1. The greatest part of words are general terms. All things that exist being particulars, it may
perhaps be thought reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should be so
too,--I mean in their signification: but yet we find quite the contrary. The far greatest part of words
that make all languages are general terms: which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but
of reason and necessity.
2. That every particular thing should have a name for itself is impossible. First, It is impossible that
every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name. For, the signification and use of words
depending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as
signs of them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things, that the mind should have
distinct ideas of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its
peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain
distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw; every tree and
plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be
looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every
soldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason why men have never
attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less
to call every leaf of plants, or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name.
3. And would be useless, if it were possible. Secondly, If it were possible, it would yet be useless;
because it would not serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of
particular things, that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and
use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood: which is then only done when, by
use or consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech, excites in another man's mind who
hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by names applied to
particular things; whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be
significant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very particular things
which had fallen under my notice.
4. A distinct name for every particular thing, not fitted for enlargement of knowledge. Thirdly, But yet,
granting this also feasible, (which I think is not), yet a distinct name for every particular thing would
not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge: which, though founded in particular
things, enlarges itself by general views; to which things reduced into sorts, under general names,
are properly subservient. These, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass,
and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or use requires. And
therefore, in these, men have for the most part stopped: but yet not so as to hinder themselves from
distinguishing particular things by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And
therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often
occasion to mention particular persons, they make use of proper names; and there distinct
individuals have distinct denominations.
5. What things have proper names, and why. Besides persons, countries also, cities, rivers,
mountains, and other the like distinctions of place have usually found peculiar names, and that for
the same reason; they being such as men have often an occasion to mark particularly, and, as it
were, set before others in their discourses with them. And I doubt not but, if we had reason to
mention particular horses as often as we have to mention particular men, we should have proper
names for the one, as familiar as for the other, and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use as
Alexander. And therefore we see that, amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names to be
known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants: because, amongst them, there is often
occasion to mention this or that particular horse when he is out of sight.
6. How general words are made. The next thing to be considered is,--How general words come to
be made. For, since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms; or
where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for? Words become general by
being made the signs of general ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them the
circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that
particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more
individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of
that sort.
7. Shown by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy. But, to deduce this a little more
distinctly, it will not perhaps be amiss to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and
observe by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from our first infancy.
There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of the persons children converse with (to instance
in them alone) are, like the persons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse and the
mother are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those
individuals. The names they first gave to them are confined to these individuals; and the names of
nurse and mamma, the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time
and a larger acquaintance have made them observe that there are a great many other things in the
world, that in some common agreements of shape, and several other qualities, resemble their father
and mother, and those persons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find those
many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name man, for example. And
thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new; but
only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is
peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.
8. And further enlarge our complex ideas, by still leaving out properties contained in them. By the
same way that they come by the general name and idea of man, they easily advance to more
general names and notions. For, observing that several things that differ from their idea of man, and
cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree
with man, by retaining only those qualities, and uniting them into one idea, they have again another
and more general idea; to which having given a name they make a term of a more comprehensive
extension: which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only as before, by leaving out the
shape, and some other properties signified by the name man, and retaining only a body, with life,
sense, and spontaneous motion, comprehended under the name animal.
9. General natures are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones. That this is the
way whereby men first formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think is so evident, that
there needs no other proof of it but the considering of a man's self, or others, and the ordinary
proceedings of their minds in knowledge. And he that thinks general natures or notions are anything
else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at first from particular
existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one effect, and then tell me,
wherein does his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul, or his idea of horse from that of
Bucephalus, but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining so
much of those particular complex ideas of several particular existences as they are found to agree
in? Of the complex ideas signified by the names man and horse, leaving out but those particulars
wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct
complex idea, and giving the name animal to it, one has a more general term, that comprehends
with man several other creatures. Leave out of the idea of animal, sense and spontaneous motion,
and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of body, life, and
nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive term, vivens. And, not
to dwell longer upon this particular, so evident in itself; by the same way the mind proceeds to body,
substance, and at last to being, thing, and such universal terms, which stand for any of our ideas
whatsoever. To conclude: this whole mystery of genera and species, which make such a noise in
the schools, and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas,
more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them. In all which this is constant and
unvariable, That every more general term stands for such an idea, and is but a part of any of those
contained under it.
10. Why the genus is ordinarily made use of in definitions. This may show us the reason why, in the
defining of words, which is nothing but declaring their signification, we make use of the genus, or
next general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity, but only to save the labour of
enumerating the several simple ideas which the next general word or genus stands for; or, perhaps,
sometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But though defining by genus and differentia (I
crave leave to use these terms of art, though originally Latin, since they most properly suit those
notions they are applied to), I say, though defining by the genus be the shortest way, yet I think it
may be doubted whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely
necessary. For, definition being nothing but making another understand by words what idea the term
defined stands for, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined
in the signification of the term defined: and if, instead of such an enumeration, men have
accustomed themselves to use the next general term, it has not been out of necessity, or for greater
clearness, but for quickness and dispatch sake. For I think that, to one who desired to know what
idea the word man stood for; if it should be said, that man was a solid extended substance, having
life, sense, spontaneous motion, and the faculty of reasoning, I doubt not but the meaning of the
term man would be as wel understood, and the idea it stands for be at least as clearly made known,
as when it is defined to be a rational animal: which, by the several definitions of animal, vivens, and
corpus, resolves itself into those enumerated ideas. I have, in explaining the term man, followed
here the ordinary definition of the schools; which, though perhaps not the most exact, yet serves
well enough to my present purpose. And one may, in this instance, see what gave occasion to the
rule, that a definition must consist of genus and differentia; and it suffices to show us the little
necessity there is of such a rule, or advantage in the strict observing of it. For, definitions, as has
been said, being only the explaining of one word by several others, so that the meaning or idea it
stands for may be certainly known; languages are not always so made according to the rules of
logic, that every term can have its signification exactly and clearly expressed by two others.
Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary; or else those who have made this rule have done
ill, that they have given us so few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions more in the next
chapter.
11. General and universal are creatures of the understanding, and belong not to the real existence
of things. To return to general words: it is plain, by what has been said, that general and universal
belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding,
made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as
has been said, when used for signs of general ideas, and so are applicable indifferently to many
particular things; and ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many
particular things: but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in
their existence, even those words and ideas which in their signification are general. When therefore
we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making; their general nature
being nothing but the capacity they are put into, by the understanding, of signifying or representing
many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that, by the mind of man, is
added to them.
12. Abstract ideas are the essences of genera and species. The next thing therefore to be
considered is, What kind of signification it is that general words have. For, as it is evident that they
do not signify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general terms, but proper
names, so, on the other side, it is as evident they do not signify a plurality; for man and men would
then signify the same; and the distinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be
superfluous and useless. That then which general words signify is a sort of things; and each of them
does that, by being a sign of an abstract idea in the mind; to which idea, as things existing are found
to agree, so they come to be ranked under that name, or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it
is evident that the essences of the sorts, or, if the Latin word pleases better, species of things, are
nothing else but these abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any species, being that which
makes anything to be of that species; and the conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed
being that which gives a right to that name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity,
must needs be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have a right to the name of that
species, is all one. As, for example, to be a man, or of the species man, and to have right to the
name man, is the same thing. Again, to be a man, or of the species man, and have the essence of a
man, is the same thing. Now, since nothing can be a man, or have a right to the name man, but
what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for, nor anything be a man, or have
a right to the species man, but what has the essence of that species; it follows, that the abstract idea
for which the name stands, and the essence of the species, is one and the same. From whence it is
easy to observe, that the essences of the sorts of things, and, consequently, the sorting of things, is
the workmanship of the understanding that abstracts and makes those general ideas.
13. They are the workmanship of the understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude of
things. I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature, in the production of
things, makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the race of animals,
and all things propagated by seed. But yet I think we may say, the sorting of them under names is
the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion, from the similitude it observes amongst
them, to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as
patterns or forms, (for, in that sense, the word form has a very proper signification,) to which as
particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, have that
denomination, or are put into that classis. For when we say this is a man, that a horse; this justice,
that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we else but rank things under different specific names,
as agreeing to those abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And what are
the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind;
which are, as it were, the bonds between particular things that exist, and the names they are to be
ranked under? And when general names have any connexion with particular beings, these abstract
ideas are the medium that unites them: so that the essences of species, as distinguished and
denominated by us, neither are nor can be anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our
minds. And therefore the supposed real essences of substances, if different from our abstract ideas,
cannot be the essences of the species we rank things into. For two species may be one, as
rationally as two different essences be the essence of one species: and I demand what are the
alterations [which] may, or may not be made in a horse or lead, without making either of them to be
of another species? In determining the species of things by our abstract ideas, this is easy to
resolve: but if any one will regulate himself herein by supposed real essences, he will, I suppose, be
at a loss: and he will never be able to know when anything precisely ceases to be of the species of a
horse or lead.
14. Each distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence. Nor will any one wonder that I say these
essences, or abstract ideas (which are the measures of name, and the boundaries of species) are
the workmanship of the understanding, who considers that at least the complex ones are often, in
several men, different collections of simple ideas; and therefore that is covetousness to one man,
which is not so to another. Nay, even in substances, where their abstract ideas seem to be taken
from the things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no, not in that species which is most
familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance: it having been more than
once doubted, whether the foetus born of a woman were a man, even so far as that it hath been
debated, whether it were or were not to be nourished and baptized: which could not be, if the
abstract idea or essence to which the name man belonged were of nature's making; and were not
the uncertain and various collection of simple ideas, which the understanding put together, and
then, abstracting it, affixed a name to it. So that, in truth, every distinct abstract idea is a distinct
essence; and the names that stand for such distinct ideas are the names of things essentially
different. Thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval as a sheep from a goat; and rain is as
essentially different from snow as water from earth: that abstract idea which is the essence of one
being impossible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abstract ideas, that in any part
vary one from another, with two distinct names annexed to them, constitute two distinct sorts, or, if
you please, species, as essentially different as any two of the most remote or opposite in the world.
15. Several significations of the word "essence." But since the essences of things are thought by
some (and not without reason) to be wholly unknown, it may not be amiss to consider the several
significations of the word essence.
Real essences. First, Essence may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is.
And thus the real internal, but generally (in substances) unknown constitution of things, whereon
their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence. This is the proper original
signification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; essentia, in its primary notation,
signifying properly, being. And in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the essence of
particular things, without giving them any name.
Nominal essences. Secondly, The learning and disputes of the schools having been much busied
about genus and species, the word essence has almost lost its primary signification: and, instead of
the real constitution of things, has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of genus
and species. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things; and it is
past doubt there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing
must depend. But, it being evident that things are ranked under names into sorts or species, only as
they agree to certain abstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names, the essence of each
genus, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea which the general, or sortal (if I may have
leave so to call it from sort, as I do general from genus), name stands for. And this we shall find to
be that which the word essence imports in its most familiar use.
These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the real, the other
nominal essence.
16. Constant connexion between the name and nominal essence. Between the nominal essence
and the name there is so near a connexion, that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed
to any particular being but what has this essence, whereby it answers that abstract idea whereof
that name is the sign.
17. Supposition, that species are distinguished by their real essences, useless. Concerning the real
essences of corporeal substances (to mention these only) there are, if I mistake not, two opinions.
The one is of those who, using the word essence for they know not what, suppose a certain number
of those essences, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly
every one of them partake, and so become of this or that species. The other and more rational
opinion is of those who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown, constitution of their
insensible parts; from which flow those sensible qualities which serve us to distinguish them one
from another, according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts, under common
denominations. The former of these opinions, which supposes these essences as a certain number
of forms or moulds, wherein all natural things that exist are cast, and do equally partake, has, I
imagine, very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of
monsters, in all the species of animals, and of changelings, and other strange issues of human birth,
carry with them difficulties, not possible to consist with this hypothesis; since it is as impossible that
two things partaking exactly of the same real essence should have different properties, as that two
figures partaking of the same real essence of a circle should have different properties. But were
there no other reason against it, yet the supposition of essences that cannot be known; and the
making of them, nevertheless, to be that which distinguishes the species of things, is so wholly
useless and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us
lay it by, and content ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of things as come within
the reach of our knowledge: which, when seriously considered, will be found, as I have said, to be
nothing else but, those abstract complex ideas to which we have annexed distinct general names.
18. Real and nominal essence the same in simple ideas and modes, different in substances.
Essences being thus distinguished into nominal and real, we may further observe, that, in the
species of simple ideas and modes, they are always the same; but in substances always quite
different. Thus, a figure including a space between three lines, is the real as well as nominal
essence of a triangle; it being not only the abstract idea to which the general name is annexed, but
the very essentia or being of the thing itself; that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to
which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of matter which
makes the ring on my finger; wherein these two essences are apparently different. For, it is the real
constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility,
fixedness, etc., which are to be found in it; which constitution we know not, and so, having no
particular idea of, having no name that is the sign of it. But yet it is its colour, weight, fusibility,
fixedness, etc., which makes it to be gold, or gives it a right to that name, which is therefore its
nominal essence. Since nothing can be called gold but what has a conformity of qualities to that
abstract complex idea to which that name is annexed. But this distinction of essences, belonging
particularly to substances, we shall, when we come to consider their names, have an occasion to
treat of more fully.
19. Essences ingenerable and incorruptible. That such abstract ideas, with names to them, as we
have been speaking of are essences, may further appear by what we are told concerning essences,
viz., that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real constitutions of
things, which begin and perish with them. All things that exist, besides their Author, are all liable to
change; especially those things we are acquain