satisfied. If this were not so, there could be no room for those indifferent and visibly trifling actions,
to which our wills are so often determined, and wherein we voluntarily waste so much of our lives;
which remissness could by no means consist with a constant determination of will or desire to the
greatest apparent good. That this is so, I think few people need go far from home to be convinced.
And indeed in this life there are not many whose happiness reaches so far as to afford them a
constant train of moderate mean pleasures, without any mixture of uneasiness; and yet they could
be content to stay here for ever: though they cannot deny, but that it is possible there may be a state
of eternal durable joys after this life, far surpassing all the good that is to be found here. Nay, they
cannot but see that it is more possible than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of
honour, riches, or pleasure which they pursue, and for which they neglect that eternal state. But yet,
in full view of this difference, satisfied of the possibility of a perfect, secure, and lasting happiness in
a future state, and under a clear conviction that it is not to be had here,--whilst they bound their
happiness within some little enjoyment or aim of this life, and exclude the joys of heaven from
making any necessary part of it,--their desires are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor
their wills determined to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.
46. Why not being desired, it moves not the will. The ordinary necessities of our lives fill a great part
of them with the uneasinesses of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, weariness, with labour, and sleepiness,
in their constant returns, etc. To which, if, besides accidental harms, we add the fantastical
uneasiness (as itch after honour, power, or riches, etc.) which acquired habits, by fashion, example,
and education, have settled in us, and a thousand other irregular desires, which custom has made
natural to us, we shall find that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these uneasinesses, as
to leave us free to the attraction of remoter absent good. We are seldom at ease, and free enough
from the solicitation of our natural or adopted desires, but a constant succession of uneasinesses
out of that stock which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped up, take the will in their turns;
and no sooner is one action dispatched, which by such a determination of the will we are set upon,
but another uneasiness is ready to set us on work. For, the removing of the pains we feel, and are at
present pressed with, being the getting out of misery, and consequently the first thing to be done in
order to happiness,--absent good, though thought on, confessed, and appearing to be good, not
making any part of this unhappiness in its absence, is justled out, to make way for the removal of
those uneasinesses we feel; till due and repeated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind,
given some relish of it, and raised in us some desire: which then beginning to make a part of our
present uneasiness, stands upon fair terms with the rest to be satisfied, and so, according to its
greatness and pressure, comes in its turn to determine the will.
47. Due consideration raises desire. And thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good
proposed, it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good,
whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the will, and be pursued. For good, though
appearing and allowed ever so great, yet till it has raised desires in our minds, and thereby made us
uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills; we are not within the sphere of its activity, our wills being
under the determination only of those uneasinesses which are present to us, which (whilst we have
any) are always soliciting, and ready at hand to give the will its next determination. The balancing,
when there is any in the mind, being only, which desire shall be next satisfied, which uneasiness
first removed. Whereby it comes to pass that, as long as any uneasiness, any desire, remains in our
mind, there is no room for good, barely as such, to come at the will, or at all to determine it.
Because, as has been said, the first step in our endeavours after happiness being to get wholly out
of the confines of misery, and to feel no part of it, the will can be at leisure for nothing else, till every
uneasiness we feel be perfectly removed. which, in the multitude of wants and desires we are beset
with in this imperfect state, we are not like to be ever freed from in this world.
48. The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire makes way for consideration. There being
in us a great many uneasinesses, always soliciting and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I
have said, that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action; and so it
does for the most part, but not always. For, the mind having in most cases, as is evident in
experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires; and so all, one
after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh
them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not using of it right comes all that
variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our
endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too
soon, before due examination. To prevent this, we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this
or that desire; as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all
liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will. For, during this
suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that
determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we
are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that
we can, or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our
nature, to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair examination.
49. To be determined by our own judgment, is no restraint to liberty. This is so far from being a
restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it; it is not an
abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the further we are removed from such a
determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind, not
determinable by its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so
far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an
imperfection, as the want of indifferency. to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an
imperfection on the other side. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet: he
is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he
were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection, if he had the same
indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would
save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming: it is as much a perfection, that desire, or the
power of preferring, should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be
determined by the will; and the certainer such determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay,
were we determined by anything but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of
any action, we were not free; the very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we
choose. And therefore, every man is put under a necessity, by his constitution as an intelligent
being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment what is best for him to do: else
he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to
deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills
and acts for an end that he would not have, at the time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it
in his present thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it
before any other; unless he can have and not have it, will and not will it, at the same time; a
contradiction too manifest to be admitted.
50. The freest agents are so determined. If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy
perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge that they are more steadily determined in their
choice of good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than
we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite wisdom
and goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good; the
freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.
51. A constant determination to a pursuit of happiness no abridgment of liberty. But to give a right
view of this mistaken part of liberty let me ask,--Would any one be a changeling, because he is less
determined by wise considerations than a wise man? Is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty
to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man's self? If to break loose from the conduct
of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment which keeps us from choosing or
doing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only freemen: but yet, I think,
nobody would choose to be mad for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already. The
constant desire of happiness, and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, nobody, I think,
accounts an abridgment of liberty, or at least an abridgment of liberty to be complained of. God
Almighty himself is under the necessity of being happy; and the more any intelligent being is so, the
nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness. That, in this state of ignorance, we short-
sighted creatures might not mistake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to suspend any
particular desire, and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in action. This is standing
still, where we are not sufficiently assured of the way: examination is consulting a guide. The
determination of the will upon inquiry, is following the direction of that guide: and he that has a
power to act or not to act, according as such determination directs, is a free agent: such
determination abridges not that power wherein liberty consists. He that has his chains knocked off,
and the prison doors set open to him, is perfectly at liberty, because he may either go or stay, as he
best likes; though his preference be determined to stay, by the darkness of the night, or illness of
the weather, or want of other lodging. He ceases not to be free; though the desire of some
convenience to be had there absolutely determines his preference, and makes him stay in his
prison.
52. The necessity of pursuing true happiness the foundation of liberty. As therefore the highest
perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness; so
the care of ourselves, that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation
of our liberty. The stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general, which is
our greatest good, and which, as such, our desires always follow, the more are we free from any
necessary determination of our will to any particular action, and from a necessary compliance with
our desire, set upon any particular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examined
whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent with, our real happiness: and therefore, till we are as
much informed upon this inquiry as the weight of the matter, and the nature of the case demands,
we are, by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good, obliged to
suspend the satisfaction of our desires in particular cases.
53. Power to suspend. This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their
constant endeavours after, and a steady prosecution of true felicity,--That they can suspend this
prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves whether
that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie in the way to their main end, and make a
real part of that which is their greatest good. For, the inclination and tendency of their nature to
happiness is an obligation and motive to them, to take care not to mistake or miss it; and so
necessarily puts them upon caution, deliberation, and wariness, in the direction of their particular
actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whatever necessity determines to the pursuit of real bliss,
the same necessity, with the same force, establishes suspense, deliberation, and scrutiny of each
successive desire, whether the satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happiness, and
mislead us from it. This, as seems to me, is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings; and I
desire it may be well considered, whether the great inlet and exercise of al the liberty men have, are
capable of, or can be useful to them, and that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not
lie in this,--That they can suspend their desires, and stop them from determining their wills to any
action, til they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the
thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our duty, and all
that is in our power; and indeed all that needs. For, since the will supposes knowledge to guide its
choice, all that we can do is to hold our wills undetermined, till we have examined the good and evil
of what we desire. What follows after that, follows in a chain of consequences, linked one to
another, all depending on the last determination of the judgment, which, whether it shall be upon a
hasty and precipitate view, or upon a due and mature examination, is in our power; experience
showing us, that in most cases, we are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire.
54. Government of our passions the right improvement of liberty. But if any extreme disturbance (as
sometimes it happens) possesses our whole mind, as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous
uneasiness, as of love, anger, or any other violent passion, running away with us, allows us not the
liberty of thought, and we are not masters enough of our own minds to consider thoroughly and
examine fairly;--God, who knows our frailty, pities our weakness, and requires of us no more than
we are able to do, and sees what was and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and
merciful Father. But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation and
restraint of our passions, so that our understandings may be free to examine, and reason unbiased
give its judgment, being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends; it
is in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours. In this we should take pains to suit the
relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that is in things; and not permit an allowed or
supposed possible great and weighty good to slip out of our thoughts, without leaving any relish, any
desire of itself there, till, by a due consideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our
minds suitable to it, and made ourselves uneasy in the want of it, or in the fear of losing it. And how
much this is in every one's power, by making resolutions to himself, such as he may keep, is easy
for every one to try. Nor let any one say, he cannot govern his passions, nor hinder them from
breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do before a prince or a great man, he can
do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will.
55. How men come to pursue different, and often evil, courses. From what has been said, it is easy
to give an account how it comes to pass, that, though all men desire happiness, yet their wills carry
them so contrarily; and consequently some of them to what is evil. And to this I say, that the various
and contrary choices that men make in the world do not argue that they do not all pursue good; but
that the same thing is not good to every man alike. This variety of pursuits shows, that every one
does not place his happiness in the same thing, or choose the same way to it. Were all the concerns
of man terminated in this life, why one followed study and knowledge, and another hawking and
hunting: why one chose luxury and debauchery, and another sobriety and riches, would not be
because every one of these did not aim at his own happiness; but because their happiness was
placed in different things. And therefore it was a right answer of the physician to his patient that had
sore eyes:--If you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your sight, wine is good
for you; but if the pleasure of seeing be greater to you than that of drinking, wine is naught.
56. All men seek happiness, but not of the same sort. The mind has a different relish, as well as the
palate; and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight al men with riches or glory (which yet some
men place their happiness in) as you would to satisfy all men's hunger with cheese or lobsters;
which, though very agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and
offensive: and many persons would with reason prefer the griping of an hungry belly to those dishes
which are a feast to others. Hence it was, I think, that the philosophers of old did in vain inquire,
whether summum bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation: and they
might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best relish were to be found in apples, plums, or
nuts, and have divided themselves into sects upon it. For, as pleasant tastes depend not on the
things themselves, but on their agreeableness to this or that particular palate, wherein there is great
variety; so the greatest happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest
pleasure, and in the absence of those which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now these, to
different men, are very different things. If, therefore, men in this life only have hope; if in this life only
they can enjoy, it is not strange nor unreasonable, that they should seek their happiness by avoiding
all things that disease them here, and by pursuing all that delight them; wherein it will be no wonder
to find variety and difference. For if there be no prospect beyond the grave, the inference is certainly
right--"Let us eat and drink," let us enjoy what we "for to-morrow we shall die." This, I think, may
serve to show us the reason, why, though all men's desires tend to happiness, yet they are not
moved by the same object. Men may choose different things, and yet all choose right; supposing
them only like a company of poor insects; whereof some are bees, delighted with flowers and their
sweetness; others beetles, delighted with other kinds of viands, which having enjoyed for a season,
they would cease to be, and exist no more for ever.
57. Power to suspend volition explains responsibility for ill choice. These things, duly weighed, will
give us, as I think, a clear view into the state of human liberty. Liberty, it is plain, consists in a power
to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing, as we will. This cannot be denied. But this seeming to
comprehend only the actions of a man consecutive to volition, it is further inquired,--Whether he be
at liberty to will or no? And to this it has been answered, that, in most cases, a man is not at liberty
to forbear the act of volition: he must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed is made to
exist or not to exist. But yet there is a case wherein a man is at liberty in respect of willing; and that
is the choosing of a remote good as an end to be pursued. Here a man may suspend the act of his
choice from being determined for or against the thing proposed, till he has examined whether it be
really of a nature, in itself and consequences, to make him happy or not. For, when he has once
chosen it, and thereby it is become a part of his happiness, it raises desire, and that proportionably
gives him uneasiness; which determines his will, and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice on all
occasions that offer. And here we may see how it comes to pass that a man may justly incur
punishment, though it be certain that, in all the particular actions that he wills, he does, and
necessarily does, will that which he then judges to be good. For, though his will be always
determined by that which is judged good by his understanding, yet it excuses him not; because, by a
too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil;
which, however false and fallacious, have the same influence on all his future conduct, as if they
were true and right. He has vitiated his own palate, and must be answerable to himself for the
sickness and death that follows from it. The eternal law and nature of things must not be altered to
comply with his ill-ordered choice. If the neglect or abuse of the liberty he had, to examine what
would really and truly make for his happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on it must
be imputed to his own election. He had a power to suspend his determination; it was given him, that
he might examine, and take care of his own happiness, and look that he were not deceived. And he
could never judge, that it was better to be deceived than not, in a matter of so great and near
concernment.
58. Why men choose what makes them miserable. What has been said may also discover to us the
reason why men in this world prefer different things, and pursue happiness by contrary courses. But
yet, since men are always constant and in earnest in matters of happiness and misery, the question
still remains, How men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to choose that, which, by
their own confession, has made them miserable?
59. The causes of this. To account for the various and contrary ways men take, though all aim at
being happy, we must consider whence the various uneasinesses that determine the will, in the
preference of each voluntary action, have their rise:
(1) From bodily pain. Some of them come from causes not in our power; such as are often the pains
of the body from want, disease, or outward injuries, as the rack, etc.; which, when present and
violent, operate for the most part forcibly on the will, and turn the courses of men's lives from virtue,
piety, and religion, and what before they judged to lead to happiness; every one not endeavouring,
or, through disuse, not being able, by the contemplation of remote and future good, to raise in
himself desires of them strong enough to counterbalance the uneasiness he feels in those bodily
torments, and to keep his will steady in the choice of those actions which lead to future happiness. A
neighbouring country has been of late a tragical theatre from which we might fetch instances, if
there needed any, and the world did not in all countries and ages furnish examples enough to
confirm that received observation, Necessitas cogit ad turpia; and therefore there is great reason for
us to pray, "Lead us not into temptation."
(2) From wrong desires arising from wrong judgments. Other uneasinesses arise from our desires of
absent good; which desires always bear proportion to, and depend on, the judgment we make, and
the relish we have of any absent good; in both which we are apt to be variously misled, and that by
our own fault.
60. Our judgment of present good or evil always right. In the first place, I shall consider the wrong
judgments men make of future good and evil, whereby their desires are misled. For, as to present
happiness and misery, when that alone comes into consideration, and the consequences are quite
removed, a man never chooses amiss: he knows what best pleases him, and that he actually
prefers. Things in their present enjoyment are what they seem: the apparent and real good are, in
this case, always the same. For, the pain or pleasure being just so great and no greater than it is
felt, the present good or evil is really so much as it appears. And therefore were every action of ours
concluded within itself, and drew no consequences after it, we should undoubtedly never err in our
choice of good: we should always infallibly prefer the best. Were the pains of honest industry, and of
starving with hunger and cold set together before us, nobody would be in doubt which to choose:
were the satisfaction of a lust and the joys of heaven offered at once to any one's present
possession, he would not balance, or err in the determination of his choice.
61. Our wrong judgments have regard to future good and evil only. But since our voluntary actions
carry not all the happiness and misery that depend on them along with them in their present
performance, but are the precedent causes of good and evil, which they draw after them, and bring
upon us, when they themselves are past and cease to be; our desires look beyond our present
enjoyments, and carry the mind out to absent good, according to the nece