Of the post-Maimonidean philosophers Crescas is the last who contributes original views of philosophical value. Joseph
Albo, of Monreal in Aragon, is of little importance as a philosopher. He rehashes the problems which occupied a
Maimonides, a Gersonides and a Crescas, and sides now with one, now with the other. He benefited by the writings of
his predecessors, particularly Maimonides, Crescas, and Simon Duran;[403a] and the philosophical discussions in the
last three sections of his "Book of Roots" ("Sefer Ikkarim") give the impression of an eclectic compilation in the interest of
a moderate conservatism. The style is that of the popularizer and the homilist; and to this he owes his popularity, which
was denied his more original teacher, Crescas.
But philosophy as such was not Albo's forte, nor was it his chief interest. While it is true that all the Jewish thinkers of the
middle ages were for a great part apologetes, this did not prevent a Maimonides or a Gersonides from making a really
thorough and disinterested study of science and philosophy; and often their scientific and philosophic conviction was so
strong that the apologia was pro philosophia sua rather than pro Judaismo. The central theme therefore in the majority
of Albo's philosophical predecessors was the equally metaphysical and theological, of God and his attributes. These
were proved by reason and confirmed by Scripture and tradition. Judaism had to be formulated and defended with a view
not so much to the dangers threatening from Christianity and Mohammedanism as to those endangering all religions
alike, namely, the opinions of science and philosophy as taught especially by the Aristotelians. Hence Maimonides
treated for the most part of the same problems as the Mohammedan Mutakallimun before him, and Thomas Aquinas the
Christian had no scruple in making the Jewish philosopher's method his own when he undertook to defend the Catholic
faith "contra Gentiles."
Different were the circumstances as well as the attitude of Joseph Albo. The purely philosophic interest was not strong in
his day. He was not confronted by the necessity of proving the existence and incorporeality of God by reason. No one
doubted these things and they had been abundantly written about in times gone by. In the interest of completeness and
for the benefit of those who were not trained in technical philosophy, Albo found it desirable to restate the results of
previous discussions of these topics in a style more accessible to the readers of his day. But the central interest in his
age was shifted. It was a time of religious disputations and forced conversions. Albo himself had taken part in such a
disputation held at Tortosa in 1413-14, and he had to defend Judaism against Christianity. He had to show his own
people that Judaism was the true religion and Christianity spurious. Hence it was religion as such he had to investigate,
in order to find what marks distinguished a divine law from a human, and a genuine divine law from one that pretended to
be such. To make this investigation logically complete he had to show that there must be such a thing as a divine law,
and that no such law can be conceived without assuming certain basal beliefs or dogmas. A discussion of religious
dogma was essential, for upon the nature of these fundamental beliefs depended one's judgment of a given law and its
character as divine or human, genuine or spurious. Hence the title of Albo's treatise, "Book of [religious] Roots [dogmas]."
And while it is true that Maimonides, the systematizer and codifier, could not fail to put down in his commentary on the
Mishna a list of articles of the Jewish creed, nothing is said of this in his philosophical work, the "Guide of the Perplexed."
With Albo the establishment of the fundamental dogmas is the central theme.
At the same time Albo was anticipated even in this, his more original contribution. Crescas, his teacher, had written,
beside the "Or Adonai," a work against Christianity. [404] And in the "Or Adonai" itself he devotes considerable space to
the question of the fundamental dogmas of Judaism, and takes occasion to criticize Maimonides for his faulty method in
the selection of the thirteen articles, on the ground that he did not distinguish between what was fundamental and what
was derivative. This suggestion gave Albo his cue, which he developed in his own way.[404a]
Human happiness, Albo tells us, depends upon theory and practice, as Aristotle says. But the human mind is inadequate
to know by itself the truth touching these two. Hence there is need of something superior to the human mind which will
define right practice and the true ideas. This can be only by divine guidance. Hence everyone must be able to tell the
divine legislation from those which are not divine. For this it is necessary to know what are the principles without which a
divine law cannot exist. This is the purpose of the book, to explain the essential principles of a divine law.[405]
A knowledge of the principles of religion would seem easy, for all people profess some religion or other, and hence are
presumed to know upon what their religions are based. But this question has not been treated adequately before, and
there is no agreement among previous writers about the number of the principles or their identity. Some say there are
thirteen (Maimonides), some say twenty-six, some six (Crescas), without investigating what are the principles of divine
religion generally. For we must distinguish between the general principles which pertain to divine legislation as such and
hence are common to all religions, and special principles which are peculiar to a particular religion.
Seeing the importance of this subject, Albo continues, I undertook this investigation. I came to the conclusion that there
are three general principles of divine religion, existence of God, Revelation, and Reward and Punishment after death.
Then there are special principles peculiar to a particular religion. From the general principles ("Ikkarim") follow particular
or derivative principles ("Shorashim.")[406]
The investigation of the principles of religion is a delicate matter because one is in danger of being reckoned an infidel if
he denies what is considered by others a fundamental dogma. Thus according to Maimonides the belief in the Messiah is
fundamental, and he who denies it is a heretic and has no share in the world to come. And yet Rabbi Hillel in the Talmud
(Sanhedrin, 99a) said, "Israel need expect no Messiah, for they had the benefit of one in the days of Hezekiah, King of
Judah." On the other hand, Maimonides does not regard creation ex nihilo as fundamental, whereas others do; and to
their mind Maimonides is open to the charge of unbelief.
The truth is that only he is an unbeliever who deliberately and knowingly contradicts the Bible. A person who believes in
the Bible but is led mistakenly to misinterpret it, and denies real principles because he thinks the Bible does not require
us to believe them as principles, or does not require us to believe them at all, is guilty of error and in need of forgiveness,
but is not a heretic.[407]
Having thus defined his attitude and purpose, Albo proceeds to criticize the list of dogmas laid down by Maimonides and
modified by Crescas, and then defends his own view. A fundamental principle ("Ikkar," lit. root) is one upon which
something else depends and without which this latter cannot exist. Maimonides counts thirteen principles of Judaism as
follows: (1) Existence of God, (2) Unity, (3) Incorporeality, (4) Eternity, (5) He alone must be worshipped, (6) Prophecy,
(7) Superiority of the prophecy of Moses, (8) Revelation, (9) Immutability of the Law, (10) God's Omniscience, (11)
Reward and Punishment, (12) Messiah, (13) Resurrection.[408] This list is open to criticism. If Maimonides intended to
admit strict principles only without which Judaism cannot exist, we understand why he named (1), (6), (8), (10), (11),
which are general principles of any divine religion, and (7) and (9) as special principles of Judaism. But we cannot see
why he included (2) and (3). For while they are true, and every Jew should believe them, Judaism can be conceived as
existing without them. It is still more strange that (5) should be counted as a principle. To be sure, it is one of the ten
commandments, "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me.... Thou shalt not bow thyself down to them, nor serve them"
... (Exod. 20, 35), but Judaism can be conceived to exist even with the belief in a mediator. Similarly it is not clear why
(13) should be considered as a fundamental dogma. On the other hand, he omitted Tradition and Free Will as beliefs
essential to any divine religion.
If, in defence of Maimonides, we say that he intended to name not only fundamental principles, but also true beliefs,
whether fundamental or derivative, then there are many others he might have mentioned, such as creation ex nihilo,
belief in miracles, that God rests in Israel through the Torah, and so on.
Another writer counts twenty-six principles, including everything that occurred to his mind, such as the attributes of
eternity, wisdom, life, power, will and others, counting paradise and hell as two, and other absurd ideas. Others
again,[409] criticizing Maimonides's principles, reduce them to six, viz. (1) God's knowledge, (2) Providence, (3) Power,
(4) Prophecy, (5) Free Will, (6) Purpose, adding thereto the three proved by Maimonides, God's existence, unity and
incorporeality. The objection to this list is that it does not contain the special dogmas of Judaism, and does not give us a
principle by which we can distinguish between the genuine and spurious divine religion. For the dogmas named in the
above list give us the necessary requirements for a divine law, but not the sufficient. We may have all these principles
and yet not have a divine religion. As to Free Will and Purpose, they are essential to divine legislation to be sure, but not
qua divine; they are also essential to a conventional human law. Divine religion has a special purpose peculiar to it.[410]
Having laid bare the defects in the attempts at a list of fundamental dogmas of Judaism made by his predecessors, Albo
categorically lays down the following three principles as fundamental to divine religion: (1) Existence of God, (2)
Providence, and reward and punishment, (3) Revelation.
To justify this statement Albo finds it necessary to make clear what is meant by divine law or religion, and what relation it
bears to other laws, not divine. This necessitates an explanation of existing laws and their motives and causes.
Animal life, we are told, may be divided into three classes according to the mode of living adopted by each. Beasts of
prey live separately and not in groups. Mankind must live in communities, as one individual is dependent upon the work
of another, and social life is essential to their existence. Intermediate between beast of prey and man are the gregarious
animals, which keep together not as a matter of necessity, as is the case in man, but for convenience, for the sake of
being together. Man is social by nature; and in order to make communal life possible, there must be some order in the
community which prohibits violence, robbery, and so on. This is known as "natural law." In addition to this there are in
many places "conventional laws," made by kings and emperors, regulating more carefully and with greater detail than the
natural law the affairs of the members of the community.
But this is not all. There is still another kind of law due directly to God's providence. The providence of God is seen even
in the lower animals, in the constitution of their bodies, not merely in matters essential to the preservation of the animal,
but also in the interest of comfort and convenience, as for example the duplication of the sense organs. It stands to
reason therefore that there is a divine influence which provides for man even to a greater degree. This providence may
extend only to one individual, but this person brings about the perfection of the race; just as in the individual man the
heart is instrumental in giving life to all the other limbs. The law which is promulgated through this person is a "divine
law."
The term "law" ("Dat") applies to any system of directions embracing a large aggregate of men, whether it contains many
commands or one. There are thus three kinds of law, natural, conventional and divine. Natural law is the same for all
persons, times and places. Conventional law is ordered by a wise man or men in conformity with the necessity of the
persons, times and places, as the reason dictates, without special divine suggestion. Divine law is ordered by God
through a prophet. The purpose of natural law is to remove wrong and promote right, keeping men from robbery and theft
so that society may be able to exist. Conventional law goes further and tends to remove the unseemly and to promote the
becoming. Divine law has for its purpose to guide men to true happiness, which is the happiness of the soul and its
eternal life. It points out the way to follow to reach this end, showing what is the true good for man to pursue, and what is
the real evil which one must shun; though it also lays down the law of right and wrong like the other two.[411]
The conventional law is inferior to the divine in a number of ways.
The conventional law only orders human conduct for the purpose of improving social life, but does not concern itself with
perfection in theoretical speculation and knowledge, which leads the soul to eternal life. The divine law embraces both
the parts upon which human perfection depends, conduct and theory. It embraces the becoming and unbecoming
(practice), and the true and untrue (theory). As the Psalmist has it, "The Law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul"
(Psal. 19, 8).
The conventional law, being human, cannot always decide with certainty what is becoming and what unbecoming. It is
liable to error. This is particularly the case in matters of theory, such as the creation or eternity of the world. The divine
law gives us certainty in all things, "The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple" (ib.).
The person guided by the conventional law is not sure that he is always guided aright; hence he cannot feel the
satisfaction and the joy of the man whose guide is the divine law, making him certain of being right—"The precepts of the
Lord are upright, rejoicing the heart" (ib. 9).
The conventional law can give general rules only, but is unable to advise in a particular case. So Aristotle in the Ethics
points out that virtue is a mean, but he cannot determine exactly the proper measure at a given time. This is the function
of the divine law—"The commandment of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eyes" (ib.).
The conventional law is subject to change in the course of time. Witness the marriage of sisters in the early period of
Adam and Abel. The divine law alone does not change—"The fear of the Lord is pure, enduring for ever" (ib. 10).
The conventional law cannot estimate exactly the merited amount and kind of reward and punishment; whereas, "The
ordinances of the Lord are the truth; they are just altogether" (ib.).[412]
Freedom and Purpose are principles of conventional law. Without freedom there is no sense in giving orders. For this
reason Freedom and Purpose are not correctly given as fundamental dogmas of divine law, for while the latter cannot get
along without them, they are not peculiar to divine law as such, but are common also to conventional law. This is why
Maimonides omitted Freedom in his creed. The same is true of Purpose in general. The divine law, however, has a
special purpose, perfection and eternal life, hence Maimonides did include it in his list.[413]
The fundamental dogmas of divine law are, as we said before, Existence of God, Revelation, Reward and Punishment. It
is evident that there cannot be a divine law without the first two. The third is also necessary; for the purpose of divine law
must be a perfection greater than the conventional law can accomplish. This is eternal life, and is signified by Reward
and Punishment.
As all agree that the Law of Moses is divine, it is proper to use it as a standard in order to discover what a divine law
must have. Accordingly if we examine the first four chapters of Genesis, we find the principle of the existence of God in
chapter one, describing creation. The second and third chapters give evidence of revelation, or communication of God
with man for the purpose of directing his conduct. Finally in the Cain incident in chapter four is illustrated the third dogma
of Reward and Punishment.[414]
Creation ex nihilo is a true belief but not a fundamental principle. For though the Aristotelian view of eternity is heretical,
as it takes away the possibility of miracles, nay even the possibility of Moses and the Messiah (for these could exist only
after the lapse of an infinite number of individuals), one who believes like Plato in a primitive matter is not necessarily in
contradiction with the Biblical miracles, for they were not ex nihilo[415] (cf. above, p. 358).
It is not sufficient to believe in the three principles mentioned to be considered a believer and to be entitled to a share in
the world to come. One must believe also in the derivative principles following from them. Thus from the existence of God
follow his unity and incorporeality. And if a man does not believe in incorporeality, he disbelieves in the real nature of
God, and it is as if he denied the original principle.
The derivative principles ("Shorashim" = roots) are as follows. From existence of God are derived four: (1) Unity, (2)
Incorporeality, (3) Independence of time, (4) Freedom from defects. From Revelation are derived three: (1) God's
knowledge, (2) Prophecy, (3) Authenticity of God's messenger. From Reward and Punishment is derived one—
Providence in the sense of special Providence. In all there are eleven dogmas.[416]
A particular commandment of the Law is not reckoned either as a fundamental principle or as a derivative. He who
trangresses it is a sinner and is punished for his misdeed, but is not a heretic who loses his share in the world to come,
unless he denies that the commandment in question is from God. In that case he comes in the category of those who
deny revelation. Similarly the belief in tradition is not a principle because it is a particular commandment. Unity of God is
a principle though it is apparently a special commandment, because the term unity contains two concepts; first, that God
is one and there is not another like him; second, that being one and free from any multiplicity or composition, he is the
cause of all the multiplicity in the world. The latter is not a particular commandment, but a principle derived from the
existence of God. The former is a particular commandment. If particular commandments were regarded as principles, we
should have as many principles as there are commandments in the Bible.[417]
The above distinction between the two senses of the term unity, one of which is rationally derived from the existence of
God, whereas the other not being so derivable is not a principle, and is given in the Bible as a special commandment, is
clearly due to Crescas, who after a few attempts at proving the unity of God in the sense of excluding dualism, gives it up
as incapable of proof logically, and falls back upon the testimony of Scripture, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord
is One." The other sense of the word unity Crescas proves by reason. Hence Albo counts it among the derivative
principles (cf. above, p. 392).
If a particular commandment is not a principle, which means that a fundamental or derivative dogma cannot itself be a
commandment, but must lie at the basis of all commandments, the question arises whence come these principles, and
who is to warrant their truth. In the sciences we know that the basal principles of a given science are not proved in that
science itself, but are borrowed from another science in which they are proved. Thus physics takes the concepts of
substance and accident from metaphysics. In turn the latter takes the idea of a first mover from physics. Among the laws,
too, the conventional law takes its principles, freedom and purpose, from political philosophy. Whence does divine law
take its principles? The existence of God can be demonstrated philosophically from premises going back to axioms and
first principles. But this is not true of Prophecy and Providence.
The answer Albo gives to this question is that of Judah Halevi and Crescas. The principles of the divine law are known
empirically, i. e., by experience. Adam knew of the existence of God, of prophecy and reward and punishment from
personal experience. Similarly Noah and Abraham. Nowadays we know the law by tradition, but the majority of the
principles thus known are so certain that there is neither difference of opinion nor doubt entertained by anyone
concerning them. Such is the status for example of the principle of Revelation. Other principles again, like the existence
of God, are, as was said before, known by theoretical speculation.[418]
To find out whether a religion professing to be of divine origin is really so or not, it must be examined first with reference
to the three fundamental, and the other derivative principles. If it opposes them, it is spurious and not genuine. If it is not
opposed to the principles in question, it must be further examined with a view to determining whether the promulgator is a
genuine messenger of God or not. And the test here must be a direct one. Miracles and signs are no conclusive proof of
prophecy, and still less do they prove that the person performing them is a messenger sent by God to announce a law.
They merely show that the person is considered worthy of having miracles performed through him, provided the miracles
are genuine and not performed through magic. The test of the prophet and the messenger of God must be as direct as it
was in the case of Moses, where the people actually saw that he was addressed by God and commissioned with a
message for them.[419]
This opinion of Albo is clearly intended as a defence of Judaism against Christianity's claim that Jesus performed
miracles, a claim which the Rabbis of the middle ages were inclined to recognize.
In addition to the three fundamental and eight derivative principles of divine legislation, there are six dogmas, which
every follower of the Mosaic law must believe. They are (1) Creation ex nihilo, (2) Superiority of Moses to other
prophets, (3) Immutability of the Law, (4) That human perfection can be attained by any one of the commandments of the
Law, (5) Resurrection, (6) Messiah.
Creation ex nihilo is neither a fundamental nor a derivative principle of religion generally or of Judaism specially
because, as we saw before (p. 413), they can exist without this dogma. At the same time it is a truth which it behooves
every religionist and particularly every Jew to believe. It follows from the principle of the existence of God. If God cannot
create ex nihilo, there is a defect in him. For creation ex nihilo is admitted in a certain sense even by those who hold that
the world is eternal. They admit that God is the cause of everything else; hence matter is his effect through the mediation
of the separate Intellect. But how can a separate Intellect be the cause of matter if there is no creation ex nihilo. This is
ex nihilo as much as anything can be. To say that we can find no reason why he should create at a particular time rather
than at another, and hence the world must be eternal, is no argument; for this reasoning can apply only to action from
necessity. Voluntary action is just of this kind, that it takes place at a particular time.
In the above argument for creation the reader will not fail to see reminiscences of Maimonides as well as Crescas (cf. pp.
271 and 403).
The superiority of Moses to other prophets is not essential to Judaism, nevertheless it behooves every Jew to believe it,
as it is included in the principle of Revelation, and the Bible tells us, "And there arose not a prophet since then in Israel
like unto Moses" (Deut. 34, 10).
The Immutability of the Law will be treated in detail later. Here it will suffice to say that while it is not a sine qua non of
Judaism, every Jew should believe it, as it is included in the derivative principle of the Authenticity of God's messenger.
It stands to reason that human perfection can be attained by the performance of any one of the commandments of the
Law. For if it requires the performance of all the commandments for this purpose, then the Law of Moses makes it more
difficult to reach perfection than the previous laws, which is not in consonance with the statement of the Rabbis that "God
gave Israel so many laws and commandments because he wished to make them meritorious" (Tal. Bab. Makkot, 23 b).
Resurrection will be treated more at length later. It must be believed because it has been accepted by Israel and has
come down to us by tradition. The same thing applies to the belief in the Messiah. This is also a traditional belief and is
related to the principle of Reward and Punishment, though it is not like the latter indispensable either to religion in
general or to Judaism in particular.[420]
The difference, it will be seen, between Albo and Maimonides in the question of Jewish dogmas is simply one of
classification and grading. Albo includes in his enumeration all the thirteen dogmas of Maimonides with the exception of
the fifth, namely, that God alone be worshipped, but instead of placing them all on the same level of importance as
equally essential to the structure of Judaism, as Maimonides apparently intended, Albo divides them into three categories
of descending rank as follows: fundamental principles, derived principles, true beliefs. Of Maimonides's list the last two,