1. Woeful abuse of words. Besides the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the obscurity
and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several wilful faults and
neglects which men are guilty of in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs less
clear and distinct in their signification than naturally they need to be.
2. Words are often employed without any, or without clear ideas. First, In this kind the first and most
palpable abuse is, the using of words without clear and distinct ideas; or, which is worse, signs
without anything signified. Of these there are two sorts:--
I. Some words introduced without clear ideas annexed to them, even in their first original. One may
observe, in all languages, certain words that, if they be examined, will be found in their first original,
and their appropriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas. These, for the most part, the
several sects of philosophy and religion have introduced. For their authors or promoters, either
affecting something singular, and out of the way of common apprehensions, or to support some
strange opinions, or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to coin new words, and
such as, when they come to be examined, may justly be called insignificant terms. For, having either
had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them when they were first invented; or at least
such as, if well examined, will be found inconsistent, it is no wonder, if, afterwards, in the vulgar use
of the same party, they remain empty sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think
it enough to have them often in their mouths, as the distinguishing characters of their Church or
School, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. I
shall not need here to heap up instances; every man's reading and conversation will sufficiently
furnish him. Or if he wants to be better stored, the great mintmasters of this kind of terms, I mean
the Schoolmen and Metaphysicians (under which I think the disputing natural and moral
philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content
him.
3. II. Other words, to which ideas were annexed at first, used afterwards without distinct meanings.
Others there be who extend this abuse yet further, who take so little care to lay by words, which, in
their primary notation have scarce any clear and distinct ideas which they are annexed to, that, by
an unpardonable negligence, they familiarly use words which the propriety of language has affixed
to very important ideas, without any distinct meaning at all. Wisdom, glory, grace, etc., are words
frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many of those who use them should be asked
what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer: a plain proof, that,
though they have learned those sounds, and have them ready at their tongues ends, yet there are
no determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed to others by them.
4. This occasioned by men learning names before they have the ideas the names belong to. Men
having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words which are easily got and retained, before
they knew or had framed the complex ideas to which they were annexed, or which were to be found
in the things they were thought to stand for, they usually continue to do so all their lives; and without
taking the pains necessary to settle in their minds determined ideas, they use their words for such
unsteady and confused notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same words other
people use; as if their very sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning. This,
though men make a shift with in the ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it necessary to be
understood, and therefore they make signs till they are so; yet this insignificancy in their words,
when they come to reason concerning either their tenets or interest, manifestly fills their discourse
with abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon, especially in moral matters, where the
words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas, not regularly and
permanently united in nature, their bare sounds are often only thought on, or at least very obscure
and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words they find in use amongst their
neighbors; and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without
much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning; whereby, besides the ease of it, they
obtain this advantage, That, as in such discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as
seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong; it being al one to go about to draw those men
out of their mistakes who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation who
has no settled abode. This I guess to be so; and every one may observe in himself and others
whether it be so or not.
5. Unsteady application of them. Secondly, Another great abuse of words is inconstancy in the use
of them. It is hard to find a discourse written on any subject, especially of controversy, wherein one
shall not observe, if he read with attention, the same words (and those commonly the most material
in the discourse, and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one collection of simple
ideas, and sometimes for another; which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for
signs of my ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but by a voluntary
imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing and
sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater
dishonesty. And a man, in his accounts with another may, with as much fairness make the
characters of numbers stand sometimes for one and sometimes for another collection of units: v.g.
this character 3, stand sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight, as in his
discourse or reasoning make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas. If men
should do so in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak
thus in the affairs and business of the world, and call 8 sometimes seven, and sometimes nine, as
best served his advantage, would presently have clapped upon him, one of the two names men are
commonly disgusted with. And yet in arguings and learned contests, the same sort of proceedings
passes commonly for wit and learning; but to me it appears a greater dishonesty than the
misplacing of counters in the casting up a debt; and the cheat the greater, by how much truth is of
greater concernment and value than money.
6. III. Affected obscurity, as in the Peripatetick and other sects of philosophy. Thirdly, Another abuse
of language is an affected obscurity; by either applying old words to new and unusual significations;
or introducing new and ambiguous terms, without defining either; or else putting them so together,
as may confound their ordinary meaning. Though the Peripatetick philosophy has been most
eminent in this way, yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it. There are scarce any of them
that are not cumbered with some difficulties (such is the imperfection of human knowledge,) which
they have been fain to cover with obscurity of terms, and to confound the signification of words,
which, like a mist before people's eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being discovered. That
body and extension in common use, stand for two distinct ideas, is plain to any one that will but
reflect a little. For were their signification precisely the same, it would be as proper, and as
intelligible to say, "the body of an extension," as the "extension of a body"; and yet there are those
who find it necessary to confound their signification. To this abuse, and the mischiefs of
confounding the signification of words, logic, and the liberal sciences as they have been handled in
the schools, have given reputation; and the admired Art of Disputing hath added much to the natural
imperfection of languages, whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the signification of
words, more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things: and he that will look into that sort of
learned writings, will find the words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in their
meaning, than they are in ordinary conversation.
7. Logic and dispute have much contributed to this. This is unavoidably to be so, where men's parts
and learning are estimated by their skill in disputing. And if reputation and reward shall attend these
conquests, which depend mostly on the fineness and niceties of words, it is no wonder if the wit of
man so employed, should perplex, involve, and subtilize the signification of sounds, so as never to
want something to say in opposing or defending any question; the victory being adjudged not to him
who had truth on his side, but the last word in the dispute.
8. Calling it "subtlety." This, though a very useless skin, and that which I think the direct opposite to
the ways of knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and esteemed names of
subtlety and acuteness, and has had the applause of the schools, and encouragement of one part
of the learned men of the world. And no wonder, since the philosophers of old, (the disputing and
wrangling philosophers I mean, such as Lucian wittily and with reason taxes), and the Schoolmen
since, aiming at glory and esteem, for their great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal to be
pretended to than really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance, with a
curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themselves the admiration of
others, by unintelligible terms, the apter to produce wonder because they could not be understood:
whilst it appears in all history, that these profound doctors were no wiser nor more useful than their
neighbours, and brought but small advantage to human life or the societies wherein they lived:
unless the coining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply them to, or the
perplexing or obscuring the signification of old ones, and so bringing all things into question and
dispute, were a thing profitable to the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward.
9. This learning very little benefits society. For, notwithstanding these learned disputants, these all-
knowing doctors, it was to the unscholastic statesman that the governments of the world owed their
peace, defence, and liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned mechanic (a name of disgrace)
that they received the improvements of useful arts. Nevertheless, this artificial ignorance, and
learned gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last ages, by the interest and artifice of those who
found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusing the
men of business, and ignorant, with hard words, or employing the ingenious and idle in intricate
disputes about unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth.
Besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange and absurd doctrines,
as to guard them round about with legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined words. Which yet
make these retreats more like the dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortresses of fair
warriors: which, if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the strength that is in them, but the briars
and thorns, and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with. For untruth being unacceptable to
the mind of man, there is no other defence left for absurdity but obscurity.
10. But destroys the instruments of knowledge and communication. Thus learned ignorance, and
this art of keeping even inquisitive men from true knowledge, hath been propagated in the world,
and hath much perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the understanding. For we see that other
well-meaning and wise men, whose education and parts had not acquired that acuteness, could
intelligibly express themselves to one another; and in its plain use make a benefit of language. But
though unlearned men well enough understood the words white and black, etc., and had constant
notions of the ideas signified by those words; yet there were philosophers found who had learning
and subtlety enough to prove that snow was black; i.e., to prove that white was black. Whereby they
had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse, conversation, instruction,
and society; whilst, with great art and subtlety, they did no more but perplex and confound the
signification of words, and thereby render language less useful than the real defects of it had made
it; a gift which the illiterate had not attained to.
11. As useful as to confound the sounds that the letters of the alphabet stand for. These learned
men did equally instruct men's understandings, and profit their lives, as he who should alter the
signification of known characters, and, by a subtle device of learning, far surpassing the capacity of
the illiterate, dull, and vulgar, should in his writing show that he could put A for B, and D for E, etc.,
to the no small admiration and benefit of his reader. It being as senseless to put black, which is a
word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea, to put it, I say, for another, or the contrary idea; i.e.,
to call snow black, as to put this mark A, which is a character agreed on to stand for one
modification of sound, made by a certain motion of the organs of speech, for B, which is agreed on
to stand for another modification of sound, made by another certain mode of the organs of speech.
12. This art has perplexed religion and justice. Nor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties, or
curious empty speculations; it hath invaded the great concernments of human life and society;
obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity; brought confusion, disorder, and
uncertainty into the affairs of mankind; and if not destroyed, yet in a great measure rendered
useless, these two great rules, religion and justice. What have the greatest part of the comments
and disputes upon the laws of God and man served for, but to make the meaning more doubtful,
and perplex the sense? What have been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions, and
acute niceties, but obscurity and uncertainty, leaving the words more unintelligible, and the reader
more at a loss? How else comes it to pass that princes, speaking or writing to their servants, in their
ordinary commands are easily understood; speaking to their people, in their laws, are not so? And,
as I remarked before, doth it not often happen that a man of an ordinary capacity very well
understands a text, or a law, that he reads, till he consults an expositor, or goes to counsel; who, by
that time he hath done explaining them, makes the words signify either nothing at all, or what he
pleases.
13 And ought not to pass for learning. Whether any by-interests of these professions have
occasioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be considered, whether it would not be well
for mankind, whose concernment it is to know things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not
to spend their lives in talking about them, or tossing words to and fro;--whether it would not be well, I
say, that the use of words were made plain and direct; and that language, which was given us for
the improvement of knowledge and bond of society, should not be employed to darken truth and
unsettle people's rights; to raise mists, and render unintelligible both morality and religion? Or that at
least, if this will happen, it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so?
14. IV. By taking words for things. Fourthly, Another great abuse of words, is the taking them for
things. This, though it in some degree concerns all names in general, yet more particularly affects
those of substances. To this abuse those men are most subject who most confine their thoughts to
anyone system, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received
hypothesis: whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of that sect are so suited to the
nature of things, that they perfectly correspond with their real existence. Who is there that has been
bred up in the Peripatetick philosophy, who does not think the Ten Names, under which are ranked
the Ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of things? Who is there of that
school that is not persuaded that substantial forms, vegetative souls, abhorrence of a vacuum,
intentional species, etc., are something real? These words men have learned from their very
entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them:
and therefore they cannot quit the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the
representations of something that really exists. The Platonists have their soul of the world, and the
Epicureans their endeavour towards motion in their atoms when at rest. There is scarce any sect in
philosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others understand not. But yet this gibberish, which, in
the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their
errors, comes, by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe, to seem the most important part of
language, and of all other the terms the most significant: and should aerial and aetherial vehicles
come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received anywhere, no doubt those
terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the
reality of such things, as much as Peripatetick forms and intentional species have heretofore done.
15. Instance, in matter. How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding, the
attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover; and that perhaps in words little
suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one. How many
intricate disputes have there been about matter, as if there were some such thing really in nature,
distinct from body; as it is evident the word matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body?
For if the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all
places be put for one another. But we see that though it be proper to say, There is one matter of all
bodies, one cannot say, There is one body of all matters: we familiarly say one body is bigger than
another; but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say one matter is bigger than another.
Whence comes this, then? Viz., from hence: that, though matter and body be not really distinct, but
wherever there is the one there is the other; yet matter and body stand for two different conceptions,
whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. For body stands for a solid extended
figured substance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confused conception; it seeming to me
to be used for the substance and solidity of body, without taking in its extension and figure: and
therefore it is that, speaking of matter, we speak of it always as one, because in truth it expressly
contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is everywhere the same, everywhere
uniform. This being our idea of matter, we no more conceive or speak of different matters in the
world than we do of different solidities; though we both conceive and speak of different bodies,
because extension and figure are capable of variation. But, since solidity cannot exist without
extension and figure, the taking matter to be the name of something really existing under that
precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes, which
have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning materia prima; which imperfection or
abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general terms I leave to be considered. This, I
think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words
were taken for what they are, the signs of our ideas only; and not for things themselves. For, when
we argue about matter, or any the like term, we truly argue only about the idea we express by that
sound, whether that precise idea agree to anything really existing in nature or no. And if men would
tell what ideas they make their words stand for, there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling in
the search or support of truth that there is.
16. This makes errors lasting. But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I
am sure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of
things. It would be a hard matter to persuade any one that the words which his father, or
schoolmaster, the parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothing that really
existed in nature: which perhaps is none of the least causes that men are so hardly drawn to quit
their mistakes, even in opinions purely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but
truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no
wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them should not be removed.
17. V. By setting them in the place of what they cannot signify. Fifthly Another abuse of words is the
setting them in the place of things which they do or can by no means signify. We may observe that
in the general names of substances whereof the nominal essences are only known to us when we
put them into propositions, and affirm or deny anything about them, we do most commonly tacitly
suppose or intend, they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances. For, when
a man says gold is malleable, he means and would insinuate something more than this. That what I
call gold is malleable, (though truly it amounts to no more,) but would have this understood, viz.,
That gold, i.e., what has the real essence of gold, is malleable; which amounts to thus much, that
malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real essence of gold. But a man, not
knowing wherein that real essence consists, the connexion in his mind of malleableness is not truly
with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound gold he puts for it. Thus, when we say that
animal rationale is, and animal implume bipes latis unguibus is not a good definition of a man; it is
plain we suppose the name man in this case to stand for the real essence of a species, and would
signify that "a rational animal" better described that real essence than "a two-legged animal with
broad nails, and without feathers." For else, why might not Plato as properly make the word
anthropos, or man, stand for his complex idea, made up of the idea of a body, distinguished from
others by a certain shape and other outward appearances, as Aristotle make the complex idea to
which he gave the name anthropos, or man, of body and the faculty of reasoning joined together;
unless the name anthropos, or man, were supposed to stand for something else than what it
signifies; and to be put in the place of some other thing than the idea a man professes he would
express by it?
18. V.g. Putting them for the real essences of substances. It is true the names of substances would
be much more useful, and propositions made in them much more certain, were the real essences of
substances the ideas in our minds which those words signified. And it is for want of those real
essences that our words convey so little knowledge or certainty in our discourses about them; and
therefore the mind, to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a secret
supposition, to stand for a thing having that real essence, as if thereby it made some nearer
approaches to it. For, though the word man or gold signify nothing truly but a complex idea of
properties united together in one sort of substances; yet there is scarce anybody, in the use of these
words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real essence on
which these properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that
by a plain abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something, which, not being in
our complex idea, the name we use can no ways be the sign of.
19. Hence we think change of our complex ideas of substances not to change their species. This
shows us the reason why in mixed modes any of the ideas that make the composition of the
complex one being left out or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, i.e., to be of another
species, as is plain in chance-medley, manslaughter, murder, parricide, etc. The reason whereof is,
because the complex idea signified by that name is the real as well as nominal essence; and there
is no secret reference of that name to any other essence but that. But in substances, it is not so. For
though in that called gold, one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out, and vice versa:
yet men do