idea which common usage calls mule, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. He that thinks
the name centaur stands for some real being, imposes on himself, and mistakes words for things.
33. How when they stand for modes and relations. In Modes and Relations generally, we are liable
only to the four first of these inconveniences; viz., 1. I may have in my memory the names of modes,
as gratitude or charity, and yet not have any precise ideas annexed in my thoughts to those names.
2. I may have ideas, and not know the names that belong to them: v.g. I may have the idea of a
man's drinking till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look red, and
his feet fail him; and yet not know that it is to be called drunkenness. 3. I may have the ideas of
virtues or vices, and names also, but apply them amiss: v.g. when I apply the name frugality to that
idea which others call and signify by this sound, covetousness. 4. I may use any of those names
with inconstancy. 5. But, in modes and relations, I cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence of
things: for modes being complex ideas, made by the mind at pleasure, and relation being but by
way of considering or comparing two things together, and so also an idea of my own making, these
ideas can scarce be found to disagree with anything existing; since they are not in the mind as the
copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as properties inseparably flowing from the internal
constitution or essence of any substance; but, as it were, patterns lodged in my memory, with
names annexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they come to exist. But the
mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my conceptions; and so using words in a
different sense from other people: I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong ideas of
them, when I give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of mixed modes or relations any
inconsistent ideas together, I fill my head also with chimeras; since such ideas, if well examined,
cannot so much as exist in the mind, much less any real being ever be denominated from them.
34. Seventhly, language is often abused by figurative speech. Since wit and fancy find easier
entertainment in the world than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative speeches and allusion in
language will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in discourses where we
seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement, such ornaments as are
borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we
must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; all the artificial and figurative
application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas,
move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats: and
therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular
addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be
avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either
of the language or person that makes use of them. What and how various they are, will be
superfluous here to take notice; the books of rhetoric which abound in the world, will instruct those
who want to be informed: only I cannot but observe how little the preservation and improvement of
truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind; since the arts of fallacy are endowed and
preferred. It is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful
instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publicly taught, and has always
been had in great reputation: and I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality, in
me to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to
suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving,
wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.
Chapter XI
Of the Remedies of the Foregoing Imperfections and Abuses of Words
1. Remedies are worth seeking The natural and improved imperfections of languages we have seen
above at large: and speech being the great bond that holds society together, and the common
conduit, whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man and one generation
to another, it would well deserve our most serious thoughts to consider, what remedies are to be
found for the inconveniences above mentioned.
2. Are not easy to find. I am not so vain as to think that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect
reforming the languages of the world, no not so much as of his own country, without rendering
himself ridiculous. To require that men should use their words constantly in the same sense, and for
none but determined and uniform ideas, would be to think that all men should have the same
notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct ideas of: which is not to be
expected by any one who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very
knowing or very silent And he must be very little skilled in the world, who thinks that a voluble
tongue shall accompany only a good understanding; or that men's talking much or little should hold
proportion only to their knowledge.
3. But yet necessary to those who search after truth. But though the market and exchange must be
left to their own ways of talking, and gossipings not be robbed of their ancient privilege: though the
schools, and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss to have anything offered, to abate the
length or lessen the number of their disputes; yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search
after or maintain truth, should think themselves obliged to study how they might deliver themselves
without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equivocation, to which men's words are naturally liable, if care be
not taken.
4. Misuse of words the great cause of errors. For he that shall well consider the errors and obscurity,
the mistakes and confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, will find some reason
to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or
hindrance of knowledge amongst mankind. How many are there, that, when they would think on
things, fix their thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply their minds to moral
matters? And who then can wonder if the result of such contemplations and reasonings, about little
more than sounds, whilst the ideas they annex to them are very confused and very unsteady, or
perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing but
obscurity and mistake, without any clear judgment or knowledge?
5. Has made men more conceited and obstinate. This inconvenience, in an ill use of words, men
suffer in their own private meditations: but much more manifest are the disorders which follow from
it, in conversation, discourse, and arguings with others. For language being the great conduit,
whereby men convey their discoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that
makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge, which are in things
themselves, yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to
the public use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words without any clear and steady
meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors? And he that designedly does it,
ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder that all the
sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure and equivocal terms, and
insignificant and doubtful expressions, capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted very
little, or not at all, the more knowing or orthodox: since subtlety, in those who make profession to
teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue: a virtue, indeed, which, consisting for the
most part in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fit to
make men more conceited in their ignorance, and more obstinate in their errors.
6. Addicted to wrangling about sounds. Let us look into the books of controversy of any kind, there
we shall see that the effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal terms is nothing but noise and
wrangling about sounds, without convincing or bettering a man's understanding. For if the idea be
not agreed on, betwixt the speaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument is not about
things, but names. As often as such a word whose signification is not ascertained betwixt them,
comes in use, their understandings have no other object wherein they agree, but barely the sound;
the things that they think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being quite different.
7. Instance, bat and bird. Whether a bat be a bird or no, is not a question, Whether a bat be another
thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it has; for that would be extremely absurd
to doubt of. But the question is, (1) Either between those that acknowledged themselves to have but
imperfect ideas of one or both of this sort of things, for which these names are supposed to stand.
And then it is a real inquiry concerning the nature of a bird or a bat, to make their yet imperfect ideas
of it more complete; by examining whether all the simple ideas to which, combined together, they
both give the name bird, be all to be found in a bat: but this is a question only of inquirers (not
disputers) who neither affirm nor deny, but examine: Or, (2) It is a question between disputants;
whereof the one affirms, and the other denies that a bat is a bird. And then the question is barely
about the signification of one or both these words; in that they not having both the same complex
ideas to which they give these two names, one holds and the other denies, that these two names
may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the signification of these two names, it were
impossible they should dispute about them. For they would presently and clearly see (were that
adjusted between them), whether all the simple ideas of the more general name bird were found in
the complex idea of a bat or no; and so there could be no doubt whether a bat were a bird or no.
And here I desire it may be considered, and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the
disputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the signification of words; and whether, if the
terms they are made in were defined, and reduced in their signification (as they must be where they
signify anything) to determined collections of the simple ideas they do or should stand for, those
disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish. I leave it then to be considered,
what the learning of disputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of themselves
or others, whose business is only the vain ostentation of sounds; i.e., those who spend their lives in
disputes and controversies. When I shall see any of those combatants strip all his terms of
ambiguity and obscurity, (which every one may do in the words he uses himself), I shall think him a
champion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the slave of vain-glory, ambition, or a party.
8. Remedies. To remedy the defects of speech before mentioned to some degree, and to prevent
the inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the observation of these following rules may be
of use, till somebody better able shall judge it worth his while to think more maturely on this matter,
and oblige the world with his thoughts on it.
First remedy: To use no word without an idea annexed to it. First, A man shall take care to use no
word without a signification, no name without an idea for which he makes it stand. This rule will not
seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with
such words as instinct, sympathy, and antipathy, etc., in the discourse of others, so made use of as
he might easily conclude that those that used them had no ideas in their minds to which they
applied them, but spoke them only as sounds, which usually served instead of reasons on the like
occasions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper significations in which they may
be used; but there being no natural connexion between any words and any ideas, these, and any
other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men who have no ideas in their minds to
which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary they
should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.
9. Second remedy: To have distinct, determinate ideas annexed to words, especially in mixed
modes. Secondly, It is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some ideas: those he annexes
them to, if they be simple, must be clear and distinct; if complex, must be determinate, i.e., the
precise collection of simple ideas settled in the mind, with that sound annexed to it, as the sign of
that precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessary in names of modes, and
especially moral words; which, having no settled objects in nature, from whence their ideas are
taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confused. Justice is a word in every man's mouth, but
most commonly with a very undertermined, loose signification; which will always be so, unless a
man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of:
and if it be decompounded, must be able to resolve it still on, till he at last comes to the simple ideas
that make it up: and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be justice, for
example, or any other. I do not say, a man needs stand to recollect, and make this analysis at large,
every time the word justice comes in his way: but this at least is necessary, that he have so
examined the signification of that name, and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind, that he can
do it when he pleases. If any one who makes his complex idea of justice to be, such a treatment of
the person or goods of another as is according to law, hath not a clear and distinct idea what law is,
which makes a part of his complex idea of justice, it is plain his idea of justice itself will be confused
and imperfect. This exactness will, perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men
will think they may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their
minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be wondered, that they have a great deal of
obscurity and confusion in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourse with
others.
10. And distinct and conformable ideas in words that stand for substances. In the names of
substances, for a right use of them, something more is required than barely determined ideas. In
these the names must also be conformable to things as they exist; but of this I shall have occasion
to speak more at large by and by. This exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after
philosophical knowledge, and in controversies about truth. And though it would be well, too, if it
extended itself to common conversation and the ordinary affairs of life; yet I think that is scarce to be
expected. Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses: and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty
well the market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal to
dispatch their ordinary affairs: and so, I think, might philosophers and disputants too, if they had a
mind to understand, and to be clearly understood.
11. Third remedy: To apply words to such ideas as common use has annexed them to. Thirdly, it is
not enough that men have ideas, determined ideas, for which they make these signs stand; but they
must also take care to apply their words as near as may be to such ideas as common use has
annexed them to. For words, especially of languages already framed, being no man's private
possession, but the common measure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one at
pleasure to change the stamp they are current in, nor alter the ideas they are affixed to; or at least,
when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. Men's intentions in speaking are,
or at least should be, to be understood; which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands,
and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common use. Propriety of
speech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds with the greatest ease and
advantage: and therefore deserves some part of our care and study, especially in the names of
moral words. The proper signification and use of terms is best to be learned from those who in their
writings and discourses appear to have had the clearest notions, and applied to them their terms
with the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man's words, according to the propriety of
the language, though it have not always the good fortune to be understood; yet most commonly
leaves the blame of it on him who is so unskilful in the language he speaks, as not to understand it
when made use of as it ought to be.
12. Fourth remedy: To declare the meaning in which we use them. Fourthly, But, because common
use has not so visibly annexed any signification to words, as to make men know always certainly
what they precisely stand for: and because men in the improvement of their knowledge, come to
have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either make
new words, (which men seldom venture to do, for fear of being though guilty of affectation or
novelty), or else must use old ones in a new signification: therefore, after the observation of the
foregoing rules, it is sometimes necessary, for the ascertaining the signification of words, to declare
their meaning; where either common use has left it uncertain and loose, (as it has in most names of
very complex ideas); or where the term, being very material in the discourse, and that upon which it
chiefly turns, is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake.
13. And that in three ways. As the ideas men's words stand for are of different sorts, so the way of
making known the ideas they stand for, when there is occasion, is also different. For though defining
be thought the proper way to make known the proper signification of words; yet there are some
words that will not be defined, as there are others whose precise meaning cannot be made known
but by definition: and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we shall see in
the names of simple ideas, modes, and substances.
14. I. In simple ideas, either by synonymous terms, or by showing examples. First, when a man
makes use of the name of any simple idea, which he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to
be mistaken, he is obliged, by the laws of ingenuity and the end of speech, to declare his meaning,
and make known what idea he makes it stand for. This, as has been shown, cannot be done by
definition: and therefore, when a synonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left.
First, Sometimes the naming the subject wherein that simple idea is to be found, will make its name
to be understood by those who are acquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So to
make a countryman understand what feuillemorte colour signifies, it may suffice to tel him, it is the
colour of withered leaves falling in autumn. Secondly, but the only sure way of making known the
signification of the name of any simple idea, is by presenting to his senses that subject which may
produce it in his mind, and make him actually have the idea that word stands for.
15. II. In mixed modes, by definition. Secondly, Mixed modes, especially those belonging to
morality, being most of them such combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of its own
choice, and whereof there are not always standing patterns to be found existing, the signification of
their names cannot be made known, as those of simple ideas, by any showing: but, in recompense
thereof, may be perfectly and exactly defined. For they being combinations of several ideas that the
mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they
please, exactly know the ideas that go to each composition, and so both use these words in a
certain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when there is occasion, what they stand
for. This, if well considered, would lay great blame on those who make not their discourses about
moral things very clear and distinct. For since the precise signification of the names of mixed
modes, or, which is all one, the real essence of each species is to be known, they being not of
nature's, but man's making, it is a great negligence and perverseness to discourse of moral things
with uncertainty and obscurity; which is more pardonable in treating of natural substances, where
doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary reason, as we shall see by and by.
16. Morality capable of demonstration. Upon this ground it is that I am bold to think that morality is
capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics: since the precise real essence of the things
moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so the congruity and incongruity of the things
themselves be certainly discovered; in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor let any one object,
that the names of substances are often to be made use of in morality, as well as those of modes,
from which will arise obscurity. For, as to substances, when concerned in moral discourses, their
divers natures are not so much inquired into as supposed: v.g. when we say that man is subject to
law, we mean nothing by man but a corporeal rational creature: what the real essence or other
qualities of that creature are in this case is no way considered. And, therefore, whether a child or
changeling be a man, in a physical sense, may amongst the naturalists be as disputable as it will, it
concerns not at al the moral man, as I may call him, which is this immovable, unchangeable idea, a
corporeal rational being. For, were there a monkey, or any other creature, to be found that had the
use of reason to such a degree, as to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce
consequences about general ideas, he would no doubt be subject to law, and in that sense be a
man, how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name. The names of substances, if
they be used in them as they should, can no more disturb moral than they do mathematical
discourses; where, if the mathematician speaks of a cube or globe of gold, or of any other body, he
has his clear, settled idea, which varies not, though it may by mistake be applied to a particular body
to which it belongs not.
17. Definitions can make moral discourses clear. This I have here mentioned, by the by, to show of
what consequence it is for men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in all their moral
discourses, to define their words when there is occasion: since thereby moral knowledge may be
brought to so great clearness and certainty. And it must be great want of ingenuousness (to say no
worse of it) to refuse to do it: since a definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of
moral words can be known; and yet a way whereby their meaning may be known certainly, and
without leaving any room for any contest about it. And therefore the negligence or perverseness of
mankind cannot be excused, if their discourses in morality be not much more clear than those in
natural philosophy: since they are about ideas in the mind, which are none of them false or
disproportionate; they having no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred to and
must correspond with. It is far easier for men to frame in their minds an idea, which shall be the
standard to which they will give the name justice; with which pattern so made, all actions that agree
shall pass under that denomination, than, having seen Aristides, to frame an idea that shall in all
things be exactly like him; who is as he is, let men make what idea they please of him. For the one,
they need but know the combination of ideas that are put together in their own minds; for the other,
they must inquire into the whole nature, and abstruse hidden constitution, and various qualities of a
thing existing without them.
18. And is the only way in which the meaning of mixed modes can be made known. Another reason
that makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary, especially of moral words, is what I
mentioned a little before, viz., that it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of them
can be known with certainty. For the ideas they stand for, being for the most part such whose
component parts nowhere exist together, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone
that collects them, and gives them the union of one idea: and it is only by words enumerating the
several simple ideas which the mind has united, that we can make known to others what their
names stand for; the assistance of the senses