioms; the acquired reason, which we cannot discuss here;
clearness of perception and quick insight. The intellectual vices are the opposites or the contraries of these.
The ethical virtues are resident in the appetitive faculty. The sensitive soul is auxiliary to the appetitive. The number of
these virtues is large. Examples are; temperance, generosity, justice, modesty, humility, contentment, courage, and so
on. The vices of this class are the above qualities carried to excess, or not practiced to the required extent. The faculties
of nutrition and imagination have neither virtues nor vices. We say a person's digestion is good or it is poor; his
imagination is correct or it is defective, but we do not attach the idea of virtue or vice to these conditions.
Virtue is a permanent and enduring quality of the soul occupying an intermediate position between the two opposite
extremes each of which is a vice, sinning by exceeding the proper measure of the golden mean or by falling short of it. A
good act is that form of conduct which follows from a virtuous disposition as just defined. A bad act is the result of a
tendency of the soul to either of the two extremes, of excess or defect. Thus temperance or moderation is a virtue. It is
the mean between over-indulgence in the direction of excess, and insensibility or indifference in the direction of defect.
The last two are vices. Similarly generosity is a mean between niggardliness and extravagance; courage is a mean
between foolhardiness and cowardice; dignity is a mean between haughtiness and loutishness; humility is a mean
between arrogance and self-abasement; contentment is a mean between avarice and slothful indifference; kindness is a
mean between baseness and excessive self-denial; gentleness is a mean between irascibility and insensibility to insult;
modesty is a mean between impudence and shamefacedness. People are often mistaken and regard one of the
extremes as a virtue. Thus the reckless and the foolhardy is often praised as the brave; the man of no backbone is called
gentle; the indolent is mistaken for the contented; the insensible for the temperate, the extravagant for the generous.
This is an error. The mean alone is worthy of commendation.
The ethical virtues and vices are acquired as a result of repeated practice during a long time of the corresponding acts
until they become a confirmed habit and a second nature. A person is not born virtuous or vicious. What he will turn out
to be depends upon the way he is trained from childhood. If his training has been wrong and he has acquired a vicious
disposition in a particular tendency, he may be cured. And here we may borrow a leaf from the book of medicine. As in
bodily disease the physician's endeavor is to restore the disturbed equilibrium in the mixture of the humors by increasing
the element that is deficient, so in diseases of the soul, if a person has a decided tendency to one of the vicious
extremes, he must as a curative measure, for a certain length of time, be directed to practice the opposite extreme until
he has been cured. Then he may go back to the virtuous mean. Thus if a person has the vice of niggardliness, the
practice of liberality is not sufficient to cure him. As a heroic measure he must practice extravagance until the former
tendency has left him. Then he may return to the liberal mean. The same thing applies to the other virtues, except that it
is necessary to use proper judgment in the amount of practice of a vicious extreme necessary to bring about a
satisfactory result. Too great deviation and too long continued from the mean would in some cases be dangerous, as
likely to develop the opposite vice. Thus it is comparatively safe to indulge in extravagance as a cure for niggardliness;
the reverse process must be used with caution. Care should likewise be taken in trying to wean a person away from a
habit of insensibility to pleasure by means of a régime of indulgence. If it is not discontinued in time, he may become a
pleasure seeker, which is even worse than total indifference.