1. Ideas of particular substances, how made. The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a
great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses as they are found in exterior things, or
by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go
constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to
common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by
one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea,
which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: because, as I have said, not imagining how
these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum
wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call substance.
2. Our obscure idea of substance in general. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his
notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a
supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple
ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the
subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended
parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a
much better case than the Indian before mentioned who, saying that the world was supported by a
great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was--a great tortoise:
but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied--
something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without
having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children: who, being questioned what such a thing is,
which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something: which in truth
signifies no more, when so used, either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the
thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are
perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name
substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find
existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, without something to support them, we
call that support substantia; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English,
standing under or upholding.
3. Of the sorts of substances. An obscure and relative idea of substance in general being thus made
we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting such combinations of
simple ideas as are, by experience and observation of men's senses, taken notice of to exist
together; and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown
essence of that substance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, etc.; of
which substances, whether any one has any other clear idea, further than of certain simple ideas co-
existent together, I appeal to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities observable in
iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a
smith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he
may talk of, has no other idea of those substances, than what is framed by a collection of those
simple ideas which are to be found in them: only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of
substances, besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of
something to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and therefore when we speak of any sort
of substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities; as body is a thing that is extended,
figured, and capable of motion; spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and
power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These, and the like fashions of
speaking, intimate that the substance is supposed always something besides the extension, figure,
solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is.
4. No clear or distinct idea of substance in general. Hence, when we talk or think of any particular
sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, etc., though the idea we have of either of them be but
the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we used to
find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet, because we cannot conceive how they should
subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in and supported by some common
subject; which support we denote by the name substance, though it be certain we have no clear or
distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.
5. As clear an idea of spiritual substance as of corporeal substance. The same thing happens
concerning the operations of the mind, viz., thinking, reasoning, fearing, etc., which we concluding
not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it,
we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which we call spirit; whereby yet it is
evident that, having no other idea or notion of matter, but something wherein those many sensible
qualities which affect our senses do subsist; by supposing a substance wherein thinking, knowing,
doubting, and a power of moving, etc., do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the substance of
spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the substratum
to those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it
is) to be the substratum to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain then, that
the idea of corporeal substance in matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions, as
that of spiritual substance, or spirit: and therefore, from our not having any notion of the substance
of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the
existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and
distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no clear and
distinct idea of the substance of a spirit.
6. Our ideas of particular sorts of substances. Whatever therefore be the secret abstract nature of
substance in general, all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances are nothing but
several combinations of simple ideas, coexisting in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as
makes the whole subsist of itself It is by such combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else, that
we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves; such are the ideas we have of their several
species in our minds; and such only do we, by their specific names, signify to others, v.g. man,
horse, sun, water, iron: upon hearing which words, every one who understands the language,
frames in his mind a combination of those several simple ideas which he has usually observed, or
fancied to exist together under that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in and be, as it
were, adherent to that unknown common subject, which inheres not in anything else. Though, in the
meantime, it be manifest, and every one, upon inquiry into his own thoughts, will find, that he has no
other idea of any substance, v.g. let it be gold, horse, iron, man, vitriol, bread, but what he has
barely of those sensible qualities, which he supposes to inhere; with a supposition of such a
substratum as gives, as it were, a support to those qualities or simple ideas, which he has observed
to exist united together. Thus, the idea of the sun,--what is it but an aggregate of those several
simple ideas, bright, hot, roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us,
and perhaps some other: as he who thinks and discourses of the sun has been more or less
accurate in observing those sensible qualities, ideas, or properties, which are in that thing which he
calls the sun.
7. Their active and passive powers a great part of our complex ideas of substances. For he has the
perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of substances, who has gathered, and put together,
most of those simple ideas which do exist in it; among which are to be reckoned its active powers,
and passive capacities, which, though not simple ideas, yet in this respect, for brevity's sake, may
conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus, the power of drawing iron is one of the
ideas of the complex one of that substance we call a loadstone; and a power to be so drawn is a
part of the complex one we call iron: which powers pass for inherent qualities in those subjects.
Because every substance, being as apt, by the powers we observe in it, to change some sensible
qualities in other subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple ideas which we receive immediately
from it, does, by those new sensible qualities introduced into other subjects, discover to us those
powers which do thereby mediately affect our senses, as regularly as its sensible qualities do it
immediately: v.g. we immediately by our senses perceive in fire its heat and colour; which are, if
rightly considered, nothing but powers in it to produce those ideas in us: we also by our senses
perceive the colour and brittleness of charcoal, whereby we come by the knowledge of another
power in fire, which it has to change the colour and consistency of wood. By the former, fire
immediately, by the latter, it mediately discovers to us these several powers; which therefore we
look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire, and so make them a part of the complex idea of it. For
all those powers that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of some sensible
qualities in those subjects on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible
ideas, therefore it is that I have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas which make the
complex ones of the sort? of substances; though these powers considered in themselves, are truly
complex ideas. And in this looser sense I crave leave to be understood, when I name any of these
potentialities among the simple ideas which we recollect in our minds when we think of particular
substances. For the powers that are severally in them are necessary to be considered, if we will
have true distinct notions of the several sorts of substances.
8. And why. Nor are we to wonder that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of
substances; since their secondary qualities are those which in most of them serve principally to
distinguish substances one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the complex
idea of the several sorts of them. For, our senses failing us in the discovery of the bulk, texture, and
figure of the minute parts of bodies, on which their real constitutions and differences depend, we are
fain to make use of their secondary qualities as the characteristical notes and marks whereby to
frame ideas of them in our minds, and distinguish them one from another: all which secondary
qualities, as has been shown, are nothing but bare powers. For the colour and taste of opium are,
as well as its soporific or anodyne virtues, mere powers, depending on its primary qualities, whereby
it is fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bodies.
9. Three sorts of ideas make our complex ones of corporeal substances. The ideas that make our
complex ones of corporeal substances, are of these three sorts. First, the ideas of the primary
qualities of things, which are discovered by our senses, and are in them even when we perceive
them not; such are the bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion of the parts of bodies; which are
really in them, whether we take notice of them or not. Secondly, the sensible secondary qualities,
which, depending on these, are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several
ideas in us by our senses; which ideas are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as anything
is in its cause. Thirdly, the aptness we consider in any substance, to give or receive such alterations
of primary qualities, as that the substance so altered should produce in us different ideas from what
it did before; these are called active and passive powers: all which powers, as far as we have any
notice or notion of them, terminate only in sensible simple ideas. For whatever alteration a
loadstone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron, we should have no notion of any
power it had at all to operate on iron, did not its sensible motion discover it: and I doubt not, but
there are a thousand changes, that bodies we daily handle have a power to use in one another,
which we never suspect, because they never appear in sensible effects.
10. Powers thus make a great part of our complex ideas of particular substances. Powers therefore
justly make a great part of our complex ideas of substances. He that will examine his complex idea
of gold, will find several of its ideas that make it up to be only powers; as the power of being melted,
but of not spending itself in the fire; of being dissolved in aqua regia, are ideas as necessary to
make up our complex idea of gold, as its colour and weight: which, if duly considered, are also
nothing but different powers. For, to speak truly, yellowness is not actually in gold, but is a power in
gold to produce that idea in us by our eyes, when placed in a due light: and the heat, which we
cannot leave out of our ideas of the sun, is no more really in the sun, than the white colour it
introduces into wax. These are both equally powers in the sun, operating, by the motion and figure
of its sensible parts, so on a man, as to make him have the idea of heat; and so on wax, as to make
it capable to produce in a man the idea of white.
11. The now secondary qualities of bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones
of their minute parts. Had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies, and
the real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce
quite different ideas in us: and that which is now the yellow colour of gold, would then disappear,
and instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts, of a certain size and figure. This
microscopes plainly discover to us; for what to our naked eyes produces a certain colour, is, by thus
augmenting the acuteness of our senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus
altering, as it were, the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a coloured object to our usual
sight, produces different ideas from what it did before. Thus, sand or pounded glass, which is
opaque, and white to the naked eye, is pellucid in a microscope; and a hair seen in this way, loses
its former colour, and is, in a great measure, pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling
colours, such as appear from the refraction of diamonds, and other pellucid bodies. Blood, to the
naked eye, appears all red; but by a good microscope, wherein its lesser parts appear, shows only
some few globules of red, swimming in a pellucid liquor, and how these red globules would appear,
if glasses could be found that could yet magnify them a thousand or ten thousand times more, is
uncertain.
12. Our faculties for discovery of the qualities and powers of substances suited to our state. The
infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our senses, faculties, and organs, to
the conveniences of life, and the business we have to do here. We are able, by our senses, to know
and distinguish things: and to examine them so far as to apply them to our uses, and several ways
to accommodate the exigences of this life. We have insight enough into their admirable
contrivances and wonderful effects, to admire and magnify the wisdom, power, and goodness of
their Author. Such a knowledge as this, which is suited to our present condition, we want not
faculties to attain. But it appears not that God intended we should have a perfect, clear, and
adequate knowledge of them: that perhaps is not in the comprehension of any finite being. We are
furnished with faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover enough in the creatures to lead us to
the knowledge of the Creator, and the knowledge of our duty; and we are fitted well enough with
abilities to provide for the conveniences of living: these are our business in this world. But were our
senses altered, and made much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward scheme of things
would have quite another face to us; and, I am apt to think, would be inconsistent with our being, or
at least well-being, in this part of the universe which we inhabit. He that considers how little our
constitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this air, not much higher than that we commonly
breath in, will have reason to be satisfied, that in this globe of earth allotted for our mansion, the all-
wise Architect has suited our organs, and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our
sense of hearing were but a thousand times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noise distract
us. And we should in the quietest retirement be less able to sleep or meditate than in the middle of a
sea-fight. Nay, if that most instructive of our senses, seeing, were in any man a thousand or a
hundred thousand times more acute than it is by the best microscope, things several millions of
times less than the smallest object of his sight now would then be visible to his naked eyes, and so
he would come nearer to the discovery of the texture and motion of the minute parts of corporeal
things; and in many of them, probably get ideas of their internal constitutions: but then he would be
in a quite different world from other people: nothing would appear the same to him and others: the
visible ideas of everything would be different. So that I doubt, whether he and the rest of men could
discourse concerning the objects of sight, or have any communication about colours, their
appearances being so wholly different. And perhaps such a quickness and tenderness of sight could
not endure bright sunshine, or so much as open daylight; nor take in but a very small part of any
object at once, and that too only at a very near distance. And if by the help of such microscopical
eyes (if I may so call them) a man could penetrate further than ordinary into the secret composition
and radical texture of bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an
acute sight would not serve to conduct him to the market and exchange; if he could not see things
he was to avoid, at a convenient distance; nor distinguish things he had to do with by those sensible
qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to see the configuration of the minute
particles of the spring of a clock, and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse its elastic
motion depends, would no doubt discover something very admirable: but if eyes so framed could
not view at once the hand, and the characters of the hour-plate, and thereby at a distance see what
o'clock it was, their owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness; which, whilst it discovered
the secret contrivance of the parts of the machine, made him lose its use.
13. Conjecture about the corporeal organs of some spirits. And here give me leave to propose an
extravagant conjecture of mine, viz., That since we have some reason (if there be any credit to be
given to the report of things that our philosophy cannot account for) to imagine, that Spirits can
assume to themselves bodies of different bulk, figure, and conformation of parts--whether one great
advantage some of them have over us may not lie in this, that they can so frame and shape to
themselves organs of sensation or perception, as to suit them to their present design, and the
circumstances of the object they would consider. For how much would that man exceed all others in
knowledge, who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes, that one sense, as to make
it capable of all the several degrees of vision which the assistance of glasses (casually at first
lighted on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who could so fit his eyes to
all sorts of objects, as to see when he pleased the figure and motion of the minute particles in the
blood, and other juices of animals, as distinctly as he does, at other times, the shape and motion of
the animals themselves? But to us, in our present state, unalterable organs, so contrived as to
discover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies, whereon depend those sensible
qualities we now observe in them, would perhaps be of no advantage. God has no doubt made
them so as is best for us in our present condition. He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the
bodies that surround us, and we have to do with; and though we cannot, by the faculties we have,
attain to a perfect knowledge of things, yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above-
mentioned, which are our great concernment. I beg my reader's pardon for laying before him so wild
a fancy concerning the ways of perception of beings above us; but how extravagant soever it be, I
doubt whether we can imagine anything about the knowledge of angels but after this manner, some
way or other in proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves. And though we cannot but allow
that the infinite power and wisdom of God may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties and
ways of perceiving things without them than what we have, yet our thoughts can go no further than
our own: so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the ideas received from our
own sensation and reflection. The supposition, at least, that angels do sometimes assume bodies,
needs not startle us; since some of the most ancient and most learned Fathers of the church
seemed to believe that they had bodies: and this is certain, that their state and way of existence is
unknown to us.
14. Our specific ideas of substances. But to return to the matter in hand,--the ideas we have of
substances, and the ways we come by them. I say, our specific ideas of substances are nothing
else but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered as united in one thing. These
ideas of substances, though they are commonly simple apprehensions, and the names of them
simple terms, yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus the idea which an Englishman
signifies by the name swan, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all
these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noise,
and perhaps, to a man who has long observed this kind of birds, some other properties: which all
terminate in sensible simple ideas, all united in one common subject.
15. Our ideas of spiritual substances, as clear as of bodily substances. Besides the complex ideas
we have of material sensible substances, of which I have last spoken,--by the simple ideas we have
taken from those operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as thinking,
understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, etc., co-existing in some
substance, we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit. And thus, by putting
together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving themselves and other things,
we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material. For
putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal
motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial
spirit; and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined
with substance, of which likewise we have no positive idea, we have the idea of matter. The one is
as clear and distinct an idea as the other: the idea of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear
and distinct ideas as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved. For our idea of substance is
equally obscure, or none at all, in both; it is but a supposed I know not what, to support those ideas
we call accidents. It is for want reflection that we are apt to think that our senses show us nothing
but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both
parts of nature, the corporeal and spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, etc., that there is
some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation, I do more certainly know, that there
is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears. This, I must be convinced, cannot be the
action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking being.
16. No idea of abstract substance either in body or spirit. By the complex idea of extended, figured,
coloured, and all other sensible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the idea
of the subst