1. Mixed modes, what. Having treated of simple modes in the foregoing chapters, and given several
instances of some of the most considerable of them, to show what they are, and how we come by
them; we are now in the next place to consider those we call mixed modes; such are the complex
ideas we mark by the names obligation, drunkenness, a lie, etc.; which consisting of several
combinations of simple ideas of different kinds, I have called mixed modes, to distinguish them from
the more simple modes, which consist only of simple ideas of the same kind. These mixed modes,
being also such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked upon to be characteristical marks of
any real beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas put together by
the mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances.
2. Made by the mind. That the mind, in respect of its simple ideas, is wholly passive, and receives
them all from the existence and operations of things, such as sensation or reflection offers them,
without being able to make any one idea, experience shows us. But if we attentively consider these
ideas I call mixed modes, we are now speaking of, we shall find their original quite different. The
mind often exercises an active power in making these several combinations. For, it being once
furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety
of complex ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence I think it is
that these ideas are called notions: as if they had their original, and constant existence, more in the
thoughts of men, than in the reality of things; and to form such ideas, it sufficed that the mind put the
parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the understanding, without considering
whether they had any real being: though I do not deny but several of them might be taken from
observation, and the existence of several simple ideas so combined, as they are put together in the
understanding. For the man who first framed the idea of hypocrisy, might have either taken it at first
from the observation of one who made show of good qualities which he had not; or else have
framed that idea in his mind without having any such pattern to fashion it by. For it is evident that, in
the beginning of languages and societies of men, several of those complex ideas, which were
consequent to the constitutions established amongst them, must needs have been in the minds of
men, before they existed anywhere else; and that many names that stood for such complex ideas
were in use, and so those ideas framed, before the combinations they stood for ever existed.
3. Sometimes got by the explication of their names. Indeed, now that languages are made, and
abound with words standing for such combinations, an usual way of getting these complex ideas is,
by the explication of those terms that stand for them. For, consisting of a company of simple ideas
combined, they may, by words standing for those simple ideas, be represented to the mind of one
who understands those words, though that complex combination of simple ideas were never offered
to his mind by the real existence of things. Thus a man may come to have the idea of sacrilege or
murder, by enumerating to him the simple ideas which these words stand for; without ever seeing
either of them committed.
4. The name ties the parts of mixed modes into one idea. Every mixed mode consisting of many
distinct simple ideas, it seems reasonable to inquire, Whence it has its unity; and how such a
precise multitude comes to make but one idea; since that combination does not always exist
together in nature? To which I answer, it is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind, combining
those several simple ideas together, and considering them as one complex one, consisting of those
parts; and the mark of this union, or that which is looked on generally to complete it, is one name
given to that combination. For it is by their names that men commonly regulate their account of their
distinct species of mixed modes, seldom allowing or considering any number of simple ideas to
make one complex one, but such collections as there be names for. Thus, though the killing of an
old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea, as the killing a man's father; yet,
there being no name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name of parricide to mark the
other, it is not taken for a particular complex idea, nor a distinct species of actions from that of killing
a young man, or any other man.
5. The cause of making mixed modes. If we should inquire a little further, to see what it is that
occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct, and, as it were, settled
modes, and neglect others, which in the nature of things themselves, have as much an aptness to
be combined and make distinct ideas, we shall find the reason of it to be the end of language; which
being to mark, or communicate men's thoughts to one another with all the dispatch that may be,
they usually make such collections of ideas into complex modes, and affix names to them, as they
have frequent use of in their way of living and conversation, leaving others, which they have but
seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names that tie them together: they rather
choosing to enumerate (when they have need) such ideas as make them up, by the particular
names that stand for them, than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex ideas with
names to them, which they seldom or never have any occasion to make use of.
6. Why words in one language have none answering in another. This shows us how it comes to
pass that there are in every language many particular words which cannot be rendered by any one
single word of another. For the several fashions, customs, and manners of one nation, making
several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in one, which another people have had never
an occasion to make, or perhaps so much as take notice of, names come of course to be annexed
to them, to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation; and so they become so many
distinct complex ideas in their minds. Thus ostrhakismos amongst the Greeks, and proscriptio
amongst the Romans, were words which other languages had no names that exactly answered;
because they stood for complex ideas which were not in the minds of the men of other nations.
Where there was no such custom, there was no notion of any such actions; no use of such
combinations of ideas as were united, and, as it were, tied together, by those terms: and therefore in
other countries there were no names for them.
7. And languages change. Hence also we may see the reason, why languages constantly change,
take up new and lay by old terms. Because change of customs and opinions bringing with it new
combinations of ideas, which it is necessary frequently to think on and talk about, new names, to
avoid long descriptions, are annexed to them; and so they become new species of complex modes.
What a number of different ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound, and how much
of our time and breath is thereby saved, any one will see, who will but take the pains to enumerate
all the ideas that either reprieve or appeal stand for; and instead of either of those names, use a
periphrasis, to make any one understand their meaning.
8. Mixed modes, where they exist. Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large when
I come to treat of Words and their use, yet I could not avoid to take this much notice here of the
names of mixed modes; which being fleeting and transient combinations of simple ideas, which
have but a short existence anywhere but in the minds of men, and there too have no longer any
existence than whilst they are thought on, have not so much anywhere the appearance of a constant
and lasting existence as in their names: which are therefore, in this sort of ideas, very apt to be
taken for the ideas themselves. For, if we should inquire where the idea of a triumph or apotheosis
exists, it is evident they could neither of them exist altogether anywhere in the things themselves,
being actions that required time to their performance, and so could never all exist together; and as
to the minds of men, where the ideas of these actions are supposed to be lodged, they have there
too a very uncertain existence: and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite
them in us.
9. How we get the ideas of mixed modes. There are therefore three ways whereby we get these
complex ideas of mixed modes:--(1) By experience and observation of things themselves: thus, by
seeing two men wrestle or fence, we get the idea of wrestling or fencing. (2) By invention, or
voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds: so he that first invented printing
or etching, had an idea of it in his mind before it ever existed. (3) Which is the most usual way, by
explaining the names of actions we never saw, or motions we cannot see; and by enumerating, and
thereby, as it were, setting before our imaginations all those ideas which go to the making them up,
and are the constituent parts of them. For, having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with
simple ideas, and by use got the names that stand for them, we can by those means represent to
another any complex idea we would have him conceive; so that it has in it no simple ideas but what
he knows, and has with us the same name for. For all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable
into simple ideas, of which they are compounded and originally made up, though perhaps their
immediate ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex ideas. Thus, the mixed mode which the
word lie stands for is made of these simple ideas:--(1) Articulate sounds. (2) Certain ideas in the
mind of the speaker. (3) Those words the signs of those ideas. (4) Those signs put together, by
affirmation or negation, otherwise than the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker. I
think I need not go any further in the analysis of that complex idea we call a lie: what I have said is
enough to show that it is made up of simple ideas. And it could not be but an offensive tediousness
to my reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea that
goes to this complex one; which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to
himself. The same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever; which, however compounded
and decompounded, may at last be resolved into simple ideas, which are all the materials of
knowledge or thought we have, or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear that the mind is
hereby stinted to too scanty a number of ideas, if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple
modes number and figure alone afford us. How far then mixed modes, which admit of the various
combinations of different simple ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we
may easily imagine. So that, before we have done, we shall see that nobody need be afraid he shall
not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend,
confined only to simple ideas, received from sensation or reflection, and their several combinations.
10. Motion, thinking, and power have been most modified. It is worth our observing, which of all our
simple ideas have been most modified, and had most mixed ideas made out of them, with names
given to them. And those have been these three:--thinking and motion (which are the two ideas
which comprehend in them all action,) and power, from whence these actions are conceived to flow.
These simple ideas, I say, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most
modified; and out of whose modifications have been made most complex modes, with names to
them. For action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws
are conversant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken
notice of, the ideas of them observed, and laid up in the memory, and have names assigned to
them; without which laws could be but ill made, or vice and disorders repressed. Nor could any
communication be well had amongst men without such complex ideas, with names to them: and
therefore men have settled names, and supposed settled ideas in their minds, of modes of actions,
distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other
circumstances; and also of their powers fitted for those actions: v.g. boldness is the power to speak
or do what we intend, before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of
speaking by a peculiar name, parrhesia: which power or ability in man of doing anything, when it
has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea we name habit; when it is forward,
and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it disposition. Thus, testiness is a
disposition or aptness to be angry.
To conclude: Let us examine any modes of action, v.g. consideration and assent, which are actions
of the mind; running and speaking, which are actions of the body; revenge and murder, which are
actions of both together, and we shall find them but so many collections of simple ideas, which,
together, make up the complex ones signified by those names.
11. Several words seeming to signify action, signify but the effect. Power being the source from
whence al action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power
into act, are called causes, and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple ideas
which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called effects. The efficacy
whereby the new substance or idea is produced is called, in the subject exerting that power, action;
but in the subject wherein any simple idea is changed or produced, it is called passion: which
efficacy, however various, and the effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in
intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing
else but modifications of motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two.
For whatever sort of action besides these produce any effects, I confess myself to have no notion
nor idea of; and so it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehensions, and knowledge; and as
much in the dark to me as five other senses, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man. And therefore
many words which seem to express some action, signify nothing of the action or modus operandi at
all, but barely the effect, with some circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating:
v.g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are
produced, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And when a countryman says the cold
freezes water, though the word freezing seems to import some action, yet truly it signifies nothing
but the effect, viz., that water that was before fluid is become hard and consistent, without
containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.
12. Mixed modes made also of other ideas than those of power and action. I think I shall not need to
remark here that, though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by
names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men, yet other simple ideas, and their several
combinations, are not excluded: much less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the
mixed modes which have been settled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of
the greatest part of the words made use of in divinity, ethics, law, and politics, and several other
sciences. All that is requisite to my present design, is to show what sort of ideas those are which I
call mixed modes; how the mind comes by them; and that they are compositions made up of simple
ideas got from sensation and reflection; which I suppose I have done.