1. Names of simple ideas, modes, and substances, have each something peculiar. Though all
words, as I have shown, signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker; yet,
upon a nearer survey, we shall find the names of simple ideas, mixed modes (under which I
comprise relations too), and natural substances, have each of them something peculiar and different
from the other. For example:
2. Names of simple ideas, and of substances intimate real existence. First, the names of simple
ideas and substances, with the abstract ideas in the mind which they immediately signify, intimate
also some real existence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of mixed
modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any further; as we shall
see more at large in the following chapter.
3. Names of simple ideas and modes signify always both real and nominal essences. Secondly, The
names of simple ideas and modes signify always the real as well as nominal essence of their
species. But the names of natural substances signify rarely, if ever, anything but barely the nominal
essences of those species; as we shall show in the chapter that treats of the names of substances
in particular.
4. Names of simple ideas are undefinable. Thirdly, The names of simple ideas are not capable of
any definition; the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet observed by
anybody what words are, and what are not, capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am
apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses, whilst
some demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined; and others think they ought not to rest
satisfied in an explication made by a more general word, and its restriction, (or to speak in terms of
art, by a genus and difference), when, even after such definition, made according to rule, those who
hear it have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This
at least I think, that the showing what words are, and what are not, capable of definitions, and
wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly besides our present purpose; and perhaps will
afford so much light to the nature of these signs and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular
consideration.
5. If all names were definable, it would be a process in infinitum. I will not here trouble myself to
prove that all terms are not definable, from that progress in infinitum, which it will visibly lead us into,
if we should allow that all names could be defined. For, if the terms of one definition were still to be
defined by another, where at last should we stop? But I shall, from the nature of our ideas, and the
signification of our words, show why some names can, and others cannot be defined; and which
they are.
6. What a definition is. I think it is agreed, that a definition is nothing else but the showing the
meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms. The meaning of words being only the
ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them, the meaning of any term is then showed, or
the word is defined, when, by other words, the idea it is made the sign of, and annexed to, in the
mind of the speaker, is as it were represented, or set before the view of another; and thus its
signification is ascertained. This is the only use and end of definitions; and therefore the only
measure of what is, or is not a good definition.
7. Simple ideas, why undefinable. This being premised, I say that the names of simple ideas, and
those only, are incapable of being defined. The reason whereof is this, That the several terms of a
definition, signifying several ideas, they can all together by no means represent an idea which has
no composition at all: and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but the showing the
meaning of one word by several others not signifying each the same thing, can in the names of
simple ideas have no place.
8. Instances: scholastic definitions of motion. The not observing this difference in our ideas, and
their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to be observed in
the definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas. For, as to the greatest part of them,
even those masters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impossibility
they found in it. What more exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent, than this definition:--"The
act of a being in power, as far forth as in power"; which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it
was not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be
the explication of. If Tully, asking a Dutchman what beweeginge was, should have received this
explication in his own language, that it was "actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia"; I ask
whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word beweeginge
signified, or have guessed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to
another, when he used that sound?
9. Modern definitions of motion. Nor have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw
off the jargon of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining simple ideas,
whether by explaining their causes, or any otherwise. The atomists, who define motion to be "a
passage from one place to another," what do they more than put one synonymous word for
another? For what is passage other than motion? And if they were asked what passage was, how
would they better define it than by motion? For is it not at least as proper and significant to say,
Passage is a motion from one place to another, as to say, Motion is a passage, etc.? This is to
translate, and not to define, when we change two words of the same signification one for another;
which, when one is better understood than the other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown
stands for; but is very far from a definition, unless we will say every English word in the dictionary is
the definition of the Latin word it answers, and that motion is a definition of motus. Nor will the
"successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another," which the
Cartesians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well examined.
10. Definitions of light. "The act of perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous," is another Peripatetic
definition of a simple idea; which, though not more absurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its
uselessness and insignificancy more plainly; because experience will easily convince any one that it
cannot make the meaning of the word light (which it pretends to define) at all understood by a blind
man, but the definition of motion appears not at first sight so useless, because it escapes this way of
trial. For this simple idea, entering by the touch as well as sight, it is impossible to show an example
of any one who has no other way to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that name.
Those who tell us that light is a great number of little globules, striking briskly on the bottom of the
eye, speak more intelligibly than the Schools: but yet these words never so well understood would
make the idea the word light stands for no more known to a man that understands it not before, than
if one should tell him that light was nothing but a company of little tennis-balls, which fairies all day
long struck with rackets against some men's foreheads, whilst they passed by others. For granting
this explication of the thing to be true, yet the idea of the cause of light, if we had it never so exact,
would no more give us the idea of light itself, as it is such a particular perception in us, than the idea
of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel would give us the idea of that pain which it is able
to cause in us. For the cause of any sensation, and the sensation itself, in all the simple ideas of
one sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different and distant one from another, that no two can
be more so. And therefore, should Descartes's globules strike never so long on the retina of a man
who was blind by a gutta serena, he would thereby never have any idea of light, or anything
approaching it, though he understood never so well what little globules were, and what striking on
another body was. And therefore the Cartesians very well distinguish between that light which is the
cause of that sensation in us, and the idea which is produced in us by it, and is that which is
properly light.
11. Simple ideas, why undefinable, further explained. Simple ideas, as has been shown, are only to
be got by those impressions objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed
to each sort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the world, made use of to explain or
define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it stands for. For, words being
sounds, can produce in us no other simple ideas than of those very sounds; nor excite any in us, but
by that voluntary connexion which is known to be between them and those simple ideas which
common use has made them the signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any words can give
him the taste of a pine-apple, and make him have the true idea of the relish of that celebrated
delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes whereof he has the ideas
already in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, not strangers to his palate, so far may
he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but
exciting in us other simple ideas by their known names; which will be still very different from the true
taste of that fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing: for the
signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no definition of light or
redness is more fitted or able to produce either of those ideas in us, than the sound light or red, by
itself. For, to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound, however formed, is to expect
that sounds should be visible, or colours audible; and to make the ears do the office of all the other
senses. Which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears: a sort of
philosophy worthy only of Sancho Panza, who had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay. And
therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which
any word stands for, can never come to know the signification of that word by any other words or
sounds whatsoever, put together according to any rules of definition. The only way is, by applying to
his senses the proper object; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the name
already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, and made use
of the explication of his books and friends, to understand those names of light and colours which
often came in his way, bragged one day, That he now understood what scarlet signified. Upon
which, his friend demanding what scarlet was? The blind man answered, It was like the sound of a
trumpet. Just such an understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have, who hopes
to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to explain it.
12. The contrary shown in complex ideas, by instances of a statue and rainbow. The case is quite
otherwise in complex ideas; which, consisting of several simple ones, it is in the power of words,
standing for the several ideas that make that composition, to imprint complex ideas in the mind
which were never there before, and so make their names be understood. In such collections of
ideas, passing under one name, definition, or the teaching the signification of one word by several
others, has place, and may make us understand the names of things which never came within the
reach of our senses; and frame ideas suitable to those in other men's minds, when they use those
names: provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas, which he
to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his thought. Thus the word statue may be
explained to a blind man by other words, when picture cannot; his senses having given him the idea
of figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the
painter against the statuary: each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary
bragging that his was to be preferred, because it reached further, and even those who had lost their
eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it. The painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a
blind man; who being brought where there was a statue made by the one, and a picture drawn by
the other; he was first led to the statue, in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the
face and body, and with great admiration applauded the skill of the workman. But being led to the
picture, and having his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head, and then the
forehead, eyes, nose, etc., as his hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without
finding any the least distinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a very
admirable and divine piece of workmanship, which could represent to them all those parts, where he
could neither feel nor perceive anything.
13. Colours indefinable to the born-blind. He that should use the word rainbow to one who knew all
those colours, but yet had never seen that phenomenon, would, by enumerating the figure,
largeness, position, and order of the colours, so well define that word that it might be perfectly
understood. But yet that definition, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind man
understand it; because several of the simple ideas that make that complex one, being such as he
never received by sensation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.
14. Complex ideas definable only when the simple ideas of which they consist have been got from
experience. Simple ideas, as has been shown, can only be got by experience from those objects
which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When, by this means, we have our minds
stored with them, and know the names for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by
definition to understand, the names of complex ideas that are made up of them. But when any term
stands for a simple idea that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impossible by any words to
make known its meaning to him. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is
ignorant that that term is the sign of it, then another name of the same idea, which he has been
accustomed to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name of
any simple idea capable of a definition.
15. Names of simple ideas of less doubtful meaning than those of mixed modes and substances.
Fourthly, But though the names of simple ideas have not the help of definition to determine their
signification, yet that hinders not but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain than those
of mixed modes and substances; because they, standing only for one simple perception, men for
the most part easily and perfectly agree in their signification; and there is little room for mistake and
wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that whiteness is the name of that colour he has
observed in snow or milk, will not be apt to misapply that word, as long as he retains that idea;
which when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he
understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together, which makes the
doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a supposed, but an unknown, real essence, with
properties depending thereon, the precise number whereof is also unknown, which makes the
difficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simple ideas the whole signification of
the name is known at once, and consists not of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea
may be varied, and so the signification of name be obscure, or uncertain.
16. Simple ideas have few ascents in linea praedicamentali. Fifthly, This further may be observed
concerning simple ideas and their names, that they have but few ascents in linea praedicamentali,
(as they call it,) from the lowest species to the summum genus. The reason whereof is, that the
lowest species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it, that so the difference being
taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one idea common to them both; which, having
one name, is the genus of the other two: v.g. there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white
and red to make them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; as
rationality being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree with brute in the more general
idea and name of animal. And therefore when, to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would
comprehend both white and red, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name,
they have been fain to do it by a word which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when
white, red, and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name colour, it signifies no more
but such ideas as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only through the
eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term to comprehend both colours and sounds,
and the like simple ideas, they do it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by
one sense. And so the general term quality, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours,
sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qualities, with distinction from extension, number, motion,
pleasure, and pain, which make impressions on the mind and introduce their ideas by more senses
than one.
17. Names of simple ideas not arbitrary, but perfectly taken from the existence of things. Sixthly,
The names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed modes have also this difference: that those of
mixed modes stand for ideas perfectly arbitrary; those of substances are not perfectly so, but refer
to a pattern, though with some latitude; and those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the
existence of things, and are not arbitrary at an. Which, what difference it makes in the significations
of their names, we shall see in the following chapters.
Simple modes. The names of simple modes differ little from those of simple ideas.